Suchergebnisse

Habermas discusses the chances for the establishment of world citizenship in contemporary society, marked by multiculturalism and the process of globalization. Habermas identifies the historical configuration of the post-national constellation, and from there themed the transition from international law to the law of citizens of the world, which aligns the concept of citizenship to the idea of ​​human rights. Habermas analyzes the Kantian idea of ​​a cosmopolitan state in which citizens are legal subjects of their respective States and members of a cosmopolitan entity. Kant elaborates on the concept of world republic, which Habermas disagrees with, but offers the example of the European Union for a discussion on the realization of a just and peaceful international order. Based on the Kantian orientation of constituting an order of world citizenship, Habermas discusses the conformation and viability of this idea in contemporary times. For Habermas, it is possible to spell out the idea of ​​cosmopolitan citizenship. From the European Union, cooperation between States and citizens shows that a cosmopolitan community is needed to complement an international community of States.

Since it is imposed to thinking, deconstruction can be seen as a law, the Law itself. Deconstruction of law is to put it in the context of writing, to notice its submission to the différance, to the play in the language. The law of deconstruction acts in the deconstruction of law, revealing paradoxes and fragilities of juridical order, as well as concepts of natural law and human rights. Finally, deconstruction of law brings with it justice as undecidability, such as the obligation to make fair decisions, even when it is not possible to state the presence of justice. Law, writing and deconstruction converge then to justice, understood as the hospitality.

Com a finalidade de reinserir Cuba na discussao dos problemas internacionais, publicam-se nesta secao tres documentos. O primeiro e um artigo de um sociologo cubano sobre as transformacoes que estao ocorrendo na economia e na sociedade cubanas e sobre as suas implicacoes. O segundo documento e um pronunciamento do arcebispo de Boston a proposito da visita do Papa a Cuba, e que contem uma lucida critica aos que pretendem impor uma mudanca politica no pais "de fora para dentro". O terceiro documento, finalmente, e um artigo solicitado ao embaixador de Cuba no Brasil sobre a posicao da ilha no cenario internacional e que reflete, como nao poderia deixar de ser, a posicao oficial dos dirigentes cubanos. (Polit Externa/DÜI)

The paper aims to clarify the sense of contemporary fascism, particularly from the example of the Brazilian Bonsolarism, defining it as an anti-systemic, anti-institucional, anti-juridical and infralegal perspective with a personalist, devoted, voluntarist, spontaneous and militant character which starts from inside judiciary and in terms of subversion of the relation among law, politics and moral, and that, by means of politicization and partisanship of law, branches to the political system, serving as instrument to the fratricide political war among parties, from there linking to civil society in the form of constitution of a digital-social mass-militia of acclamation oriented to an anti-systemic posture. In this dynamic, the fascism has two constitutive and streamlining cores: on one side, it subverts the correlation of human rights and law, delegitimizing and truly destroying the ontogenetic primacy, the separation, the differentiation, the self-referentiality and the overposition of law in relation to politics and moral, as the subsidiarity of them regarding law; on other, it leads to the deconstruction from inside to judiciary and political system of the highly institutionalist, legalist, technical, formal and depersonalized perspective which is proper to them, eliminating the centrality of the judiciary and, them, delegitimizing its regulator role regarding to political system and to the social dialectics, normalizing the totalizing regression caused by political-moral colonization of the democratic law. By reconstructing the pluralist and universalist democracy's meta-normative and generative basis as a public system of law, that is, the co-originality of universality of human rights, pluralism and law, the condition of ontogenetic primacy, independence, self-subsistence and overposition of law in relation to politics and moral, as the subsidiarity of these regarding to law, we will point to the renewal of this systemic, systematic, procedural, mediated, instancial, progressive and publicized perspective of the public system of law, in the interrelation, separation and overposition of judiciary and political system, demarcated by a strong ideal of methodological-procedural-axiological institutionality, legality, technicality, formality and depersonalization, which eradicates the politicization and partisanship of law and, by devolving the complete integrality to law-judiciary, confines the democracy's political system and civil society to their true limits which are its structural basis: the human rights, the legal process and the public system of law, with the necessity of full translation of politics and moral to law, delimitating the pluralist and universalist democracy as a public system of law oriented to the production of universality in/as/by legality.

Discusses the judgement of General Augusto Pinochet and the jurisdiction of Spain over crimes of genocide, terrorism, and torture committed in Argentina and Chile in relation to questions of state sovereignty and diplomatic immunity under international law.

The present investigation strives to show Nietzsche's considerations about natural law. Since the German philosopher bases his thinking on an organicist conception, in principle one is led to think of a welcome and even a positive emphasis on natural law. However, in several passages of his writings Nietzsche is hostile towards natural law, mainly because it acts as a framework, measurement and calculation of the movement of nature. Natural law, for this reason, consists in falsifying nature. For, the legal mechanisms are imposed on the free action of nature, depriving it of its organic singularity to fit it in an artificial rationality. The free action of nature cannot be captured by rational framing mechanisms dictated by natural law. However, Nietzsche recognizes in the will to power a kind of natural law that acts on natural phenomena without constraining them, but leads them to the highest peaks of force.