Suchergebnisse

The reviewed book is devoted to understanding the meaning of justice in the context of justice. These concepts are studied in detail in the monograph. In addition, the norms of various branches of law are analyzed, ways of improving them are proposed to direct them towards a person and achieve justice, reasonableness, honesty

Monographic work of Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences M.I. Kleandrov is a fully meaningful and critical analysis of the previous experience of judicial activity in the system of arbitration courts and, finally, in the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Council of Judges of the Russian Federation, scientific activity as a chief researcher at the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, necessary to develop a new understanding of what new forms of fair justice should be. The solution of this problem, the author believes, is necessary in conditions of uncertainty of legal norms, within the framework of judicial discretion, with judicial law-making and rulemaking, the problems of evidence in court proceedings and in extreme situations (pandemics), solving problems related to the imposition of death sentences and the rapid introduction of artificial intelligence into judicial activity.

"Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht zum einen die wichtigsten Argumente in der Diskussion zwischen den Egalitariern und den Inegalitariern mit Blick auf die Fragestellung, wie das Verhältnis von Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit genau aussieht. Zum anderen werden auf der Grundlage der Untersuchung erste Überlegungen für einen eigenen Ansatz - wie man das Verhältnis von Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit verstehen sollte - angestellt." (Autorenreferat)

The defense of capitalism in America is rooted in a preference for the market's justice of earned deserts over the justices of equality and need associated with the polity. These preferences have structural roots in the way governments and markets serve different values and purposes, satisfy wants, focus on fairness or justice, enlist causal attributions, distribute or redistribute income, are limited by rights, and seem to offer either harmony or conflict of interest. Some of these "structural" differences, however, are themselves perceptual, and corrected by changed perceptions of the productivity of government and of our historic predecessors, and by a community point of view involving changed accounting systems, as well as by policies of full employment rather than guaranteed incomes. With few institutional changes, these altered perceptions may partially restore political justice to favor.

In the US today, there remain many unresolved issues related to race, in particular issues that are legacies of past injustices toward African Americans. This article argues that, in addressing these issues, we have much to learn from other societies that have undergone political transformations from regimes that systematically abuse human rights to regimes that respect, or at least purport to respect, human rights. These transitions have given rise to the idea of transitional justice, & to well-developed debates about what justice requires during such periods of transition. I argue (in the first section) that transitional justice usually requires the backward-looking measures of prosecution, reparation, & acknowledgement, & I further argue (in the following section) that by this standard the transformation that took place during the civil rights era in the US was unjust, or, at least, remains incomplete. In the final section of the article, I discuss measures that should be considered as ways of completing our transition to a racially just society. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract:Adam Smith argues that virtue falls into two broad categories: "justice," which he calls a "negative" virtue because it principally comprises restraint from harming or injuring others; and "beneficence," which he calls "positive" because it comprises the actions we ought to take to improve others' situations. Smith's conception of justice is thus quite "thin," and some critics argue that it is indeed too thin, since it fails to incorporate substantive concerns for the well-being of others. In this essay, I lay out Smith's conception of justice and offer a way to understand it that attempts to comprehend the various things he says about it. I then offer a cluster of objections drawing on criticisms that might fall under the heading of "social justice." Finally, I suggest how Smith might respond to the criticisms by outlining a Smithian conception of what I call "ultimate justice."

Ecological justice concerns the distribution of environments between life forms. This paper seeks to integrate this concept with Barry's theory of justice as impartiality. The latter aims to be a theory of justice that is impartial between substantive theories of the good. Issues of ecological justice are noted within Barry's theory, but are subsumed under one such substantive theory of the good, namely, ecocentrism. This subsumption of ecological justice under a substantive theory of the good turns out to imply that justice as impartiality on Barry's account is readily compatible with the extermination of other species -- if, for example, ecocentrism has few supporters. However, the concept of the "community of justice" can be separated from substantive conceptions of the good & used to develop a version of justice as impartiality, which builds ecological justice into its foundations, thereby making the justice of exterminations much harder to establish. Doing this requires pondering further the ideas of fairness & reasonable agreement in the contract situation, which is central to Barry's theory, & focusing upon the various "inarticulates" who are unable to defend their interests in contract situations. It is clear that justice as impartiality cannot avoid substantive moral dispute over such matters. 18 References. Adapted from the source document.

In the fields of planning theory and human geography, there is a growing discussion of the just city. The impression is that in order to continue the discussion of the crucial issue of the just city, certain methodological considerations and precautions are necessary. The article is focused on three in particular: (a) (urban) institutions as the first subject of justice, (b) the incomplete overlap between social justice and distributive justice, (c) the distinction between the concept and the conceptions of social justice. The impression is that these three issues are not always recognised, or at least not always to the fullest extent, in the current debate in planning theory.

AbstractThis symposium seeks to generate fresh theoretical thinking about the relations between justice and law. In particular, it aims to reappraise justice conceptually by insisting on a theoretical openness to justice within and beyond law, and indeed against law. The symposium's articles conceive justice and law both within their plurality and variety and in their own terms and relations. The symposium carries the inquiry into fields beyond defined categories so as to reveal some of the social, political, and ethical ideas, registers, and concealed forces at work and at stake in the domain of justice.

AbstractThis article reflects upon the ways in which transitional justice debates and processes impacted Tunisia's transition. It explores key questions such as what demands for justice emerged in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution? Did Tunisia's transitional justice process reflect these demands? And, did international norms of transitional justice, which emerged from a field of practice that draws heavily upon European, Latin America and Sub‐Saharan experiences, but has largely excluded the Arab Middle East, serve to mediate between competing demands for justice in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution? It will be argued that transitional justice demands in Tunisia reflected a breakdown in the state–society socioeconomic bargain, which had maintained autocratic regimes since independence in 1956; however, due to the elite‐centred nature of transitional justice discourses, many transitional justice demands never resonated into mainstream transitional justice discourse. We will argue that international transitional justice entrepreneurs' attempt to import a normative framework that was ill suited to grapple with the complex legacies of socioeconomic marginalization, resulted in a growing disillusionment and disengagement from the state driven transitional justice process on the part of Tunisian society.