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Positive law is two-dimensional: it has a justice (or ideal) dimension (and requisite) and a factual (or real) dimension (and requisite). Both are essential. Hence positive law lapses when either of the two is absent. In terms of the factual requisite, law remains in place as actual norms of law (unlike mere norm-formulations), provided that a minimum degree of effectiveness is maintained; that is to say, only as long as the subjects of the law consistently and voluntarily act in accordance with such norm/s, and provided further that deviant conduct is remedied by effective coercive measures. "Norm/s" that lose the factual dimension lapse into mere norm-formulations and no longer qualify as positive law. Thus viewed, a realistic grasp of the content of law is co-dependent on actual conduct, regardless of what the norm-formulations purport positive law to entail, because the norm-formulations may have lost track of the actual state of the law. Grasping the actual content of law, including constitutional law, therefore requires not only analysing the norm-formulations of the formally recognised sources of the law, but more specifically social and political observation which may reveal the following: (1) actual behaviour that closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation, in which case the formulations reliably happen to reflect (and by implication to describe) the actual state of law; or (2) conduct that regularly deviates from the norm-formulations (usus) by the deviators who deem themselves legally bound to act as they are acting(opinio iuris), in which case new (substituting) law has in fact come into being, without such substituting law being reflected in a new (amended) norm-formulation; or (3) large-scale but inconsistent and irregular deviant conduct where the deviators do not consider themselves legally bound to act in the various deviant ways, combined with haphazard enforcement, thus allowing deviators to get away with their transgressions. Unlike the first scenario, the purported norm (law) as reflected in the norm-formulations is in part unsettled but unlike as in the second scenario, no new norm (law) has come into being. A legal lacuna opens up - that is, an area not regulated by existing legal norms. Viewed from the perspective of the factual dimension, law, including constitutional law, is much more susceptible to the volatility of unpredictable changes and instability than what the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy purport it to be. The doctrine holds law (and the constitution) to be formulation driven, and therefore formal-static in nature, in that the law remains essentially static until the norm-formulations (the text) are amended in terms of the prescribed amendment procedures prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy fail to account for the factual dimension which causes it (the doctrine) to obscure the inner workings of the factual dimension of law, and therefore acts as a hindrance to understanding the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.

Positive law is two-dimensional: it has a justice (or ideal) dimension (and requisite) and a factual (or real) dimension (and requisite). Both are essential. Hence positive law lapses when either of the two is absent. In terms of the factual requisite, law remains in place as actual norms of law (unlike mere norm-formulations), provided that a minimum degree of effectiveness is maintained; that is to say, only as long as the subjects of the law consistently and voluntarily act in accordance with such norm/s, and provided further that deviant conduct is remedied by effective coercive measures. "Norm/s" that lose the factual dimension lapse into mere norm-formulations and no longer qualify as positive law. Thus viewed, a realistic grasp of the content of law is co-dependent on actual conduct, regardless of what the norm-formulations purport positive law to entail, because the norm-formulations may have lost track of the actual state of the law. Grasping the actual content of law, including constitutional law, therefore requires not only analysing the norm-formulations of the formally recognised sources of the law, but more specifically social and political observation which may reveal the following: (1) actual behaviour that closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation, in which case the formulations reliably happen to reflect (and by implication to describe) the actual state of law; or (2) conduct that regularly deviates from the norm-formulations (usus) by the deviators who deem themselves legally bound to act as they are acting (opinio iuris), in which case new (substituting) law has in fact come into being, without such substituting law being reflected in a new (amended) norm-formulation; or (3) large-scale but inconsistent and irregular deviant conduct where the deviators do not consider themselves legally bound to act in the various deviant ways, combined with haphazard enforcement, thus allowing deviators to get away with their transgressions. Unlike the first scenario, the purported norm (law) as reflected in the norm-formulations is in part unsettled but unlike as in the second scenario, no new norm (law) has come into being. A legal lacuna opens up - that is, an area not regulated by existing legal norms. Viewed from the perspective of the factual dimension, law, including constitutional law, is much more susceptible to the volatility of unpredictable changes and instability than what the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy purport it to be. The doctrine holds law (and the constitution) to be formulation driven, and therefore formal-static in nature, in that the law remains essentially static until the norm-formulations (the text) are amended in terms of the prescribed amendment procedures prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy fail to account for the factual dimension which causes it (the doctrine) to obscure the inner workings of the factual dimension of law, and therefore acts as a hindrance to understanding the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.

Thinking about justice -- The possibility of a justice convention -- The justice convention continued: Deliberating about the proper scope of public protection -- The justice convention continued: Deliberating about the appropriate response to wrongdoing -- The justice convention continued: Deliberating about criminal procedure -- The justice convention concluded: Deliberating about equality -- From natural law to human rights -- Nuremberg and beyond: the creation oa a system of international criminal justice -- Transitional justice: New democracies grapple with their past -- The right to be let alone: determining the scope of personal freedom -- Justice in a lifeboat: Thinking about life-life tradeoffs -- Restorative justice: A challenge to the currrent system of criminal justice -- Sentencing offenders in noncapital cases -- Sentencing offenders in capital cases: The death penalty -- Justice and mercy.

In this pathbreaking and provocative analysis of the aesthetics of law, the historian, legal theorist, and musician Desmond Manderson argues that by treating a text, legal or otherwise, as if it were merely a sequence of logical propositions, readers miss its formal and symbolic meanings. Creatively using music as a model, he demonstrates that law is not a sterile, rational structure, but a cultural form to be valued and enhanced through rhetoric and metaphors, form, images, and symbols. To further develop this argument, the book is divided into chapters, each of which is based on a different

I. Law, Ideology and Punishment -- 1. Introduction: Critique and Retrieval of the Liberal Ideal of Criminal Justice -- 2. Between Appearance and Reality: the Contradictions of Legal Ideology -- 3. Juridical Ideology and the Philosophy of Punishment -- II. The Birth of Juridical Individualism: Hobbes and the Philosophy of Punishment -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Contradiction in the Hobbesian Philosophy of Punishment -- 3. Hobbes's Juridical Individualism -- 4. Hobbes and the Historical Development of the Philosophy of Punishment -- 5. Conclusion -- III. Purifying Juridical Individualism: Kant's Retributivism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Metaphysical Basis of Punishment -- 3. 'A Theory Built on Tension' -- 4. Conclusion: Kant's Juridical Individualism -- IV. Rationalising Juridical Individualism — and the Rise of 'the Irrational': Hegel -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Hegelian Justification of Punishment -- 3.'From the Point of View of Abstract Right' -- 4. Reason, Reality and the Irruption of 'the Irrational' -- 5. Conclusion -- V. Abstract Right and the Socialisation of Wrong: Retributivism's English Decline and Fall -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Revising the Classical Tradition:T.H.Green -- 3. Revising the Classical Tradition: Bradley and Bosanquet -- 4. Conclusion -- VI. Juridical Individualism and State Power: Utilitarianism in the Twentieth Century -- 1. Introduction -- 2.The Triumph of Utilitarianism -- 3. Utilitarianism and Individual Right -- 4. Conclusion -- VII. Juridical Individualism, Individual Freedom And Criminal Justice -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Defending Freewill -- 3. Freewill, Determinism and Criminal Justice -- 4. Conclusion -- VIII. Juridical individualism, State Power And Legal Reasoning -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Legal Reasoning and Criminal Responsibility -- 3. Speaking the Language of Law -- 4. Conclusion -- IX. The Limits of Legal Ideology -- 1. The Philosophical — Historical Development of the Liberal Ideal of Criminal Punishment -- 2. The Return to Kant -- 3. The Ideal and the Actual.

Justice can be approached from many angles in ethical and political debates, including those involving healthcare, biomedical research, and well-being. The main doctrines of justice are liberal egalitarianism, libertarianism, luck egalitarianism, socialism, utilitarianism, capability approach, communitarianism, and care ethics. These can be further elaborated in the light of traditional moral and social theories, values, ideals, and interests, and there are distinct dimensions of justice that are captured better by some tactics than by others. In this article, questions surrounding these matters are approached with the hermeneutic idea of a distinction between "American" and "European" ways of thinking. ; Peer reviewed

Okosnica je ovoga članka pojam pravednosti u filozofiji Marka Tulija Cicerona. Iako ga razmatra i u drugim djelima, najsustavnije ga razlaže u trećoj knjizi djela De re publica. Pisano je prema uzoru na Platonovu Državu te stoga krije vrijednu filozofsku građu utemeljenu na antičkim autoritetima. Djelo se uspoređuje i s Platonovom Državom (Politeia) i važnim Aristotelovim promišljanjima o pravednosti. Ugledajući se na Platona, nakon napisane Države, Ciceron stvara djelo Zakoni, u kojemu obrađuje problem pravednosti i pravde u okviru prava. Osim dvaju potonjih djela, u članku će se analizirati i moralno-filozofska rasprava O krajnostima dobra i zla. Predstavit će se način na koji Ciceron shvaća pravednost, njezinu povezanost s božanskim podrijetlom i naravi te razliku između građanskoga i prirodnoga prava. Za Cicerona muževi su instrument više mudrosti i dobra države ispred su dobra pojedinca, a moguće je biti pravedan osluškivanjem i najvećim nastojanjem slijeđenja prirodnih zakona. Iako se nepravednošću dobiva najviše dobara, zemlje ili časti, njome se najviše i gubi. Glavni je argument protiv nepravednosti taj što ona uznemirava, donosi nesklad, razara zajednice i odnose te narušava državu, što upućuje na unutarnji nagon za pravednošću. Pravednost je vrsta kamena temeljca prirodnoga zakona, zakona koji potječe iz više sile i dan je ljudima kako bi održavali dobar društveni red. Ciceron zastupa ideju univerzalnoga morala, zajedničkoga svim ljudima. Pravednost stavlja na pijedestal vrlina pripisujući joj državotvornost. Pisanje Države i Zakona stoga su posljednji Ciceronovi pokušaji spašavanja Rimske Republike. U radu će se objasniti značenje pojma pravednost te usporediti Ciceronova promišljanja s Platonovim i Aristotelovim.