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In solving the problem of preserving its sovereignty and assurances of connection with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned that Oblast into a geopolitical hostage - a territory that it received as the spoils of war in the process of cession whereby it is sought not only to maintain (the internal aspect) but also to force other countries or international institutions to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act as direct or indirect liberation of the hostage (the external aspect). Due to the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast (the Potsdam train, geographical position, social-economic factors) it is the interior aspect that might be of more significance to Moscow, which is officially "covered" by the exterior one. Formally Moscow does not oppose, and even encourages that the Kaliningrad Oblast should be treated as a specific, unique region of Russia. However, in practice it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself. In this way it seeks to stimulate and maintain the Stockholm syndrome in the Oblast - the residents of Kaliningrad themselves must put up with the status of an ordinary Russian region. In the article are presented concrete cases revealing how this mechanism of a Russian hostage functions in political practice: by involving the Kaliningrad exclave into the "high politics" to create the air of its peculiarity, and at the level of the "low politics, though keeping alive hopes of peculiarity in the exclave, by preventing them from being realised in. [to full text]

In solving the problem of preserving its sovereignty and assurances of connection with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned that Oblast into a geopolitical hostage - a territory that it received as the spoils of war in the process of cession whereby it is sought not only to maintain (the internal aspect) but also to force other countries or international institutions to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act as direct or indirect liberation of the hostage (the external aspect). Due to the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast (the Potsdam train, geographical position, social-economic factors) it is the interior aspect that might be of more significance to Moscow, which is officially "covered" by the exterior one. Formally Moscow does not oppose, and even encourages that the Kaliningrad Oblast should be treated as a specific, unique region of Russia. However, in practice it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself. In this way it seeks to stimulate and maintain the Stockholm syndrome in the Oblast - the residents of Kaliningrad themselves must put up with the status of an ordinary Russian region. In the article are presented concrete cases revealing how this mechanism of a Russian hostage functions in political practice: by involving the Kaliningrad exclave into the "high politics" to create the air of its peculiarity, and at the level of the "low politics, though keeping alive hopes of peculiarity in the exclave, by preventing them from being realised in. [to full text]

The problem of enclaves/enclaves in the theory of IR opens an interesting field of study, not only because of the actual phenomena and processes accompanying the formation of said entities, but also due to inaccuracies and variances in the very terms in use, especially in the field of public policy. The Kaliningrad Oblast is either an enclave (from the point of view of the EU, NATO, as well as Poland and Lithuania), or an exclave (from the point of view of the Russian Federation). The status of the region as perceived by the Western countries and organisations differs from the Russian standpoint. The Kaliningrad Oblast always would be a region of external influences of the West, an element of their foreign, security and economic policies, while for Russia Kaliningrad is a sphere of its domestic governance, although shaped by many international determinants resulting from its geographical location. This paper is aimed at examining public policy of the EU and neighbouring countries towards the Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of its specific geographical location and legal status. Possibilities of the region's incorporation in the EU's neighbourhood is also emphasized in the paper as an important factor affecting the position of the Kaliningrad Oblast.

The problem of enclaves/enclaves in the theory of IR opens an interesting field of study, not only because of the actual phenomena and processes accompanying the formation of said entities, but also due to inaccuracies and variances in the very terms in use, especially in the field of public policy. The Kaliningrad Oblast is either an enclave (from the point of view of the EU, NATO, as well as Poland and Lithuania), or an exclave (from the point of view of the Russian Federation). The status of the region as perceived by the Western countries and organisations differs from the Russian standpoint. The Kaliningrad Oblast always would be a region of external influences of the West, an element of their foreign, security and economic policies, while for Russia Kaliningrad is a sphere of its domestic governance, although shaped by many international determinants resulting from its geographical location. This paper is aimed at examining public policy of the EU and neighbouring countries towards the Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of its specific geographical location and legal status. Possibilities of the region's incorporation in the EU's neighbourhood is also emphasized in the paper as an important factor affecting the position of the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Authors present a general outline of local self governments' cross border cooperation of north eastern Voivodships in Poland with the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation. They analysed the impact of European Union enlargement eastwards on the scope and form of the cooperation, identifying in detail barriers hampering development of mutual relations. Development of good cross border relations with the Kaliningrad exclave is an important factor in Baltic Europe integration. ; Marcin Polom

In solving the problem of preserving its sovereignty and assurances of connection with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned that Oblast into a geopolitical hostage - a territory that it received as the spoils of war in the process of cession whereby it is sought not only to maintain (the internal aspect) but also to force other countries or international institutions to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act as direct or indirect liberation of the hostage (the external aspect). Due to the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast (the Potsdam train, geographical position, social-economic factors) it is the interior aspect that might be of more significance to Moscow, which is officially "covered" by the exterior one. Formally Moscow does not oppose, and even encourages that the Kaliningrad Oblast should be treated as a specific, unique region of Russia. However, in practice it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself. In this way it seeks to stimulate and maintain the Stockholm syndrome in the Oblast - the residents of Kaliningrad themselves must put up with the status of an ordinary Russian region. In the article are presented concrete cases revealing how this mechanism of a Russian hostage functions in political practice: by involving the Kaliningrad exclave into the "high politics" to create the air of its peculiarity, and at the level of the "low politics, though keeping alive hopes of peculiarity in the exclave, by preventing them from being realised in. [to full text]

In solving the problem of preserving its sovereignty and assurances of connection with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned that Oblast into a geopolitical hostage - a territory that it received as the spoils of war in the process of cession whereby it is sought not only to maintain (the internal aspect) but also to force other countries or international institutions to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act as direct or indirect liberation of the hostage (the external aspect). Due to the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast (the Potsdam train, geographical position, social-economic factors) it is the interior aspect that might be of more significance to Moscow, which is officially "covered" by the exterior one. Formally Moscow does not oppose, and even encourages that the Kaliningrad Oblast should be treated as a specific, unique region of Russia. However, in practice it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself. In this way it seeks to stimulate and maintain the Stockholm syndrome in the Oblast - the residents of Kaliningrad themselves must put up with the status of an ordinary Russian region. In the article are presented concrete cases revealing how this mechanism of a Russian hostage functions in political practice: by involving the Kaliningrad exclave into the "high politics" to create the air of its peculiarity, and at the level of the "low politics, though keeping alive hopes of peculiarity in the exclave, by preventing them from being realised in. [to full text]

In solving the problem of preserving its sovereignty and assurances of connection with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned that Oblast into a geopolitical hostage - a territory that it received as the spoils of war in the process of cession whereby it is sought not only to maintain (the internal aspect) but also to force other countries or international institutions to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act as direct or indirect liberation of the hostage (the external aspect). Due to the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast (the Potsdam train, geographical position, social-economic factors) it is the interior aspect that might be of more significance to Moscow, which is officially "covered" by the exterior one. Formally Moscow does not oppose, and even encourages that the Kaliningrad Oblast should be treated as a specific, unique region of Russia. However, in practice it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself. In this way it seeks to stimulate and maintain the Stockholm syndrome in the Oblast - the residents of Kaliningrad themselves must put up with the status of an ordinary Russian region. In the article are presented concrete cases revealing how this mechanism of a Russian hostage functions in political practice: by involving the Kaliningrad exclave into the "high politics" to create the air of its peculiarity, and at the level of the "low politics, though keeping alive hopes of peculiarity in the exclave, by preventing them from being realised in. [to full text]

In solving the problem of preserving its sovereignty and assurances of connection with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned that Oblast into a geopolitical hostage - a territory that it received as the spoils of war in the process of cession whereby it is sought not only to maintain (the internal aspect) but also to force other countries or international institutions to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act as direct or indirect liberation of the hostage (the external aspect). Due to the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast (the Potsdam train, geographical position, social-economic factors) it is the interior aspect that might be of more significance to Moscow, which is officially "covered" by the exterior one. Formally Moscow does not oppose, and even encourages that the Kaliningrad Oblast should be treated as a specific, unique region of Russia. However, in practice it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself. In this way it seeks to stimulate and maintain the Stockholm syndrome in the Oblast - the residents of Kaliningrad themselves must put up with the status of an ordinary Russian region. In the article are presented concrete cases revealing how this mechanism of a Russian hostage functions in political practice: by involving the Kaliningrad exclave into the "high politics" to create the air of its peculiarity, and at the level of the "low politics, though keeping alive hopes of peculiarity in the exclave, by preventing them from being realised in. [to full text]

In 2007–2015, Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IO RAS) carried out seismological observations in the water area and on the coast of the Baltic Sea using autonomous seismic stations. Here, in the area of the Sambia Peninsula, previously considered aseismic, a strong perceptible earthquake with a magnitude of about M = 4.6 occurred in 2004. The most interesting data were obtained by IO RAS in 2008–2009 from seismological monitoring using autonomous bottom and coastal seismic stations. The data obtained in 2010–2015 turned out to be unsuitable for full-scope processing due to several causes (losses of bottom seismographs, high noise level at coastal stations, etc.). Seismological monitoring in the west of the Kaliningrad region and in the adjoining area of the Baltic Sea detected weak earthquakes with magnitudes ML = 2.5-3 whose sources are confined to the development are of the Kravtsovskoe offshore oil field. Some of these earthquakes have been recorded by the stations of the Norwegian seismic array NORSAR and by the seismic stations of Sweden. The Kravtsovskoe oil field is located on the shelf northwest of the unique natural object, the Curonian Spit. The detected weak earthquakes are likely to be anthropogenic, induced by reservoir pressure disturbances as a result of intensive hydrocarbon production, and are probably precursors of a strong man-made earthquake.

Subjects of the empress. Wider context of regional history education on East Prussia and identity processes in contemporary Kaliningrad oblastPolitical, economic and social changes brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union have had a significant impact on Kaliningrad Oblast, the empire's westernmost territory of geostrategic importance. Formerly belonging to the German province of East Prussia, the region was meant to become Sovietised completely. The end of the Cold War led to a complete bankruptcy of such policies. At the turn of the 80s and 90s the emergence of a grass-roots interest in the officially forbidden parts of the Oblast's history made the question of the relation between its pre-war and post-war past up-to-date. Its topicality was strengthened after the 2005-2006 commemorations of founding the city of Königsberg and Kaliningrad Oblast, in which both central and regional authorities were heavily involved. This paper aims at identifying how elements of the history of East Prussia have been selected, interpreted and incorporated into the regional history education course books in contemporary Kaliningrad Oblast. It argues that the growing criticism of the course books' contents has been related to Russia's domestic situation since the 2012 presidential election and the tensions with the West after 2014. Both events have hastened the process of forming and cementing the so-called new Russian conservatism which has had a growing influence on the Baltic semiexclave. Poddani cesarzowej. Szeroki kontekst regionalnej edukacji historycznej na temat Prus Wschodnich a procesy tożsamościowe we współczesnym obwodzie kaliningradzkimZmiany polityczne, gospodarcze i społeczne spowodowane rozpadem Związku Sowieckiego wywarły głęboki wpływ na obwód kaliningradzki, najdalej wysunięty na zachód obszar imperium o dużym znaczeniu geostrategicznym. Obwód, wcześniej wchodzący w skład niemieckich Prus Wschodnich, miał zostać całkowicie zsowietyzowany. Koniec zimnej wojny doprowadził do bankructwa takiej polityki. Na przełomie lat osiemdziesiątych i dziewięćdziesiątych pojawienie się oddolnego zainteresowania oficjalnie zakazanymi częściami historii obwodu spowodowało, że pytanie o stosunek między jego przeszłością przedwojenną i powojenną stało się bardzo aktualne. Ten stan został wzmocniony po uroczystościach związanych z założeniem miasta Królewiec i obwodu kaliningradzkiego w latach 2005-2006, w które zaangażowały się zarówno władze centralne, jak i regionalne. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu prześledzenie, w jaki sposób elementy historii Prus Wschodnich zostały wybrane, zinterpretowane i włączone do podręczników poświęconych historii regionu we współczesnym obwodzie kaliningradzkim. Autor argumentuje, że rosnąca krytyka treści podręczników związana jest z sytuacją wewnętrzną Rosji po wyborach prezydenckich w 2012 roku oraz rosnącymi napięciami w stosunkach z państwami zachodnimi. Obydwa wydarzenia przyspieszyły proces kształtowania i krzepnięcia tak zwanego nowego rosyjskiego projektu konserwatywnego, który wywiera coraz większy wpływ na bałtycką półeksklawę.

Der Kleine Grenzverkehr zwischen Polen und Russland erlaubt den Einwohnern der Oblast Kaliningrad und einiger Kreise der Woiwodschaften Ermland-Masuren und Pommern, ohne Visum in diejenigen Zonen im Nachbarstaat zu reisen, die von dem Vertrag erfasst werden. Die Möglichkeit, Reisen ins andere Land auf der Grundlage der Einreiseerlaubnis des Kleinen Grenzverkehrs zu unternehmen, wird von Russen wie auch Polen gern wahrgenommen, wenn sich auch die Gründe für diese Fahrten bei beiden Gruppen deutlich unterscheiden. Analysiert man den Kleinen Grenzverkehr, haben zwei Aspekte Schlüsselbedeutung. Erstens sind es die Reisemotivationen der Einwohner der Kaliningrader Oblast und der Polen. Zweitens muss angesichts der aktuellen Lage untersucht werden, welchen Einfluss die aktuelle Politik Russlands auf der internationalen Bühne und die damit einhergehende Abkühlung der Beziehungen zwischen Warschau und Moskau auf den Kleinen Grenzverkehr haben.

Der Kleine Grenzverkehr zwischen Polen und Russland erlaubt den Einwohnern der Oblast Kaliningrad und einiger Kreise der Woiwodschaften Ermland-Masuren und Pommern, ohne Visum in diejenigen Zonen im Nachbarstaat zu reisen, die von dem Vertrag erfasst werden. Die Möglichkeit, Reisen ins andere Land auf der Grundlage der Einreiseerlaubnis des Kleinen Grenzverkehrs zu unternehmen, wird von Russen wie auch Polen gern wahrgenommen, wenn sich auch die Gründe für diese Fahrten bei beiden Gruppen deutlich unterscheiden. Analysiert man den Kleinen Grenzverkehr, haben zwei Aspekte Schlüsselbedeutung. Erstens sind es die Reisemotivationen der Einwohner der Kaliningrader Oblast und der Polen. Zweitens muss angesichts der aktuellen Lage untersucht werden, welchen Einfluss die aktuelle Politik Russlands auf der internationalen Bühne und die damit einhergehende Abkühlung der Beziehungen zwischen Warschau und Moskau auf den Kleinen Grenzverkehr haben.