Suchergebnisse

Geschichte der Wirtschaftsintegration von Kenia, Tansania und Uganda im Rahmen der "East African Community".Beschreibung der gemeinsamen Ziele und der wirtschaftlichen, finanziellen und verwaltungstechnischen Mechanismen der Zusammenarbeit. Ursachen des Zusammenbruchs sind auf der politischen Ebene zu suchen. Angesichts der SADCC-Gründung ist an eine Wiederbelebung nicht zu denken. Das Scheitern der EAC kann dazu genutzt werden, künftig bessere Formen der Konfliktregelung bei anderen Formen der Wirtschaftsintegration zu entwickeln. (DÜI-Wsl)

Are rebel leaders punished for signing peace agreements? Many studies have found that leaders face domestic punishment for signing peace agreements. However, while this may be true for state leaders, it remains unclear whether this is also the case for rebel leaders. Between 1975 and 2018, I describe what happened to the rebel leaders who signed a peace agreement. One-third of rebel leaders in these countries experienced exile, imprisonment, or unnatural death, while the rest shifted to politics or pursued rebellion. I describe two prototypical life paths after peace agreements of former rebel leaders in Colombia and Niger: the unpunished and the punished. This study shows how the database of rebel leader attributes (ROLE) can be advanced with novel data, enabling the kinds of studies on rebel leaders that scholars have conducted on state leaders in international politics. Future studies should extend research on rebel leader characteristics and peace negotiations.

In postconflict settings, peace agreements often include power-sharing provisions that integrate formerly warring parties into the state. The aim of such provisions is to prevent conflict from resuming. At the same time, however, they can inadvertently increase the risk of coups d'état. Existing research identifies a correlation between peace agreements and coups, but the causal mechanisms underlying this association remain underexplored. This article argues that power sharing affects the motives of incumbent elites to intervene in politics via a coup and the opportunity for former rebels to do so successfully. Evidence from coup attempts in Burundi and Guinea-Bissau illustrates the plausibility of these arguments and suggests ways to extend them in future work. While debate remains over whether power sharing prevents civil war recurrence, this article shows how it can create incentives for other forms of political violence.