Suchergebnisse

The Technical Agreement between Prishtina and Belgrade, brokered by European Union in April 2013, was hailed as a milestone in the process of normalization of relations between the two countries as well as unblocking the path of both Kosovo and Serbia towards European Union. The dialogue held a promise as a vehicle which, in conjunction with bilateral pressure on both sides by EU and a tailored enlargement process, could finally lead to normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. However, most of the deadlines set up in the implementation plan of the Agreement have been stepped over. This delay in implementation combined with the victory of "Serbian List", Kosovo Serb political party backed heavily by Belgrade Government, in the last general elections in Kosovo, have brought into jeopardy two of the main targets of the Technical agreement as a vehicle to a broader and more important political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia as well as integration of local Kosovo Serbs into institutions of the state of Kosovo. This paper argues that Germany, United Kingdom and USA need to be more directly engaged in the process to pressure both sides to fulfill what was agreed in April 2013. It is a prevailing belief among many analysts that the only peaceful acceptable outcome depends on full integration of Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo's state institutions, full normalization of relations between Prishtina and Belgrade, mutual recognition, and rewarding Kosovo by suspending the visa regime for EU countries for citizens of Kosovo. Delay in implementation, loss of pace and interest of EU in this process, is leading to sharpening of ethnic divisions in Kosovo and increasing the numbers of those who oppose dialogue on both sides.

Technological development has caused profound changes and social stability. Regions which have had stable populations for centuries have experienced enormous population growth leading to the emergence of sometimes unmanageable megaplex cities as well as bringing about macroscopic environmental change. The scope of this IFAC SWIIS Conference is to offer insights into mitigating unwanted side-effects of rapid development and to share methodologies for appropriate ways of managing the introduction of technologies which will alter social stability. Contributions included in this volume cover a very broad field of interest for subjects such as social aspects of technology transfer, managing the introduction of technological change, ethical aspects, technology and environmental stability, and anticipating secondary and tertiary effects of technological development. * 3 survey papers, 17 technical papers and a summary of the panel discussion * Bringing together scientists and engineers working in these subjects to discuss solutions

AbstractThis article explores the relationship between memory, political violence, and identity among the Roma minorities in Kosovo. In the aftermath of the 1998–1999 conflict in Kosovo, countless Roma were forced to escape Albanian retaliation, accused of being Serb collaborators. Many had to resettle in enclaves near Fushë Kosovë on the outskirts of Kosovo's capital Prishtina, others left for Serbian-controlled northern Kosovo or to neighboring countries or to Western Europe. Through an ethnographic investigation with displaced Roma families around Prishtina and in Prizren, the article examines how the communities mobilize collective memories of the violent past to adapt to a new political situation, find their place, and navigate their present within Kosovo's social, economic, and political landscape. It shows that the past is a constant reminder of compromised loyalties toward the majority group, which in turn dictates their (non)relations. Roma voices and narratives about the violent past are not part of the dominant and official discourse; they are counter-memories, telling a story that is silenced and unrecognized by the majority.

Many cities in Kosovo suffer from poor air quality, with ambient concentrations of particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5 micrometers or less (PM2.5) significantly exceeding the national and European Union (EU) standards and global air quality guidelines for PM2.5 established by the World Health Organization (WHO). The air pollution in the capital city of Prishtina rivals that of big cities like Beijing, Mumbai, and New Delhi. Especially in winter, urban areas face severe smog episodes, caused by the increased demand for heat from the residential and commercial sector, which is mainly provided by burning solid fuels. Such levels of air pollution are unsafe for Kosovo's population of 1.9 million and cause significant deleterious health impacts. This report is one in a series of three reports on air quality management (AQM) in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia. It examines the nature and magnitude of ambient air pollution (AAP) in Kosovo. It provides estimates of the health burden and the economic cost associated with the health impacts of AAP, that is, PM2.5, in Kosovo. It also analyzes of the roles of various sources of PM2.5 emissions on ambient air quality in Kosovo at a national level. The institutional and policy framework for AQM in the country is examined, including contributions of other development institutions in supporting Kosovo in addressing air pollution. Furthermore, the report presents experiences of selected countries that have applied different policy, investment, and technical interventions for air pollution, prevention, reduction, and abatement. Finally, it provides recommendations for reducing air pollution in Kosovo.

This working paper takes a critical look at the written coverage of issues of jihadi radicalization and foreign fighters from Kosovo, identifying key themes, assumptions, and areas where the press seems to have missed certain points. The paper is based on an extensive survey of written English-language media coverage retrieved online, secondary NGO/grey and academic literature, as well as some 50 original interviews with experts, frontline practitioners, policymakers and donors conducted in Prishtina, Brussels, or via Skype. While not attempting to provide a full picture, the paper identifies points on which the international media coverage seems to have got matters wrong, and areas where the evidence calls for greater nuancing. These include the number of foreign fighters, the reasons for radicalization and why people have travelled to Syria, as well as the government's response. ; publishedVersion

After wars in which it was included, the Western Balkans region entered the new phase of development after the whole decade of instability. The path towards the recovery of the national and social systems promised a lot, but after anew instability with the murder of the Prime minister of Serbia, and constant political frictions, the region was again in front of a difficult choice. This time, the choice is not between a war and a peace, but between a desire to become a part of the European Union, and a constant stumble in solving the problems that no region, that became a part of the Union, didn't face. The gola of this work is to analyse technical and political aspects of those processes, so we get closer to the answer why it is so. We are speaking of a process where there are answers to the questions of a cause of consequences, that we can feel even today, as well as to the questions about the European future of the region, shich should have already happened. We are speaking of the process of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo in the context of European integration. The Brussels agreement deals with a number of disputed issues between Belgrade and Prishtina, especially the status of the four municipalities in northern Kosovo inhabited by about 40,000 Serbs which have remained outside Prishtina's control. A compromise was reached over many of the contentious issues including police, education, urban planning, economics, culture, and the health and community organisations of the Serbian municipalities in Kosovo. However, the agreement has been interpreted differently by both sides. The authorities in Kosovo claim that it represents Serbia's recognition of Kosovo as a de facto state, whereas the Serbian side maintains that the agreement will ensure the autonomy of the Serbian municipalities, and that establishing good relations with Kosovo does not amount to a recognition of its independence. However, these agreements do not guarantee Kosovo's international recognition or its membership in the United Nations and other international organisations. Nor do they give autonomy to the Serbian communities; the community of Serbian municipalities will only have executive and coordinative powers. The normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a prerequisite by the EU for continuing the process of the European integration of the two states. After signing the agreement on 22 April, the European Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia, and of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo. In this case the German position will be decisive. Although the German government received the signature of the document with satisfaction, Berlin also made it clear that it expects the agreement's provisions to be implemented effectively. The Agreement primarily concerns the status of the Serbian municipalities in Kosovo, and provides for their voluntary association. This will therefore include both four municipalities in northern Kosovo and the municipalities inhabited mostly by Serbs in the country's interior. This solution only partially meets the expectations of Belgrade, which seeks to strengthen the Serbian minority institutionally and politically, especially in the four northern municipalities. The community authorities will coordinate the municipalities' activities within their executive powers in the fields of urban planning, education, culture and health. The community is to represent the municipalities in their relations with Prishtina, but it will not have its own competences, apart from any which may be delegated by the central government. In this way, the Serbian local community's competences will not generally go beyond those of Kosovo's other municipalities, although it will provide a platform for the leaders of the Serbian community to represent its interests. The mayors of the four Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo will be able to submit a list of candidates from which Kosovo's interior minister will select the local police commander in northern Kosovo. The matter of who takes up this position will therefore depend on agreement between the authorities in Prishtina and the leaders of the four Serbian municipalities. The Serbian police structures already existing in the north will be incorporated into the Kosovo police. The police forces are to be fully funded from the Kosovo state budget; the agreement does not specify whether the Serbian institutions in Kosovo will continue to be funded by Belgrade, which may prove to be an area of future conflict. In matters relating to the judiciary in Kosovo, the Serbian municipalities will be responsible for a specific department appellate court in Prishtina, composed of judges representing the Kosovo Serbs. In addition, Serbia's Prime Minister at that time, Ivica Dacic has stated that he has received assurances from NATO, that the Kosovo army would not enter the Serb-inhabited municipalities in the north of Kosovo. Serbia's recognition of Kosovo is the most important demand of the Prishtina authorities. The agreement makes only limited reference to relations between Kosovo and Serbia; the penultimate paragraph of the document requires the parties to refrain from mutually impeding their progress in integrating with the European Union. During the negotiations, the Serbian side requested similar wording relating to the UN and the OSCE to be removed. The Serbian government unanimously adopted the document, but it has avoided taking any actions which would demonstrate that it has recognized Kosovo as a state. It does not mean that the agreement is subject to a process of ratification, which would be appropriate for agreements between states. Thus, the nature of the agreement is open to an asymmetric interpretation. It is unlikely that Kosovo and Serbia will agree on its true nature any time in the near future. The agreement is an important step in the direction of establishing good neighborly relations between the Serbian and the Albanian people, although it does not determine the ultimate success of the dialogue. To improve relations between them and their prospects for being integrated into the EU, the smooth implementation of the agreement will be essential. The biggest challenge to it is the skepticism of the Serbs living in northern Kosovo and of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The question of how to implement the agreement remains open. It provides for the creation of a special Kosovar/Serbian committee to deal with its implementation. Not specified in the document, however, is who would be able to join the committee, or what competences such persons will be granted. The agreement removes a major barrier to the integration of Serbia and Kosovo with the EU, but it does not conclusively establish any specific date to start Serbia's accession negotiations or Kosovo's association talks. The European Commission and the European Parliament clearly recommend these actions; and many European leaders have also expressed similar sentiments. A much more muted reaction, however, has come from Berlin; the German government has stated that the agreements are only the first step towards an expected 'normalisation' of relations. Germany may demand rigorous implementation of the agreement before the date for starting accession talks is fixed (i.e. at the Council meeting in June), perhaps by imposing conditional clauses for its approval. Serbia has made far-reaching concessions, but its path towards EU depends on at least a partial and visible implementation of the agreement in the near future. The question is: Is this the end of the Serbian policy towards Kosovo or does it constitute a new policy direction?. ; Nakon ratova u koje je bio uklјučen, region Zapadnog Balkana je posle čitave decenije nestabilnosti, ušao u novu fazu razvoja. Put ka ozdravlјenju državnog i društvenog sistema je obećavao mnogo, ali nakon ponovne nestabilnosti ubistvom premijera Srbije, i konstantnih političkih trzavica, region se opet našao pred teškim izborom. Ovog puta izbor nije između rata ili mira, već između želјe da postane deo Evropske unije (EU), i stalnog spoticanja u rešavanju problema sa kojima se nijedan region, koji je postao deo Unije, nije suočio. Cilј rada je analiza tehničkih i političkih aspekata tih procesa, kako bismo bili bliži odgovoru zašto je to tako. Reč je o procesu u kome se nalaze odgovori na pitanja uzroka posledica koje i danas osećamo, ali i na pitanja o evropskoj budućnosti regiona, koja je po svim procenama već trebalo da se desi. Reč je o procesu normalizacije odnosa Srbije i Kosova u kontekstu evropskih integracija.