Suchergebnisse

Nacionalizem in konceptualizacija pomena biti Turek, je sodobno vprašanje Turčije. Od neuspeha otomanizma naprej sta bili etnična pripadnost (turkishness) in religija (islam) videni kot pogoj za ustanovitev naroda. Čeprav razprave v povezavi s konceptom biti Turek še vedno potekajo, se poskuša turški narod in nacionalizem pogosto utemeljiti z monističnim pojmovanjem, kar se kaže tudi v politikah homogenizacije, ki so usmerjene proti neturškim in nemuslimanskim manjšinam (predvsem Kurdom, Grkom in Armencem). Politične elite, ki so sledile procesu turkizacije, so dobile navdih od novo nastajajočih evropskih držav, katere so bile preoblikovane zaradi nacionalističnih gibanj ; te so poskušale graditi državo na novo zamišljenih narodih. Čeprav je bila francoska revolucija pomemben navdih za mnoge osmanske politične elite, je bila Nemčija nedvomno tista država, ki je postala najbolj primeren model za turško državno strukturo. V tem pogledu je bila Nemčija vzeta kot vzorec za turški nacionalizem, medtem ko se je v Turčiji gradil narod na turkizmu. V študiji analiziramo vzpostavitev turškega nacionalizma, pri čemer bom izpostavila bom dvostranske odnose in jih primerjala z Nemčijo glede na ideološke izraze in politične operacije. S poudarjanjem teh križanj želim razkriti vpliv nemške politike in njene ideologije nacionalizma na turško nacionalistično politiko in koncept nacionalizma v procesu izgradnje države v Turčiji. V raziskavi analiziram strukturo in značilnosti turškega nacionalizma, pri čemer so fokusiram na procesa izgradnje države med letoma 1908 in 1945 in razkrivanjem nemškega vpliva na turško nacionalno politiko z identifikacijo analogij med turškim in nemškim nacionalizmom. Za to študijo je pomembno preučiti sorodne koncepte, kot so narod, nacionalizem, modernizem in romantika. Skozi to preučevanje želim analizirati, kakšen nacionalizem se pojavi in v kakšnih razmerah. V okviru moje teze, ki temelji na analizi vpliva nemškega procesa izgradnje naroda na turško politiko, predvsem z vidika etničnega nacionalizma in homogenizacije, bo v prvem delu pozornost prevsem na konceptu nemške romantike, medtem ko bo v drugem delu sledila obravnava konkretnih primerov oz. praks. Ker je nacionalizem vedno pomebnejša tema tako v svetovni politiki kot tudi v turški notranji politiki, je ta raziskava pomembna za osvetlitev turške politične zgodovine. Preučevanje obdobja izgradnje nacionalne države in ideologije etničnega nacionalizma v turški zgodovini pa nam bo pomagalo tudi k razumevanju ozadja aktualnih političnih razmer v Turčiji. Za razumevanje sodobnih dilem in izzivov v turški politiki, predvsem tistih ki ovirajo procese demokratizacije, je pomembno preučiti politike v preteklih fazah procesa turkizacije. Osnovna teza te teme je, da je nacionalizem v turški zgodovini imel pomembno vlogo, zlasti v začetku 20. stoletja, ko je predstavljal prevladujoči sentiment večinske demokracije, kar je nenazadnje tudi aktualna politična pozicija v Turčiji. Razvoj turško-nemških odnosov, zlasti v času obeh svetovnih vojn, je imel velik vpliv na turško politično zgodovino. Zato so ključna vprašanja, ki bodo vodila našo raziskovanje: »Kako je Nemčija postala odločilna za turško politiko?« in »Katere teme je nemški politični vzorec prenesel na politike turkizacije v Turčiji?«. Poleg glavnih raziskovalnih vprašanj bodo moja podporna raziskovalna vprašanja »Kakšna je bila vloga Nemčije pri tako imenovanem Armenski vprašanju?«, »Kakšni so bili zinanje-politični odnosi Turčije in Nemčije v času druge svetovne vojne?« in »Kakšni so bili vplivi ideološke in politične bližine z nacistično Nemčijo na politike homogenizacije v Turčiji?«. Cilj te naloge je tako poudariti, da turški nacionalizem temelji na etničnosti in da njegova genealogija sega v začetke procesa izgradnje države v novo ustanovljeni Republiki Turčiji, ki je bila pod neposrednim nemškim vplivom. ; Nationalism and the conception of being a Turk is a contemporary issue in Turkey. Since the failure of Ottomanism, ethnicity (Turkishness) along with religion (Islam) has been suggested as the thing that makes people a nation. Although there are still some discussions going on regarding the concept of being a Turk, the Turkish nation and nationalism have been attempted to be built on a monistic basis, and national policies have been put into practice against non-Turk and non-Muslim minorities (mainly Kurds, Greeks, and Armenians) in pursuit of homogeneity. Since the concept of nation belongs to modern history, political elites who pursued the process of Turkification were inspired by newly emerging European states which had been reshaped by nationalist movements, and which attempted to build a nation-state based on a new nation. Although the French revolution had been a source of inspiration for many of the Ottoman political elite, the state ideology of Germany, which was re-established several times throughout history, has become structurally the most favourable model for Turkey, particularly the creation of the Second Reich and the Weimar Republic. In this respect, Germany was taken as a pattern for Turkish nationalism while constructing the nation in Turkey upon Turkism. In this study, I examine the establishment of Turkish nationalism and its conception during the Young Turk period in the history of Ottoman Turkey along with the one-party era in the history of the Republic of Turkey. I highlight the bilateral relations and intersecting cases with Germany with regards to ideological terms and political operations. By emphasizing these intersections, I aim to reveal the influence of German politics and its ideology of nationalism on Turkish nationalist policies and the concept of nationalism during the nation-building process in Turkey.

Turgut Özal, hem Başbakanlığı hem de Cumhurbaşkanlığı görevi süresince iç siyaset ve dış politikasında koyduğu hedefler ve bu hedefleri yerine getirmede Türkiye'nin bu dönemine damgasını vurmuştur. Özal, icraatları ile günümüzde de hala etkisi devam etmektedir. Görevde olduğu dönemde olduğu gibi günümüzde de izlediği politikalar sonucunda ısrarla referans olarak gösterilmiş ve takdir edilen ya da eleştirilere maruz kalan nadir devlet adamlarından biridir. Devlet adamı olduğu yılları Türkiye için olduğu kadar uluslararası düzen açısından da kökten değişen ve oldukça hareket kapsamlı yıllar olmuştur. Özal ne kadar Türkiye'nin komşuları, bölge ülkeleri, Avrupa ülkeleri ve ABD ile ikili ilişkilerin düzeltilmesi için çaba gösterdi ve ekonomik alanda iş birliğinin geliştirilmesi için çaba sarf ettiyse, o oranda komşularımızla ve bölgede iş birliğinin geliştirilmesi ve güvenlikle ilgili problemle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. İran ile Irak arasında 1988, yılına kadar süren savaş, ekonomik olarak Türkiye'ye kazançlar getirdiği kadar, Türkiye'yi Kuveyt Savaşı ile birlikte bölge ülkeleri arasında bir problem olmaktan çıkıp, uluslararası bir nitelik kazanan ve Türkiye'nin güvenliğini tehdit eden Kürt sorunuyla karşı karşıya gelmesine neden olmuştur. Soğuk Savaşın, stratejileri ve dünya politikacılarını şaşırtacak bir biçimde aniden sona ermesi ile Sovyetlerin dağılması ve balkanlardan Orta Asya'ya kadar uzanan coğrafyadaki siyasi, kültürel, etnik çatışmalar Türkiye'nin alışılmadık bir biçimde dış politika ile ilgilenmeye, hızlı karar almaya zorlamıştır. Bu tez beş bölükten oluşuyor. Birinci bölükte Türk dış politikasının esas ilkeleri ele alınıp Kurtuluş Savaşı esnasında izlenen dış politikalar ve beraberinde Lozan süreci incelenmiştir. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde Demokrat Parti dönemi işlenmiştir. Aynı zamanda Batı ittifakında yer alan Türkiye'nin konumu değerlendirilmiştir. Tek yönlü dış politikanın da incelendiği bu bölümde dönemin dış politika sorunları ve bu sorunlara yönelik geliştirilen çözümler ya da atılan adımlar yer almaktadır. Üçüncü bölüme gelindiğinde Türk iç politikasında görülen değişimler yer alırken tek taraflı politikadan çok taraflı bir değişime uğrayan politikaya yönelmeden bahsedilmiş ve ABD ile yaşanan krizler neticesinde SSCB ile Türk siyasi tarihinde ilk yakınlaşmaların başladığı yer almıştır. Bu tezin dördüncü bölümünde Özal'ın kişiliği ve bu kişiliğinin getirdiği dış politika anlayışı ele alınarak Türkiye'nin ABD, SSCB, Balkanlar, Yunanistan, AT gibi devletlerce olan ilişkilerine değinilmiştir. Aynı zamanda bu bölümde Ermeni sorunu ele alınarak bu sorunlara yönelik politikalar geliştirilmiştir. Çalışmanın son kısmını oluşturan beşinci bölümde ise Soğuk Savaşın bitmesi ile uluslararası sistemde Türk dış politikalarına olan etkileri söz edilip Soğuk Savaşın ardından ülkenin Orta Asya ile Kafkasya açılımı incelenmiştir. ; Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister of the targets set in both domestic politics and foreign policy during the Presidency and Turkey in fulfilling these objectives has been the hallmark of this era. Özal still continues to have an impact with his actions. It is one of the rare statesmen who have been persistently referenced as a result of the policies he pursued, as he did during his term of office, and was appreciated or criticized. year in which the statesman in terms of radical change in the international order as well as for Turkey and has been quite extensive movements year. Ozal how Turkey's neighbors, countries in the region, endeavored to correct bilateral relations with European countries and the USA and has made efforts for the development of cooperation in the economic field, he has remained proportion of our neighbors and the development of cooperation in the region and security faced with relevant problems. 1988 between Iran and Iraq, until the year-long war, economically as well as bring gains to Turkey, Turkey Kuwait war with countries in the region ceases to be a problem between winning an international qualification and facing Turkey's security and threatening Kurds with the problem caused him to come. Cold War, strategies and world politicians will surprise a manner sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union with the end and the Balkans than in a region extending to Central Asia, political, cultural, ethnic conflicts, Turkey's interested in an unusual manner as in foreign policy, was forced to make quick decisions. This thesis consists of five divisions. In the first part, the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy are discussed and the foreign policies followed during the War of Independence and the Lausanne process are examined. In the second part of the study, the Democrat Party period was covered. The location is also located in the Western alliance, Turkey is evaluated. In this section, where one-way foreign policy is also examined, there are foreign policy problems of the period and solutions or steps taken for these problems. In the third part, while the changes in the Turkish domestic policy are taking place, it was mentioned that the unilateral policy was directed towards the policy that has undergone a multilateral change, and that the first rapprochets with the USSR began in the history of Turkish political history. Ozal's personality and the fourth part of this thesis by considering foreign policy that brought the people of Turkey in the United States, the Soviet Union, the Balkans, Greece, was mentioned by the state as their relationship to the EC. At the same time, in this section, policies were developed for these problems by addressing the Armenian problem. In the fifth chapter, which constitutes the last part of the study, after the end of the Cold War, its effects on Turkish foreign policies in the international system is mentioned and after the Cold War, the opening of the country to Central Asia and the Caucasus is examined.

During the previous century much of the world has taken great strides in adopting and implementing democracy and yet the Middle East has notably faltered. More recently with the rise of religious extremism, the region has fallen farther behind with many states retaining authoritarian forms of governance demonstrating gross humanitarian abuses. Most notably since the turn of the century, the resurgence of Islam as a driving force in regional politics, has proven a daunting challenge for the increasingly secular statesmen and academics of the West. Likewise attempts to understand the situation from an outside perspective and apply remedies concocted in western institutions have met with repeated failure and have in fact only served to bolster the anti-democratic narratives of fundamentalists and terrorists. In order to fully appreciate the roots of the dilemma and help create better communication between East and West, the people living in the Middle East need to be heard and included in the dialogue. In this study, interviews were done with a broad selection of sixteen students from the Middle East studying at the Eastern Mediterr ne n University in G zim usa, Northern Cyprus. This selection included Arabs, Turks, Iranians and Kurds from all major political and religious backgrounds. Each was asked for their thoughts on the state of democracy in the Middle East. Their answers highlight the fact that although most Middle Easterners welcome incre sed freedom they don"t w nt the incre singly individualist democracy promoted in the West or the political and economic strings often attached to it. Their responses also underscore the essential role that Islam continues to play in the political psyche of their region, the nature of which westerners largely misunderstand. This study should prove helpful in highlighting the real concerns of the up and coming generation of Middle Easterners with a view towards fostering better understanding and communication. Keywords: Democracy, Middle East, Secularism, Human Rights, Islam, West. ; ÖZ: Geçti imiz yüzyıl boyunc düny nın büyük bir kısmı demokrasiyi benimseme ve uygul m yolund büyük mes fe k t etmesine r men Ort do u bölgesi bu konuda lenen tökezlendi. Son z m nl rd yükselen şırı dinci kıml rl birlikte otokratik yönetimler v rlıkl rını dev m ettirerek büyük ins ni dr ml rın y ş nm sın sebep oldular ve bu bölgenin ülkeleri Düny Demokr si Endeksi"nde d h d lt b s m kl r gerilediler. Özellikle 21. yüzyılın b şınd n itib ren İsl m dininin bölgesel politik l rın etkin bir gücü ol r k yeniden yükselmesi b tıd gittikçe daha f zl sekülerleşen diplomatlar ve akademisyenler için şılm sı güç bir engel haline geldi. Benzer şekilde, dış rıd n ol yı anlamaya ç lışıp, çözüm önerileri üretmek isteyen b tılı kurumlar hep b ş rısız oldular ve slınd bu sadece köktendincilerin ve teröristlerin anti-demokratik prop g nd l rını y ym l rına y rdımcı oldu. Ort do u"d ki sorun ve ikilemlerin kökenine inmek ve B tı ile Do u r sında daha s lıklı bir iletişim s l m k için bölgede y s y n h lkl rın seslerinin daha güçlü bir şekilde duyulm sı ve diyaloga dahil edilmeleri gerekmektedir. Bu ç lışm d G zim us KKTC"de bulun n Do u Akdeniz Üniversitesi"nde ö renim gören Ort do u"nun f rklı ülkelerinden on ltı ö renciye nket ç lışm sı uygul ndı. Ç lışm y f rklı dini ve politik grupl rd n Ar p Türk F rs ve Kürt ö renciler dahil edildi. Her bir k tılımcıy "Ort do u"d ki Demokr sinin Durumu" h kkında sorular yöneltildi ve görüşleri lındı. Cev pl rı, her ne kadar Ort do u"d yasayan h lkl rın ço unlu unun bireysel özgürlüklerin gelişmesini destekledi i gibi görünse de, b tılı tarzda yükselen demokr sinin ber berinde getirdi i yasam seklini ve demokrasiyle ilintili siyasi ve iktisadi modellere pek de sıc k b km dıkl rı ortaya çıktı. Ç lışm d n elde edilen bir b şk sonuçt da, İsl m dininin bölgenin siyasi psikolojisinde önemli bir rol oyn yıcı oldu u öne çıktı. Bu durum, din ve devlet işlerinin kesin çizgilerle birbirinden yrıldı ı sistemlerle yönetilen seküler B tılı yönetimlerin, İsl m dininin bölge siyasetindeki etkin rolünü anlamakta güçlük çekmelerine ve bölgeyi y nlış okum l rın sebebiyet vermektedir. Bu ç lışm , Ort do u"d yetişmekte olan yeni nesil gençlerin güncel k ygıl rını y nsıtm kl birlikte topluml r r sınd daha s lıklı bir nl yış ve iletişim s l m kt f yd lı olm yı m çl m kt dır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi, Ort Do u Laiklik, İns n H kl rı İslam, B tı. ; Master of Arts in International Relations. Thesis (M.A.)--Eastern Mediterranean University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Dept. of International Relations, 2016. Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. John Turner.

Roughly ten years ago, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, swept across Mesopotamia. At its peak, it controlled large swathes of Iraqi and Syrian territory, equivalent in size to Great Britain, subjecting more than 10 million people to its brutal governance. Although the "caliphate" lost its state apparatus years ago, ISIS remains a destructive force by operating sleeper cells and waging deadly ambushes in Iraq and Syria. The remnants of ISIS have recently been conducting hit-and-run attacks in the Syrian governorates of Deir Ezzor, Homs, and Raqqa. The targets have been the Kurdish-led Peoples' Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), and Iran-backed militias aligned with President Bashar al-Assad's government, including the Afghan Shi'a Fatemiyoun Brigade.ISIS continues posing a "considerable threat in Syria," Danny Makki, an analyst covering Syria, told Responsible Statecraft. "The group maintains the capacity to conduct deadly guerrilla attacks and sabotage operations which, despite the group's diminished presence, have inflicted significant loss of life on Kurdish and Syrian government areas in the country." ISIS, Makki explained, does "not operate out of a specific area — there's no big town or base they have, so it's a difficult war to fight [against] them."Al-Sukhnah, located in the Homs Governorate of Eastern Syria, is a strategic town that has repeatedly been the target of ISIS attacks. According to Makki, ISIS has recently come close to capturing it. A year ago, ISIS waged its deadliest terrorist attack since January 2022, slaughtering 53 Syrians who were gathering desert truffles near al-Sukhnah. In the Homs Governorate, ISIS forces killed at least 14 SAA soldiers near the ancient city of Palmyra just last month.Debating the U.S. military presenceThe possibility of an ISIS resurgence cannot be discounted given the growing instability caused by the expansion of Israel's war on Gaza throughout the Levant with escalating tit-for-tat attacks between the U.S. military and Iran-aligned groups in both Syria and Iraq. Amid debates in Washington about the future of the U.S. military presence in Syria, ISIS-related factors — along with U.S. interests in countering Iranian and Russian influence in the Middle East while keeping the Assad regime weak — are given weight.A concern raised by many officials in Washington is the possibility that a withdrawal of the roughly 900 U.S. troops in Syria could result in an explosive comeback by ISIS. Whether such concerns are valid or not is debatable. Nonetheless, given the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Biden administration does not want the departure of U.S. military forces from another country to end in a takeover by violent extremists."The ISIS-related detention and displacement sites under Kurdish control represent a significant, latent threat," said Mona Yacoubian, a senior adviser at the US Institute of Peace."If the Kurds for some reason — for example, if they come under major Turkish attack or should the US withdraw from Syria — are no longer able to maintain control of those sites, ISIS would virtually overnight burst back onto the scene as a powerful force," Yacoubian told RS. "The ISIS detention sites alone hold some 10,000 ISIS fighters, a veritable 'ISIS army in detention' which could quickly pose a major threat to global interests if they break free."
"If you suddenly see thousands of hardened Islamic State fighters being set free [from Kurdish-controlled prisons], then yes, you're going to have a problem in these areas very soon," agreed Aron Lund, a fellow at Century International who focuses on Syria.Yacoubian's view is that the U.S. military presence in Syria has "been a victim of its own success." By maintaining a military footprint in the country, which has cost the U.S. relatively little in terms of blood and treasure, Washington has "enabled a strong Kurdish partner force that has been able to help stabilize the area and most importantly guard and control ISIS-related detention and displacement sites."
"This unsung success has essentially gone under the radar," argued Yacoubian. It ultimately amounts to "an instance where the absence of something happening, i.e. major ISIS resurgence, is the success. It is famously difficult to tout a non-event as a success!"Other experts, however, reject this idea that the continued U.S. occupation of roughly one-third of Syria's territory has made the country or the region safer from ISIS.The argument that ending the U.S. military presence in Syria would somehow empower ISIS is "absolutely ludicrous," charges Karim Emile Bitar, who teaches international relations at Saint Joseph University of Beirut."Those who peddle these sorts of arguments seem to have been living on another planet for the past 30 years," Bitar argued. "We now have plenty of evidence that whether in Iraq or in Syria [...] the presence of U.S. forces on the ground is actually what empowers and enables these groups and feeds their propaganda."The Lebanese scholar pointed to Barack Obama's 2015 interview with VICE News in which the then-U.S. president asserted that ISIS was a direct successor of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which itself blossomed as a result of the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation. Obama called it a salient example of unintended consequences and urged foreign policymakers in the future to aim before shooting.
There is much to say about the responsibility of the George W. Bush administration's disastrous invasion of Iraq for ISIS's formation and rise. But one must also recognize that the way in which the U.S. would withdraw from Syria, if it so decides, matters. Among other questions to be addressed are, which local actors would Washington coordinate the pull-out with? And what would such coordination look like?"There's a serious risk of short-term disruption and conflict, should the United States withdraw without adequate arrangements with other actors in the region," according to Lund. "Changing a long-established status quo is always risky, even if it's an unsatisfying status quo—or even a really bad one.""Should the current security architecture collapse, such as after a U.S. withdrawal, it's likely that the Islamic State would exploit that and gain in power and influence," he added. Lund also noted that a "meteoric rise of the 2013, 2014 kind does not look likely at all, because so much has changed, and people are now aware of the problem."There are undoubtedly many compelling arguments as to why the U.S. military should exit Syria. But coordinating this withdrawal with local actors will be key if ISIS is to be denied the chance to exploit chaos, which the group has historically done very effectively.

The starting question underlying this thesis is "What is so deep about deeply divided societies?2" The "deeply divided societies" paradigm emerged during the 20th century as a depiction of societies considered as fragmented and in need of a certain diagnostic for them to be able to live peacefully and with no constant fighting. For those societies to achieve peaceful coexistence, the diagnostic has been, until now, implementing a consociational model of governance, implying power-sharing among the segments of society and/or formerly belligerent factions. However, why are some societies depicted as deeply divided, while others are not, although they share – obviously each within its own context – the same factors and dynamics implying deep division as prescribed by the paradigm? Moreover, where does the scientific literature put the threshold for considering a group of people as deeply divided, knowing of course that conflicts exist in every part of society, from the family unit up to state institutions? Our focus for this thesis will be Lebanon. Our choice stems from two main reasons. The first being that Lebanon, in the political science literature, is depicted as an interesting case of deeply divided society, with, for some authors, a functioning consociational model that is successfully managing societal disruptions, and able to settle conflicts between sectarian groups in Lebanon, while for other authors consociationalism has failed to develop into a fully-fledged democratic model. The second reason is, as mentioned in the above paragraph, the blurry definition and conceptualization revolving around the "deeply divided societies" paradigm. Since no threshold seems to be able to set a clear definition of the paradigm, the idea remains very shallow. Arbitrarily categorizing a handful of countries and societies as deeply divided and not others, although they share very "similar" characteristics, seems quite a far-fetched problematic. Insights from Lebanon reveal some interesting dimensions as per the "deeply divided societies" paradigm: no one actually seems in bad terms with the other, or hates the other. To put it in a simple way: if a Christian is asked about Muslims in the country, the answer would be far from expressing hostility. On the contrary, the questioned person will clearly show indifference regarding the other's sect (Majed, 2021). If so, then what is really "deep" about the so-called division? What differentiates it from other normal divisions of any society? Another rationale behind this work is the latest uprising that started in 2019 in Iraq and Lebanon. In the societies depicted as "deeply divided", light is always shed on identity-based cleavages (sect-based identities, or sometimes in Iraq a mix of ethnic and sectarian related identities (Kurds - Sunni muslims - Shi'a muslims)), even at a time when social and economic demands are taken at the forefront of country-wide protests (Majed, 2019). In the Lebanese case, it is indeed the economic reality which constituted the main drive of the uprising. Firstly, most of the protesters belonged to a 16 to 25 years old age range. They belonged mostly to popular classes with relatively low monthly incomes and are vulnerable to any eventual shocks due to their precarious situation (Bou Khater and Majed, 2020: 11). In addition to that, the interview sample clearly pointed out the dire economic situation pushing them to be part of the uprising. Secondly, protesters belonged to different geographical areas, and protests were not only focused in the capital Beirut (unlike for example other contemporary uprisings as the "You Stink" movement in 2015 for instance). Naturally, major Cazas (districts) such as Tripoli or Beirut attracted more protesters due to their size, but the other regions were equally "represented" (Bou Khater and Majed, 2020: 10). This geographical representation in the whole country brings some doubts about what the "deeply divided society" paradigm implies. How is the Lebanese society so deeply divided then if all of its social components, and especially its youth, rallied around the same socio-economic demands, and to a certain extent, political demands? Although these are preliminary questions – and cannot lead to any conclusion whatsoever in this promptness – they invite us to re-question the aforementioned paradigm. As per the paradigm itself, does deeply divided societies imply as their core element pretending divisiveness, identities as they are? Or does it imply the polarization of identities? Imagining a causal chain leading to a deeply divided society is in fact quite a difficult task to achieve; for a society to achieve a great step towards divisiveness suggests a model of society where each group does not/cannot face the other directly. Here comes the role of the institutional arrangements where the consociational model of governance lies. Its role is appeasing these tensions and paving the way to a more peaceful and integrated society. As shown by many scholarly studies, diversity does not form an obstacle to democracy (Fearon, 2004; Fish and Brooks, 2004: 162). In addition to that, it is argued that all civil conflicts share more or less the same underlying economic reasons, while the ethnic/religious aspect becomes relevant in the war's aftermath. If so, why did only a certain sample of countries/societies receive the "deeply divided society" description, and others not? Put differently, why is the emphasis on certain cleavages focal for certain societies and not others? Is it truly because these societies do have particularities, or because the religious cleavage is maintained at the forefront of the analyses and descriptions? It is noteworthy to mention that many defenders and sympathizers of the consociational model of government have been advising policy-makers on many issues, be it at the United Nations, on Northern Ireland, Cyprus, South Africa or Iraq. We consider such recommendations as erroneous and inaccurate, since the description of the conflicts and of their aftermath is often – if not always – misleading, by putting forward the parameters and factors that are only relevant for the consociationalists. In this sense, policymakers, consultants and other "weighty" bodies are not remedying the source of the problem, but are rather enforcing and anchoring it (Majed, 2017). This Master's thesis presents itself as an alternative exploratory roadmap to the study of what is usually presented as "deeply divided societies". It will explore the Lebanese case – which is usually presented as a deeply divided society – and will try, through an attempt at clarifying definitions, and a qualitative-historical analysis, to put into question the rigid idea of the aforementioned paradigm. The study will do so by questioning the traditionally used paradigm, and by inverting the variables of study by defining sectarianism as the dependent variable, rather than the explanatory one, as usually done to describe Middle Eastern societies (Ghosn and Parkinson, 2019: 494). In order to set the frame of the work, it is worth noting what lies in the debate around "disciplinarians" and "area specialists" on the notion of sectarianism, since this thesis fits exactly in this middle ground: "While the former, lack "conceptual sophistication and methodological rigor", favor "description over explanation", and have "no interest in parsimony and generalizations", the latter are "engaging in sterile conceptual and abstract theoretical debates providing little real insight into complex behavioral patterns" (Valbjørn, 2021: 4).

Against the backdrop of the ongoing Gaza war and an enraged Arab street, the future of 2,500 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq is once again in question. Despite a full withdrawal in 2011, the government of Iraq "invited" U.S. forces to return in 2014 to combat Daesh, or ISIS. But seven years after the "Caliphate" was pronounced defeated, the multinational Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve maintains a large military presence in Iraq, ostensibly to "work by, with and through regional partners to militarily defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, in order to enable whole-of-coalition governmental actions to increase regional stability."Despite those laudable intentions, attacks against U.S. military personnel have intensified and so has political pressure to conclude the mission, far beyond similar calls for expulsion following the targeting of Qassim Soleimani in 2020. The presence of foreign forces in general and the U.S. troops in particular is vexing to Iraq with its long history of occupation (although calling 2,500 non-combat forces an occupation is a bit of a stretch), but is also an opportunity, particularly among Iranian-backed political parties and militias, to create a strawman responsible for all of the country's ills.For many Iraqis the counter-ISIS coalition is like the guest who has overstayed his welcome."The presence of U.S. military forces on Iraqi soil has been increasingly causing problems to Iraq and its neighbors; it also gives a pretext to terrorists to resume their attacks on Iraqis," said Dhia Al-Asadi, former minister of state who headed the Al-Ahrar (Sadrist) Bloc in parliament. "These forces should withdraw immediately so that a legitimate, nationalist Iraqi government can take the lead and build its military and security capacity without unsolicited U.S. interference."Yet, not all Iraqis concur with those views."Despite the considerable strength of militia forces in Iraq, surpassing that of the Iraqi national army, their calls for the withdrawal of Americans and allies are primarily rhetorical," said Nahro Zagros, editor in chief of Kurdistan Chronicle and former vice president of Soran University in Erbil. "If the decision rested with the Iraqi populace, the majority would prefer the continued presence of Americans. However, Iraqi affairs are not under Iraqi control but influenced by neighboring powers."According to Falah Mustafa, a close adviser to the president of the Kurdistan Region on Foreign Policy Affairs, "any decision [on the future of the coalition forces] must be based on national consensus.""For the Kurdistan Region, certainly we are part of Iraq and we will abide by any decision that Iraq makes, but one single group of Iraqi society cannot determine this alone, because Iraq is a diverse country. Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Christians, we all need to agree on this issue because it is about the stability, security of this country," he said.While the U.S. has sought to maintain a military presence in Iraq, arguments to keep them there do not stand up to scrutiny. There is an unspoken proposition that Iraq could be used as a launch platform for attacks against Iran or elsewhere, but this is specifically prohibited by the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which remain the foundational document for the Iraq-U.S. relationship. It says, "The United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq."Besides, Iraq is not needed for this purpose. The U.S. currently has a major logistical base in Kuwait with over 13,000 army troops, a naval base in Bahrain housing the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Al Udeid Air Base in Doha is the largest military installation in the region with over 8,000 troops. The Persian Gulf can fit a Carrier Battle Group with ease. These, in addition to other bases in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan and Turkey, maintain more than sufficient ground, air and naval assets to challenge any military force in the region. A second argument is the often-stated rhetorical trope that leaving Iraq would be a victory for the Iranians. While it may be a rhetorical victory for Iran, rhetoric should not be the basis for foreign policy. A military withdrawal from Iraq would be seen in Tehran as stabilizing Iran's western borders, but it must be acknowledged that the U.S. seeks the same outcome on its borders. The Monroe Doctrine has been the cornerstone of U.S. hemispheric policy for 200 years, just as Persian influence has driven similar aspirations towards Iraq for over a millennium. Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif famously said, "Look at the map. The U.S. military has travelled 10,000 kilometers to dot all our borders with its bases. There is a joke that it is Iran that put itself in the middle of U.S. bases."The U.S. argument conflates influence with interference. The economies and cultures of the two societies are vastly intermingled, shown most clearly with the hundreds of thousands of pilgrims which peacefully cross the borders annually to visit Qom and Najaf. Yet, the fundamental U.S. concern should not be one of Iranian influence but of Iranian interference, of which its insinuation into the political and economic structures will continue, regardless of the U.S. troop presence.Last, some would argue for a continued U.S. troop presence, asserting that the counter-ISIS mission is not finished, and ISIS remains a significant threat to both Iraq and the international community. While there may be some validity to this argument, it begs the question whether the Iraqis need continued foreign assistance or can accomplish this mission unilaterally. A U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission has recently been meeting to analyze these and other concerns to determine the rationale for a continued military mission. Mustafa, who previously served as head of KRG's Department of Foreign Relations, said it is important to remember that "this should not be emotional; it should not be affected by other factors.""Iraqis, the U.S. — the relevant people — need to sit down together, discuss and assess the situation on the ground, review the extent of engagement, assess the threats, Iraqi capabilities and determine together the nature and shape of future arrangements and future relations between Iraq and the U.S., and the rest of coalition countries," he said.According to Al-Asadi, "Daesh, like al-Qaida before it, will not cease to exist as a threat not only to Iraq but to the region and the entire world. Names, strategies and means may change, but the masterminds and beneficiaries of such groups will always keep them ready to strike, and sometimes they serve as a hired gun."However, he added: "Iraqi forces are qualified and capable of dealing with this threat. They may need some up-to-date technology, training and honest cooperation with regional and world countries who ought to share the same amount of concern about the growing danger of these terrorist groups."While the need for "up-to-date technology, training and honest cooperation" is important, it could be provided by other nations' forces, contractors or remotely, rather than by the physical presence of U.S. forces.A final argument suggests the continued presence of U.S. forces is an insurance against internal Iraqi threats. According to Zagros, "the most significant danger originates from within Iraq itself, where militia forces persist in attacking fellow Iraqis and opposing factions.""I firmly believe that without the presence of Americans and their allies, Iraq and the broader region face the risk of fragmentation and collapse," he said.Yet, those same militia forces are using the presence of U.S. forces as a casus belli to wage a deadly campaign against the forces of occupation, aligning themselves with the Iranian "Axis of Resistance" to receive equipment, training and funding from the Quds Force. Counterintuitively, the very presence of U.S. troops strengthens the hands of the militias and creates instability, especially when the United States unilaterally targets militia leaders and infringes on Iraqi territorial sovereignty to do so.These four factors, alone, imply that the U.S. troop presence comes at high costs and marginal benefits. The U.S. continues to be painted as an occupier, an aggressor, a foreign agitator and the cause of Iraqi society's near-collapse since the 2003 invasion.As Al-Asadi notes, "Why does the U.S. want to negotiate its withdrawal from Iraq? If they really want to stabilize Iraq and the region, they should withdraw their military troops first, then they can diplomatically negotiate their future relations with Iraq. Given the fragility of the situation and institutional dysfunctionality, we cannot hope for a better situation. The major denominator is the existence of foreign military troops in Iraq."Since October 7, U.S. support for Israel has aggravated the anger, and has brought the question of continued U.S. presence to the fore. While some arguments for remaining may exist, and Iraq is certainly more important than Otto von Bismarck's famous quote that the Balkans are not "worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier," the U.S. should reflect, clear-eyed, on the risk to American lives, the provocation to Iran, the almost paternalistic view that the Iraqi security establishment can't succeed against ISIS on its own, or can't find other alternatives, and the significant animosity against U.S. policy throughout the region. The Counter-ISIS Coalition performed brilliantly, but it is time to say, "Mission Accomplished."

This study aims to perform a comparative analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy on Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis in particular. It also reviews both countries' foreign policy toward the Middle East since their declaration of becoming Republic states in general. As foreign policy theory, neoclassical realism is applied. It then discusses changing dynamics and analyses influential factors shaping Turkey and Indonesia policies of Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis at the unit and systemic level of analysis. It summarises that the factors of leaders' perceptions upon international and regional systemic changing trends and pressures as well as state powers have become influential factors. In case of Palestine issue, during 2004-2016, Turkish domestic politics has undergone domestic transformations namely first public opinion and civil society's roles influence the foreign policy. Before the AKP party came to power, a determinant actor of Turkey's foreign policy was the military. However, the military role then decline. Instead, the role of non actor states including civil society and non-government organizations have increased. Domestic public opinion has been marked by a re-emergence of common historical and cultural senses under Ottoman heritages. This factor then results in a reactive engagement of Turkey to the Middle East. Second, the emergence of civilian leader as a new actor of foreign policy. The mechanism of foreign decision-making then shifted v following a decline of military influence. An active civilian control emerged and domestic political structure rebuilt. It resulted in multi-actor of foreign policy such as NGO, think tanks, etc. They contribute as the new tool of Turkish soft power. Third, leader factors. Leaders play roles in attracting international public opinion. Turkish leader's opinion perceives that no permanent peace of region without peace in Palestine. They also put an emphasis to a strategic importance of Muslim world. Therefore Turkey needs to re-engage into the regional issues. Fourth, an increase of Islamist factor. Re-involvement of Muslim groups into domestic politics serves a democratic equality for all parties. Turkish NGO with Islamist outlook also rises as a pressure group, thus it impacts on the concern to the Palestine issue. They put a large concern to the sensitivity of Jerusalem status and nature as a holy city for Muslims especially a concern to who will control that holy city.Fifth, a proactive foreign policy. the Israel-Palestine conflict that perceived as the heart of regional instability results in proactive foreign policy into the settlement of Palestine issue. In regional level, the main source of regional conflict is the Palestine-Israel conflict. In sum, Turkey conducts a balancing policy during the AKP administration regarding Palestine issue. Indonesia sets the aspiration of an active engagement policy in the Middle East. It could be seen such as a presence of special of the Middle East diplomatic mission, Indonesia government recognition and support to Hamas after won the parliament election for Gaza strip, the efforts to be honest broaker in Palestine-Israel conflict, and an official representation in Ramallah. Indonesia also is officially consistent to adopt a nonrecognition policy of the state of Israel. Indonesia has undergone several diplomatic efforts in regional and international level to support the recognition of the state of Palestine and proposed on humanitarian approach by providing a continuation of humantarian aids for Palestinians. In comparison with Turkey, during 2004-2016, Indonesia has undergone transition era to civil democracy era. It has turn into a democracy process and reach democratic stability in post-transition. In democratic era of Indonesia, anti-colonialism spirit of 1945 Constitution has been continued as a historical basis of Indonesia's engagement. Besides, Indonesian government accomodates Muslim aspiration through the presence of Islamist considerations into the state's foreign policy. An increase of Islamist factor in domestic politics namely Islamist-oriented aspirations in domestic public opinion. There a high level of sensitivity upon the issues including the Jerusalem issue in which Al-Aqsa mosque vi placed on as one of prominent issues, beyond Palestinian refugee issue and Israel occupation on Palestinian lands for the Indonesian Muslim groups and government. In other words, there interplay between Muslim groups and Indonesian government in regard to deal with Palestine issue. A major of Indonesian Muslims and government officially are united to struggle for Palestinians. Other Islamist factors are Muslim groups as the moral force. Muslim groups put pressure if the government behave in passive response to the Islamist issues. An example of strong and harsh pressures of all segment Muslim groups over any initiative of opening diplomatic ties with Israel by Indonesian governments, so it is often suspended by eventually cancelled. In addition, an increasingly role of Islamist parties as well as new Indonesia's international orientation and identity have affected a continuity of nonrecognition policy towards Israel and supporting Palestine in accordance with two-state solution. In the level of international, the wave of democratization policy leads to the emergence of democratised foreign policy. Indonesia's democratised foreign policy has been conducted through various diplomatic efforts creating an active involvement of nonstate actors. After the Syrian revolution in 2012 escalated, it has turned into a civil war. The emergence of various non-state actors such the ISIS, the PYD-YPG, and other militant or radical groups, as well as direct intervention of regional and international powers sparked the conflict much more escalated. These have posed direct threat to Turkey and challenged Turkey's Middle East policy, notably in Syria. Therefore, Turkey's Syria policy has changed from soft power to hard power approach. Several domestic influential factors shaping Turkish policy first a humanitarian dimension of crisis namely the influx of refugees results in an open door policy. Since 2011, Syria conflict has sparked refugee waves to Turkey. As a direct neighboring countries, it had been demanded by international community and domestic humanitarian nature to open the borders and secure the people. Second, the security threat in Turkey-Syria's borders. Assad regime's military policy against the Syrian oppositions and the development of the crisis with an engagement various non-state armed groups (the YPG-PYD, ISIS, other moderate and radical groups) that began in 2013 have made the situation more complicated. Due to their activities strived to claim the sovereignty and conducted terror attacks, hence those have posed threats to Turkish national security and territorial integrity. Another risk is the influx of foreign terrorist fighters across the border through Turkey on their way to and from Syria. vii Even, probably they reside in Turkey as a third country before returning to home countries. So, it also has to dealt with the way to send them back to countries of origin. In the international level, the most influential factors are first the international and regional actors' engagement into the conflict. Since 2015, there has increased the international interventions. Foreign countries and non state actors' involvement have created the strategic pattern of alliance and enmity among global and regional powers as well as non-state actors. Second, the rise of ISIS. This terror organization posed the threat to Turkish national security through multiple suicide bombings. Third, the emergence of the PYD threat. This group has taken benefits of Syria conflict through controlling the Syrian Kurds, self-proclaiming several cantons and establishing a sphere of influence or terror corridor in northern Syria bordering Turkey. On the other hand, Indonesian government policy towards the Syria crisis can be explained through the influencing factors as follow. First, a commitment to non-alignment with any military bloc as one of basic ideas of the principle of Independent Foreign Policy. In Syria conflict, Indonesia prevents from any engagement of the multilateral and bilateral military pact with Syria and major powers. Instead, it prefers to strengthen ties rely on peaceful coexistance. Given, Indonesia has a critical and substansial roles in the establishment of the NAM, so it positions itself to commit the basic spirit of nonalignment. Second, the leader perceptions. Indonesia stance is sided with neither the Assad regime nor the oppositions while it adopts non-interference into Syria's domestic politics. In other words, Indonesia's official stance is neutral. This stance is meant it fighting against any colonialism and violation forms caused by the regime under the world peace and security. Indonesia government not interpret the neutral stance as a neutral politic that means not to care to the crisis but conducts policy in a way of achieving its national interest. Third, the protection of Indonesian citizens in Syria as a foreign policy's priority. In order to pursue this goal, Indonesian government is still opening diplomatic representatives in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. This representatives has main task to protect, defend and secure them until they are repatriated to Indonesia. No matter who rules, it will cooperate in line with its strategic interests still remain there. Moreover, the influential factors in international level are first the ISIS and Indonesian foreign fighters dimension. Indonesia was also targeted by the ISIS through multiple ISIS-linked and inspired terror attacks. Besides, ISIS also is defined as a threat as the possible terror attacks conducted by Indonesia-origined foreign fighters return to home. viii The potential threats of the presence of the ISIS' supporters and recruits in Indonesia is revival of local extremist groups' sleep cells that probably conducting terror attacks, promoting inter and intra religious conflict, fulfilling the lack of local militant group's capability, recruiting the new cadres targeting youth cadres. Second, Indonesia's role within the framework of the OIC. Despite, Indonesia is the world's majority Muslim populated country and an active actor in the OIC, in fact, Indonesia has no significant role on Syria crisis. It has only played the limited role due to several factors namely a minor actor in term of regional geopolitics and the lack of experience upon the regional complex politics. It remains to manage limited bilateral ties with Syria government. In sum, it tends to conduct a passive foreign policy on Syria crisis. In conclusion, Turkey has adopted and preferred to choose humanitarian and political-oriented approach towards Syria crisis. However, after several international developments rised which put risks to its national security, Turkish foreign policy has then shifted to propose a security-oriented approach. It combines soft and hard powers in formulating process of the foreign policy. Meanwhile, Indonesian government also has put forth primarily humanitarian approach in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Syria while suggesting such political solution stance in order to solve that crisis with optimalizing the way of diplomacy. Indonesian leaders stance is to prevent a military approach. When it is evaluated on the basic principle of Indonesian foreign policy namely independent and active principle, Indonesia is independent but not active. In this context, these basic principles determine it not enter a formal alliance, further not interferring and involving into other state's domestic problems. Instead, it should actively encourage bilateral cooperations with other countries. In addition, it demonstrates a status quo of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy in a pragmatic way. In this situation, it might recognise that there is a gap between its aspiration and capability to play wider global roles especially in participating to the conflict resolution of the Middle East region. Indonesia government and Muslim group tend to stand in opposite in case of Syria crisis. Indonesian government tend to position in moderate stance and keep in status quo of non-interference policy upon the domestic problem of Syria. For Indonesian goverment, there several reasons why Indonesia still continue to open its diplomatic representative and develop bilateral ties in Syria while most countries closed their diplomatic office in Damascus. First, historical relations between Syria and Indonesia. Syria was the first countries which recognized Indonesia's independence. Second, Indonesia avoids to be ix perceived by Syria regime of getting involved into Syria's domestic issue especially Syria's territorial sovereignty. Third, respect to Syria as a member of the NAM. In which the NAM adopts non-interefere policy as an agreement amongst member states. While Indonesia considers the NAM was birth and insipired by the Bandung Conference with its "Dasasila Bandung" whose an important principle is to respect other state territorial sovereignty. In other words, Indonesia has been trying to play a normative international role in case of Syria crisis. In sum, Indonesian political power might not be powerful yet in affecting the conflict resolution directly compared to other international and regional actors such as Turkey might be has. ; Bu tez çalışmasında, Türkiye ve Endonezya'nın Filistin Sorunu ve Süriye Krizi'ya yönelik dış politikasını karşılaştırmalı bir analizini amaçlanmıştır. Ayrıca cumhuriyet devletleri olma ilan etmelerinden dolayı iki ülkenin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış politikalarını incelemiştir. Dış politika teori olarak neoklasik realizm uygulanmıştır. Daha sonra Filistin Sorunu ve Süriye Krizi'nin Türkiye ve Endonezya politikalarını birim ve sistematik analiz düzeyinde şekillendiren, değişen dinamikleri ve analiz etkenleri tartışılmıştır. Liderlerin uluslararası ve bölgesel sistemik değişen eğilimleri, baskıları ve devlet iktidarı üzerindeki algılarının etkili faktörler haline geldiğini özetlenmiştir. Filistin meselesinde, Türkiye'de 2004-2016 yılları arasında iç siyaseti, içsel dönüşüme uğramıştır. İlk olarak kamuoyu ve sivil toplumun rolleri dış politikasına etkilenmesidir; AKP partisi iktidara gelmeden önce, Türkiye'nin dış politikasında asker belirleyici aktörü olarak olmuştur. Fakat, daha sonra askerinin rolü azalmıştır. Bunun yerine sivil toplum ve sivil toplum örgütleri de dahil olmak üzere devlet dışı aktörlerinin rolü artmıştır. Osmanlı mirası altındaki ortak tarihsel ve kültürel duyuların yeniden ortaya çıkmasıyla iç kamuoyunu dikkat çekmektedir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yeniden aktif katılımını sonuçlanmaktadır. İkinci olarak sivil liderin yeni dış politika aktörü olarak ortaya çıkmasıdır. Askeri etkinin azalmasından sonra dış karar vermenin mekanizması değiştirilmiştir. Aktif bir sivil kontrolunu ortaya çıkmış ve iç siyasi yapını yeniden inşa edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla STK, düşünce kuruluşları, vb. gibi dış politikaları ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Türk yumuşak gücünün yeni aracı olarak katkıda bulunmuştur. Üçüncü olarak ise lider faktörleridir. Liderler uluslararası kamuoyunun çekme rolü oynamaktadır. Türk liderinin Filistin'de barışsız bölgenin kalıcı barışı olmadığını algılanmıştır. Onlar da Müslüman dünyasının stratejik önemine vurgulanmıştır. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin bölgesel meselelerine yeniden girmesi gerekmektedir. Dördüncüsü, İslamcı faktörün artışıdır. Tüm taraflar için demokratik bir eşitliğe Müslüman grupların iç politikaya yeniden dahil olmasını hizmet etmektedir. İslamcı bakış açısıyla Türk STK'sı da bir baskı grubu olarak yükselmektedir. Dolayısıyla Filistin meselesine de etkilenmektedir. Kudüs'ün statüsü ve doğasının Müslümanlara karşı kutsal bir şehir olarak hassasiyetini, özellikle de kutsal şehri kimin kontrol edeceğine yönelik kaygısını dile getirmektedir. Beşinci olarak, proaktif bir dış politikasıdır. Bölgesel düzeyde, bölgesel çatışmaların ana kaynağı Filistin-İsrail çatışmasıdır. Bölgesel istikrarsızlığın kalbi olarak algılanan İsrail-Filistin çatışması, Filistin sorununun çözümü için proaktif bir dış politikasını sonuçlanmıştır. Özetle, Türkiye'nin AKP yönetimi sırasında Filistin meselesiyle ilgili bir dengeleme politikası yürütülmüştür. Endonezya'nın Ortadoğu'da aktif bir katılım politikası arzusunu belirlenmiştir. Bunlar da, Orta Doğu diplomatik misyonunun özel bir varlığı, Endonezya hükümetinin Gazze şeridindeki parlamento seçimlerini kazandıktan sonra Hamas'a tanınması ve desteklenmesi, Filistin-İsrail çatışmasında dürüst bir aracı olma çabaları ve Ramallah'da resmi bir temsilcidir. Ayrıca, Endonezya İsrail devletinin tanınmayan bir politikasını resmi olarak tutarlı ile benimsemektedir. Endonezya'nın Filistin devletinin tanınmasını desteklemek ve Filistinlilere insancıl yaklaşımların sürdürülmesini sağlayarak insani yaklaşımı önermek için bölgesel ve uluslararası düzeyde çok sayıda diplomatik çabalarını sarf etmiştir. Türkiye ile karşılaştırıldığında, Endonezya'da 2004-2016 yılları arasında, sivil demokrasi dönemine geçiş dönemi geçirilmiştir. Geçiş dönemi sonrasında demokrasi sürecine dönüşmüş ve demokratik istikrara ulaşılmıştır. Endonezya'nın demokratik döneminde, Endonezya'nın angajmanı tarihsel temeli olarak 1945 Anayasasının antisömürgecilik ruhunu devam etmiştir. Ayrıca, devletin dış politikasında İslamcı faktör varlığının sayesinde Endonezya hükümeti Müslümanların isteklerini karşılamaktadır. İç siyasette İslamcı faktörün artması, iç kamuoyunda İslamcı odaklı hedeflenmiştir. Filistinli xii mülteci meselesinin ve Filistin toprakları üzerinde İsrail işgalinin ötesinde, Endonezya Müslüman grupları ve hükümeti için El-Aksa camisinin yer aldığı Kudüs meselesi de dahil olmak üzere ön plana çıktığı önemli konular arasında yüksek düzeyde hassasiyet vardır. Başka bir deyişle, Filistin meselesiyle ilgili olarak Müslüman gruplar ve Endonezya hükümeti arasında karşılıklı etkileşim vardır. Endonezyalı Müslümanların büyük bir kısmı ve hükümetin resmen Filistinliler için mücadele etmeyi birleşmişlerdir. Diğer İslamcı faktörlerin ahlaki güçü, Müslüman gruplarıdır. İslamcı meselelere pasif bir şekilde tepki gösterdiğinde Müslüman gruplar hükümete baskı yapmışlardır. Endonezya hükümetleri tarafından İsrail ile diplomatik ilişkilerin kurulmasına ilişkin herhangi bir girişimde, tüm müslüman gruplarının güçlü ve sert baskılarından dolayı çoğu zaman iptal edilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, yeni Endonezya'nın uluslararası yönelimi ve kimliğinin yanı sıra İslamcı partilerin giderek artan bir rolü, İsrail'e karşı tanınmayan bir politikasının sürekliliğini etkilemiştir ve Filistin'i iki devletli çözümlere uygun olarak desteklemiştir. Uluslararası düzeyde ise, demokratikleşme politikasının dalgası demokratikleşmiş dış politikanın ortaya çıkmasına yol açmaktadır. Endonezya'nın demokratik dış politikası, devlet dışı aktörlerin aktif katılımını sağlayan çeşitli diplomatik çabalarla gerçekleştirilmiştir. 2012 yılında Süriye devrimi arttıktan sonra bir iç savaşa dönüşmüştür. İlk olarak, IŞİD, PYD-YPG ve diğer militan veya radikal gruplar gibi çeşitli devlet dışı aktörlerin ortaya çıkması ve aynı zamanda bölgesel ve uluslararası güçlerin doğrudan müdahalesi, çatışmayı daha da tırmandırmıştır. Bunlar Türkiye'ye doğrudan tehdit oluşturup özellikle Süriye'deki Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu politikasına meydan okumuştur. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin Süriye politikası yumuşak güçten sert güç yaklaşımına dönüş olmuştur. Türk siyasetini şekillendiren birçok içi faktör, öncelikle insani bir kriz boyutu, yani mülteci akının açık kapı politikasını sonuçlanmaktadır. 2011 yılından itibaren Süriye krizinin mülteci dalgalarını Türkiye'ye ateşlemiştir. Doğrudan komşu ülkeler olarak, Türkiye'yi sınırları açmak ve halkı güvence altına almak için uluslararası toplum ve yerel insani yardımlar tarafından talep edilmiştir. İkinci olarak Türkiye-Süriye sınırlarında güvenlik tehdidi oluşmuştur. Esad rejimi'nin Süriye muhalefetlerine karşı yürüttüğü askeri politika ve krizin gelişmesiyle, 2013 yılında başlayan devlet dışı silahlı grupların (YPG-PYD, IŞİD, diğer ılımlı ve radikal gruplar) durumu daha da kriziye karmaşık hale getirmiştir. Egemenlik iddiasında bulunma ve terör saldırıları yürütme çabaları nedeniyle, Türk ulusal güvenlik ve toprak bütünlüğüne tehdit oluşturmuştur. Başka bir risk ise, Süriye'ye gidip xiii çıkarken yabancı terörist savaşçıların Türkiye üzerinden sınır ötesi girişidir. Hatta, ülkelerine muhtemelen dönmeden önce Türkiye'de üçüncü bir ülke olarak yaşamışlardır. Bu yüzden, onları menşe ülkelerine geri gönderme yolunu da ele almak zorunda kalmaktadır. Uluslararası düzeyde ise, en etkili faktörler öncellikle uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlerin çatışmaya girmesidir. 2015 yılından beri uluslararası müdahalelerini arttırmıştır. Yabancı ülkeler ve devlet dışı aktörlerin katılımı, küresel ve bölgesel güçlerin yanı sıra devlet dışı aktörler arasındaki ittifak ve düşmanlığın stratejik modelini oluşturmuştur. İkincisi, IŞİD'in yükselişidir. Bu terör örgütü, birçok intihar saldırısı ile Türk ulusal güvenliğine tehdit oluşturmuştur. Üçüncü olarak, PYD tehdidinin ortaya çıkışıdır. Bu grup Süriyeli Kürtleri kontrol ederek, birkaç kantonu ilan ederek ve Türkiye sınırındaki kuzey Süriye'de bir etki alanı veya terör koridoru kurarak Süriye çatışmasından yararlanmıştır. Öte yandan, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizine yönelik politikası, aşağıdaki gibi etkileyen faktörler aracılığıyla açıklanabilir. Birincisi, Bağımsız Dış Politika ilkesinin temel fikirlerinden biri olarak herhangi bir askeri bloğa uyumsuzluk bir taahhüdüdür. Süriye krizinde, Endonezya, Süriye ve büyük güçler ile çok taraflı ve iki taraflı askeri paktların her türlü müdahalesini engellemiştir. Bunun yerine, barışçıl bir birlikteliğe güvenmek üzere ilişkileri güçlendirmeyi tercih edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla Endonezya'nın Bağlantısız Hareketi kurulmasında kritik ve yardımcı bir rolleri vardır. Bu yüzden uyumsuzluğun temel ruhunu yerine getirmek için kendini konumlandırmaktadır. İkincisi, lider algılarıdır. Endonezya'nın tutumu, ne Esad rejimi ne de muhalefetlerle karşı karşıya kalırken, Süriye'nin iç siyasetine müdahale etmemektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Endonezya'nın resmi duruşu tarafsızdır. Bu duruş, dünya barış ve güvenliği altındaki rejimin neden olduğu sömürgecilik ve ihlal biçimlerine karşı savaşmak anlamına gelmektedir. Endonezya hükümeti'nin tarafsız duruşu tarafsız bir siyaset olarak yorumlamamaktadır, krize dikkat etmemek değildir. Fakat, politikasını ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda yürütmek anlamına gelmektedir. Üçüncüsü, Süriye'deki Endonezya vatandaşlarının korunmasının önceliğine bir bağlılık oluşturmasıdır. Bu hedefe ulaşmak için Endonezya hükümeti Şam, Halep ve Lazkiye'de diplomatik temsilcileri açmaya devam etmiştir. Bu temsilciler Endonezya'ya gönderilmeden önce onları korumak, savunmak ve güvenceye almak için temel görevlere sahiptir. Süriye'deki kimin hükümetleri olursa olsun, stratejik çıkarları doğrultusunda işbirliği yapmaya devam edecektir. xiv Daha sonra, uluslararası düzeyde etkili olan faktörler, ilk olarak IŞİD ve Endonezya'nın yabancı savaşçıları boyutudur. Endonezya'yı IŞİD'e bağlı ve ilham veren terör saldırılarıyla da IŞİD tarafından hedef alınmıştır. Ayrıca, Endonezya kökenli yabancı savaşçıların menşei ülkelerine dönmesiyle ilgili olası terör saldırılarından dolayı IŞİD bir tehdit olarak tanımlanmıştır. Olası terör saldırıları yürüten, iç ve dış dini çatışmaları teşvik eden, yerel militan grubun kapasitesinin eksikliğini yerine getiren, yeni kadroları işe almak genç kadroları hedefleyen yerel aşırı grupların uyku hücrelerinin yeniden canlanmasını kapsamakta Endonezya'daki IŞİD'in destekçileri ve temsilcilerinin varlığının potansiyel tehditleridir. İkincisi, Endonezya'nın İKT çerçevesinde rolüdür. Buna rağmen, Endonezya dünyanın çoğunlukta Müslüman nüfuslu ülkesi ve İKT'de aktif bir aktörüdür. Fakat, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizinde önemli bir rolü yoktur. Bölgesel jeopolitik terim olarak küçük bir aktör ve bölgesel karmaşık siyaset üzerine deneyim eksikliği gibi nedenlerden dolayı sınırlı rol oynamıştır. Süriye hükümetiyle sınırlı ikili ilişkilerin yönetiminde kalmaya devam ettiğini belirlemektedir. Özetle, Süriye krizi durumunda pasif bir dış politika yürütme eğilimindedir. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye Süriye krizine yönelik insani ve politik odaklı yaklaşımı benimsemiş ve tercih etmiştir. Fakat, ulusal güvenliğini tehlikeye sokan birçok uluslararası gelişmenin ardından, Türk dış politikası güvenlik odaklı bir yaklaşım tercih etmiştir. Dış politikanın formüle edilmesinde yumuşak ve sert güçleri birleştirmektedir. Öte yandan, Endonezya hükümeti'nin Süriye'deki insani krizle başa çıkmada insani yardım yaklaşımını ortaya koyarken, bu krizi diplomasi yolunu en uygun hale getirmiştir. Endonezyalı liderlerin duruşu askeri bir yaklaşımı engellemektir. Endonezya dış politikası'nın temel ilkesi olan bağımsız ve aktif ilkeleri olarak değerlendirildiğinde, Endonezya bağımsızdır ancak aktif değildir. Dolayısıyla bu temel ilkeler, diğer devletlerin iç sorunlarına müdahale etmemek ve bunlara müdahalede bulunmamaktan ziyade askeri bir ittifaka girmediğini belirlemektedir. Bunun yerine, diğer ülkelerle ikili ilişkilerini aktif olarak teşvik etmelidir. Ayrıca, Endonezya'nın bağımsız ve aktif statükoyu bir dış politikasını pragmatik bir şekilde göstermektedir. Bu durumda, özellikle Orta Doğu bölgesinin çatışma çözümüne katılma konusunda daha geniş küresel rol oynama isteği ve yeteneği arasında bir uçurum olduğunu fark edilmektedir. Süriye krizi durumunda Endonezya hükümeti ve Müslüman grup karşıt olarak durmaktadır. Endonezya hükümeti ılımlı duruşa yönelme ve Süriye'nin iç sorunu üzerine müdahale etmeme politikası'nın statüsünü korumaktadır. Endonezya'nın diplomatik xv temsilcisini açmaya ve Süriye'de ikili ilişkiler geliştirmeye devam ederken, çoğu ülke Şam'da diplomatik bürosunu kapatmaya devam etmesinin birkaç nedeni vardır. İlk olarak, Süriye ve Endonezya arasındaki tarihi ilişkiler olmasıdır. Süriye, Endonezya'nın bağımsızlığını tanıyan ilk ülkelerdir. İkincisi, Endonezya Süriye'nin iç meselesine özellikle Süriye'nin toprak egemenliğine dahil olma Süriye rejimi tarafından algılanmaktan kaçınmasıdır. Üçüncüsü, Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin üyesi olarak Süriye'ye saygı göstermesidir. Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin üye devletler arasında bir anlaşma olarak müdahaleci olmayan bir politikasını benimsemektedir. Endonezya, Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin önemli bir ilkesi olarak diğer devlet topraklarının egemenliğine saygı duyması gereken "Dasasila Bandung" ile Bandung Konferansı'nda doğup yaşandığını düşünmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizi durumunda normatif bir uluslararası rolü oynamaya denilebilmektedir. Özetle, Endonezyainın siyasi gücü Türkiye'nin sahip olabileceği gibi diğer uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlere kıyasla çatışma çözümünü doğrudan etkilememektedir. ; Türkiye Bursları