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The Kurds inhabit an area known as Kurdistan, which roughly includes the Zagros and Taurus mountain ranges, and lies along the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Traditionally, the Kurds were nomadic pastoralists or settled agriculturalists, but now mainly live in settled agricultural communities with livestock. The Kurds are predominantly orthodox Sunni Muslims of the Shafi school, however, some tribes are Shiite (Busby, 1996). This entry focuses on the orthodox Sunni Muslim Kurds living in the town and vicinity of Rowanduz, Iraq, ca. 1950. The Kurdish religious beliefs are interwoven through many spheres of life. The religious group is coterminous with the society in the sense that the Kurds are not an autonomous political group, as, "the society is politically integrated with others in a pluralistic state within which it enjoys theoretically equal status (Column 1, Tuden and Marshall, 1972)." Therefore, religion is coterminous with Kurdish society aside from the polity, which is integrated with the Iraq government. ; Non UBC ; Unreviewed ; Other

Teil VIII unserer Serie zum "Islamischen Staat": "Blogforum 'Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat". Die Kurden feiern in diesen Tagen den Sieg über den Islamischen Staat in Kobane. Die Hauptstadt des Distrikts Ain al-Arab im Gouvernement Aleppo in Syrien liegt nahe der syrisch-türkischen Grenze. Seit Anfang 2014 ist Ain al-Arab Zentrum eines der drei selbstverwalteten Kantone Rojavas. Diese Kantone stehen unter der Kontrolle der kurdischen "Partei der Demokratischen Union" (PYD) und ihrer Verbündeten. Die PYD ist eine Schwesterpartei der PKK, sie erkennt Abdullah Öcalan als ideologischen Führer an.

At most times, Kurdish society has existed at the periphery of, and functioned as a buffer between, two or more neighbouring states. From c. 1500 until the First World War, the relevant states were the Ottoman Empire in the west and Safavid, later Qajar Iran in the east (with Russia and the British Empire gradually encroaching upon the region from the north and south, respectively). In the aftermath of the World War, Kurdistan was divided among four of the modern would-be nation states succeeding these empires, becoming a peripheral and often mistrusted region in each of them. All these states, whether empire or nation state, have exercised various forms of indirect rule over Kurdistan, which have had a profound impact on the social and political organisation of Kurdish society. The specific tribal formations that existed in Kurdish society in various historical periods were in important respects the products of the interaction of these states with Kurdish society.

What the Kurds of Iraq really need is a breakthrough on political formulas. What they need is a far-reaching change in their constitutional relationship with Iraq. This does not necessarily mean that they must have a state of their own, though a state of Kurdistan in which Kurds from Iraq, Turkey, and Iran are united has often been dreamed of. The issue today is not Kurdistan in the sense of a major rescrambling of boundaries. It is the demand of Iraqi Kurds for freedom from oppression. What their leaders are demanding is genuine autonomy within Iraq, guaranteed by UN presence and enshrined in international law.

International audience ; Since the 1990s, the Turkish military have been forcing numerous Kurdish peasants in the South-east of Turkey to migrate to the cities, invoking reasons of safety required by the presence in their home areas of combatants of an independence movement. The precarious situation in which they find themselves, particularly in Istanbul, has effects on the schooling of their children. Whereas in their original home areas there was a correlation between the presence of school establishments and the level of participation in education, this is not the case in Istanbul. The very paradoxical situation obtains that whereas the fathers had been provided education in their home villages, their children have no access to schooling in an urban environment. For these large numbers of families, the absence of schooling for their children can explained by financial and cultural reasons. ; A partir des années 90, le pouvoir militaire turc force de très nombreux paysans kurdes du Sud-est de la Turquie à émigrer dans les grandes villes, invoquant des raisons de sécurité liées à la présence de combattants d'un mouvement indépendantiste. La situation précaire dans laquelle ils se retrouvent, notamment à Istanbul, a des effets sur la scolarisation de leurs enfants. Si sur le lieu d'origine, il existait une corrélation entre la présence d'établissements scolaires et le taux de scolarisation, ce n'est plus le cas à Istanbul. On observe donc une situation très paradoxale : alors que les pères avaient été scolarisés au village, les enfants n'ont plus accès à l'école en milieu urbain. Pour ces familles nombreuses, l'absence de scolarisation renvoie à des raisons économique et culturelle.

Until a few years ago, Kurdish nationalism was the only movement in Turkey that openly defied the official doctrine that Turkey is a homogeneous nation-state. Informally, people would freely apply ethnic labels to their acquaintances; everybody was aware of the rich ethnic variety of the country, [2] but it was thought undesirable to acknowledge this and most people were reluctant or afraid to define themselves as anything but Turks. In the 1970s, Kurdish nationalists had begun challenging this official view, and in 1979 a cabinet minister caused a political scandal by calmly remarking that he too was a Kurd.[3] The military regime of 1980-83 made a last-ditch attempt to silence those Kurds who wished to be different, but its oppressive measures had the opposite effect of what was intended; they strengthened the Kurds' sense of their distinct identity and resulted in massive sympathy for the separatist PKK.

This article argues for a new approach to understanding statelessness. It explores the limits of international laws on statelessness and the relationships between statelessness, diaspora and nationalism. It discusses how the condition of statelessness has affected Kurds, and how statelessness has been constructed and experienced at an individual and collective level in the diaspora. It argues for an expanded definition of the international laws of 'stateless' person: adding to the accepted de jure and highly contested de facto definitions, by also suggesting a third, new, category of 'socially stateless' people. The article examines the concept of diaspora itself from the perspective of Kurdish interviewees and explores how, for stateless groups like Kurds, 'living in diaspora' can mean more than one place, including their land of origin. It will suggest the concept of 'double' or 'multiple' diasporas, where stateless people do not feel that they belong either to their country of origin or to the country in which they now live. This article discusses that when an ethnic community is stateless, then even those individuals who have an official nationality, citizenship or passport, may often describe themselves as stateless. The relationship between statelessness, diaspora and nationalism is highlighted; and the impact of this on diaspora involvement in homeland politics, conflict and peace is explored. The article also argues that the lack of protection which international law(s) offer around statelessness paradoxically create new forms of nationalism.

The social, economic, and political situations of Kurdistan and other areas in which Kurds live have changed drastically during the last decades. The Kurds are now almost totally autonomous in Northern Iraq, building state institutions in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan) and democratic autonomy in Northwest Kurdistan (eastern Anatolia). Politically, until the 1990s, Kurds were dominated and contentious players; today they are key players in the Near East. This paper considers Kurdish interactions with regional powers - Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria - and 'disputed boundaries', and the role of self-determination, autonomy and federalism in solving the Kurdish Question. Within the current context marked by political upheaval of the Kurds in some areas of Kurdistan and the continued repression of Kurds in other areas, I examine the potential for federal solutions to solve the Kurdish Question by giving Kurds regional autonomy within the state boundaries of Turkey.

Straddling four sovereign states, long time oppressed and subject of the worst atrocities which modern history has ever known, the Kurdish population makes news again in the hectic region of the Middle East and even at an international level.By the plurality of its communities and especially in the absence of a common regional Kurdish movement, the Kurdish conflict is now referred to as atransnational matter. Thus, in this rhythm, the Kurdish Government in Erbil is already emerging as a key element for the regional peace, and will, probably, find himself among the most powerful nations in the Middle East, thanks to his huge energetic resources, in the upcoming years. ; À cheval sur quatre États souverains, très longtemps opprimé et sujet des pires atrocités que l'histoire moderne n'ait jamais connu, la population kurde fait de nouveau parler d'elle dans la région mouvementée du Moyen-Orient, voire même au niveau international. De par la pluralité de ses communautés et surtout en l'absence d'un mouvement régional kurde commun, le conflit kurde est désormais qualifié de transnational. En effet, le Gouvernement Régional du Kurdistan est déjà en train de s'imposer comme étant un élément pacificateur régional incontournable, et ce grâce à ses ressources énormes en matières d'hydrocarbures.

Straddling four sovereign states, long time oppressed and subject of the worst atrocities which modern history has ever known, the Kurdish population makes news again in the hectic region of the Middle East and even at an international level.By the plurality of its communities and especially in the absence of a common regional Kurdish movement, the Kurdish conflict is now referred to as atransnational matter. Thus, in this rhythm, the Kurdish Government in Erbil is already emerging as a key element for the regional peace, and will, probably, find himself among the most powerful nations in the Middle East, thanks to his huge energetic resources, in the upcoming years. ; À cheval sur quatre États souverains, très longtemps opprimé et sujet des pires atrocités que l'histoire moderne n'ait jamais connu, la population kurde fait de nouveau parler d'elle dans la région mouvementée du Moyen-Orient, voire même au niveau international. De par la pluralité de ses communautés et surtout en l'absence d'un mouvement régional kurde commun, le conflit kurde est désormais qualifié de transnational. En effet, le Gouvernement Régional du Kurdistan est déjà en train de s'imposer comme étant un élément pacificateur régional incontournable, et ce grâce à ses ressources énormes en matières d'hydrocarbures.

The Kurdish people in the Middle East have played a valuable role in furthering U.S. policy interests in the region. The U.S. has aligned itself with various Kurdish groups in a series of strategic partnerships dating back to the early 1970s, yet has never considered the Kurdish nation an ally. As such, the U.S. has reneged on multiple different pacts with the Kurds and opened the door for state-sponsored conflict against a supposed ally, despite mutual interests between both groups. This thesis aimed to assign a formal role to the Kurds within U.S. foreign policy, and to analyze the function of the Kurdish minority in U.S. policy decisions in the Middle East. A historical process tracing model was utilized to sequence a history of numerous U.S.-Kurdish partnerships into careful description and analysis, namely to identify the relationship foundations and causal mechanisms driving the connection between both groups. Despite numerous different partnerships that proved beneficial to both groups, this thesis has found that the U.S. has in fact benefited from existing Kurdish vulnerability and the continuation of the Kurdish struggle in the Middle East. The ongoing Kurdish struggle has positioned the Kurds as valuable strategic partnerships in multiple different conflicts in the Middle East. Furthermore, this thesis finds that despite the U.S.-Kurdish connection, Kurdish policy goals aim to upset the greatest U.S. interest in the region, which is to secure state stability and ensure regional security. There exists an inverse relationship between Middle Eastern state stability and Kurdish influence and control in the region. Because of this, the Kurds find themselves in opposition to long-term U.S. policy interests in the Middle East, even though they have contributed multiple times to the defense and security of short-term U.S. goals in the region.

Der Nahe Osten erlebt einen nicht gekannten Aufschwung kurdischer Politik. Gleichzeitig stehen wichtige Weichenstellungen an. Im Irak hoffen die Kurdinnen und Kurden auf die Gelegenheit, ihre Unabhängigkeit zu erklären, was die Auflösung des Irak beschleunigen würde. In der Türkei sind der Ausgang der Verhandlungen zwischen der PKK und der Regierung und die Zukunft des Waffenstillstands offen. In Syrien werden die Kurdinnen und Kurden ohne Unterstützung des Westens ihre für autonom erklärten Siedlungsgebiete nicht halten können. Ein Rückzug der PYD würde dort mit der Gefahr einer weiteren Welle ethnischer Säuberungen einhergehen. Humanitäre Krisen um die Flüchtlinge aus Syrien und dem Irak, die Notwendigkeit zur Reetablierung einer regionalen Ordnung und die eigene energiepolitische Abhängigkeit zwingen Europa, sich über eine neue Kurdenpolitik Gedanken zu machen. Dabei kann sich europäische Kurdenpolitik nicht länger darauf fokussieren, das Vorgehen autoritärer Regime gegen ihre kurdischen Minderheiten zu unterstützen. Eine solche Politik hat längst ihr Potential zur Herstellung von Stabilität eingebüßt. Europäische Kurdenpolitik kann aber auch nicht allein darin bestehen, sich vorbehaltlos mit den jeweiligen politischen Forderungen der Kurdinnen und Kurden zu solidarisieren. Denn radikale Lösungen in der einen oder anderen Richtung bergen das größte Gewaltpotential in sich. Europäische Kurdenpolitik muss auf Ausgleich, Vermittlung und Deeskalation gerichtet sein. Sie kann indes nur funktionieren, wenn ihre Protagonistinnen und Protagonisten einerseits mehrere alternative Entwicklungsverläufe in ihre Überlegungen einbeziehen und wenn sie andererseits Kanäle für die Kommunikation mit allen Akteurinnen und Akteuren eröffnen - auch auf Seiten der Kurdinnen und Kurden. (SWP-Studien)

The promotion of nation-states and the spread of people's right to self-determination have led to the emergence of national and secessionist movements around the world and consequently impose a serious threat to the territorial integrity of the already established states. The Iraqi Kurds are one of these groups and have fought for their independence since the end of World War I. They were oppressed by successive Iraqi governments that did not recognize their national rights. The Kurdish struggle in Iraq reaped a limited autonomy in the 1970s but fell short of the expectation of the Kurds and was crippled by the insincerity of the Iraqi government and the interference of external powers. The greatest twentieth century development to the Kurdish status in Iraq took place following the Gulf War in the early 1990s when the Iraqi government was compelled to pull out of the three Kurdish provinces of Duhok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. As a result, the Kurds gained an opportunity to rule themselves separately from the Iraqi government and under the protection of the international community. They have established their own government and other state institutions and have managed to create the foundation of an entity which has become like a de facto state, but have so far failed to convert it into a de jure state. The purpose of this research is to examine the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's (KRI) endeavours of gaining recognition and its prospects of becoming an independent state. Like in other de facto states, the pursuit of international legitimacy was the main motivation behind the conduct and policy of KRI. The Kurds in Iraq have employed various legitimization strategies in their quest for recognition. Their justifications for claiming statehood include remedial secession, democracy and earned sovereignty, the right to external self-determination and Iraq's failure as their base state. The study is aimed to contribute to the study of de facto states in general, including their evolution and their legitimization strategies, and of the evolution of the KRI as a de facto state and the legitimization justifications it utilized particularly in its endeavor of claiming statehood. By examining the KRI from 1990 to 2018, the study resolves to explain the creation and evolution of the KRI as a de facto state and its pursuit of international recognition.

Für jede irakische Regierung standen zwei Probleme im Vordergrund, deren Lösung großen Mut und Verantwortungsbereitschaft und einen starken Rückhalt erfordert hätte. Das eine Anliegen bestand darin, die Entwicklung in allen Lebensbereichen des Landes aktiv voranzutreiben, und das andere darin, eine angemessene Regelung der Kurdenfrage herbeizuführen. Die Fragestellung der vorliegen Arbeit ist auf zwei Themenkomplexe gerichtet: Welche Hindernisse stellten sich der Entstehung eines kurdischen Staates in Süd-Kurdistan (heute Nord-Irak oder Irakisch-Kurdistan) nach dem Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs entgegen und weshalb konnte zwischen 1917 und 1990 trotz zahlreicher politischer Bemühungen keine Regelung des Kurden-Konfliktes im Irak herbeigeführt werden. Die Arbeit ist chronologisch aufgebaut. Außerdem wird auch ein kurzer Ausblick auf weitere Entwicklungen nach dem Untersuchungszeitraum gegeben.

The article considers factors determining the peculiarities of the integration processes in Iraqi Kurdistan. The formation of Iraqi Kurdistan as a social-political community was determined by the growth of national consciousness of the population of the autonomy, and by accelerating processes of self-determination under the influence of a number of external and internal reasons. The national identity of the Iraqi Kurds as a part of the Kurdish people is based on the same historical background, language, and culture, on the mental attribution of the Kurds to the single group, which is explained not only by historical facts, but also by a specific worldview and myths sometimes divorced from reality but rooted in the collective representations. The external pressure of direct aggression and political enforcement to the assimilation plays a key role in the consolidation of the Iraqi Kurds and in the growth of their national self-determination: the resistance to the common enemy strengthens the national identity of the Iraqi Kurds. The author examines factors both general for all the Kurds and specific for Iraqi Kurdistan, i.e. the strengthening of the common form of language through the education, literature and media institutions, and the development of economic relations and civil and political institutions, which is due to the autonomy status of Iraqi Kurdistan. The article identifies and examines objective reasons preventing intensive integration processes in the community of Iraqi Kurds, which are, on the one hand, the influence of the external forces including neighbor states, transnational corporations, the authorities of Baghdad, and the growing military aggression of the armed terrorist groups; on the other hand, the slowdown of integration processes inside Iraqi Kurdistan are due to the internal contradictions in the autonomy determined by the features of the social and political structure of the Kurd society, such as tribalism, immaturity of the political system, and ethnic and religious diversity.