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The Kurds inhabit an area known as Kurdistan, which roughly includes the Zagros and Taurus mountain ranges, and lies along the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Traditionally, the Kurds were nomadic pastoralists or settled agriculturalists, but now mainly live in settled agricultural communities with livestock. The Kurds are predominantly orthodox Sunni Muslims of the Shafi school, however, some tribes are Shiite (Busby, 1996). This entry focuses on the orthodox Sunni Muslim Kurds living in the town and vicinity of Rowanduz, Iraq, ca. 1950. The Kurdish religious beliefs are interwoven through many spheres of life. The religious group is coterminous with the society in the sense that the Kurds are not an autonomous political group, as, "the society is politically integrated with others in a pluralistic state within which it enjoys theoretically equal status (Column 1, Tuden and Marshall, 1972)." Therefore, religion is coterminous with Kurdish society aside from the polity, which is integrated with the Iraq government. ; Non UBC ; Unreviewed ; Other

At most times, Kurdish society has existed at the periphery of, and functioned as a buffer between, two or more neighbouring states. From c. 1500 until the First World War, the relevant states were the Ottoman Empire in the west and Safavid, later Qajar Iran in the east (with Russia and the British Empire gradually encroaching upon the region from the north and south, respectively). In the aftermath of the World War, Kurdistan was divided among four of the modern would-be nation states succeeding these empires, becoming a peripheral and often mistrusted region in each of them. All these states, whether empire or nation state, have exercised various forms of indirect rule over Kurdistan, which have had a profound impact on the social and political organisation of Kurdish society. The specific tribal formations that existed in Kurdish society in various historical periods were in important respects the products of the interaction of these states with Kurdish society.

What the Kurds of Iraq really need is a breakthrough on political formulas. What they need is a far-reaching change in their constitutional relationship with Iraq. This does not necessarily mean that they must have a state of their own, though a state of Kurdistan in which Kurds from Iraq, Turkey, and Iran are united has often been dreamed of. The issue today is not Kurdistan in the sense of a major rescrambling of boundaries. It is the demand of Iraqi Kurds for freedom from oppression. What their leaders are demanding is genuine autonomy within Iraq, guaranteed by UN presence and enshrined in international law.

Until a few years ago, Kurdish nationalism was the only movement in Turkey that openly defied the official doctrine that Turkey is a homogeneous nation-state. Informally, people would freely apply ethnic labels to their acquaintances; everybody was aware of the rich ethnic variety of the country, [2] but it was thought undesirable to acknowledge this and most people were reluctant or afraid to define themselves as anything but Turks. In the 1970s, Kurdish nationalists had begun challenging this official view, and in 1979 a cabinet minister caused a political scandal by calmly remarking that he too was a Kurd.[3] The military regime of 1980-83 made a last-ditch attempt to silence those Kurds who wished to be different, but its oppressive measures had the opposite effect of what was intended; they strengthened the Kurds' sense of their distinct identity and resulted in massive sympathy for the separatist PKK.

The social, economic, and political situations of Kurdistan and other areas in which Kurds live have changed drastically during the last decades. The Kurds are now almost totally autonomous in Northern Iraq, building state institutions in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan) and democratic autonomy in Northwest Kurdistan (eastern Anatolia). Politically, until the 1990s, Kurds were dominated and contentious players; today they are key players in the Near East. This paper considers Kurdish interactions with regional powers - Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria - and 'disputed boundaries', and the role of self-determination, autonomy and federalism in solving the Kurdish Question. Within the current context marked by political upheaval of the Kurds in some areas of Kurdistan and the continued repression of Kurds in other areas, I examine the potential for federal solutions to solve the Kurdish Question by giving Kurds regional autonomy within the state boundaries of Turkey.

The promotion of nation-states and the spread of people's right to self-determination have led to the emergence of national and secessionist movements around the world and consequently impose a serious threat to the territorial integrity of the already established states. The Iraqi Kurds are one of these groups and have fought for their independence since the end of World War I. They were oppressed by successive Iraqi governments that did not recognize their national rights. The Kurdish struggle in Iraq reaped a limited autonomy in the 1970s but fell short of the expectation of the Kurds and was crippled by the insincerity of the Iraqi government and the interference of external powers. The greatest twentieth century development to the Kurdish status in Iraq took place following the Gulf War in the early 1990s when the Iraqi government was compelled to pull out of the three Kurdish provinces of Duhok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. As a result, the Kurds gained an opportunity to rule themselves separately from the Iraqi government and under the protection of the international community. They have established their own government and other state institutions and have managed to create the foundation of an entity which has become like a de facto state, but have so far failed to convert it into a de jure state. The purpose of this research is to examine the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's (KRI) endeavours of gaining recognition and its prospects of becoming an independent state. Like in other de facto states, the pursuit of international legitimacy was the main motivation behind the conduct and policy of KRI. The Kurds in Iraq have employed various legitimization strategies in their quest for recognition. Their justifications for claiming statehood include remedial secession, democracy and earned sovereignty, the right to external self-determination and Iraq's failure as their base state. The study is aimed to contribute to the study of de facto states in general, including their evolution and their legitimization strategies, and of the evolution of the KRI as a de facto state and the legitimization justifications it utilized particularly in its endeavor of claiming statehood. By examining the KRI from 1990 to 2018, the study resolves to explain the creation and evolution of the KRI as a de facto state and its pursuit of international recognition.

The Syrian uprising in 2011 opened a door and paved the way for Syrian Kurds to reorganize themselves and retake their homeland from the Syrian regime. The Syrian crisis had not been concluded when another problem emerged, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which was very strong and a risk for the world at large. The international community turned its attention to the decline of, and ending the threat of ISIS to the region. To that end, the U.S has made a coalition to confront the risks of the terror group, but the U.S has not sought to engage in the war directly with its troops. The U.S strategy has been supporting groups by airstrikes, providing weapons and looking for a reliable and powerful group in Syria capable of ending ISIS"s threat. After the defense skills displayed by Syrian Kurds (PYD) in Kobane in 2014, the U.S came to understand that the Kurds are the best option for cooperation against the brutal group, ISIS. On the other hand, the Syrian Kurds needed and tried to get support for fighting ISIS because they did not have enough weapons, ammunition and any international support. In addition, the Syrian Kurds have had some enemies in the region making it necessary for the Kurds to align themselves with the U.S in order to protect from other foes and getting help for fighting ISIS and other groups. The United States and PYD established their relations in 2014. The relationship is beneficial for both sides as for the U.S, ending the threats of ISIS was necessary and for PYD ending ISIS, getting support and protection from other groups and states like Turkey, is also necessary. I hypothesize that in this relationship; the PYD could exploit the situation for their goals and realize the advantages. ; ÖZ: 2011 yılında Suriye"de yaşanan ayaklanma, Suriye Kürtlerinin yeniden organize olarak Suriye rejiminden kendi topraklarını geri almalarına imkân ve olanak sağlamıştır. Suriye krizi, tüm dünyayı tehdit eden ve çok güçlü olan Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti"nin (İŞİD) ortaya çıkışıyla sonuçlanamamıştır. Uluslararası toplum dikkatini İŞİD"in bölgede yarattığı tehdide son vermeye çevirmiştir. Bu maksatla ABD, söz konusu terör örgütünün yarattığı tehditleri bertaraf etmek için bir koalisyon oluşturdu ancak ABD, askeri birlikleriyle doğrudan savaşa girmeyi istememektedir. ABD; hava saldırıları, silah teminatı ile grupları destekleme stratejisi izlemiştir ve Suriye"de İŞİD tehdidine son verebilecek güvenilir ve kuvvetli bir grup aramıştır. 2014 yılında Kobane"de Suriye Kürtlerinin (PYD) gösterdiği başarılı savunma becerilerinden sonra ABD vahşi İŞİD grubuna karşı işbirliği yapabilecekleri en iyi seçeneğin Kürtler olduğunu anlamıştır. Diğer yandan Suriye Kürtlerinin İŞİD ile savaşmaları için desteğe ihtiyaçları vardı çünkü yeterli silahları, mühimmatları yoktu ve uluslararası desteğe sahip değillerdi. Bunlara ek olarak Suriye Kürtleri, kendilerini bölgedeki diğer düşmanlarından korumak ve İŞİD ile diğer gruplarla savaşmak için ABD ile ittifak yapmaya ihtiyaç duymaktaydı. Bu ilişki her iki taraf için de faydalıdır. ABD için İŞİD tehdidinin ortadan kaldırılması gerekliyken PYD"nin hem İŞİD faaliyetlerine son vermek hem de Türkiye gibi diğer bölgesel devlet ve gruplardan korunmak için desteğe ihtiyacı vardı. Bu çalışmadaki hipotezim, PYD bu durumu kendi hedefleri doğrultusunda kullanarak avantajlarından faydalanacaktır. ; Master of Arts in International Relations. Thesis (M.A.)--Eastern Mediterranean University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Dept. of International Relations, 2017. Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. John Turner.

The AKP (Justice and Development Party) government in Turkey was committed from the very beginning of its rule to address the longstanding Kurdish issue in a conciliatory approach rather than a confrontational one, rejecting the Kemalist governments" dead-end conflict policies. However, the collapse of the Peace Process in September 2014, which followed the spill-over of the Syrian Civil War and the developments related to the Kurdish town of Kobane in northern Syria, have marked the end of this particular attempt to solve the Kurdish issue, probably ending any potential productive dialogue between AKP and the militant Kurds. The aim of this article is to study the AKP government policy towards Turkey"s Kurdish population, from the early and ambitious years, all the way to the Kurdish referendum in Iraq and the effects of the regionalisation of Turkey"s Kurdish issue. There are two questions to be addressed: To what extent is the Syria War to blame for the failure and the subsequent shift of the government"s policy to the old, confrontational approach? How much of this could be a predetermined political decision, related to Ankara"s internal politics, rendering the process Turkey"s Kurds expendable?

The diplomatic conflict that exists between the government in Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government impacts relations of both authorities at the international diplomatic level. As the case of Polish-Iraqi relations demonstrates, meaningful and effective involvement with the KRG is obstructed and sometimes impossible because of the ongoing Baghdad-Erbil conflict and the continuous possibility of the KRG seceding from Iraq. With the dynamics of Iraq changing post Maliki, it is important for these diplomatic relations to change accordingly, both internally and externally, in order to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq

International and regional organizations can act as persuasive actors with regard to minority rights in a given country by raising awareness, putting theissue on agenda, and endorsing a new platform in a country which may lead toa policy change. Despite the general observation that Turkey's Europeanization process has had limited impact on the minority issues in Turkey, there arenumerous examples that the European Union (EU) has played a constructiverole in improving of rights and fundamental freedoms for the Kurdish populaceliving in Turkey. The Law on Compensation for Damage Arising from Terrorpassed in 2004 is a case worth addressing in order to ascertain both the symbolic and discursive policy change. The aim of this article is to explain how theEU used democratic tools to promote change in Turkey's political structure forthe displaced Kurds. The Europeanization of Turkey, based on specific conditionality, is taken as primarily responsible for granted for the shift and thepolicy change. In this policy-oriented case study, hypotheses from Rationalistand Constructivist Approaches in Europeanization literature are investigated toexplain the causes and constitutive relations of the policy shift from repudiateto compensation.

The Kurds are an ethnic group that has experienced significant friction with other countries, such as Persia, Arabia, the Mongols, and Turkey. However, the Kurds and the Ottoman Empire have established completely distinct relations, including the mutual attraction of the Islamic Faith, school of thought, and the problem of nationalism. Although Islam does not discern according to the ethnicity people belong to, it is a devotion that distinguishes their degree before God. Therefore, this article attempts to examine how the Kurds have been able to survive under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire, which was formerly considered as a substitute for the previous Islamic caliphate that ruled based on shari'a. The study discovered that the political and legal transformation in the body of the Ottoman Empire made the Kurds extremely depressed and agitated. This brought about the rise of their nationalism and intention to establish an independent state. Unfortunately, it was difficult to realize since the region's map is shaped by the winning countries of World War I, which did not recognize the so-called Kurdistan State. Also, the surrounding countries, such as Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq, did not want to lose their territory.

For years the Syrian Kurds were referred to as the 'forgotten Kurds' since they attracted very little attention from researchers and public media. The civil war in Syria, which broke out in 2011, changed all this. Thus, the Syrian Kurds proved to be the most effective tactical allies to the American-led coalition against the Islamic State on the Syrian front of the battle. How come the 'forgotten Kurds' suddenly became world-stage actors? This brief traces the development of a Syrian Kurdish political identity from the first attempts to unite the Kurds living in Syria after the World War I to the mobilisation of the Syrian Kurds during the current Syrian civil war. The brief examines how regime repression and lack of external support for the Kurdish struggle in Syria made the Syrian Kurds prefer non-violent action and complicity with the regime from the time of independence and onwards. It also examines how the civil war paved the way for a more assertive political identity as the Syrian regime withdrew from the Kurdish areas and the international coalition chose the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia as tactical allies in the war against the Islamic State. The brief also displays that the Syrian Kurds are divided along political lines. Some Kurds are fighting for the so-called 'Rojava revolution' in the autonomous Kurdish regions, others participate in the Geneva peace talks as part of the Syrian opposition, yet others act as independent actors advocating liberal democracy and human rights.

For the past twelve years, the Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed selfgovernment in at least part of their homelands; the Kurdishadministered enclave was to most purposes an independent state although it lacked all forms of international recognition. The Kurdish leaders never stopped proclaiming that they had no ambitions to separate from Iraq permanently; their stated political objectives could be summarized in the slogan "democracy for all of Iraq, and autonomy for Kurdistan." And there is much, indeed, that ties the Kurds to the rest of Iraq: a common history and common perceptions such as result from enculturation in the same educational system, listening to and watching the same media, and decades of taking part in the same political system.

The aim of this paper is to examine the dominant ideology and official discourse in Turkey and its representation and exclusion of Kurdish identity and culture. We will attempt to do this in three parts. In the first part, we will look at the historical development and the implementation of the Turkish official discourse and its core element, that of Turkish nationalism. We will here examine the elimination of the Kurdish identity, language, and culture through the official Turkish discourse. In the second part we will focus on the Turkish official discourse today, in particular on the constitutional changes made in order to comply with EU legislation and on the differences between the new Turkish laws, their implementation and their violation by Turkish police and military. It is mainly in part three that the role of the European Union and its discourse will enter our analysis. This section will explore the clash between the Turkish official discourse and the discourse of the European Union on issues such as minorities, democracy and human rights. Such a clash provides the ideal platform to explore and examine the nature of Turkish official discourse today. Our discussion is based on Althusser's and Foucault's notions of ideology and discourse, and on Said's elaboration of Orientalism.

Since the very early stages of Arabic historiography in the ninth century, the Kurds have been mentioned by several authors. According to the texts, these populations, described as being fierce and rough, lived in the mountainous regions of the Middle East from Fârs to the Taurus. The area or field of action crossed by the Kurdish tribes is an always shifting tribal and political space, not an area over which military domination or political sovereignty is necessarily applied. During the twelfth century, Arabic literary sources seem to describe a reduction of what might be called the "tribal territory of the Kurds". This phenomenon follows a political reshuffling born of Turkmen infiltrations and the counter-crusades led by the Zankid rulers resulting in the emergence of the Ayyubid dynasty. During the Mamluk era, Mongols and Mamluks battled with each other, with the "tribal territory of the Kurds" lying at the boundary of these two entities. This paper will address the problems posed by the textual approach. I will recall the polysemy implied by the word "Kurd" and discuss the question of Kurdish "ethnicity" during the Middle Ages, the criteria for it, and the manifestation of the sense of group belonging. The use made of the words bilâd al-akrâd and zûzân al-akrâd in Arabic medieval literary sources will be analysed. Which space do they designate? What do they imply? I will argue that these designations are not an administrative or a literary abstraction. I will also address another problem: the separation between Zagrosian and Ciszagrosian Kurdish tribal territory that appears in the texts. I will then describe the territorial dynamics and the spatial reorderings of the regions inhabited by the Kurds from the 11th to the 14th century, drawing a map of the Kurdish settlements or nomadic spaces and showing the changes inside a broader social and political configuration. Thanks to al-'Umarî's Masâlik al-Absar which lists many Kurdish tribes, I will discuss the anchoring of these populations and the rebirth of a tribal political anchoring in these regions during the Mamluk period. Lastly, I will try to embrace the subjective dimension of the attachment of the Kurds to a specific territory. Is there evidence of a sense of belonging to this territory? What is the link between the latter and the Kurds in Syria and Egypt?