Suchergebnisse

Uz temeljna ustavna načela vladavine prava i podjele vlasti, načelo kolektivne i pojedinačne ministarske odgovornosti jamac je demokratskog legitimiteta uprave, koji leži u neprekinutom lancu delegacije i odgovornosti od birača prema parlamentu, od parlamenta do ministra te od ministra kroz sve razine uprave do razine najbliže građanima. U ovom radu razmatra se ustavnopravna osnovanost demokratskog legitimiteta neovisnih regulatornih tijela, s posebnim osvrtom na načelo ministarske odgovornosti. Poredbeno se obrađuju primjeri iz europskih država, gdje neovisnost regulatornih tijela ne zadire u temeljna ustavna načela. Zaključno se nastoji utvrditi u kojoj mjeri formalno utvrđena politička neovisnost jamči takvu neovisnost u materijalnom smislu te se razmatraju neke od najutjecajnijih teorija koje o svrsi osnivanja neovisnih regulatornih tijela nudi politička znanost. ; In addition to the fundamental constitutional principles of the rule of law and separation of powers, the principle of collective and individual ministerial responsibility is the guarantee of the democratic legitimacy of administration that lies in the unbroken chains of delegation and accountability from voters to Parliament, from Parliament to the minister, and from the minister through all levels of administration, to the level closest to citizens. This paper examines the theoretical constructions of the democratic legitimacy of independent regulatory authorities from the constitutionalist point of view, with particular reference to the principle of ministerial responsibility. It further discusses comparative examples from European countries where the independence of the regulatory authorities does not violate fundamental constitutional principles. In conclusion, this paper seeks to determine the extent to which formally established political independence guarantees such independence in the material sense, bearing in mind some of the most influential theories on the purpose of the establishment of independent regulatory authorities

Ovaj rad ispituje pravne odraze autonomije političkog predstavništva u kontekstu tekuće pandemije. U njemu se iz vizure ustavne teorije razmatraju dva događaja. Jedan je odluka Ustavnog suda o izbornosti uvjeta ograničenja temeljnih prava. Drugi su građanske inicijative kojima se Sabor nastoji prisiliti na pridržavanje tih uvjeta. Koristeći koncept ustavne šutnje kao instrument, ova se dva razvoja povezuje kako bi se istražilo prostore koje Ustav Republike Hrvatske ostavlja političkim praksama, ali i moguće djelovanje građanskih inicijativa na njih. Svrha je toga tvrditi da se građanske inicijative ne može smatrati neustavnima ako ne pokušavaju nadglasati legitimne ustavne šutnje političkog predstavništva. ; In this paper author explores the legal dimensions of the autonomy of the legislature in the context of the current pandemic. The paper is situated in Croatian constitutional theory and is written against the background of two developments. The first one is a decision of the Constitutional Court of Croatia that authorized the Croatian parliament to avoid a more demanding procedure for adopting the restrictions of fundamental rights enacted in the pandemic. The second development is the use of ballot initiatives to force the parliament to adhere to this procedure. Using the concept of constitutional silences as a tool, I bring these two developments together to explore what are the spaces for unwritten political rules left by the Croatian Constitution and how does the ballot initiative challenge them. I do this to argue that ballot initiatives should not be considered unconstitutional when they do not attempt to override legitimate constitutional silences of parliamentary representation.

In the second part of the text the author looks into the paradox of the concept of justice as discerned by Jacques Derrida, & analyzes the tradition of the European constitutional law. Since the constitution & politics are discordant & semantically irritating mediums, the author argues that the European Union is an open semantic relationship of legal acquisitions & political processes. The European Union should be explained by means of contemporary, postmodernist theories derived from the linguistic & deconstructivist reversals of the modern substantial rationalism, universalism & cosmopolitism. Consequently, the constitution & the law are not underpinned by the political or any other specific power; on the contrary, it is the unspecific power of the constitution & the law that enables the gradual development & strengthening of the European law & the constitution without the extra constitutional authorities as the disguised power that traditionally legitimizes law. References. Adapted from the source document.

Having in mind the long evolution of constitutions & constitutional politics & the universal appeal of the process of the interplay between virtue & demagogy that occurs during presidential elections, the author touches on several topics. The first are the standard "dogmatic" comparative provisions regarding the election of the head of state which the author looks into through the constitutional-legal prism of the so called selection effect. As the institution of the president of the republic exists in many constitutions & is thus among the most significant institutionalized aspects of political & social life of every country, the author focuses on the extent in which that institution in the electoral context contributes to the affirmation of republicanism, democracy & public sphere. The author concludes that the election of presidents & the effects of electoral selection, among other things, affect the process of political integration that ought -- to not only in Croatia but everywhere & due to a plethora of reasons -- promote the universally accepted ontological principles of contemporary constitutional-democratic state. Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

Due to the historical experience with the Weimar Republic, some abiding constitutional principles have been built into the new Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (its Fundamental Law). Instead of the positivist & formalistic interpretation of democracy of the Weimar Constitution, the authors of the Fundamental Law have opted for the concept of the so-called "militant democracy" i.e. democracy firmly linked to certain values. The concept of "militant democracy" is found in a number of articles in the German Fundamental Law, as a preemptive protection of democracy & a bulwark against extremist positions even before extremist groups break any law. The concept of "militant democracy" is based on the democratic theoretical & sociological-philosophical assumptions by Karl Loewenstein & Karl Mannheim. They have been converted into constitutional practice & incorporated into the Gennan Fundamental Law. However, the instruments of "militant democracy" do not include only the protective measures stipulated by the Constitution but an array of other measures of different intensity. Various instruments of "militant democracy" meant to protect democracy in the FR of Germany are described & include the discursive, penal-legal, administrative & constitutional-legal protection of democracy. The instruments of the protection of democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany are not unique, but some instruments e.g. the possibility of banning political parties are very rare in western democracies. & finally, this situation is briefly compared to the situation in some western & postcommunist democracies. References. Adapted from the source document.

Based on Paul Feyerabend's distinction between guided & free exchange, the author argues that the accession of the post-communist states to the European Union took the form of the former kind, i.e. the form of communication where all participants in the process voluntarily embrace the meaning of law developed through inter-institutional discourse within the European Union. However, due to the nature of European law which does not apply to the purely internal situations in the Member States, a completely guided exchange between the EU & candidate countries is not possible. The author holds that the unity of, & loyalty towards, the European constitutional framework in an enlarged European Union is best served by the discoursive construction of the meaning of constitutional choices, principles & rules. References. Adapted from the source document.

Iako su SAD jedna od država koja ne predviđa oblike neposredne demokracije na razini federacije, ustavi članica američke federacije prihvaćaju instituciju ustavne i zakonodavne inicijative – jedan od ključnih elemenata za njihovo razlikovanje od Ustava SAD-a. Građani 24 savezne države SAD-a neposredno su od 1904. do kraja 2005. odlučivali o 2.155 ustavnih i zakonskih prijedloga, u 21. stoljeću Amerikanci očekuju širenje novog ustavnog populizma – uporabe institucija neposredne demokracije. Autorice tumače ustavna rješenja i stvarne učinke primjene navedenih institucijana oblikovanje državne politike u tim državama. ; Although the USA is one of the states that does not have provisions for the forms of direct democracy at federal level, the constitutions of American federal states have accepted the institute of constitutional and legal initiative, which is one of the key elements that differs them from the Constitution of the United States of America. The citizens of 24 American federal states directly decided about 2,155 constitutional and law drafts between 1904 and 2005. The American people expect the institutions of direct democracy to be used more extensively in the 21st century. The authors explain constitutional solutions and the effects of implementation of these institutes on the shaping of state policies in the respective federal states. The institute is used for bypassing the state legislatures in order to limit their freedom of action by constitutionalising the political choices. Tax- -reduction initiatives limit the revenues legislatures can levy and spend, and thus control the damage. This institute is becoming a means of launching changes in different public areas, such as taxes and expenditures, campaign financing, public education. However, the state legislatures can limit effects of the successful initiatives by withholding financial aid necessary for their implementation. State policy does not finish at the moment the initiatives are adopted by citizens. Sanctions depend on citizens' ability to establish the facts about the compliance with the decisions made by direct citizens' participation, and on clarity of the texts adopted by initiatives.

U tekstu se rastvara pojam "dekonstrukcije" administrativne države u SAD-u kao njen reprezentativni primjer. Polazeći od dominacije moderne administrativne države, puna slika suvremenog konstitucionalizma u SAD-u mora uključivati administrativni konstitucionalizam kao svekoliko razumijevanje i interpretaciju suvremene administrativne države i njene strukture od strane agencija i drugih aktivnih aktera upravnoga prava. Administrativni konstitucionalizam danas je jedan od najintenzivnije izučavanih predmeta istraživanja komparativnog ustavnog i upravnog prava. Razlog egzegeze ovoga pitanja nisu samo njegove različite dimenzije već i činjenica da on predstavlja glavni mehanizam kojim se danas elaborira i implementira ustavno značenje. ; This paper opens up the concept of "deconstruction "of administrative states in the USA as its representative example. Starting from the domination of a modern administrative state, the full picture of modern constitutionalism in the USA must include administrative constitutionalism as overall understanding and interpretation of a modern administrative state and its structure by agencies and other active participants in administrative law. Administrative constitutionalism is today one of the most intensively studied subjects of investigation of comparative constitutional and administrative law. The reason for exegesis of this issue is not only its various dimensions but also the fact that it represents the main mechanism which today elaborates and implements constitutional meaning.

The successive stages of development of constitutional democracy in the USA, in particular the experience of "judicial supervision paradox," show us that the U.S. Supreme Court performed at least two different functions: (1) norm enforcement, & (2) policy-making through re-examination & interpretation of the Constitution & the laws in cases brought before the Court. Dissent among American legal experts related to this & other matters prove that debates on judicial activism are not a thing of the past. Still, both advocates & critics of judicial activism share the view that judges have been an important part of the American constitutional process since its inception. The Marbury v. Madison case (1803) affirmed the institution of judicial supervision & denoted a gradual shift of judicial power into the field of public law. Thus further expansion & transformation of judicial power was made possible. In this article, the author establishes a connection between judicial activism & judicial supervision, & adheres to the standpoint that the "judicializing aspect of modern liberalism" deserves as much attention as any other aspect of democratization. Adapted from the source document.

The author argues that democracy is not appropriate for the resolution of the relationship between law & the democratically conditioned state authority in the multinational Europe. The so-called democratic deficit should be understood not only as the empirical fact of a multinational Europe, but also as a paradoxical structural attribute of modern political thought from Kant until today. The author claims that the people should not rule as they might violate all the laws they enacted themselves. Thus the question of the equality of citizens cannot be a democratic one but legal & constitutional. Democracy cannot lay claim to be the sole provider of the legal equality of citizens just as law cannot be the only arbiter in making democratic distinctions among them. Since democracy should be understood as an independent autopoietic & autoimmune medium relatively independent of political power & legal constraints as its setting, the author concludes that the existing forms of immediate & representative democracy, as well as of the traditional form of democratic decision/making represent a risk of regressive progress in Europe in the direction of democracy limited by nation, religion or by class. Adapted from the source document.

Ustavna demokracija opis je, obilježje, ali "i počelo, i cilj" suvremenih država civilizacijskoga kruga kojem RH pripada. Sama demokracija kao oblik vladavine u idealnom je slučaju asimptotski proces stalna usavršavanja. Isto vrijedi i za ustavnost. Dakako, ti procesi nipošto nisu ireverzibilni. I dok je u suvremeno doba u biti nemoguće povući potpun i oštar rez između pridjeva i imenice spomenute sintagme "ustavna demokracija", namjera je ovog rada promotriti prevladavajuće procese razvoja ustavnosti u našoj državi kako bismo upozorili na prijeteće točke, ali i na važne potencijale za buduća postupanja državnih tijela i samih građana. Identifikacija problema u svojevrsnom Dunning-Kruger sindromu pretpolitičkog stanja svijesti znatna dijela društvene potke u RH čini evoluciju ustavne vladavine osobito kompleksnom i nipošto izvjesnom. Dopuštamo si blag optimizam s obzirom na dosadašnje korake te podsjećanje na to da demokratski i ustavni procesi općenito nisu linearni. Ipak, stanje opasne stagnacije i zaglavljenost u glibu koruptivno-klijentelističkog mentaliteta nalaže ozbiljan i interdisciplinarni pristup svladavanju problema. Osnovno je pitanje ovdje kako ustavno pravo može doskočiti rečenim izazovima te koji su potrebni i mogući koraci u tom smjeru. U radu prvo analiziramo stvarnu vrijednost konstitucionalizma u našoj državi, i to preko njegova pozitivnog i negativnog naboja. Potom upozoravamo na uzroke identificiranih izazova koje nalazimo u stanju hrvatskoga društva i u refleksiji takva stanja u nedavnom djelovanju najviših državnih institucija. Ističemo bitnost preuzimanja institucijske i građanske odgovornosti. Imajući u vidu notornu potrebu ustavne revizije, fokusiramo se na formativno-edukativni potencijal budućega ustavotvornog procesa. Ustav bez odgovarajućeg stupnja internalizacije državnih tijela i građana ne može živjeti. Odgoj i obrazovanje za ustavnu demokraciju ostaju kamen temeljac funkcionirajućega društva. Na kraju predlažemo i dodatan sinergijski angažman sveučilišne zajednice. ; Constitutional democracy is a description, a characteristic, but it is also the "foundation and goal" of contemporary civilizations which Croatia belongs to. Democracy itself, as a form of governance, is ideally an asymptotic process of constant improvement. The same goes for constitutionality. These processes, however, are not irreversible. While it is impossible to draw a complete and sharp demarcation line between the adjective and the noun in the "constitutional democracy" syntagm, the aim of this paper is to look into predominant processes of constitutional development in Croatia not only in order to point out challenges, but also to draw attention to important potential for the future functioning both of the state and its citizens. A major problem is identified as a form of Dunning-Kruger syndrome of pre-political state of mind of a significant part of the social matrix in the Republic of Croatia that in turn renders the evolution of constitutional governance particularly complex and not at all certain. We allow a mild optimism given the previous steps and remembering that democratic and constitutional processes are not linear. However, the state of dangerous stagnation and immersion in the corruptive-clientelistic mentality calls for serious and interdisciplinary approach to this problem. The fundamental question remains: to what extent can constitutional law provide remedies to these challenges and what are the necessary steps in that direction? The paper firstly analyses the actual value of constitutionalism in Croatia through its positive and negative aspects. Then we turn to the causes of problems we have identified. We find them both in the state of the social matrix and reflections of this state in recent acts of the highest state institutions. The importance of assigning institutional and civil responsibility is particularly pointed out. Keeping in mind a notorious need for constitutional revision, we focus on formative and educational potential of the future constitution-making process. A constitution cannot prosper without an adequate level of internalization on the level of state bodies, but also of its citizens. Education and understanding of constitutional democracy remain the corner-stones of a functioning society. At the end we propose a synergy of members of academic institutions for an additional beneficial effect.

Although our talk about human rights is part of the ethical awareness of contemporary politics, it still has not received adequate theoretical justification & foundation. Serious philosophical problems arose in the very beginning of the history of the "human rights" concept, with Locke's liberal natural right & Kant's reasonable right. According to the author, the difficulty stems from the concept of person, for in every liberal legal theory the person is perceived as bearer of human & fundamental rights. Meanwhile, the dominant constitutional theory of human & fundamental rights starts from the identical meanings of "person" as an individual, in its uniqueness, & of "man" as a general definition. It is, however, necessary to start from the fundamental difference between the two key concepts. While the "man" concept is defined universalistically, there is no universal concept for persons & no possibility of breaking them down into subcategories. While every individual, as instance of the concept, must be defined in the same way as everyone else, persons are defined individualistically; each person is a unique individual which can be neither duplicated nor multiplied. The author proposes a solution of the fundamental rights problem-matter within the framework of constitutional law. Personal rights are brought to existence as follows: organs of the state, in accordance with positive law, give to the individual the title of state-citizen as an individualistically unique legal person. Everyone receives it, in the same way, as a unique & irreplaceable person. In the normal conditions, the state has the obligation to make sure, via courts & the police, that everyone's personal right is untouchable. On the basis of this logic, a demarcation line can be drawn between the personal fundamental rights & the collective rights of citizens (such as political rights, which the individual can practice only together with others). Only such an interpretation would provide our libertarian fundamental rights with a consistently secular character, with no concession to the internal attachment, in whichever way it may be concealed, to metaphysical or religious presuppositions. Adapted from the source document.