Suchergebnisse

In 1970 Belgium established three Communities: the French, Flemish and German-speaking Communities. It was then in 1980 that three regions were set up: Walloon, Flemish and Brussels. Further amendments to the Constitution were made on 7 and 15 July 1988, as well as a special law of 8 August 1988 amending the original law of 8 August 1980. It is essential to say that most of the changes and principles governing the organisation and functioning of both the three Communities and the three regions date back to 1970 and 1980. The international nature of the Community's role in 1970 is significant. In 1980, an Arbitration Court was provided for by the Constitution and established to settle conflicts between the laws and decrees of the Communities and the Regions. The Federal State is characterised by two features: autonomy and co-operation. In 1988, the Arbitration Court continued the work of constitutional justice and verifies the conformity of laws or decrees with the provisions of international law and in particular European law. ; En 1970 la Belgique a instauré trois Communautés : les Communautés française, flamande et germanophone. Puis c'est en 1980 que se sont mises en place trois Régions : wallonne, flamande et bruxelloise. De nouveaux amendements à la Constitution ont été faits le 7 et le 15 juillet 1988, ainsi qu'une loi spéciale du 8 août 1988 qui est venue modifier la loi originale du 8 août 1980. Il est indispensable de dire que l'essentiel des changements et des principes d'organisation et de fonctionnement des trois Communautés aussi bien que des trois Régions datent de 1970 et de 1980. Le caractère international du rôle que les Communautés ont joué en 1970 est significatif. En 1980, une Cour d'arbitrage a été prévue par la Constitution et créée afin de régler les conflits entre les lois et les décrets des Communautés et des Régions. L'Etat fédéral se caractérise par deux traits : l'autonomie et la co-opération. En 1988 la Cour d'arbitrage poursuit l'oeuvre de justice constitutionnelle et vérifie la ...

1 towards new constitutional politics of citizenship, identity and minority protection1.1 introduction: remarks on terminology; 1.2 erosion of the foundations of the classical concept of citizenship; 1.3 devaluation and extension of citizenship; 1.4 citizenship and democracy; 1.5 multiculturalism and minority rights; 1.6 conclusion; 2 strong religion and weak minorities: a cautionary tale from europe; 2.1 de-privatized religion: a challenge to public reason; 2.2 the illusion of religious pluralism: jewish schools and muslim veils.

The present book invites the reader to rethink some questions raised in EU external relations law in the light of recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice, from the perspective of the constitutional foundations of the Union. The various chapters invite the reader to take a look at the balance between the specific legal regime for EU external action and the constitutional fundamentals of the EU legal order such as: the principles of conferral, loyalty, and institutional balance, as well as the rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights protection. The accommodation between specificity and fundamental principles is, thus, a transversal constitutional issue.

The present book invites the reader to rethink some questions raised in EU external relations law in the light of recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice, from the perspective of the constitutional foundations of the Union. The various chapters invite the reader to take a look at the balance between the specific legal regime for EU external action and the constitutional fundamentals of the EU legal order such as: the principles of conferral, loyalty, and institutional balance, as well as the rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights protection. The accommodation between specificity and fundamental principles is, thus, a transversal constitutional issue

The present thesis proposes to return to the place of fiction within constitutional law. It will be a question here of considering fiction as a tool used by the constitutional judge in order to respond to the specificities of the supreme norm. Although fiction is never invoked by the judge, it remains present in his reasoning. The research work that has been written attempts to come back to the constituent's relations with regard to fiction, which allows the constitutional text a certain flexibility, necessary to be part of a logic of sustainability. The Constitution occupies a special place within the legal order. It would have such a value that it would become unalterable. Nevertheless, this specificity would have an impact on its practice, in particular when the supreme standard would be confronted with the evolutions of the company. Fiction would offer an alternative to the constitutional judge to apply the values provided for by the standard, while allowing him to free himself from the rigidity imposed by the written word.However, there is no question of proposing a cataloging of different fictions, which would potentially be used. It will be a question here of observing the logics, which can animate, for example, the constitutional judge, when he uses, consciously or not, fiction. The place of fiction within the supreme norm appears to be revealing of the very nature of law. An opposition would thus be created, between the law which is considered as the representation of the real and the fiction, which leads the constitutional judge on more uncertain grounds. Fiction, however, appears to be a necessity since it makes it possible to transcribe and support the logic of the constitutional judge. This thought becomes intelligible in order to allow a better understanding of constitutional law. ; La présente thèse se propose de revenir sur la place de la fiction au sein du droit constitutionnel. Il sera ici question de considérer la fiction comme un outil employé par le juge constitutionnel, afin de répondre aux ...

The present thesis proposes to return to the place of fiction within constitutional law. It will be a question here of considering fiction as a tool used by the constitutional judge in order to respond to the specificities of the supreme norm. Although fiction is never invoked by the judge, it remains present in his reasoning. The research work that has been written attempts to come back to the constituent's relations with regard to fiction, which allows the constitutional text a certain flexibility, necessary to be part of a logic of sustainability. The Constitution occupies a special place within the legal order. It would have such a value that it would become unalterable. Nevertheless, this specificity would have an impact on its practice, in particular when the supreme standard would be confronted with the evolutions of the company. Fiction would offer an alternative to the constitutional judge to apply the values provided for by the standard, while allowing him to free himself from the rigidity imposed by the written word.However, there is no question of proposing a cataloging of different fictions, which would potentially be used. It will be a question here of observing the logics, which can animate, for example, the constitutional judge, when he uses, consciously or not, fiction. The place of fiction within the supreme norm appears to be revealing of the very nature of law. An opposition would thus be created, between the law which is considered as the representation of the real and the fiction, which leads the constitutional judge on more uncertain grounds. Fiction, however, appears to be a necessity since it makes it possible to transcribe and support the logic of the constitutional judge. This thought becomes intelligible in order to allow a better understanding of constitutional law. ; La présente thèse se propose de revenir sur la place de la fiction au sein du droit constitutionnel. Il sera ici question de considérer la fiction comme un outil employé par le juge constitutionnel, afin de répondre aux ...

The present thesis proposes to return to the place of fiction within constitutional law. It will be a question here of considering fiction as a tool used by the constitutional judge in order to respond to the specificities of the supreme norm. Although fiction is never invoked by the judge, it remains present in his reasoning. The research work that has been written attempts to come back to the constituent's relations with regard to fiction, which allows the constitutional text a certain flexibility, necessary to be part of a logic of sustainability. The Constitution occupies a special place within the legal order. It would have such a value that it would become unalterable. Nevertheless, this specificity would have an impact on its practice, in particular when the supreme standard would be confronted with the evolutions of the company. Fiction would offer an alternative to the constitutional judge to apply the values provided for by the standard, while allowing him to free himself from the rigidity imposed by the written word.However, there is no question of proposing a cataloging of different fictions, which would potentially be used. It will be a question here of observing the logics, which can animate, for example, the constitutional judge, when he uses, consciously or not, fiction. The place of fiction within the supreme norm appears to be revealing of the very nature of law. An opposition would thus be created, between the law which is considered as the representation of the real and the fiction, which leads the constitutional judge on more uncertain grounds. Fiction, however, appears to be a necessity since it makes it possible to transcribe and support the logic of the constitutional judge. This thought becomes intelligible in order to allow a better understanding of constitutional law. ; La présente thèse se propose de revenir sur la place de la fiction au sein du droit constitutionnel. Il sera ici question de considérer la fiction comme un outil employé par le juge constitutionnel, afin de répondre aux ...

The issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods.The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after Word War II and is described as "political empiricism" in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970's and advocates a "legal empiricism". Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for "case law empiricism", widely discussed in this analysis. ; Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l'empirisme et du ...

The issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods.The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after Word War II and is described as "political empiricism" in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970's and advocates a "legal empiricism". Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for "case law empiricism", widely discussed in this analysis. ; Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l'empirisme et du conceptualisme interroge la possibilité pour la doctrine, d'induire de la jurisprudence des catégories plus générales et abstraites, facilitant la connaissance d'une discipline essentiellement jurisprudentielle. L'idée de confronter cette problématique au droit constitutionnel est d'abord liée aux mutations de la discipline depuis la création du Conseil constitutionnel en 1958. Précisément, le développement de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle pouvait laisser présumer une facette empirique en droit constitutionnel, susceptible d'interroger la nécessité pour la doctrine, de procéder a posteriori à une mise en ordre synthétique des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel. En réalité, l'alternance entre l'empirisme et le conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel dépasse le seul rapport de la doctrine et la jurisprudence. La présente étude s'efforce alors de saisir dans tous les stades de la discipline, et quelles que soient les sources, le travail de systématisation du droit. Néanmoins, il ne s'agit pas de se contenter de suivre, conformément à une démarche chronologique, l'évolution de la pensée en droit constitutionnel, mais de procéder à l'identification de périodes. Le conceptualisme ancien, hérité des premiers manuels de droit constitutionnel à la fin du XIXe siècle, a permis d'élaborer les grands principes du droit constitutionnel français. Partant, l'évolution des méthodes doctrinales tout au long du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle, en lien avec l'évolution du droit lui-même, soumet ces principes à des démarches plus empiriques. Il s'agit d'abord, d'un premier courant doctrinal apparu à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qualifié dans le cadre de la présente étude de « empirisme politique », puis, aux alentours des années 1970, d'un second courant, défendant un « empirisme juridique ». Enfin et cette dernière période demeure en cours, le développement de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, caractérisée par son empirisme, ouvre la voie à un « empirisme jurisprudentiel », dont les enjeux sont plus largement abordés dans la présente étude.