Suchergebnisse

In 1970 Belgium established three Communities: the French, Flemish and German-speaking Communities. It was then in 1980 that three regions were set up: Walloon, Flemish and Brussels. Further amendments to the Constitution were made on 7 and 15 July 1988, as well as a special law of 8 August 1988 amending the original law of 8 August 1980. It is essential to say that most of the changes and principles governing the organisation and functioning of both the three Communities and the three regions date back to 1970 and 1980. The international nature of the Community's role in 1970 is significant. In 1980, an Arbitration Court was provided for by the Constitution and established to settle conflicts between the laws and decrees of the Communities and the Regions. The Federal State is characterised by two features: autonomy and co-operation. In 1988, the Arbitration Court continued the work of constitutional justice and verifies the conformity of laws or decrees with the provisions of international law and in particular European law. ; En 1970 la Belgique a instauré trois Communautés : les Communautés française, flamande et germanophone. Puis c'est en 1980 que se sont mises en place trois Régions : wallonne, flamande et bruxelloise. De nouveaux amendements à la Constitution ont été faits le 7 et le 15 juillet 1988, ainsi qu'une loi spéciale du 8 août 1988 qui est venue modifier la loi originale du 8 août 1980. Il est indispensable de dire que l'essentiel des changements et des principes d'organisation et de fonctionnement des trois Communautés aussi bien que des trois Régions datent de 1970 et de 1980. Le caractère international du rôle que les Communautés ont joué en 1970 est significatif. En 1980, une Cour d'arbitrage a été prévue par la Constitution et créée afin de régler les conflits entre les lois et les décrets des Communautés et des Régions. L'Etat fédéral se caractérise par deux traits : l'autonomie et la co-opération. En 1988 la Cour d'arbitrage poursuit l'oeuvre de justice constitutionnelle et vérifie la ...

The article proposes: to group the approach that is common in the classification of state functions (depending on the sphere of social life into political, economic, etc.) with the social functions of the branch; to group the actual legal functions of the branch to adapt one of the approaches proposed by experts in the theory of state and law to classify the functions of law. An appeal to popular Ukrainian textbooks on the theory of state and law allows to summarize: analyzing the functions of law, scientists distinguish between protective and regulatoryfunctions (including regulatory static and regulatory dynamic). In general, almost none of the specialists -authors of educational and methodical publications in this discipline does not ignore the classification of the functions of the right to regulatory and security. Sometimes the authors detail this classification, sometimes they integrate it into the author's systems of legal functions. But it is unlikely that there is now a publication that covers theoretical issues related to the grouping of legal functions, and does not mention the regulatory and protective functions. Based on this, it is hardly appropriate not to apply this classification when grouping the functions of the field of constitutional law. One of the classifications of legal functions, which should be borrowed to group the functions of the constitutional law of Ukraine, is the classification of legal functions depending on their special legal nature into regulatory and protective. Given that this classification reflects the functions inherent in law in general, it is clear that they are also inherent in the field of constitutional law of Ukraine. Therefore, it is advisable to recommend not just to apply this classification when distinguishing the functions of the branch of constitutional law, but to refer to it as a potential element of a complex classification of functions of the branch of constitutional law of Ukraine. The analyzed classification will indicate the kind of special legal characteristics of a function inherent in the branch of constitutional law. Thus, its classification should be combined with one or more classifications of a less general nature, which will reveal the features inherent in the functions of the branch of constitutional law. ; У статті запропоновано: для угруповання соціальних функцій галузі адаптувати підхід, що є поширеним при класифікації функцій держави (залежно від сфери соціального життя на політичні, економічні тощо); для угрупування власне юридичних функцій галузі адаптувати один із підходів, який пропонується фахівцями з теорії держави і права для класифікації функцій права. Звернення до популярних українських підручників із теорії держави та права дозволяє резюмувати: аналізуючи функції права, вчені виділяють охоронну та регулятивну функції (у т. ч. регулятивну статичну та регулятивну динамічну). Загалом майже жоден із фахівців - авторів навчально-методичних видань із цієї дисципліни не оминає увагу класифікацію функцій права на регулятивну й охоронну. Інколи автори деталізують цю класифікацію, інколи інтегрують її в авторські системи функцій права. Але навряд чи зараз є видання, у якому висвітлюються теоретичні питання, пов'язані з угрупуванням функцій права та не згадувалося б про регулятивну й охоронну функції. Виходячи з цього, навряд чи доцільно не застосовувати цю класифікацію при угрупуванні функцій галузі конституційного права. Одною з класифікацій функцій права, яку доцільно запозичити для угрупування функцій галузі конституційного права України, є класифікація функцій права залежно від їх спеціально-юридичного характеру на регулятивну й охоронну. Враховуючи, що ця класифікація відображає функції, притаманні праву загалом, зрозуміло, що вони притаманні також і галузі конституційного права України. А тому доцільно рекомендувати не просто застосувати цю класифікацію при виокремленні функцій галузі конституційного права, а й звернутися до неї як до потенціального елементу складної класифікації функцій галузі конституційного права України. Аналізована класифікація вказуватиме на різновид спеціально-юридичної характеристики тієї чи іншої функції, притаманної галузі конституційного права. Отже, її класифікацію доцільно поєднати з однією чи кількома класифікаціями менш загального характеру, які будуть розкривати особливості, притаманні функціям саме галузі конституційного права.

Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration (Government Administration Law) has set the scope of discretion in Indonesian legal system. But the form of discretion is limited in scope government decision (KTUN) and factual actions of the government. The restriction implicates circulars or others policy rule is not a form of discretion. In addition, the provisions concerning the terms of use discretion, procedures and legal effect of discretion in the Government Administration Law are not applicable to the use of policy rule. In fact, the substance of discretion in policy rule (e.g. circulars and instructions) has the potential of conflicting laws and regulations and/or General Principles of Good Administration. The legal issues in this study are the constitutionality of the scope of discretion in Article 1 point 9 and Article 23 paragraph (1) of the Government Administration Law. This analysis showed that limits the scope of discretion in Government Administration Law contrary to formal elements, substantive, and control mechanisms within the rule of law. This analysis also suggests the expansion of the scope of discretion in the Government Administration Law and setting policy rules as the object of the petition for judicial review so that there is a control mechanism by trial to discretion in the form of policy rule.

Eavesdropping is a means by which to achieve the detection of offenses and criminal offenses. It does not constitute a legal test as evidence not included in the legislation, but the tools to search for evidence. Such as tapping should be used when it detects these offenses which by their type is very difficult to detect. Of course, this means test does not need to reach the violation of fundamental constitutional rights in Albania since otherwise the test tool will become a mechanism for pressure and fear that people will unhappily booty of this tool. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2013.v4n9p434

The subject of the research is the problems of constitutional law enforcement of administrative offences legislation, taking into account the prospects for its new codification.The purpose of the article is confirmation or confutation of the hypothesis that the effectiveness of the new Code of administrative offences depends on whether the legal positions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on the principles of administrative responsibility will be taken into account when drafting it.The authors use methods of complex analysis, synthesis, as well as formal-legal method of interpretation of Constitution, legislation on administrative offences and judicial decisions of Russian Constitutional Court.The main results and scope of their application. The administrative torts law in Russia is expected to pass through the total review up to the grounds of its codification in close future. The article presents initial positions of that changes within basic frames produced by Russian Constitutional Court. Its case-law has already invaded into many spheres and details in respective sphere of legal rules and also prescribed a lot for their future. This case-law yet is necessarily made within its inherent range for it is ever constrained procedurally by content of actions and cases to be settled. However Russian administrative torts law is destined for reformation in new code-making in view of constitutional case-law and in order to do better with neighbor spheres of legal responsibility. Disputable matters of administrative liability, the company's responsibility with psychical fiction on its fault (corporative thinking, wishing, desire, diligence), substantial and procedural equity etc. are described and discussed in the article as to the administrative law of torts on in its constitutional dimension.Conclusions. The Code of administrative offences of the Russian Federation does not fully meet the legal needs of society. Work on real improvement of this code will continue, therefore, legal science should be more strongly and persistently to implement in legislative practice constitutional ideas about improvement of codification and ensuring unity of legal space of the country. In particular, it is necessary to settle the debatable aspects of tort liability, the guilt of legal entities when it is addressed by fiction to the phenomena of the psyche (thinking, goals, will, caution), the constitutional and legal foundations of justice in the field of administrative penalties, procedural enforcement of rights and freedoms, etc. ; С учетом ожидаемого системного пересмотра законодательства об административных правонарушениях описывается исходная к этому обстановка, главным образом с правовых позиций Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации, которые изложены по предмету как небольшой свод правоположений с их юрисдикционными обоснованиями. Фиксируется, что эти позиции привели к заметным конституционно-правовым вмешательствам в административно-деликтное право и многое опреде-лили в нем на будущее в прескриптивных обращениях к законодательным властям. Исходя из ретроспективы и текущего состояния, предполагаются объем и структура предстоящей административно-деликтной кодификации, затрагиваются дискуссионные стороны деликтоспособности, вины юридических лиц, когда она обращена по фикции к явлениям психики (мышлению, целям, воле, осторожности), конституционно-правовые основы справедливости в области административных наказаний, процессуального обеспечения прав и свобод и другое по заявленной теме.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has been faced with few major Constitutional Law problems during the period under consideration. Statistically, the action of the Court in invalidating one law out of almost a score that were attacked before it on the basis of constitutional defect suggests an attitude of judicial restraint toward the product of a coordinate branch of government. The relatively small number of constitutional questions raised-- and many of them were obviously make-weight rather than points of principal reliance-- suggests a general awareness of the Court's stability and the unlikelihood of its departing from established precedent. Similarly, regard for the precedent established in Plessy v. Ferguson, with its "separate but equal" doctrine, was a major factor in the decision of two federal district courts in Tennessee involving alleged deprivation of constitutional rights in the furnishing of educational and recreational facilities to Negroes. It was not a year for the expansion or contraction of doctrines of constitutionality previously established, although in one instance at least it appears that some "new law" was made.

Henry Monaghan famously argued that much of constitutional interpretation takes the form of what he termed constitutional common law, a body of doctrines and rules that are constitutionally inspired but not constitutionally required and that can be altered or reversed by Congress. This Essay argues that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law: Constitutional concerns permeate core administrative law doctrines and requirements, yet Congress enjoys broad power to alter ordinary administrative law notwithstanding its constitutional aspect. Unfortunately, the constitutional common law character of much of ordinary administrative law is rarely acknowledged by courts. A striking example of this lack of acknowledgment is the 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., in which the Supreme Court insisted that whether an agency action is "arbitrary and capricious" and whether it is unconstitutional are separate questions. Recognizing the interrelationship between constitutional law and ordinary administrative law is important both for the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of constitutional common law and for proper appreciation of the role administrative agencies can play in our constitutional order. Underlying many attacks on constitutional common law is a view of constitutional law as having a narrow and determinate scope. Yet the interwoven relationship between ordinary law and constitutional law in the administrative law context suggests this view of constitutional law is false. In addition, seeking to enforce constitutional norms through ordinary administrative law better accords with constitutional principles than efforts to segregate out the two and is likely to prove less intrusive to the policymaking prerogatives of the political branches. The better critique is not the extent to which constitutional common law surfaces in administrative contexts, but rather the lack of transparency that accompanies it.

The impact of EU membership on the UK constitution has been profound. In the Miller (Article 50) case, the Supreme Court described the effect of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) – the means by which EU membership was given effect within the UK – as being unprecedented in constitutional terms. Not only did it provide for a new source of law, and a new constitutional process for making law in the UK, it also fundamentally changed the UK's system of government and the way in which we think about the location and exercise of public power.

The authors survey the recent developments in Florida constitutional law, focusing on the powers and duties of the three branches of state government. Their discussion includes an analysis of the recent constitutional amendment modifying the jurisdiction of the supreme court.

Virtually all constitutional scholars agree, and the Supreme Court has uniformly held, that our entire system of constitutional democracy is premised in important part on the dictate of judicial review, i.e., the power of the judiciary to exercise the final say as to the meaning of the countermajoritarian Constitution's provisions. Absent judicial review, the fundamental speed bumps to tyranny that the Framers so carefully inserted into our political structure would be rendered all but useless at best and a fraud on the electorate at worst. Yet puzzlingly, most of the very same scholars and judges assume that the very political branches that the Constitution is designed to restrain will fully control the remedies to be issued. Thus, all the political branches need to do to avoid constitutional control is deny the courts any power to enforce their decisions. Such a logically inconsistent dichotomy indirectly destroys the essence of the judicial review process that is so central to American constitutional democracy. Yet neither constitutional scholars nor the Supreme Court have recognized either the serious logical flaw or the potentially grave practical dangers in vesting in the very branches sought to be controlled by the Constitution the final power to determine the scope—indeed, the existence—of remedies to enforce constitutional dictates. This Article explains the inherent theoretical and practical link between constitutional review and constitutional remedies, demonstrating that full control of constitutional remedies belongs in the judiciary, not the political branches. It then explains how judicial inference of constitutional remedies in the face of textual silence on the issue can be justified by principled theories of textual interpretation, highlights the inadequacy of scholarly work in this area, and answers potential counterarguments. Finally, it applies this theory of constitutional remedies to the Supreme Court's implied remedies jurisprudence.

This Article identifies the causes and consequences of a puzzling asymmetry in constitutional law. Of the three facets of adjudicative factfinding-evidence, procedure, and rules of decision- only two are constitutionalized. Constitutional law regulates procedural and decisional rules, but not whether the evidence that factfinders use is adequate. Constitutional law regulates procedure through a set of rules that determine a person's power to control the trial by adducing evidence in support of her case and by examining the evidence of her adversary. Constitutional law regulates decisionmaking by setting probability requirements for findings of fact-standards of proof-and by allocating the burdens of proof among the prosecution, plaintiffs, and defendants. Constitutional law, however, does not control adequacy of the evidence upon which factfinders determine the probability of contested allegations and apply the burdens of proof. This is so because the Supreme Court interprets the Due Process Clause, as related to evidence, very narrowly. Under this interpretation, any evidence is constitutionally adequate when its use is not "fundamentally unfair." Moreover, "fundamental unfairness" occurs only in extreme cases such as those which exhibit a serious prosecutorial misuse of the trial process. Examples include when the government knowingly procures the defendant's conviction by false evidence or by evidence from which factfinders can draw no rational inferences. Anything less is not "fundamentally unfair." As a result, virtually any rule that controls evidential admissibility and identifies evidence that does or does not require corroboration is constitutional. The "fundamental unfairness" criterion practically exempts evidential adequacy from constitutional scrutiny.

This article draws on the tradition of cosmopolitanism to offer a normative framework for the integration of democratic constitutional systems. The laterally conducted constitutional integration, which takes place outside formal institutional settings, remains under-theorized despite its transformative effect on constitutional law around the world. This article uses Kant's tripartite system of public law as presented in Perpetual Peace – ius civitatis (domestic political right), ius gentium (international political right), ius cosmopoliticum (cosmopolitan right) – to explain, defend and steer ongoing phenomena of constitutional integration. By contrast to other scholarly accounts, which associate a cosmopolitan view to top-down approaches to institutional reform at the international level or to universal moral demands, my account takes domestic constitutionalism as both starting and end points. In this sense, I defend a bottom-up version of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism from the ground-up preserves the primacy of the domestic jurisdictions: each domestic constitutional order retains the filter of its own discourse and structures as it integrates and internalizes the experiences of other constitutional orders. Cosmopolitanism helps to understand ongoing phenomena of constitutional integration because it rejects methodological nationalism in constitutional analysis. It also justifies these phenomena by showing that cross-jurisdictional integration is compatible with the constitutional democratic commitment to self-government.

This is the first event of the Transsystemic Law Series ; The University of Victoria follows a transsystemic method of teaching and thinking about law to educate across different legal orders, emphasize the relevance of Indigenous legal traditions to Canada, and contribute to understandings of law that are different from long-established legal views. Join the second presentation of our Transsystemic Law Series. Professor John Borrows will explain why a transsystemic approach to constitutional law contributes not only to understanding how different communities organize as distinctive political units, but also to giving Indigenous legal traditions equal footing with common and civil law traditions in Canada. ; UVic Graduate Student Law & Society Research Group ; Faculty ; Unreviewed

Mr. Justice Powell has publicly characterized the 1974 Term of the Supreme. Court as a "dull" one. Whatever the accuracy of that description, the 1974 Term was, in the public eye, a quiet one. When, late in the Term, the Court ordered the death penalty case held over for reargument, it ensured that the 1974 Term would generate few front-page testimonials to the supreme authority of the Supreme Court. But neither a dull nor a quiet Term can obscure the current reality that the Court's claim to be the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution" appears to command more nearly universal respect today than at any time since Chief Justice Marshall invoked that document to deny Mr. Marbury the commission to which he was legally entitled. After a history of far more struggle than is generally remembered, it is now settled that (absent a constitutional amendment) the Court has the last say, and in that sense its constitutional interpretations are both authoritative and final. The Court's great prestige has, however, tended to deflect "careful inquiry into the limits beyond which its decisions, although authoritative, are not final. Even as the Justices have developed the habit of writing constitutional opinions that look like detailed legislative codes, the Court's great prestige has fostered the impression that every detailed rule laid down has the same dignity as the constitutional text itself. This impression should be understood as the illusion it is. Indeed, a wide variety of Supreme Court pronouncements are subject to modification and even reversal through ordinary political processes. For example, Congress may validate a state law previously invalidated by the Court as an unreasonable burden upon commerce. Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court explicitly recognized that its "Miranda warnings" might be modified by Congress and, perhaps, even by the states. Were our understandings of judicial review not affected by the mystique surrounding Marbury v. Madison, it might be more readily recognized that a surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional "interpretation" is best understood as something of a quite different order – a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress. I hope to demonstrate that a theory of such a constitutional common law is necessary to explain satisfactorily a number of "constitutional" doctrines, and to outline a principled basis for a specialized common law rooted in the Constitution. Finally, I will suggest some implications of express recognition of a constitutional common law of individual liberty.

This chapter provides an overview of the emerging field of transnational constitutional law (TCL). Whilst questions of constitutional law are typically discussed in the context of a specific domestic legal setting, a salient strategy of TCL is to understand constitutional law and its values by placing them 'in context' with existing and evolving cultural norms and political, social and economic discourses and struggles. Drawing on socio-legal investigations into the relationships between law and non-law and the significance of legal pluralism, TCL considers what role constitutional law and its values might play in shaping and bringing about social and legal transformation within an emerging global economic order in which non-territorially confined spaces of struggle involve transnational actors and social formation dynamics. TCL thus emerges out of constitutional law in a transnational legal context. Based on Zumbansen's concept of Transnational Law (TL) as a methodological framework to study the Actors, Norms and Processes of legal formations in a global context, rather than positing TL as a distinct legal field, we examine transnational constitutional law phenomena in their social, political and economic contexts. This allows us to revisit and reassess well-known constitutional law concepts such as the rule of law, equality and access to justice in a new light, in particular where we confront – in this paper – legacies of these concepts in both the Global North and South. This engagement renders visible lived experiences of constitutional law and constitutionalism in local and transnational contexts, drawing attention to the growing number of those who have, through processes of globalisation, fallen out of, or were never made party to, the Western 'social contract'. We present TCL as emerging on two levels. On a macro level, studies of comparative constitutional law and post-colonial approaches to law shine light on processes of globalisation and financialization as they manifest themselves in conflictual dynamics within trade law, and international human rights law, with regard to civil, socio-economic and cultural rights. TCL also emerges on a micro level through careful ethnographic and anthropological studies that examine different forms of what Saskia Sassen persuasively coined "Expulsions", meaning struggles and resistance against different forms of expropriation, eviction or alienation, within volatile economic and political landscapes. Finally, our transnational critique of the 'rule of law' reflects our hope for a 'thick' and historically reflective RoL concept. In