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Examining the Supreme Court's recent decisions in the legislative veto case, Professor Strauss stresses the importance of a distinction no Justice observed between use of the veto in matters affecting direct, continuing, political, executive-congressional relations, and use of the veto in a regulatory context. Only the latter, he argues, had to be reached by the Court; and only the latter presents the constitutional difficulties that troubled the Court. The utility of the veto in the political context makes the opinions' sweep regrettable.

Until either article 2, section 28 or the judicial construction of that section is modified, Tennessee will be unable to levy a general personal income tax. The revenue needs of the state will rise dramatically during the next twenty years, placing increasing strain on the antiquated and regressive privilege-property tax structure no win effect.' As noted earlier, a constitutional amendment specifically authorizing a personal income tax does not appear to be a likely prospect for the foreseeable future. The only feasible solution seems to be the passage of a nongraduated income tax, such as that proposed by the Tax Modernization and Reform Commission in an effort to prompt the Tennessee Supreme Court to reconsider and retreat from its present construction of section 28. This may not be as futile as it might at first appear. A nongraduated income tax, exempting the income from property taxed ad valorem, bears at least a surface resemblance to a property tax, and might be characterized as such. This tax would reach the income from personal services, tapping a major new source of revenue.

This paper's aim is to reconstruct the electoral question that has affectedItaly for four years. After the famous judgement n.1/2014 of the Constitutional Court, the Italian electoral political system has been one of the most unstable, considering that another electoral system was declared unconstitutional. The latest elections were held with a mixed system that caused a deadlock in the formation of the government. The new electoral law has dissatisfied everyone and seems to be temporary, waiting for a new and coveted political balance.Summary:1. Premise - 2. From 2005 to 2014: three elections with an unconstitutional electoral law - 3. A new electoral law never applied, but unconstitutional - 4. An approved electoral law (in the run-up to the elections) that displeases everyone. - 5. The elections of March 4, 2018 and the deadlock in the formation of the government - 6. A system searching for a coveted balance. ; En este escrito se analiza el controvertido régimen electoral de Italia en los últimos cinco años. Después de la importante decisión 1 de 2014 de la Corte costituzionale, el sistema electoral italiano se encontró entre los más inestables, al declararse inconstitucional dos veces la ley electoral. Lasúltimas elecciones se han llevado a cabo a través de un sistema mixto que ha provocado un estancamiento en la formación del gobierno. La nueva ley electoral ha sido objeto de crítica desde diferentes sectores y parece ser transitoria, en espera de un nuevo y codiciado equilibrio político.

This paper is born from the desire to deepen the constitutional evolution in our country: Albania. The constitution is understood as a commune of rules which compose a state legal order. It is based on juristic values like the respect of human dignity and the freedom of individual, put as general principles of activity orientation of civil community. To understand better and in a comprehensive way the complex constitutional system of our country, initially is needed to be analyzed the legal route of its historic evolution, particularly in the light of legal- constitutional importance that has covered in the actual constitutional structure. The main focus of this actual argument is that of the analysis of characteristics of different constitutional Charters and their evolutional processes- being those the Statutes of Constitutional Law, to close with the constitutional order of Fundamental Charter of 1998. The main target of this research is that of the analysis of the constitutional system leaded by the Constitution of 1998. Before we make this, we think that is reasonable to present in chronologic order the most important institutional politic events which have indicated the Albanian constitutional history, being sure that in this way, we can understand the present be looking at the past. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n6s2p702

The paper takes into account a feature of Hans Kelsen's juridical thinking that has been so far rather underestimated: the weight of normativism on his theory of private law. The author closely connects Kelsen's critical approach to the notion of subjective right and further relates the legal norms to the institutions of the market economy. The interepretative assumptions of Kelsen are constantly confronted with the theoretical background that propelled the development of the modern constitutional state based on the rule of law.

One of the iconic issues in American law and politics is the question of free will—sometimes known as agency, choice, or autonomy, or the absence of duress, coercion, and compulsion. In politics, whether one is liberal or conservative, we balk at government limitations on choice and fight those limitations with legal arguments about rights and political rhetoric about freedom. Liberals demand access to abortions, want the ability to purchase medical marijuana, and bristle at pat-down searches before boarding a plane. Conservatives dislike requirements to buy health insurance or pay taxes, rail against limits on gun ownership and school prayer, and decry government regulation of everything from food to the environment. Liberals and conservatives may disagree about the specifics of what they want to be free to choose, but both sides believe that choice is a good thing. In law, the notion of choice and free will is ubiquitous. For example, only contracts freely entered into are considered valid—if a contract is the result of duress, it is unenforceable. In tort law, some acts are torts because they infringe on the will of others—a fist to the nose is a tort if not consented to, and merely pugilism if it is. Rape is sexual intercourse without consent. Sexual harassment law prohibits sexual attention in the workplace that is unwanted and unconsentedto. Under the Fourth Amendment, ourts admit evidence seized without a warrant if that evidence was found in the course of consensual searches. Under the Fifth Amendment, confessions of a criminal suspect are admissible if uncoerced. Under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation," the government cannot force one to speak. Under the Free Exercise Clause, the government cannot require religious activity or adherence. Under the Tenth Amendment, the federal government cannot impose coercive conditions on funding going to states. One of the most important legal issues in our country today, for instance, is whether the federal government can impose an "individual mandate" to purchase health insurance. The question destined for the Supreme Court is whether Congress acted beyond its Commerce Clause power when it took from individuals the choice of whether to buy health insurance. In one way or another, each of these political and legal questions turns on the nature of choice and free will. But defining free will is famously difficult and the question has bedeviled philosophers and legal theorists for centuries. This article presents the view that the Supreme Court has implicitly adopted three different definitions, or paradigms, of free will and choice. By outlining these paradigms, one gains insights into the analysis the Court uses to decide cases that depend on notions of free will. This article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I introduce the three paradigms by discussing the famous case of West Virginia v. Barnette, in which the Supreme Court struck down a mandate that schoolchildren recite the Pledge of Allegiance. In Part II, I place the debate about free will into a larger philosophical and theoretical context. In the subsequent three parts, I walk through each of the three paradigms—the "ultra-dispositionalist," the "libertarian," and the "situationalist." Focusing on constitutional law cases, I highlight some of the prominent examples of the Court's use of each paradigm to analyze and decide cases.

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- NOTE BY THE SERIES EDITOR -- ABOUT THE AUTHOR -- PREFACE -- I. CREATING AND SITUATING INTERNATIONAL LAW -- 1. Custom, Authority and the Creation of International Law -- Introduction -- Custom as a Law-Creating Process -- Finnis's Account of Custom-Formation -- Concluding Observations: A Brief Interpretation of Finnis's Schema -- 2. Situating International Law in Municipal Legal Systems in Africa -- Introduction -- International Law and Municipal Law -- The Theoretical Issue -- English Common Law and Civil Law Approaches -- Constitutional Incorporation of International Law in Africa -- International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: A Southern African Perspective -- Conclusion -- II. PRE-INDEPENDENCE TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND THE POST-COLONIAL STATE -- 3. The Newly Emergent State and the Devolution of Pre-Independence Treaties -- Introduction -- Malawi: A Post-Colonial Case Study -- Colonial Treaty Obligations and Third Parties: Theory and Practice -- Concluding Observations: Devolution of Treaty obligations in the Post-Colonial Era -- 4. Succession to Treaties and International Fluvial Law in Africa: The Niger Treaties -- Introduction -- The Pre-Independence Position -- Revision and Abrogation of the General Act of Berlin in 1890 and 1919 -- The Devolution of the Pre-Independence Niger Treaties upon the new Riparian States -- The Colonial Position -- State Succession and the Devolution of the Convention of St. Germain -- The Convention of St. Germain as a Dispositive Treaty and the Source of an International Servitude -- Article 1 of the Act of Niamey (1963): Abrogation of the Convention of St. Germain -- Conclusion -- III. HUMAN RIGHTS -- 5. Contextualizing Democracy and Human Rights in Africa -- Introduction -- International Human Rights Law: A Historical Note.

Die Piraterie rückte durch eine Häufung von Übergriffen auf Handelsschiffe vor der Küste Somalias verstärkt in das Blickfeld der Staatengemeinschaft. Eilig wurde der Entschluss gefasst, dem Problem auch mit Strafverfolgung beizukommen. Nach einer Phase der Orientierung einigte sich die Weltgemeinschaft auf die Regionalisierung des Problems - also die Verlagerung der Strafverfolgung und des Strafvollzugs auf Anrainerstaaten des Indischen Ozeans. Die Arbeit befasst sich im Allgemeinen mit dem völkerrechtlichen und im Speziellen mit dem menschen- und grundrechtlichen Rahmen der Strafverfolgungsstrategie gegenüber der Piraterie unter Einbeziehung der Rechtsordnungen der kooperierenden Regionalstaaten. Sie enthält Anstöße für eine Neuausrichtung der Strafverfolgungsstrategie gegenüber der Piraterie vor Somalia, aber auch andernorts

Thomas Aquinas's notion on law, tyranny and resistance served as a limitation on governmental powers. When those who bear the law command things which exceed the competence of such authority, the subject is free to obey or disobey. The function of the law culminates in two maxims: quantum ad vim coactivam legis and quantum ad vim directivam. With regard to the former, the prince is above the law (legibus solutus). It implies the principle of Salus reipublicae suprema lex, which means that the safety of the state is the supreme law. According to this principle property, liberty and life (basic individual rights) are subordinate to or even sacrificed for the supposed public good. With regard to the latter, the prince's power should be subject to the law. The vis directiva limits the authority of the prince. This principle is in accordance with the rule of law. This notion is concomitant with the constitutional principles entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. The idea of the Constitution is also bolstered by the entrenchment of the rule of law. The purpose of the rule of law is to protect basic individual rights. Hereafter the rule of law requires the prince or state to act in accordance with the law. It also means that the prince or branches of state must obey the law. If the prince or state acts without legal authority, it is acting lawlessly, which is against the notion of a constitutional democracy.

This book examines the specific reforms in social protection that took place during the European financial crisis, while embedding them in a broader human rights and constitutional law framework of nine European countries. Analytical and comprehensive, this is a helpful tool for all legal professionals that deal with crisis-related reforms.

Methodological issues pervade contemporary debates in EU law. There are many reasons for this. Some are specific to the subject matter of EU law itself. The multiple crises that the European Union is experiencing lead EU law scholars to question their classical conception of EU law: a law of integration that should more or less naturally lead to a constitutional or federal order. These crises may also lead scholars to question their relationship with the European institutions, which have been central to the development of the core concepts of EU law and of EU law as a disciplinary field.

The discontent with the European Union expressed in the referenda over the Maastricht Treaty in the beginning of the 1990s and more recently enunciated through the French and Dutch rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty has widely been perceived as being a consequence of the Union"s legitimacy deficit. There might be different reasons for this deficit. Whereas some argue that it is rooted in a lack of Humean legitimacy, i.e. a lack of utilitarian problem-solving capacity (output legitimacy), others hold that it is a consequence of the lack of Lockean legitimacy or popular consent or approval of the Union, i.e. a lack of democratic legitimacy (input legitimacy). It is the aim of this book to introduce a democratic model that bridges these two sources of legitimacy and which, bearing in mind the unique institutional, legal and societal qualities of the European Union, could provide a solid basis of legitimacy of the European Union in general and the European Constitutional Treaty in particular. Dr. Tor-Inge Harbo holds a Norwegian law degree and a MA in European Studies. His PhD thesis was written under the supervision of Professor Dr. iur. Ulrich K. Preuss at the Free University of Berlin, Otto Suhr Institute of Political Studies, Department Legal Bases of Politics. He is currently working as a lecturer and researcher at the Faculty of Law, University of Oslo

The Public's Law shows how bureaucracy can advance democracy. It develops a Progressive understanding of law and politics from American thinkers' transformation of German theories of the state, emphasizing that the state must provide the goods people need to participate in democratic politics. Using examples from the New Deal and the Civil Rights Era, the book develops a normative theory with implications for deliberative democratic theory, constitutional theory, and administrative law.