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Includes "Application for entry Forest Crop Law, form 2450-16". ; "Rev. 5-72" -- p. 9. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The aim of this short paper is to explore the concept of 'general' rules of customary international law (i.e., rules in principle binding upon all states, as contrasted with 'special' rules binding only on a few states, usually on a regional or local basis), and-the tension which exists between that concept and the consensual basis of customary international law. It will be suggested that it is possible to hold a view of international law which denies the general applicability of most rules of customary law and preserves its consensual character, while admitting that a few rales of truly general application do exist which, however, must derive their binding force from outside the framework of consensual law creation.

A journal article on the conflict between customary law and general law in Zimbabwe. ; Under Zimbabwean law and despite the achievement in April 1980 of majority rule, with regard to family law and personal law, discriminatory treatment of Africans and women persists. Despite the passage since Independence of two Acts designed to help eradicate racism and sexism in Zimbabwe (the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, "the Primary Courts Act" and Legal Age of Majority Act, "the Legal Age of Majority Act") the statute books still contain pre-Independence legislation preventing equal treatment of Africans and women. The Primary Courts Act eliminated racially based criteria for determining which system of law should apply to a particular dispute. It introduced new guidelines for resolving conflicts between customary law and general law, a significant move towards equality under the law. It repealed an Act containing a provision that exempted disputes between Africans from many general family law statutes.

One often reads or hears that a state has a right to exclude all aliens from its territory unless a treaty obligation requires admission. Frequently, that proposition prefaces discussion of such issues as immigration quotas, expulsion and deportation of aliens, justiciability and procedural due process in litigation involving immigration questions, and the duty of states to protect aliens. Sometimes the proposition is colored by such words as "of course," "no longer open to serious question," or "unquestionably"—clues, at least, that some questions and doubts may be in order.

In his recent Review article, 'Do general rules of international law exist?', Lowe states that there are at least two interpretations of the nature of customary international law.1 In the following, I shall attempt to clarify what these two interpretations are, examine the implications which Lowe attaches to the interpretation which he favours, and discuss his assertions about truly general rules of international law.