The author compares the new law on higher education with the program demanded by the Croatian Social-Liberal Party. This is a two-level comparison: a direct comparison of excerpts from the text & the articles of the law, & an indirect comparison of fundamental principles & general policies. The law plays lip service to the requirements for private universities, autonomy, & ideological neutrality. In implementation of the law, the procedures as well as the law itself have been contravened. This is illustrated by a detailed outline of the unsatisfactory provisions of the law & the U of Zagreb statute regarding students. Adapted from the source document.
The author compares the new law on higher education with the program demanded by the Croatian Social-Liberal Party. This is a two-level comparison: a direct comparison of excerpts from the text & the articles of the law, & an indirect comparison of fundamental principles & general policies. The law plays lip service to the requirements for private universities, autonomy, & ideological neutrality. In implementation of the law, the procedures as well as the law itself have been contravened. This is illustrated by a detailed outline of the unsatisfactory provisions of the law & the U of Zagreb statute regarding students. Adapted from the source document.
This is a critical examination of the most elaborate statement of the general will theory. Bosanquet contrasts our "lower," merely "actual" will -- described as a series of momentary & passing, ignorant, routine, commonplace, irrational, barren, mutually conflicting violations -- with our "higher," "true," "real" will, which is a comprehensive & coherent system of stable & long-term, well-informed violations that require self-sacrifice & are expressed in "the great moments of life." His central thesis is that the individuals' "real" will is the "general will" of the community that has been internalized & makes up the individual's "higher," "better" self. The theory is meant to solve the problem of political obligation by showing that, when obeying the law, the individual obeys only himself/herself, & his/her freedom is not curtailed but rather affirmed. The author argues that Bosanquet's argument fails at both crucial steps: it does not succeed in contrasting our "actual" & our "real" will, nor in identifying the latter with the "general will" of our community. The individual will is not embedded in his/her community law the way the theory makes it out to be, & if we have a moral obligation to obey the law, it is not grounded as much in the "general will" of community as in our own "higher," "true" will. Adapted from the source document.
Pokrovčeva knjiga Slobodno stvaranje prava: Herman U. Kantorowicz i slobodnopravni pokret (2018) nameće pitanje izraženo naslovom ovog rada na koje rad odgovara u tri koraka: prvo, pretpostavkom da je pitanje odgovorivo samo idealnim tipovima pravnih disciplina / funkcija; drugo, upućivanjem na kontekst Kantorowiczevih gledišta, osobito na objavu presuda; treće, ocjenom da je Kantorowicz podijelio pravnu znanost u prepletene funkcije a ne u odvojene discipline. U tu svrhu rad nudi idealne tipove disciplina i funkcija pravne dogmatike, pravne historije, pravne teorije i, kao najsloženiji i najkorisniji skup funkcija, pravnopolitičku analizu. Pretpostavka je, koja se ne dokazuje, da ne postoji ni oštra granica između pravne znanosti i susjednih znanosti: sociologije, ekonomije, psihologije, filozofije. ; Is Herman U. Kantorowicz's classification of legal disciplines - which includes general legal science, legal dogmatics, legal history, sociology of law, philosophy of law, and legal policy - a division of scholarly knowledge of law into distinct disciplines/sciences or into intertwined functions of a single scholarly discipline/science? The question is prompted by the book written by Zoran Pokrovac entitled Slobodno stvaranje prava: Hermann U. Kantorowicz i slobodnopravni pokret (Free Law: Hermann U. Kantorowicz and the Free Law Movement ) and published by "Breza" and the Faculty of Law of the University of Split in 2018. Answering this question may assist Croatian legal scholars in finding standards of scholarly excellence, especially of research de lege ferenda. This paper offers an answer in three steps. The first is the recognition that scholarly practices differ considerably, which means that the question may be answered only by construing and correlating ideal types of legal disciplines / functions that are compatible with Kantorowicz's general ideas, prominent interpretations of legal scholarship, and Croatian mainstream legal scholarship since. The second step provides a context of Kantorowicz's ...
Commenting on the article by R. Badinter (1996, this issue), the author contends that experts in international law are not broad-minded regarding the establishment of a state. Most legal experts take for granted the statements of the international judiciary on the existence of certain rules of general international law & consider them validated & indisputable. This fiction has been given support by states, since they uphold only those legal statements that suit their interests. The author analyses the Opinions of the Arbitration Committee on the process of the disintegration & the Criteria for the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia as well as the criteria for the creation of the new states. He considers this precedent as central for international judiciary law. Adapted from the source document.
Different parts of state territory on land, sea, & in the airspace are explained first. The concept of territorial sovereignty is envisaged through principles of its all-inclusiveness & its exclusivity, subject to many exceptions & restrictions imposed either by rules of general international law or by specific treaty obligations that can be assumed by a state. The concept of state servitudes was not assimilated in the practice of international courts & tribunals. Besides, it can be the cause of some misconceptions & confusion in public international law. Within the explanation of territorial boundaries are discussed the so-called natural boundaries -- such as rivers, lakes, & mountain boundaries -- as well as the artificial boundaries. An explanation of the principle of uti possidetis, of procedures of fixing boundaries, & of special legal scope of boundary treaties in international law is offered in conclusion. Adapted from the source document.
More often than not, the State did not acknowledge the matrimonial norms as settled by the Church. This relation seems to have altered towards the end of the 19th century, when the State succeeded in imposing on the Church the respect for the general civil framework. Yet, the change was not radical. The Church and the State were still pretty connected. The State acknowledged the Church's right to be in charge with officiating marriages, with bed and home separation according to the requirements of each confession. However, the State had the right to supervise the civil and military status, the relationship between the spouses, legacy, legal guardianship, the issue of supporting children and spouses and many others. The Church admitted the involvement of the State in major demographic issues in an individual's life. As time went by, the State became more and more complex while its legislation became ever more "lay". It is true that willy-nilly lay legislation borrowed norms and regulations belonging to Church's legislation. The frail State – Church dualism on family law was influenced by lay laws enforcing the lay legitimacy of important moments in man's life. Matrimonial laws as set out in 1894 were the most complex laws in the 19th century. Due to their clarity, they managed to put an end to misunderstandings between lay and Church authorities. Moreover, the matrimonial issues between different confessions were in favour of the State. Civil law very clearly favoured family and children's interests. They were all conceived to better supervise individual's education in a moral family where the Church would still have an influence.
The future of the contemporary state is considered genealogically via a reconstructive review of Rousseau's theory of political law, which depicts the original project of the constitution of the democratic state as a political community of citizens. Rousseau envisaged the modern state as an epochal legal/political program of the concurrent subjectivization of a nation (as ethos) into a people (as demos) & the selfish man (raisonneur violent) into the citizen (citoyen). The rationale of this subjectivization is expressed in the theory of the general will. A people exist as a political subject, as a law-giver, only as a subject of the general will, just as individuals become free citizens through the process of democratic generalization of their political will. The logic of the process of the generalization of the will, as political emancipation, lies within one nation as demos. A legitimate state is possible only if it realizes the individuality of a people as a substantial totality. General will is always solely public, the political will of a people, its will for its own identity. The national democratic state is not a historical given; the free will is a creation, a project of the actualization of the rule of the general will realized by a sovereign people. The state is an unavoidable space of the equalization of the general will of a people & the will of all free individuals, in which citizens within the legislative process accomplish their collective, inter-subjective autonomy. From the point of view of the prospects of the realization of this project, contemporary states are unfinished, even unfinishable. Although in the contemporary plural society, the national democratic state is no longer the sole space of the political & the legal subjectivization of the citizens, it is still undoubtedly the central one. Rousseau's theory of the general will offers the epochal criteria for the recognition of the political character of any citizen's "political association," not only with the state, but also with sub-state or supra-state formations. Each & every political association is a genuine democratic community only if it is the "work of art" of the citizens themselves who self-confidently shape their collective activity, since a community of citizens is possible only if this integration represents the will of all of them as a sum of the irreducible differences among them. 47 References. Adapted from the source document.
Mixed government, which is commonly regarded as a distinctly medieval form of government, is relevant also to contemporary constitutional states. It is the best form of government, since the aristocratic element is a continuous source of virtue, especially of justice, & a check not only on the executive, as the monarchical element which is the seat of political power, & the legislature, as the democratic element which expresses the will of the majority, but also groups & institutions that have the might & will to impose themselves as oligarchies. Mixed government is also the form of government that is practiced by most developed contemporary constitutional states: US, UK, France, Switzerland, Germany, etc. European nobility is the original aristocratic institution, by virtue of the fact that it was a system for the transfer of both virtue & general conditions of life. Three institutions that emerged in the late Middle Ages assumed structures & functions of the nobility. The first is the clergy. When, as a result of the differentiation of feudal society ethical & intellectual virtues of the nobility could no longer maintain general conditions of life, the clergy, by virtue of their abstract knowledge that ranged from philosophy & theology to law & medicine, became a class of new experts in generalities & thereby a new aristocracy. The second modern aristocratic institution is the judiciary, which has a structure & function similar to earlier aristocracies. The task of judges is to establish the highest virtue of constitutionalism. It is justice by law, which regulates general conditions of life in the state & society. What qualifies judges for the task is expertise in the new generality. The expertise includes not only education & experience in law but also impeccable private life & demonstrated professional ethics. The third modern aristocratic institution is the profession, whose most important instance is the legal profession. It shares its structure & function partly with the judiciary & partly with other professions. It seems that modern professions are degenerating. In the key area of data processing, due to rapid changes of technology, professions as systems of the transfer of virtue do not even seem to be possible. Professional aristocracies are replaced increasingly by oligarchies of capitalists & technocrats. Adapted from the source document.
The author writes about Jefferson's political philosophy. There is no text by Jefferson that would set out a certain political issue. There are numerous texts of his, written in the course of fifty years, but a collage of them would not amount to a political theory or a doctrine. Jefferson was not interested in theoretical but solely in technical & practical issues. This makes him a typical 18th-century lawyer of the common law vein. Common law of that time was an amateur area, devoid of any technical or professional expertise & part of general moral principles. Jefferson was deft at formulating the widely held ideas of his time, embracing some century-old well-known political truths by Grotius, Milton, Locke, & Burlamaqui. The author suggests that Jefferson was first & foremost a statesman, & his judgments were politically tainted. Nevertheless, he was the most educated statesman ever among American presidents. Adapted from the source document.
Ombudsman, unlike the court, cannot make binding decisions, but usually public authorities follow its recommendations, otherwise he may bring the case to the attention of politicians and the public by informing Parliament. The link between the two fundamental European institutions, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Ombudsman, may be defined as a strong direct link between the problems of EU citizens. Requests to each institution represent an interest of each petitioner, which is intended to be solved by matching laws with moral rules and general principles of law.
The author views the changes in the legislation within the framework of the sweeping political changes that occurred in 1990 & 1991. The focus of the analysis of the legislative changes (a comparison of the legislation prior to the political changes with the legislation up to 2002) is the press, the freedom of the press & the media in general, & the cultural changes in the transition that left their impact on media law, ie, the conceptual right to information, the respect for privacy, the distinction between the private & the public persons & politicians, the protection of reputation & honor, & the transparency of influences in the media. 13 References. Adapted from the source document.
The central question in addressing the subject of confidential information is to define the borderline between citizens' "right to know" & the general interest of keeping certain information confidential -- in a word, between justifiable & unjustifiable secrets. This area includes parts of administrative & public media law & the theory of public law. The paper is limited to the analysis of the issue of classified information in state possession (state, military, & official secrets) on three levels: theoretical, comparative, & that of legislation in Croatia. The essential elements of the theoretical concept of confidentiality are the possession of the information kept secret from others; deliberate concealment; & social context. A secret can have different forms: strategic, private, pressing, sequential, collective, petty, deep, simple, exploited, & conspiratorial, as in a plot. The theoretical analysis of confidentiality deals with the questions of contemporary forms of the manipulation of information (defining agendas & priorities, "quantitative overload," lobbying) & with the generic issue of the process of decision making, lies, & half-truths. In closing, the author offers certain elements for legislation regarding classified information. 13 References. Adapted from the source document.
Kant's concept of "perpetual peace" is the cornerstone of the rational human right that, in the form of international law, bears upon all states. However, the prerequisite for enduring international legal security & peace is that the internal affairs of states are based on constitutional & republican principles. Although Kant is clearly aware of the antinomies & paradoxes of a world league of states, he nevertheless postulates the ideal of a world league of republican states, since it corresponds to the general striving of nature & moral consciousness; such a league would guarantee a relatively peaceful coexistence among the states, based on international legal precepts. Hegel has often (& wrongfully) been accused of being an apologist of war; in fact, he only realized (having in mind the realities of sovereign national states) the inevitability of multilateral conflicts -- including military ones. His disproval of Kant's ideal of a league of states is based on his disbelief in the feasibility of supranational law, which should be superior to the absolute sovereignty of the state & keep an eye on & contain its partial interests. Adapted from the source document.
The problem matter of this paper is the theoretical dialogue between two republican theories of democracy as a form of political subjectivisation of people as citizens. The first part focuses on H. Arendt's criticism of Rousseau's conception of general will in opposition to the will of all and the particular will as such. In the second part, examples are provided of possible textual support in the Social Contract to such an understanding of Rousseau's general will concept, not only as different in quality but also as truly antagonistic towards the will of all as a sum of particular wills of members of the political body of the republic. In the third part, the author shows that H. Arendt's reading is explained, on the one hand, by the equation of Rousseauian political theory with its Jacobin ideological reception and political instrumentalisation at the time of the French Revolution; in connection therewith, H. Arendt's interpretation of the logic of the French Revolution, with its reduction of the Revolution's goals to the social question, is elucidated by Habermas's interpretation of the French version of the natural-law construction of civil society as an amalgamation of Rousseauian and physiocratic theories. On the other hand, the criticism of Rousseau is conditioned by Arendt's refusal to reflect on political freedom within the logics of sovereignty. In the final part, the author indicates how H. Arendt and her conceptual framework (distinction between power and violence) may contribute to a better understanding of Rousseau (the sovereign as a synthesis of general will and political power; the government as a synthesis of particular will and violence). Adapted from the source document.
