This article reviews the significant developments in the area of public utility law between January 1996 and August 1997. The first section covers legislative changes affecting electric, gas, telephone, and other public utilities; the second section reviews administrative action taken by the Virginia State Corporation Commission; and the third section addresses judicial action applied to the regulation of public utilities. The purposes of this article are to.provide Virginia public utility practitioners an overview of the recent developments in public utility law and to explain the impact these developments have upon public utilities operating in Virginia. This article, however, does not discuss or review all new developments related to Virginia public utility law.
In this Lecture I shall discuss the reasons that officials and citizens should rely upon in American politics. In recent years, various theorists have claimed that people in liberal democracies should rely in politics on "public reasons," reasons that are accessible to all citizens. Others have objected that such a counsel is unreasonable, if not incomprehensible. I shall concentrate on two facets of this issue. First, does the law exemplify a structure of public reasons – that is, do judges deciding cases draw on a stock of public reasons that is narrower than all the reasons one might give for a particular result? My second inquiry concerns the status of natural law – long claimed by adherents to be a source of reasons of universal power, reasons whose persuasiveness does not depend on theological judgments. Are natural law arguments exemplars of public reasons or not? These two inquiries help us to understand the dimensions of claims about public reasons, and to evaluate their comprehensibility and persuasiveness. They also raise the question whether many reasons are not better seen as lying along a spectrum of publicness rather than as being public or not. My position is that various recommendations to rely on public reasons are comprehensible, but on examination, they are far more complex than they may first appear. The law is a domain of public reasons, but that point is also less obvious than a first glance suggests. A counsel to rely on public reasons is persuasive for what officials, and would-be officials, express about particular political issues; it is not persuasive for citizens or for all the reasons that motivate officials. Natural law arguments fit uncomfortably with modern ideas about public reasons; some natural law arguments are public in the required sense, but others are not. Our examination of natural law arguments suggests that, in respect to many reasons for decisions, it may be wiser to talk of degrees of publicness, rather than public or not.
The article examines questions of public law as they apply to some of the scandals that have affected the Thatcher regime in Britain. It looks at some of the principles which underlie parliamentary actions and the internal machinations of Governments. Finally, the article questions the application and development of administrative law which it seems is beset by inconsistency and contradiction in the courts of Britain.
States the public projects and services that are subject to the request of a permit to be developed, these include thermoelectric and hydroelectric power plants.
Includes index. ; "November 1988". ; "Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works". ; At head of title: 100th Congress, 2d session. Committee print. ; Bibliography: v. 4, p. 2717-2725. ; Microform. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Includes index. ; "November 1988." ; "Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works." ; At head of title: 100th Congress, 2d session. Committee print. ; CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 88 S322-4 (v.1), CIS 88 S322-5 (v.2), CIS 88 S322-6 (v.3), CIS 88 S322-7 (v.4) ; Bibliography: vol. 4, p. 2717-2725. ; Microfiche. ; Mode of access: Internet.
This law defines electric power as a public service and states that the generation, transmission, distribution and commercialization of said power is to be regulated by the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos).
"Public law litigation" – civil rights advocacy seeking to restructure public agencies - has changed course over the last three decades. It has moved away from remedial intervention modeled on command-and-control bureaucracy toward a kind of intervention that can be called "experimentalist." Instead of top-down, fixed-rule regimes, the experimentalist approach emphasizes ongoing stakeholder negotiation, continuously revised performance measures, and transparency. Experimentalism is evident in all the principal areas of public law intervention – schools, mental health institutions, prisons, police, and public housing. This development has been substantially unanticipated and unnoticed by both advocates and critics of public law litigation. In this Article, we describe the emergence of the experimentalist model and argue that it moots many common criticisms of public law litigation. We further suggest that it implies answers to some prominent doctrinal issues, including the limits on judicial discretion in enforcing public law rights and the constraints entailed by separation-ofpowers norms. Our interpretation understands public law cases as core instances of "destabilization rights" – rights to disentrench an institution that has systematically failed to meet its obligations and remained immune to traditional forces of political correction. It suggests reasons why judicial recognition and enforcement of such rights might be both effective in inducing better compliance with legal obligations and consistent with our structure of government.
This article describes the evolution of legal aid and public interest law in China and examines its implications for the legal profession and the law in the context of four intertwined developments: first, China's efforts to establish a nationwide system of government-run legal aid centers; second, China's attempt to expand the availability and improve the quality of legal representation for indigent criminal defendants; third, China's bid to force the legal profession to serve poor clients via mandatory pro bono requirements for lawyers; fourth, the development of non-governmental legal aid centers and the expanding incentives for profit-oriented lawyers to take on pro bono cases or pursue public interest litigation. Although it is too early to declare that the evolution of legal aid will reshape the function of law or the status of individual rights in China, this article argues that the evolution illustrates the choices facing China as it continues to reform its legal system and legal profession. China's development of legal aid also demonstrates the degree to which legal development in China is progressing without any single dominant rationale or policy goal.
Governments everywhere procure goods and services as inputs into the production of public goods and services. Such purchases can account for a substantial share of total demand for goods and services. Governments' tendencies, however, to "Buy National," and other discriminatory purchasing practices, can have high costs. The end result for the world as a whole is likely to be substantially inferior in welfare terms to a cooperative outcome where governments agree to refrain from discrimination. Hence the Government Procurement Act (GPA) aims to subject public purchasing to international competition. However, many developing countries, along with others such as Australia and New Zealand, have refused to join the GPA on the grounds that it is not in their best interest. This volume examines the GPA and discusses what could be done to improve it with a view to expanding its membership. The contributors focus on four broad issues: the negotiating history, content, and operation of the GPA; the economics of the GPA's rules and disciplines; the implementation of the GPA in domestic legal systems; and, finally, possible alternatives to--and improvements on--the current set of multilateral rules and disciplines. Offering the most comprehensive assessment of the subject available, the volume will be of interest to scholars of international trade, as well as people whose work involves them in government procurement, from the buyers and sellers of goods and services to those concerned with legal aspects. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1144/thumbnail.jpg
'New public law' has a keen interest in the deployment of power and the shifting nature of the public and private. In this article, we argue that the historical legacy of the Crown has hindered the ability of public lawyers to respond to changes in modes of governance in the UK. The constitutional law textbook tradition has played a key role in limiting critiques of the Crown because of the obfuscation that surrounds the legal and political status of the Monarch. However, instead of discounting the significance of the monarchy, we use it as a resource for exploring governing power, the blurring of boundaries and constitutional renewal. Our starting point is the life, death and, most importantly, the funeral of Diana, Princess of Wales. The latter event exposed the political relevance of the 'personal' in a most dramatic way, generating claims about the 'feminisation of the government' and 'emotions augmenting democracy'. We follow through on these claims in order to focus on the effects of adopting private, intimate-sphere norms in the public sphere, in particular public-sphere decision making. While aware of the risks associated with this 'transformation' of democracy, we conclude that the increasing centrality of the intimate merits onsideration in new public law's search for progressive tools of modern governance.
Law in modern market societies serves both democratic and economic functions. In its economic function, law is a service, a means of enhancing the value of transactions and organizations. Yet modern market economies continue to rely on the state, rather than the market, to provide this service. This paper investigates whether private provision of law may be superior to public provision. We look in particular at corporate law, where there is a substantial literature exploring the efficiency implications of "regulatory competition" and compare this competition with market competition between private providers. Drawing from the well-known framework of spatial models of imperfect competition, we argue that while neither public nor private competition may lead to the optimal corporate law regimes, there are at least some reasons to believe that private provision may be preferable. Specifically, we present a model that demonstrates in which regulatory competition is likely to produce widespread emulation, and little innovation. Private competition, in contrast, is more likely to lead to greater "product" differentiation, which benefits heterogeneous consumers of corporate law services in the short term. Moreover, such differentiation also has long-term benefits, as providers are able to "learn" more about business organizations' demand-side characteristics, and thus tailor their services to business needs more effectively.
Law in modern market societies serves both democratic and economic functions. In its economic function, law is a service, a means of enhancing the value of transactions and organizations. Yet modern market economies continue to rely on the state, rather than the market, to provide this service. This article investigates whether private provision of law may be superior to public provision. We look in particular at corporate law, where there is a substantial literature exploring the efficiency implications of "regulatory competition" and compare this competition with market competition between private providers. Drawing from the well-known framework of spatial models of imperfect competition, we argue that while neither public nor private competition may lead to the optimal corporate law regimes, there are at least some reasons to believe that private provision may be preferable. Specifically, we present a model that demonstrates when regulatory competition is likely to produce widespread emulation and little innovation. Private competition, in contrast, is more likely to lead to greater "product" differentiation, which benefits heterogeneous consumers of corporate law services in the short term. Moreover, such differentiation also has long-term benefits, as providers are able to "learn" more about business organizations' demand-side characteristics and can thus tailor their services to business needs more effectively.
The public interest litigant is no longer a nascent phenomenon in American jurisprudence. Born of the need of large numbers of people who individually lack the economic wherewithal or the logistical capacity to vindicate important social values or their own specific interests through the courts, these litigants now participate actively in much federal civil litigation: public law litigation. Despite the pervasive presence of public interest litigants, the federal judiciary has accorded them a mixed reception, particularly when applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Many federal courts have applied numerous Rules in ways that disadvantage public interest litigants, especially in contrast to traditional litigants, such as private individuals, corporations, and the government. These developments were not inevitable. Most of the Rules, as adopted originally in 1938 and as amended subsequently, did not anticipate, but were compatible with, public law litigation and public interest litigants' involvement in federal civil litigation. Indeed, certain ideas underlying the Rules as a set of litigating principles may have facilitated public law litigation and public interest litigants' expanding participation in civil suits. Nonetheless, a number of judges has enforced numerous Rules in ways that adversely affect these litigants and which now constitute a discernible pattern. The fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules affords an auspicious occasion to explore the federal courts' application of the Rules to public law litigation and the consequences of that judicial treatment. The first section of this Article surveys the history of the Rules and chronicles the rise of public interest litigants and their growing involvement in federal civil litigation. The review shows that nearly all of the Rules, as promulgated in 1938 and as revised thereafter, were consistent with, and even may have promoted, public law litigation and public interest litigants' increasing activity. When the coalescence of numerous developments significantly transformed the character of considerable federal civil litigation, federal courts confronted many unforeseeable issues for whose resolution the Rules afforded little guidance. The second part of the Article, therefore, analyzes how the federal judiciary has addressed a number of these issues. The evaluation reveals that many courts have enforced numerous Rules in ways that have adversely affected public interest litigants. Indeed, application of all these Rules may have had cumulative impacts and even chilling effects on the litigants. Because the assessment also indicates that courts can and should enforce the Rules with greater solicitude for public interest litigants, the final section offers suggestions for so applying them and for future work on the Federal Rules and public law litigation during the next half-century of the Rules' application.
Une version remaniée a été publiée sous les références suivantes : Eric Millard Famille et droit public, recherches sur la construction d'un objet juridique LGDJ, Paris, 1995 Collection Bibliothèque de droit public Tome 182 Préface Jean-Arnaud Mazères Avant-propos Marie-Anne Cohendet Lien fiche HAL-SHS : http://halshs.ccsd.cnrs.fr/halshs-00009967 ; Family is, in terms of public law, a notion which acts as a sort of reference for a number of directly operational concepts, but at the same time, without there being a single and exact definition in substantive law or doctrine. The importance of this notion has nevertheless become such, notably through the constitutionally protected right to lead a normal family life and the various public-sector actions aimed at families, that one can no longer simply observe the presence of the notion in legal pronouncements and an attempt has to be made to develop a coherent description of the notion of family. That is the intention of this thesis. This will require the application of methods of analysis that will allow us to get behind the manifest diversity that is the public law concept of family, to attempt to discover its real contents. This will involve considering the origins of the constructed notion and the legal processes that have constructed the notion of amily, using a global analytical grid. This would show the State and the Family as social phenomena with direct links of dependence and opposition. Public law would be seen as an instrument enabling the reconstruction of the social reality of these links, through the construction of the legal notion of the family. One can then show how, by means of this reconstruction, the State protects the only concept of the family that, through its forms and above all its functions, is useful for its own construction and how, in doing this, it places it in a context of social control through the use of legal techniques that ensure its representation and its administration. ; La famille est pour le droit public un objet qui sert de ...
