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The early copies of the first editions of no.2, 3, and 4 of the Legislative Review were numbered "Legislative Summary, No.1" ; Mode of access: Internet.

The early copies of the first editions of no. 2, 3, and 4 of the Legislative review were numbered "Legislative summary, no. 1." ; Mode of access: Internet.

Superceded by the American labor legislation review. ; Contents: no. 1. Review of labor legislation of 1909, by Irene Osgood. [1909. Publication no. 4]--no. 2. Industrial education; summary of legislation concerning industrial education in public elementary and secondary schools, by E.C. Elliott. 1909. [Publication no. 5]--no. 3. Summary of labor laws in force 1909; administration of labor laws [by] C.B. Austin. 1909. [Publication no. 6]--no. 4. Summary of labor laws in force 1909; woman's work [by] Maud Swett. 1909. [Publication no. 7]--no. 5. Summary of laws in force 1910; child labor, by Laura Scott. 1910. [Publication no. 8]--no. 6. Review of labor legislation of 1910 [by] Irene Osgood Andrews. 1910. (Publication no. 11) ; The early copies of the first editions of no. 2, 3, and 4 of the Legislative review were numbered "Legislative summary, no. 1." ; Mode of access: Internet.

Revisión de leyes, decretos y resoluciones a nivel Nación y Provincia de Buenos Aires. ; Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales

Political scientists know remarkably little about the extent to which legislatures are able to influence policymaking in parliamentary democracies. In this article, we focus on the influence of legislative institutions in periods of coalition government. We show that multiparty governments are plagued by "agency" problems created by delegation to cabinet ministers that increase in severity on issues that divide the coalition. We also argue that the process of legislative review presents an important—but understudied—institutional opportunity for coalition partners to overcome these tensions. We evaluate our argument using original legislative data on over 300 government bills collected from two parliamentary democracies. The central implication of our findings is that legislatures play a more important role in parliamentary democracies than is usually appreciated by providing a key institutional mechanism that allows coalition partners with divergent preferences to govern successfully.

This chapter concerns the guarantee of the right to equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. It explores the two doctrines that have evolved to test the constitutionality of a measure when faced with an Article 14 challenge: the ?classification test? or the ?old doctrine? (which I have labelled ?unreasonable comparison?) and the ?arbitrariness test? or the ?new doctrine? (labelled ?non-comparative unreasonableness?). I show that (a) the classification test (or the unreasonable comparison test) continues to be applied for testing the constitutionality of classificatory rules (whether or not legislative in character); (b) it is a limited and highly formalistic test applied deferentially; (c) the arbitrariness test is really a test of unreasonableness of measures which do not entail comparison (hence labelled non-comparative unreasonableness); (d) its supposed connection with the right to equality is based on a conceptual misunderstanding of the requirements of the rule of law; and (e) courts are unlikely to apply it to legislative review (in the actor-sensitive sense). The way forward is to beef up the classification doctrine to realise its true potential, and abandon the arbitrariness doctrine with respect to actor-sensitive legislative review.

Multiparty governance requires compromise and this compromise can
lead to electoral losses. I argue that coalition members are
motivated to differentiate themselves from their cabinet partners to
mitigate potential electoral losses resulting from voters perceiving
them as not rigorously pursuing their core policy positions or not
possessing strong policy stands. I test this argument with original
data on the scrutiny of over 2,200 government bills gathered from
three parliamentary democracies incorporating information on voter
perceptions of partisan ideology and parties' policy preferences as
derived from their manifestos. I find that coalition partners that
are perceived as more similar will amend one another's legislative
proposals more vigorously in an effort to differentiate in the eyes
of the electorate—to protect their brand—and therefore provide
evidence for "pure" vote-seeking behavior in the legislative review
process. Furthermore, these original data provide answers to several
open questions regarding the policy motivations of cabinet parties
in legislative review and the role of committee chairs and external
support parties on policy outcomes.

On the surface the proposals surrounding refugee resettlement in the 1999 "white paper" Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation appear to be watered down versions of Legislative Review Advisory Group (LRAG) 1998 report Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration proposals. However, the "white paper" proposals are the "tip of the iceberg" of a series of recommendations Citizenship and Immigratiotn Canada (CIC) has developed on how Canada should resettle refugees in the future. This paper outlines and compares the LRAG report, the "white paper" and CIC's model for future resetlement. It argues that the proposals offer an opportunity to diminish long-standing barriers to the Canadian resettlement program, though the motivation for these changes may be partially based on very practical operational needs. Yet in order to ensure such change takes place, NGOs will have to continue to pressure CIC and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration that Canada's resettlement program be truly humanitarian and that the number of refugees resettled each year not be reduced. ; En surface, les propositions concernant la relocalisation des réfugiés dans le « livre blanc » de 1999 De solides assises pour le 21e siècle: Nouvelles orientations pour la politique et la législation relatives aux immigrants et aux réfugiés apparaissent comme une version édulcorée du rapport. Au-delà des chiffres: L'immigration de demain au Canada, ayant émané du Groupe Consultatif en 1998. Cependant, les propositions du « livre blanc » ne sont que la pointe de l'iceberg d'une série de recommandations développées par Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada sur la façon dont le Canada devrait désormais relocaliser les réfugiés. Le présent article décrit et compare le rapport du Groupe Consultatif, le « livre blanc », et le modèle proposé par Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada. On développe ici une argumentation selon laquelle toutes ces propositions offrent une ...

Recent research on parliamentary institutions has demonstrated that legislatures featuring strong committees play an important role in shaping government policy. However, the impact of the legislators who lead these committees – committee chairs – is poorly understood. This study provides the first examination of whether the partisan control of committee chairs in parliamentary systems has a systematic impact on legislative scrutiny. The article argues that committee chairs can, in principle, use their significant agenda powers to serve two purposes: providing opposition parties with a greater ability to scrutinize government policy proposals, and enabling government parties to better police one another. Analyzing the legislative histories of 1,100 government bills in three parliamentary democracies, the study finds that control of committee chairs significantly strengthens the ability of opposition parties to engage in legislative review. The analysis also suggests that government parties' ability to monitor their coalition allies does not depend on control of committee chairs.