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A significant part of the revenue in the EU budget is raised via a GNI-based resource. The purpose of this paper is to use a stylized model of an economic federation to analyze how this way of raising funds to the central authority affects the labor income taxes implemented by the lower-level governments. This question is analyzed both when the federal fee is proportional to GNI and proportional to GDP. One key result is that if the government in a lower-level jurisdiction acts as a Nash follower vis-a-vis the other governments in the public sector, then there is an incentive to implement a higher tax on labor. Another is that if the lower-level government is able to exercise decentralized leadership vis-à-vis a federal government which is concerned with redistribution, then the incentive structure underlying the taxation of labor is independent of how the federal government collects its revenue.

One of the main arguments against raising capital income tax rates is that doing so discourages savings and investment and hinders economic growth. However, academic research on taxes and growth suggests that this argument has no real basis. And the primary alternatives to capital income taxation — labor income taxes and increased government borrowing — carry their own potentially adverse effects on growth. Available for download at http://ssrn.com/author=2205 ; https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/1004/thumbnail.jpg

This paper provides a model of nonlinear income taxation in a context of international mobility. We consider two identical countries, in which each government chooses non-cooperatively redistributive taxes. It is shown that when skilled workers can move at low cost, the income taxation does not involve distortions. When the cost to move becomes high for skilled workers, taxation policy is less redistributive but qualitatively similar to the taxation policy in autarky. Moreover, the mobility of the unskilled workers does not affect the income taxation when both countries have Rawlsian objectives.

This paper provides a model of nonlinear income taxation in a context of international mobility. We consider two identical countries, in which each government chooses non-cooperatively redistributive taxes. It is shown that when skilled workers can move at low cost, the income taxation does not involve distortions. When the cost to move becomes high for skilled workers, taxation policy is less redistributive but qualitatively similar to the taxation policy in autarky. Moreover, the mobility of the unskilled workers does not affect the income taxation when both countries have Rawlsian objectives.

We compare two different redistributive policies specifically designed to alleviate poverty. The first one is inspired to the idea of participation income, the second focused on the introduction of a negative income tax. Briefly characterizing an economy with workers and non-workers and using income as evaluation space for poverty, we determine optimality conditions of both measures under a flat rate labor income tax. Finally, we emphasize a necessary condition for these measures to mitigate poverty.

¿Puede el Gobierno español generar más ingresos fiscales haciendo más progresivo el Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas? Para responder a esta pregunta, construimos una economía de ciclo vital con riesgo sobre la productividad laboral no asegurable y oferta laboral endógena. Además, los individuos están sujetos a impuestos progresivos sobre el trabajo y los ingresos del capital, así como a una serie de impuestos proporcionales que capturan las cotizaciones sociales, el Impuesto sobre Sociedades y el IVA. Nuestra respuesta es sí, pero no mucho. Una reforma que aumenta los impuestos sobre las rentas del trabajo para las personas que ganan más que el ingreso laboral medio y reduce los impuestos para aquellos que ganan menos que el ingreso laboral medio genera una pequeña recaudación adicional. La recaudación por el impuesto sobre las rentas del trabajo se maximiza a un tipo marginal efectivo del 51,6 % (38,9 %) para el 1 % (5 %) de las personas con mayor renta, frente al 46,3 % (34,7 %) de la economía de referencia. En este caso, el aumento de la recaudación del impuesto sobre las rentas del trabajo es de solo un 0,82 %, mientras que la recaudación fiscal total desciende un 1,55 %, debido a que la mayor progresividad se asocia con una menor oferta de trabajo y capital agregados. Así, el Gobierno recauda impuestos más altos de una economía más pequeña. La recaudación fiscal total es mayor si el aumento de los tipos impositivos marginales afecta solo a las rentas más altas. Sin embargo, este aumento debe ser sustancial y cubrir a un gran segmento de dichos contribuyentes. Por ejemplo, el aumento de la recaudación como resultado de un aumento de 3 puntos porcentuales del tipo marginal sobre el 1 % de los que más ganan es solo del 0,09 %. Por el contrario, un aumento de 10 puntos porcentuales sobre el 10 % de los que más ganan (aquellos con ingresos laborales por encima de 41.699 euros) eleva los ingresos fiscales totales en un 2,81 %. ; Can the Spanish government generate more tax revenue by making personal income taxes more progressive? To answer this question, we build a life-cycle economy with uninsurable labor productivity risk and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face progressive taxes on labor and capital incomes and proportional taxes that capture social security, corporate income, and consumption taxes. Our answer is yes, but not much. A reform that increases labor income taxes for individuals who earn more than the mean labor income and reduces taxes for those who earn less than the mean labor income generates a small additional revenue. The revenue from labor income taxes is maximized at an effective marginal tax rate of 51.6% (38.9%) for the richest 1% (5%) of individuals, versus 46.3% (34.7%) in the benchmark economy. The increase in revenue from labor income taxes is only 0.82%, while the total tax revenue declines by 1.55%. The higher progressivity is associated with lower aggregate labor supply and capital. As a result, the government collects higher taxes from a smaller economy. The total tax revenue is higher if marginal taxes are raised only for the top earners.The increase, however, must be substantial and cover a large segment of top earners. The rise in tax collection from a 3 percentage points increase on the top 1% is just 0.09%. A 10 percentage points increase on the top 10% of earners (those who earn more than €41,699) raises total tax revenue by 2.81%.

Fiscal multipliers depend on several structural characteristics of each economy. In this study it is argued that labor income tax progressivity lowers the fiscal multipliers of fiscal consolidation programs. By calibrating an incomplete‑ markets, overlapping generations model for the United States for different values of the labor income tax progressivity, it is shown that as progressivity increases the recessionary impacts of fiscal consolidation are lower in the case of consolidation through decrease of government spending and are more recessionary in the case of consolidation financed with tax hikes. ; Os multiplicadores orçamentais dependem de várias características estruturais de cada economia. Neste estudo, argumenta‑ se que a progressividade do imposto de rendimento do trabalho reduz os multiplicadores fiscais dos programas de consolidação fiscal. Ao calibrar um modelo de gerações sobrepostas e de mercados incompletos para os Estados Unidos e para diferentes valores da progressividade do imposto sobre os rendimentos do trabalho, mostra‑se que, à medida que a progressividade aumenta, os impactos recessivos da consolidação orçamental são menores no caso da consolidação por redução dos gastos governamentais, e são mais recessivos no caso da consolidação ser financiada com aumento de impostos.Palavras‑ chave: consolidação orçamental; multiplicadores orçamentais; progressividade fiscal sobre os rendimentos do trabalho.