The history of Veneto in the second half of 20th century is a history of great and sudden social transformations. The first one happens because of the economic boom that began in the 1970s, later than in other areas of Italy. The boom has led to a progressive consumption of the territory which has strongly changed the landscape towards a urban sprawl. Andrea Zanzotto denounces this situation already in 1970. In the 2000s, many writers denounced the erosion of the territory by unscrupulous businessmen and corrupt politicians. In these years, the most interesting works are novel rather than essays. In particular I quindicimila passi by Vitaliano Trevisan tells this situation by focusing on an unstable and highly effective character, who dreams of the Amazon in the suburbs of Vicenza. Cartongesso by Francesco Maino, published in 2014, takes the complaint to the extreme, because the author builds a very long invective against the Venetian people. But it is only in 2015, when Romolo Bugaro publishes Effetto domino, that the second major change in the Veneto region, due to the economic crisis, is represented: the building contractors who devastate the area are now defeated.
In the first part of the article, the author analyses the latest dimensions of on the territory of the former Yugoslavia stemming from the Dayton and Paris accords. His starting point is the geographical criterion which produces five trouble spots which may jeopardize the process of security-building. He concludes that only a determined application of political, diplomatic and economic pressures, as well as military presence, may bring about a new dimension of security in Southeastern Europe. The second part of the article gives a review the analyses of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the creation of new state this part of Europe, as well as of the concepts and schemes for a certain degr linkage and bringing together, the most prominent of which is the American initiative for the co-operation in Southeastern Europe. It is obvious that this region will go on being viewed through different lenses and that the interests of the observers, more than those of the peoples living in this part of Europe, will get precedence. (SOI : PM: S. 23)
The author analyzes the position of Croatia following the Dayton accord. These accords have secured the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on the consociational principle as stipulated by Arend Lijphart. However, fierce integrational nationalisms still rage in B&H, they spill over into the neighbouring states where they create military and political instability. In Croatia, the populist and vindictive nationalism is on the wane, but not so th original democratic nationalism. The latter is manifested in its twin task: on to join the prestigious union of European states while the other is to go on w the unification of the entire Croatian ethnic corpus. The first brand of nationalism has been trying by hook or by crook to ensure a place for Croatia the Council of Europe in order to escape the trap of a community of Balkan states as envisaged by Eurostrategists and their latest "globally regional European" policy. Thus, the post-Dayton Croatia will be marked by fault-lines and conflicts between these two types of nationalisms; one, pro-European and the other integrational (aimed at bringing together the entire Croatian ethnos). (SOI : PM: S. 149)
Uvod: Demografsko staranje predstavlja v zadnjem času velik izziv, s katerim se sooča večina evropskih držav, tudi Slovenija. Ob daljšanju življenjske dobe se mnogi starejši soočajo z eno ali več kroničnimi boleznimi, odvisnostjo od drugih, oslabljenostjo in krhkostjo. A stanje krhkosti ni nepovratna posledica staranja ; izziv, s katerim se soočamo ob podaljševanju življenjske dobe je doseganje čvrste, nekrhke, zdrave in samostojne starosti. Namen: Namen dela je proučiti razširjenost in pojavnost sindroma krhkosti pri starejših odraslih (starih 65 let in več) v Sloveniji in ovrednotiti razlike v primerjavi z Evropo. Metode: Izvedli smo retrospektivno raziskavo razširjenosti in pojavnosti sindroma krhkosti v Sloveniji in Evropi na podlagi podatkov iz raziskave o zdravju, procesu staranja in upokojevanju v Evropi - SHARE. Uporabili smo podatke za leto 2011 (val 4), 2013 (val 5) in 2015 (val 6), pri čemer smo krhkost ovrednotili na podlagi validirane metode SHARE fenotip krhkosti. Analizirali smo razširjenost in pojavnost sindroma krhkosti v Sloveniji in Evropi, ter izvedli primerjavo razširjenosti med Slovenijo in Evropo, in sicer po spolu, starostnih skupinah, izobrazbi, samooceni zdravja, polifarmakoterapiji, geografskih regijah (v Sloveniji) in državah (v Evropi). Rezultati: Razširjenost sindroma krhkosti med starejšimi odraslimi v letu 2015 je bila v Sloveniji 14,2% (95% CI: 12,7-15,6%), v Evropi pa 15,4% ; 95% CI: 14,8-15,9%). Razširjenost predkrhkosti v Sloveniji je bila 41,8% (v Evropi: 44,4%). Med leti 2011 (18,1%), 2013 (17,0%) in 2015 (14,2%) je razširjenost krhkosti v Sloveniji padala. Štiriletna pojavnost (2011-2015) sindroma krhkosti je bila v Sloveniji 4,4 % (95% CI: 2,1-6,7%), v Evropi 5,4 % (95% CI: 4,9-5,9%). Večja razširjenost in pojavnosti krhkosti je pri ženskah, narašča s starostjo, večja je pri nižje izobraženih ljudeh ter osebah s polifarmakoterapijo. Več kot 45% krhkih posameznikov v Sloveniji in Evropi svoje zdravje ocenjuje kot slabo. Najmanjša razširjenost krhkosti je na gorenjskem (8,5%), največja v pomurski regiji (22,2%), v Evropi pa v splošnem narašča od severne proti južni Evropi. Statistično značilen vpliv na krhkost ima spol (v Evropi), starost, izobrazba (v Evropi), samoocena zdravja, polifarmakoterapija ter tudi nekatere regije v severovzhodni Sloveniji in države v Evropi. Zaključki: V prihodnosti bi bilo smiselno poenotiti metodologijo določanja krhkosti ter poenotiti definicijo pojavnosti krhkosti in predkrhkosti, da bi bili rezultati raziskav v različnih državah lažje primerljivi. ; Introduction: Demographic ageing affects most of the European countries, including Slovenia. Increased life expectancy is associated with higher prevalence of chronic diseases, disability, weakness and frailty. Nevertheless, frailty is not an irreversible one-way process. Current challenge for modern healthcare systems is providing non-frail, healthy and independent aging. Aim: The aim of this master's thesis is to evaluate prevalence and incidence of frailty syndrome in older adults (⡥ 65 years) in Slovenia and examine differences compared to other European countries. Methods: Retrospective study of prevalence and incidence of frailty syndrome in Slovenia and Europe was conducted, using the data from Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe (SHARE). We used data collected in 2011 (wave 4), 2013 (wave 5) and 2015 (wave 6). Frailty was defined according to validated SHARE Frailty Phenotype method. Prevalence and incidence of frailty in Slovenia and Europe was analyzed, including comparison between Slovenia and Europe, using variables: sex, age categories, education, self-rated health, polypharmacy, statistical regions (Slovenia) and countries (Europe). Results: The overall prevalence of frailty in Slovenia (2015) was 14.2% (95% CI: 12.7-15.6 %), in Europe 15.4% (95% CI: 14.8-15.9%). Prevalence of pre-frailty was 41.8% (Europe: 44.4%). Prevalence in Slovenia was decreasing throughout years: 2011 (18.1%), 2013 (17.0%) and 2015 (14.2%). Four-year incidence of frailty syndrome (2011-2015) was 4.4% (95% CI: 2.1-6.7%) in Slovenia and 5.4% (95% CI: 4.9-5.9%) in Europe. Frailty prevalence and incidence increased with age, and were more frequent among women and participants with lower education and older adults with polypharmacy. More than 45% of older adults in Slovenia and Europe self-assessed their health as bad. Frailty prevalence varies across statistical regions in Slovenia. The proportion of frailty or prefrailty was in general higher in southern than in northern Europe. The variables that are significantly related to prevalence of frailty are gender (female, Europe), age, education (Europe), self-rated health, polypharmacy, some statistical regions in Slovenia and countries in Europe. Conclusions: Unified methodology for evaluating frailty is necessary for easier comparison of results between countries. Moreover, a harmonized definition of measuring frailty incidence may be useful.
The article provides an analysis of youth values in Croatia in the socialist and post-socialist periods, comparing them with values of older citizens and of the political elite. The comparative analysis is based on data obtained through four empirical investigations conducted in 1986, 1999 and 2004. The results show that the predominant youth values remain stable, with minor oscillations in rank. The aspects in which the young are different from the older citizens are a broader variety of interests, a greater acceptance of post-materialistic values, and a lesser acceptance of traditional and political values. It is also shown that the optimism of youth is constantly on a high level, as well as their satisfaction with life, which is more pronounced than with older citizens. In all analyzed segments the political elite is noticeably different from both above-mentioned groups. The overall findings confirm that the acceptance of observed values varies depending on the social-political context, and the age and social status of the respondents. Since the scope of the variations is limited, the author concludes that this analysis gives one more confirmation of the relative stability of values, and of the fact that they are transmitted from generation to generation in a way which does not endanger social continuity. Adapted from the source document.
The article provides an analysis of youth values in Croatia in the socialist and post-socialist periods, comparing them with values of older citizens and of the political elite. The comparative analysis is based on data obtained through four empirical investigations conducted in 1986, 1999 and 2004. The results show that the predominant youth values remain stable, with minor oscillations in rank. The aspects in which the young are different from the older citizens are a broader variety of interests, a greater acceptance of post-materialistic values, and a lesser acceptance of traditional and political values. It is also shown that the optimism of youth is constantly on a high level, as well as their satisfaction with life, which is more pronounced than with older citizens. In all analyzed segments the political elite is noticeably different from both above-mentioned groups. The overall findings confirm that the acceptance of observed values varies depending on the social-political context, and the age and social status of the respondents. Since the scope of the variations is limited, the author concludes that this analysis gives one more confirmation of the relative stability of values, and of the fact that they are transmitted from generation to generation in a way which does not endanger social continuity. Adapted from the source document.
At the end of the Second World War, Poles, who had come to Bosnia and Hercegovina as settlers at the beginning of the twentieth century, lived in the districts of Srbac, Prnjavor, Derventa, Laktasi, Bosanska Dubica, Prijedor, Doboj, Bosanski Brod, Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanski Novi, Piskavica, Banja Luka, and to a lesser extent, they could be found in parts of the counties of Vares, Zenica, Teslic, Zavidovici and Sarajevo. There political situation was very unfavourable, and they were frequently the objects of various kinds of attacks and terror. Immediately following the war, they requested permission collectively to emigrate to Poland. This was allowed during 1946 on the basis of the protocol signed by Yugoslavia and Poland on January 2, 1946. Under its terms, each emigrant stated in writing that he was emigrating voluntarily and that he was relinquishing claim to all immovable property in Yugoslavia. The mass emigration began in November. In total, 2649 families numbering 14088 members left Bosnia and Hercegovina (this figure included 7405 children below eighteen years of age, 3501 adult women, and 3182 adult men). They left behind 6400 domesticated animals, 1784 homes, 12350.5 ha of arable farm land, and 1495.8 ha of forest. After the Poles emigrated, their lands and possessions were allocated for internal colonization. (SOI : CSP: S. 104)
In its introduction, the paper defines the meanings of the words 'safety' and 'police'. Then it deals with different police organizations, their organizational structure and different police models of operation with the emphasis on studying the latest approach to the police work called community policing that is being introduced also in the Slovene police lately. Since the central topic here is local community safety, the paper deals with the community at which police work must be targeted. Then follows a study and analysis overview regarding the population's readiness to co-operate with the police. The empirical part of the paper presents an opinion survey among the Podravje Region population to find out to what extent people trust the police, how they are satisfied with the police work, what is the discrepancy between estimation and the expectations the Podravje population has for police officers, and how safe they feel. The survey shows the following: the Podravje population feels safe, people trust the police and they are ready to co-operate in solving safety problems. It has been ascertained that police officers fulfill people's expectations, because in dealing with people, the police were better than expected. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of this article, through an analysis of Veljko Vujacic's text and other pamphlets and manifestos by the Serbian political elite, was to show that the Serbian elite and the Serbian society have not got rid of their nationalist bias in explaining the events which led to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. They claim that the main culprit for this failure was the communist national policy and the failure to use adequate means (meaning Rankovic's technology of violence) in order to preserve the unity of the state. The second part of the article serves to demonstrate how Weber's view on the politics of power does not suffice to explain away the bolshevist and the communist form of the populist Serbian nationalism. The moment when the former Yugoslav political elite split into the anticommunist and anticentralist on the one hand, and the bolshevist and the centralist on the other, there was no possibility for a compromise. The third part suggests that Vujacic (and not only he) thinks that a way of overcoming the Serbian "dominant" nationalism is the catharsis of Serbian intellectuals and the Serbian society. However, as the latest events and proclamations of the Serbian elite show, his is a solitary case. (SOI : PM: S. 37)
V pričujoči raziskavi smo preučili strukturo, dejavnike in posledice politične kulture in državljanske participacije v postjugoslovanskih družbah. Uporabljenih je bilo več virov kvantitativnih podatkov, med drugim raziskava 2.178 študentov družboslovja v osmih postjugoslovanskih entitetah (M starost = 19,8 leta, SD = 1,89) ; reprezentativni vzorci Evropske raziskave vrednot (2008) ; pretekli valovi Svetovne raziskave vrednot (1995/8) in podatki raziskave jugoslovanske mladine (Jupio, 1986). Analiza na agregatni ravni je pokazala, da so v socioekonomsko manj razvitih okoljih (Kosovo, BiH in NJR Makedonija) v večji meri prisotni elementi podložniške politične kulture (Almond in Verba, 1963), v okviru katere so se kot ključni elementi na individualni ravni izkazali avtoritarnost, splošni tradicionalizem, tradicionalni pogled na spolne vloge in nacionalizem. Medentitetne razlike na merah ekonomske kulture (ekonomski egalitarizem in državni paternalizem) so povečini majhne in statistično neznačilne, saj vse entitete na obeh indikatorjih dosegajo visoke povprečne vrednosti. V skladu s predvidevanji dopolnjene modernizacijske teorije je demokratična politična kultura bolj koherentna v socioekonomsko bolj razvitih postjugoslovanskih državah, v nasprotju s teorijo pa manj razvite države dosegajo višje povprečne ravni državljanske participacije. Starost in socioekonomski status sta se izkazala za najmočnejša sociodemografska dejavnika politične kulture in državljanske participacije. Višje stopnje učinkovite demokracije (Inglehart in Welzel, 2007) dosegajo socioekonomsko bolj razvite države, ki izkazujejo tudi najvišje stopnje demokratične politične kulture. Longitudinalna analiza ni pokazala enotne smeri političnokulturnih sprememb ; slednje so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih bile v smeri večanja tako demokratičnih kot tudi nekaterih podložniških orientacij (npr. avtoritarnosti). Avtorji sklenejo, da proces demokratične konsolidacije, tako političnokulturne kot tudi institucionalne, v večini postjugoslovanskih družb še ni končan. Na koncu so predstavljene implikacije raziskave. ; The present study examined structures, determinants and consequences of political culture and citizen participation in post-Yugoslav societies. Several empirical data sources were employed, among others a survey of 2,178 social science students in eight post-Yugoslav entities (M age = 19.8 years, SD = 1.89) ; representative samples from European Values Study (2008), earlier waves of World Values Survey (1995/8) and a study of Yugoslav youth Jupio carried out in 1985. The aggregate level results indicated that socio-economically less developed entities (Kosovo, BiH, and FYR Macedonia) scored higher on subject political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), which was at the individual level found to be characterized by its four core components: authoritarianism, general traditionalism, traditional gender roles attitudes, and nationalism. Between-country differences on measures of economic cultural orientations (economic egalitarianism and state paternalism) were largely minor or insignificant, since all entities scored high on both measures. As predicted by revised modernization theory democratic political culture was found to be more coherent in socioeconomically more developed post-Yugoslav countries. Inconsistent with modernization approach results demonstrated higher levels of citizen participation in less well-off countries. Age and socioeconomic status proved to be the most potent sociodemographic predictors of political culture and citizen participation. Finally, democracy was found to be more effective (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) in socioeconomically more developed countries, which also scored highest on measures of democratic political culture. Longitudinal analysis did not uniformly confirm substantive political culture changes with changes in the last two decades taking place in both democratic as well as authoritarian direction. Authors conclude that the process of democratic consolidation, both political-cultural as well as institutional, is far from over in the majority of post-Yugoslav entities. Implications of the results are discussed.
Zadolževanje in razdolževanje je trenutno zelo aktualna tema tako v Sloveniji, kot tudi v svetu. V magistrski nalogi smo raziskali, kako so se zadolževala in razdolževala slovenska gospodinjstva in podjetja v obdobju 2004 -2015 in trende primerjali s trendi v državah EU. Podatki kažejo, da so slovenska gospodinjstva približno polovico manj zadolžena kot gospodinjstva ostalih članic Evropske unije. Čisto drugačna pa je situacija v sektorju podjetij, saj so slovenska podjetja v krizo vstopila z visoko stopnjo zadolženosti. Opazne so tudi bistvene razlike v strukturi financiranja slovenskih in tujih podjetij. Na osnovi raziskave ugotovljamo, da so se slovenska gospodinjstva in podjetja pred krizo bolj zadolževala od subjektov v ostalih članicah Evropske unije in kasneje začela izvajati proces razdolževanja. ; Indebtedness and deleveraging is currently a very topical issue in Slovenia, and as well in the world. In this Masters thesis we have researched indebtedness and deleveraging for Slovenian householders and companies in the period 2004-2015 and compared this trends with trends in other European Union states. The data show that Slovenian householders are approximately 50 % less overindebted then hoseholders in other European Union states. Quite different is situation in the corporate sector, where Slovenian companies entered the crisis with high debt levels. We also noticed significant differences in the financial structure of Slovenian and foreign companies. Based on our research we established that before the crisis Slovenian householders and companies were borrowing more like householders and companies in other states of the European Union, and started with proces of deleveraging much later.
Članak razmatra uspon, oblike i posledice protesta u nedemokratskim režimima, oslanjajući se na noviju literaturu iz uporedne analize političkih režima i društvenih pokreta. Oblik režima značajno oblikuje izglede za izbijanje protesta, kao i njegove oblike i posledice. Protesti često proizvode bitne promene u personalnom sastavu i politici vlasti, koje značajno utiču na strukturu i delovanje nedemokratskih režima, i ponekad vode promeni režima. Primeri su navedeni iz kasnog komunističkog autoritarizma u Poljskoj i Jugoslaviji, u kojima su dugotrajni protesti doprineli padu režima i države, i postkomunistički autoritarni režimi u Srbiji i Ukrajini koji su više puta uzdrmani a zatim i dokrajčeni "pritiskom odozdo". ; The paper explores the politics of protest in non-democratic regimes using insights from comparative regime analysis and social movement theory. A regime type strongly shapes factors that trigger popular mobilization, the repertories of collective action and their implications. Protest politics may produce a considerable political change, such as policy and personality change in the political establishment, as well as important shifts in the structure and operation of non-democratic regimes, even regime change. The paper provides evidence from the late communist authoritarian Poland and Yugoslavia, in which sustained protests contributed to the collapse of regime and state, and the post-communist competitive authoritarian Serbia and Ukraine, which experience repeated protest waves and were brought down by protest politics.
The aim of this study was to determine whether there is a difference between female abstinents in Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of certain demographics (age, education, rural-urban, party and ethnicity) and socio-psychological characteristics (interest in politics, the ways of getting their information about politics, trust in institutions, dogmatism, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, the end justifies the means, the attitude towards the leader, conservatism, liberalism and authoritarianism). The study was conducted in the first half of March 2013, on a sample of 483 adult women who did not plan to vote in the upcoming elections, who in the past six years (three election cycles) either voted occasionally, or they voted, but have no intention of voting again, or they have never voted. We started from the assumption that the different modes of political abstinence differ with respect to the measured variables. The results show that the three categories of women abstinents differ in terms of certain socio-demographic variables: age, education, ethnicity, party affiliation and religious beliefs. There are differences among respondents concerning political interests. The greatest interest was found among the respondents who manipulate their turning out to the polls, followed by those who were disappointed in the elections, while the slightest interest in politics was among the respondents who have never voted. Television is still the dominant medium for getting information about political events, the second and third ones are newspapers and radio, but they are much less influential. Yet among the three categories of women abstinents significant differences were found only regarding television and radio. Three categories of women abstinents differ only in cosmopolitanism and liberalism variables. There is a difference between women abstinents in their confidence in institutions. The most trust in institutions is found in women who occasionally took part in the elections, followed by those who voted, but no longer do so. The least trust in institutions is found among women who have never voted. ; Cilj ovog istraživanja je ustanoviti da li postoji razlika među apstinenticama u Bosni i Hercegovini prema određenim demografskim (starost, obrazovanje, selo-grad, stranačka i etnička pripadnost) i socio-psihološkim karakteristikama (zainteresovanost za politiku, način informisanja o politici, povjerenje u institucije, dogmatizam, nacionalizam, kosmopolitizam, cilj opravdava sredstvo, odnos prema vođi, konzervativizam, konzervativistička autoritarnost i liberalizam). Istraživanje je provedeno u prvoj polovini marta 2013. godine na uzorku od 483 punoljetne žene koje ne planiraju da glasaju na predstojećim izborima, a koje su u posljednjih šest godina (tri izborna ciklusa) nekad glasale, a nekad ne, glasale su, ali više neće, ili nikad nisu glasale. Pošli smo od pretpostavke da će različiti modaliteti političke apstinencije da se razlikuju s obzirom na mjerene varijable. Dobijeni rezultati pokazuju da se tri kategorije apstinentica razlikuju po pojedinim sociodemografskim varijablama: starost, obrazovanje, etnička i stranačka pripadnost i vjerska ubjeđenja. Ispitanice se međusobno razlikuju i zainteresovanošću za politiku. Najveće interesovanje nalazimo kod ispitanica koje manipulišu svojim izlaskom na izbore, a slijede one koje su se razočarale u izbore, dok je zainteresovanost za politiku najmanja kod ispitanica koje uopšte ne glasaju na izborima. Televizija je još uvijek dominantan medij za informisanje o političkim dešavanjima, dok su na drugom i trećem mjestu dnevne novine i radio, ali su znatno manje uticajni. Ipak, između tri kategorije apstinentica nalazimo značajne razlike samo kod televizije i radija. Tri kategorije apstinentica se međusobno razlikuju samo po varijablama kosmopolitizam i liberalizam. Prisutna je i razlika između apstinentica po njihovom povjerenju u institucije. Najviše povjerenja u institucije nalazimo kod ispitanica koje nekad izlaze, a nekad ne izlaze na izbore, slijede ispitanice koje su glasale, ali više neće. Najmanje povjerenja u institucije nalazimo kod ispitanica koje nikad ne glasaju.
The article looks into the changes in the party and the social structure of the first House of the Croatian parliament (Sabor) in the transitional period. A total of twenty-six political parties have had seats in the Parliament; sixteen of them secured their place in it through a prior support of the electoral body, while ten of them secured their parliamentary status solely through individual lists. The author shows that the party fragmentation has occurred due to the process of parliamentary parties' factioning and the transfer of delegates from the parliamentary into the non-parliamentary parties. The degree of the party fragmentation in the Sabor is considered moderate and not disruptive for the functioning of the Parliament. This is due to the continued and stupendous mandate dominance of the majority party and to the fact that the party fragmentation has primarily involved the opposition parties. An analysis of the social/demographic characteristics of the representatives has shown that the Sabor is dominated by male, college-educated, forty-eight years old Croats with a bit more than four years of parliamentary experience. The educational structure of the Sabor does not differ much from other European parliaments, but the number of senior representatives is somewhat higher than in other European countries, while the share of women is the standards. It has been suggested that the most effective strategy the Croatian parliamentary political parties could employ regarding the gender and age representation are internally determined quotas for women and young people on their candidates' lists for elections. This would indirectly influence the social structure sof the Croatian parliament. (SOI : PM: S. 174)
