Im Artikel wird die Politik Deutschlands gegenüber Polen seit der Unterzeichnung des Vertrages über gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit am 17. Juni 1991 bis heute dargestellt. Der Vertrag markierte die historische Wende in den vielschichtigen deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen und eröffnete ein neues Kapitel. Man sprach damals von der Werte- und Interessengemeinschaft. Später aber war auch die Rede von einer Konflikt- und Streitgemeinschaft. Deswegen wurden die vergangenen 25 Jahre auf Grund von Konsens und Dissens in den Beziehungen sowie aus dem Gesichtspunkt ihrer Wahrnehmungsunterschiede in drei Perioden unterteilt: 1990 bis 1998: Phase der Verständigung und Versöhung; 1998 bis 2007: Phase der Distanz in den Beziehungen; 2007 bis 2015: Phase der Suche nach erwachsener Partnerschaft. Die Bilanz der Errungenschaften in der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Deutschland und Polen fällt im vergangenen Vierteljahrhundert im allgemmeinen positiv aus. Es ist vor allem das Agieren von Deutschland als Anwalt Polens in der EU und NATO hervorzuheben. Die Herausforderungen, die auch Konfliktfeldern zwischen Polen und Deutschland markieren, betreffen unter anderem folgende Themen: polnische Minderheit in Deutschland, Flüchtlingskrise, das Verhältnis zu Russland und zur Ukraine, Energiepolitik, Europapolitik und Geschichtspolitik.
The declining years of the communist regimes towards the end of the 80s as well as the on-going process of a thaw in political relations was also reflected in the Vatican's policy towards Christians in Eastern Europe. The task was not easy as the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church in Russia were afraid of ecumenical slogans propagated by the pope. They even presented their own, competitive ideas, whose aim was to discredit John Paul II's diplomatic efforts. The Pope's policy towards churches in other European countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland) did not assume a common approach as the fate of Christians there was shaped independently from each other and even with certain respect granted by the Kremlin towards the uniqueness of each country. The key aspect of John Paul II's policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe was the pursuit of spiritual renewal of Christianity in the East, which was supposed to be started with the pilgrimage to the USSR (Ukraine, Moscow and Lithuania). ; The declining years of the communist regimes towards the end of the 80s as well as the on-going process of a thaw in political relations was also reflected in the Vatican's policy towards Christians in Eastern Europe. The task was not easy as the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church in Russia were afraid of ecumenical slogans propagated by the pope. They even presented their own, competitive ideas, whose aim was to discredit John Paul II's diplomatic efforts. The Pope's policy towards churches in other European countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland) did not assume a common approach as the fate of Christians there was shaped independently from each other and even with certain respect granted by the Kremlin towards the uniqueness of each country. The key aspect of John Paul II's policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe was the pursuit of spiritual renewal of Christianity in the East, which was supposed to be started with the pilgrimage to the USSR (Ukraine, Moscow and Lithuania).
Wbrew nadziejom Palestyńczyków wybuch Arabskiej Wiosny, zamiast przyśpieszyć pozytywne przemiany doprowadził do pogorszenia sytuacji w regionie i samej Autonomii Palestyńskiej. Zostały zatrzymane oczekiwane procesy gospodarcze. Doszło do kilku dewastujących Strefę Gazy operacji militarnych Izraela. Pogłębiły się podziały – na Zachodni Brzeg rządzony przez OWP oraz Hamas kontrolujący Strefę Gazy. Pogorszeniu uległy nastroje społeczne wśród Palestyńczyków. Wobec pojawienia się w regionie tzw. Państwa Islamskiego, wspólnota międzynarodowa, w szczególności USA, straciły zainteresowanie trudnym do rozwiązania konfliktem bliskowschodnim. Ciosem dla Palestyńczyków było przeniesienie przez Donalda Trumpa, w maju 2018 r., ambasady USA w Izraelu z Tel Awiwu do Jerozolimy. Wobec pogłębiających się problemów w Autonomii Palestyńskiej, w tym utraty zaufania do Palestyńczyków ze strony Izraela, kwestionowana zaczęła być w Izraelu idea rozwiązania dwupaństwowego, to jest przyszłego pokojowego współistnienia żydowskiego Izraela i arabskiej Palestyny. Połowiczny sukces, jaki osiągnęli Palestyńczycy uzyskując w 2012 r. statusu państwa obserwatora w ONZ nie równoważy strat, dla sprawy palestyńskiej z lat 2011–2018. Wiele wskazuje, że Palestyńska Władza Narodowa znajduje się dziś w przededniu przeobrażeń, które będą musiały uwzględnić niekorzystne zmiany, które zaszły w ostatnich latach. Słowa kluczowe: Arabska Wiosna, Palestyńczycy, OWP, Hamas, operacje militarne, konflikt bliskowschodni, rozwiązanie dwupaństwowe, ONZ ; Despite the hopes of the Palestinians, the outbreak of the Arab Spring, instead of accelerating positive changes, led to a signifi cant deterioration of the situation in the region and in the Palestinian Authority itself. Positive economic processes have been stopped. Successive Israeli military operations devastated the Gaza Strip. The divisions on the West Bank ruled by the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas controlling the Gaza Strip deepened. Social sentiment among Palestinians has deteriorated. In view of the emergence of the so-called Islamic State in the region, the international community, in particular the US, lost interest in resolving the Middle Eastern conflict. The moving of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in May 2018, was a blow to the Palestinians. But what's the worst, is the loss of Israeli trust to the Palestinians, especially the fact that the idea of a two-state solution has been questioned in Israel. The partial success that the Palestinians achieved by obtaining the status of an observer in the United Nations in 2012 does not balance the losses that the 2011–2018 period brought to the Palestinian cause. There are many indications that the Palestinian National Authority is at a crossroad, on the eve of changes that will have to take into account the changes that have taken place in recent years. Key words: Arab Spring, Palestinians, PLO, Hamas, military operations, Middle East conflict, two-state solution, UN
W grudniu 2011 r. minęła 20. rocznica rozpadu ZSRR. Na ile zmieniła się polityka i strategia energetyczna Rosji po 20 latach transformacji polityczno-gospodarczej? Jakie są nowe cele polityki energetycznej Rosji w drugiej dekadzie XXI w.? Szczególne miejsce w strategii surowcowej Rosji odgrywa od lat polityka utrzymywania kontroli sieci przesyłu surowców. Polityka ta obejmuje zarówno budowę nowych linii przesyłu, jak również uzyskanie kontroli nad systemem ropo- i gazociągów państw tranzytowych. Po dwóch dekadach Rosja przeorientowała swoją politykę surowcową wobec Wschodu. Równocześnie, dzięki zaangażowaniu dużych europejskich koncernów we wspólne nowe projekty, takie jak gazociąg Nord Stream czy South Stream, Rosja skutecznie utrzymuje kluczową pozycję dostawcy na europejskich rynkach energetycznych oraz kontrolę głównych szlaków eksportu gazu do UE. Taka polityka gwarantuje Rosji wpływ na bezpieczeństwo energetyczne całej UE. Rosja w odpowiedzi na nowe wyzwania podejmuje też działania mające na celu przeciwdziałanie rozwojowi niekonwencjonalnych technologii wydobycia gazu w Europie. ; December 2011 marked the 20th anniversary of the USSR collapse. To what extent has the Russian policy and energy strategy changed after 20 years of political and economic transition? What are the new energy policy objectives of Russia in the second decade of the twenty-first century? For years, a special place in Russia's raw materials strategy has been played by the policy to maintain control of transmission network resources. This policy covers both constructing of new transmission lines as well as gaining control of the petroleum and gas systems of transit countries. After two decades Russia reorientated its policy towards the East. At the same time, thanks to the involvement of large European corporations in new joint projects such as the Nord Stream or the South Stream gas pipelines, Russia effectively holds the position of the key energy supplier in the European market and controls main the gas export routes to the EU. Such a policy ensures Russia's influence on energy security across the EU. Russia, in response to new challenges, takes actions aimed at preventing the development of unconventional gas production technologies in Europe. ; В декабре 2011 г. миновала 20-я годовщина распада СССР. Насколько изменилась энергетическая политика и стратегия России после 20 лет политическо- экономической трансформации? Какими являются новые цели энергетической политики России во второй десятилетии XXI в.? На протяжении многих лет особенное место в сырьевой стратегии России играет политика контроля за транспортировкой энергоресурсов. Эта политика охватывает как сооружение новых средств доставки энергоресурсов, так и контролирование уже имеющихся систем нефте- и газопроводов в транзитных государствах. В последних двух десятилетиях Россия пытается переориентировать свои сырьевые потоки на Восток. Одновременно, благодаря вхождению больших европейских концернов в совместные новые проекты, напр. газопровод «Северный поток» (Nord Stream) или «Южный поток» (South Stream), Россия эффективно удерживает позицию главного поставщика энергоресурсов на европейский рынок и контролирует главные пути экспорта газа в ЕС. Такая политика гарантирует России влияние на энергетическую безопасность всего ЕС. Вместе с тем, в ответ на появляющиеся новые энергетические возможности, Россия старается противодействовать развитию нетрадиционных технологий добычи газа в Европе.
Year 1989 marked a breakthrough in the presence and development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Poland. The freedom of association was restored, and the society immediately took advantage of this freedom. Since the early 1990s, decentralization has been coupled with a revived activity of the civic sector, and a clear increase in the number of 'grass-root' initiatives, stimulated by the society itself. The number of NGOs has kept growing, including the associations, foundations, and church organizations. The scope of their activity, the number of employees and the tasks they undertake have been expanding. In order to understand the essence of social economy, and primarily to notice the opportunity to develop the state on the basis of the principles of social economy, it was necessary to change the definition of the essence of the state and society, their role, and to correlate their mutual objectives and needs. The administrative reform executed in Poland in 1999, resulted in moving the burden of public tasks from the central government to the units of territorial self-government. The administrative reform introduced three layers of territorial division in order to promote self-governance, facilitate the operation of local authorities, and bring them closer to citizens. Over the last twenty years, NGOs have become a valuable partner in territorial self-government by performing various kinds of public tasks and thus becoming an exceptionally significant element of social policy. The principles regulating the co-existence of the third sector and the state are laid down in the act of law of April 24, 2003 on public benefit and volunteer work, which provides a comprehensive regulation of the activity of NGOs in the realm of public life, the principles (subsidiarity, sovereignty of parties, partnership, efficiency, fair competition, and transparency), and the form of cooperation between such organizations and the organs of public administration with respect to the performance of public tasks. It should be emphasized, however, that while NGOs have taken over services rendered in some areas, their potential has not been fully utilized. The functioning of social organizations manifests civic freedom and society's self-organization. The activities of the third sector organizations allow the fulfillment of important social needs, such as the need for spontaneous association, social initiative and organizational autonomy. The functioning of social organizations has an advantageous influence on the activity of public and private organizations. The NGOs in Poland and abroad play an increasingly significant role, both in the development of civic society of democratic states, and also in the process of performing public tasks and the development of economies. At present, forms of cooperation between NGOs and the territorial self-government are being sought. This may indicate that both local authorities and the third sector organizations have reached a point where they are ready to form a real partnership. This is an optimistic statement, especially given the opportunity to develop the sector of social economy using the financial means of the EU structural funds. Along with the ageing of affluent societies, social exclusion, poverty and unemployment are the fundamental social problems for Poland and the whole of modern Europe. The subjects of the third sector of an economy can play a key role in solving these problems.
The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.
Year 1989 marked a breakthrough in the presence and development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Poland. The freedom of association was restored, and the society immediately took advantage of this freedom. Since the early 1990s, decentralization has been coupled with a revived activity of the civic sector, and a clear increase in the number of 'grass-root' initiatives, stimulated by the society itself. The number of NGOs has kept growing, including the associations, foundations, and church organizations. The scope of their activity, the number of employees and the tasks they undertake have been expanding. In order to understand the essence of social economy, and primarily to notice the opportunity to develop the state on the basis of the principles of social economy, it was necessary to change the definition of the essence of the state and society, their role, and to correlate their mutual objectives and needs. The administrative reform executed in Poland in 1999, resulted in moving the burden of public tasks from the central government to the units of territorial self-government. The administrative reform introduced three layers of territorial division in order to promote self-governance, facilitate the operation of local authorities, and bring them closer to citizens. Over the last twenty years, NGOs have become a valuable partner in territorial self-government by performing various kinds of public tasks and thus becoming an exceptionally significant element of social policy. The principles regulating the co-existence of the third sector and the state are laid down in the act of law of April 24, 2003 on public benefit and volunteer work, which provides a comprehensive regulation of the activity of NGOs in the realm of public life, the principles (subsidiarity, sovereignty of parties, partnership, efficiency, fair competition, and transparency), and the form of cooperation between such organizations and the organs of public administration with respect to the performance of public tasks. It should be emphasized, however, that while NGOs have taken over services rendered in some areas, their potential has not been fully utilized. The functioning of social organizations manifests civic freedom and society's self-organization. The activities of the third sector organizations allow the fulfillment of important social needs, such as the need for spontaneous association, social initiative and organizational autonomy. The functioning of social organizations has an advantageous influence on the activity of public and private organizations. The NGOs in Poland and abroad play an increasingly significant role, both in the development of civic society of democratic states, and also in the process of performing public tasks and the development of economies. At present, forms of cooperation between NGOs and the territorial self-government are being sought. This may indicate that both local authorities and the third sector organizations have reached a point where they are ready to form a real partnership. This is an optimistic statement, especially given the opportunity to develop the sector of social economy using the financial means of the EU structural funds. Along with the ageing of affluent societies, social exclusion, poverty and unemployment are the fundamental social problems for Poland and the whole of modern Europe. The subjects of the third sector of an economy can play a key role in solving these problems.
The economic policy of Polish governments changed but can be broadly divided into two groups. The first encompassed periods when Polish policy belonged to awidelydefined world mainstream. The second –those when Polish governments attempted alternatives tothe mainstream, looking for various ways of "taking ashortcut". In general, the first group helped economic development, the second hindered it, isolating the country from the world economy. The first group included the entire interwar period, when autarchic tendencies were mainstream, as well as the years 1944–1947 and 1989–2015. ; Polityka gospodarcza rządu polskiego przechodziła różne fazy, które jednak generalnie można podzielić nadwie grupy. Do pierwszej należały te, kiedy polityka polska mieściła się wgłównym nurcie przemian światowych. Do drugiej te, kiedy władze polskie stawiały naalternatywne wobec mainstreamu rozwiązania, ulegając pokusie "pójścia naskróty". Generalnie można powiedzieć, że pierwsze przyczyniały się do rozwoju kraju, adrugie sprowadzały jego rozwój namanowce, izolując od gospodarki światowej. Do pierwszej grupy można zaliczyć cały okres międzywojenny, łącznie zlatami 30., kiedy totendencje autarkiczne były właśnie mainstreamowe, lata 1944–1947 ilata 1989–2015.
ill., 24 cm ; The first stage of excavations at the Chotyniec hillfort in southeastern Poland (8 km from today's Polish-Ukrainian border), carried out in 2016–2019, has produced an assemblage of finds that link it to the forest-steppe variant of the Scythian Cultural Circle. A cult area (zolnik) was investigated, discovering fragments of Greek wine amphorae, an abundance of weapons and personal metal accessories of Scythian provenance. Settlements with similar assemblages of finds located around the hillfort have been identified as a micro-region of key importance for the interpretation of the cultural situation in the early Iron Age of a territory covering the regions of Volhynia and western Podolia – today in southeastern Poland and the adjoining areas of Ukraine. The article discusses the "eastern" groups: Lezhnica, Cherepin-Lagodiv and Western Podolian, in the context of the Chotyniec discoveries ; il., 24 cm ; W latach 2016–2019 przeprowadzono pierwszy etap wykopalisk na grodzisku w Chotyńcu (południowo-wschodnia Polska, 8 km od obecnej granicy polsko-ukraińskiej). Odkryte materiały pozwalają łączyć je z leśnostepowym wariantem scytyjskiego kręgu kulturowego. Na grodzisku zbadano zolnik, w warstwach którego znaleziono pokaźny zespół przedmiotów. Na plan pierwszy wysuwają się fragmenty greckich amfor na wino, liczne militaria i ozdoby metalowe o scytyjskiej proweniencji. W okolicy grodziska zidentyfikowano także osady z podobnymi przedmiotami. Można już mówić o całym mikroregionie – aglomeracji, której identyfikacja ma kluczowe znaczenie dla interpretacji sytuacji kulturowej we wczesnej epoce żelaza na obszarze południowo-wschodniej Polski oraz przyległych terenów Ukrainy – Wołynia i zachodniego Podola. W artykule rozpatrywane są "wschodnie" grupy: leżnicka, czerepińsko-łagodowska i zachodniopodolska w kontekście odkryć w Chotyńcu
25 lat działalności samorządu terytorialnego w Polsce to okres w historii Polski szczególny – czas dynamicznych zmian politycznych, społecznych i gospodarczych, których samorządy w znaczącym stopniu były kreatorami. I trzeba przyznać, że to właśnie te pierwsze, najtrudniejsze przecież lata nie miały sobie równych, bo tak ogromnego entuzjazmu i zaangażowania społecznego nie udało się osiągnąć już nigdy później. Miałem szczęście uczestniczyć w budowaniu samorządu terytorialnego w Polsce niemal od początku, na wszystkich jego szczeblach.Na obejmujących swe funkcje samorządowcach spoczęła ogromna odpowiedzialność, bo kredyt zaufania, jakim ich obdarzono, związany był z ogromnymi oczekiwaniami społecznymi: 25 lat temu nie chodziło przecież tylko o możliwość przeprowadzenia wyborów samorządowych, ale o fundamentalne zmiany we wszystkich dziedzinach życia. Decentralizacja i demokratyzacja polskiego państwa nie byłyby możliwe bez samorządów. To one włączały w przemiany całe społeczeństwo, uczyły odpowiedzialności i transparentności działania.Budowa samorządu terytorialnego w Polsce była też ogromną operacją logistyczną, na niespotykana dotąd skalę ‒ 25 lat temu ponad 100 tysięcy osób z urzędników państwowych zmieniło się w samorządowych, zdobywając nowe umiejętności i kompetencje, m.in. korzystając z wcześniejszych doświadczeń innych krajów. W wyniku komunalizacji mienia gminy przejęły wtedy kilka milionów nieruchomości i ponad 1500 przedsiębiorstw.Doświadczenia legislacyjne i organizacyjne pierwszego etapu reformy pozwoliły już jednak w 1991 r. rozpocząć prace nad jej drugim etapem – tworzeniem samorządów powiatowych i wojewódzkich, co nastąpiło po ośmiu latach. Samorząd regionalny powstawał już w momencie, gdy Polska przygotowywała się na przyjęcie unijnych środków przedakcesyjnych, w których podziale samorządy regionalne miały odgrywać znaczącą rolę. To na samorządach regionalnych spoczęła odpowiedzialność za tworzenie warunków do rozwoju województwa i wzrostu jego konkurencyjności.A przed nami kolejne ogromne wyzwanie – optymalne wykorzystanie środków unijnych z okresu budżetowego 2014-2020. Nie mam żadnych wątpliwości, że zrobimy to dobrze. ; The 25 years of activity of self-government in Poland occupy a special place in Polish history. It has been a period of dynamic political, social and economic changes and self-government units have been to a large extent creators of that change. Undoubtedly, the first years, which were also the most difficult ones, played a crucial role, and never again has it been possible to achieve the same level of enthusiasm and social involvement in the process. I was lucky to participate in the building of self-governing structures in Poland from the very beginning and at all levels.There was huge responsibility placed on the shoulders of those who were appointed to the function of a local self-government officer. The credit of trust given to them was charged with enormous social expectations. The stake 25 years ago was not only the possibility of free elections; it was the fundamental changes in all aspect of life. Decentralisation and democtratisation of the Polish state would not have been possible without active engagement of self-government, which involved the entire society in the process of change, they taught responsibility and transparency.The building of self-government in Poland was a huge logistic project, on a scale not previously encountered. Over 100 thousand state clerks transformed into independent officials, learning new skills and competences, also drawing on experiences of other countries. In result of the processof passing state property to local governments, communes and municipalities (gmina) received several millions of plots of land and over acquired over 1,500 enterprises. The experiences gained in the legislative and organisational work of the first stage of the self-governance reform, enabled Poland to enter the second stage of the reform in 1989 and to commence work of the building of district (powiat) and regional (voivodship) self-government structures. That process was completed 8 years later. Self-governance at the regional level was being developed when Poland was about to receive pre-accession funds from the European Union, a lucky moment since it was self-government that was to play a vital role in their distribution. Regional self-government is also responsible for facilitating suitable and supporting conditions for regional development and competitiveness of regions.Today, we are facing another challenge which is an optimal use of the EU funds allocated to Poland from the 2014-2020 budget. I have no doubts that we shall do it well.
Celem poniższego opracowania jest syntetyczne przedstawienie zaangażowania Unii Europejskiej w rozwiązanie konfl iktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego. Rok 2018 jest dobrym momentem na podsumowanie roli Unii Europejskiej oraz innych aktorów regionalnych i międzynarodowych w rozwiązaniu kwestii palestyńskiej. Obecnie mija 25 lat od podpisania porozumienia z Oslo i 30 lat od deklaracji niepodległości ogłoszonej przez Organizację Wyzwolenia Palestyny. Z kolei w 2017 r. minęło 50 lat od zajęcia przez Izrael Strefy Gazy oraz Zachodniego Brzegu Jordanu. W artykule autorka zdecydowała się przyjąć tezę, iż konfl ikt izraelsko-palestyński stanowi jedno z głównych wyzwań dla polityki zagranicznej UE oraz jest nieodłączną cechą regionalnego układu sił i bez jego uregulowania nie można myśleć o trwałym pokoju na Bliskim Wschodzie86. Implikacje konfl iktu dla Unii Europejskiej są wielowymiarowe oraz dotyczą bezpieczeństwa, dialogu politycznego, kwestii gospodarczych i społecznych. Mają również wpływ na całościową politykę prowadzoną przez Unię wobec regionu śródziemnomorskiego. Powyższe zagadnienie stanowi ponadto ważny przyczynek do pogłębienia badań nad ewolucją Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii. Artykuł podzielony jest na pięć części. Pierwsza przedstawia źródło, ewolucję oraz poszczególne etapy konfl iktu od końca drugiej wojny światowej. W drugiej części wskazane zostały implikacje zapisów porozumienia z Oslo dla procesu negocjacji pokojowych. W trzeciej zawarto zidentyfi kowane najważniejsze problemy, które uniemożliwiają osiągnięcie trwałego pokoju między Izraelem a Palestyną. W czwartej części przedstawiono stanowisko Unii Europejskiej wobec konfl iktu i rozwiązania dwupaństwowego oraz współpracy dwustronnej z Izraelem i Palestyną. Ostatnia, piąta część stanowi omówienie problemów związanych z zaangażowaniem Unii Europejskiej na rzecz zakończenia konfl iktu. Analiza przeprowadzona w niniejszym artykule oparta została na zróżnicowanych źródłach i literaturze przedmiotu, w szczególności z lat 2015–2018 oraz badaniach własnych autorki. W opracowaniu zastosowano ujęcie krytyczne i problemowe, uwzględniające zachowanie podstawowych aktorów, ważnych z punktu widzenia omawianego tematu oraz wykorzystano następujące metody badawcze: czynnikową, instytucjonalno-prawną, analizy zawartości oraz elementy metody decyzyjnej. ; The aim of the article is to present the European Union's commitment to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict. 2018 is a good time to take stock of the role of the European Union and other regional and international actors in resolving the Palestinian issue. Currently, it is 25 years since the signing of the Oslo Agreement, 30 years after the declaration of independence announced by the PLO. A year earlier, 50 years have passed since Israel seized the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The article assumes the thesis that the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict is one of the main challenges for the EU's foreign policy, is an inherent feature of the regional balance of power and without its regulation it is impossible to think about a lasting peace in the Middle East. Its implications are multidimensional and concern security, political dialogue, economic and social issues. The confl ict also has an impact on the overall policy pursued by the Union towards the Mediterranean. The article is divided into fi ve parts. The fi rst presents the source, evolution and individual stages of the confl ict from the end of the Second World War. In the second part, the implications of the provisions of the Oslo Agreement for the negotiation process were indicated. The third identifi es the most important problems that prevent a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine. In the fourth part author shows the position of the European Union towards the confl ict and a two-state solution, and bilateral cooperation with Israel and Palestine. The fi fth part discusses the problems related to the involvement of the European Union in ending the conflict. The analysis carried out in this article is based on diversified sources, literature on the subject, in particular from 2015–2018, and the author's own research. The study uses a critical, problematic approach, taking into account the behavior of the basic actors, important from the point of view of the discussed topic, and the following research methods were used: factor analysis, institutional and legal, content analysis and elements of the decision method.
Der Artikel beschreibt und fasst die Auswirkungen der Wiedervereinigung auf das deutsche Parteiensystem nach 1990 zusammen. Zu den wichtigsten Konsequenzen der Vereinigung gehören: 1) die Entstehung einer neuen Partei (die PDS, seit 2007 Die Linke), welche die Interessen der Ostdeutschen Bevölkerung vertrat; 2) darauffolgende Bildung einer Fünfparteiensystem nach 1990; 3) unterschiedliche Wahlpräferenzen der West- und Ostdeutschen und die Herausbildung eines spezifischen regionalen Parteiensystems in den neuen Bundesländern (das Modell 3+, d.h. CDU, SPD, PSD/Die Linke + eventuell andere Parteien); 4) die Abschwächung beider großen Volksparteien und Verlust ihrer Dominanzposition innerhalb des deutschen Parteiensystems nach der Bundestagswahl 2009; 5) Relevanzverlust der FDP; 6) größere Veränderungsdynamik auf der deutschen politischen Szene. Das Ergebnis der Bundestagswahlen vom 22. September 2013 brachte große Veränderungen auf der politischen Szene Deutschlands. Beide Volksparteien, insbesondere CDU/CSU, gewannen zum Teil die verlorenen Positionen zurück, hauptsächlich auf Kosten der mittleren Parteien, FDP befand sich zum ersten Mal außer Bundestag und auf der deutschen politischen Szene erschien eine neue Partei – AfD. Nach der Wahl entstand das Modell 4+2 (vier Parteien: CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Linke und die Grünen, die im Bundestag vertreten sind + FDP und AfD, die knapp unter Sperrklausel waren) und die Große Koalition von CDU/CSU und SPD übernahm die Macht. Diese Konstellation schien eine Zeit lang beständig zu sein. Dennoch wurde die Position der beiden regierenden Parteien (insbesondere der CDU) seit dem Ausbruch der Migrationskrise abgeschwächt und der Einfluss der AfD, die konsequent gegen die Willkommenspolitik der Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel opponieren, wurde allmählich stärker.
In the Author's opinion, if the development of civic society is to be measured in terms of participation in political life and involvement in non-government organizations East Germans seem to have adapted to the new reality better than Poles. However, if we take into consideration the potential of both nations Poles still stand a chance to build an efficient, and, first of all, their own, modern society. The advantage of having retained their own country, although so often criticized by Poles, may turn out to be fundamental. East Germans could not enjoy this privilege. ; In the Author's opinion, if the development of civic society is to be measured in terms of participation in political life and involvement in non-government organizations East Germans seem to have adapted to the new reality better than Poles. However, if we take into consideration the potential of both nations Poles still stand a chance to build an efficient, and, first of all, their own, modern society. The advantage of having retained their own country, although so often criticized by Poles, may turn out to be fundamental. East Germans could not enjoy this privilege.
The article presents the political, social, ethnical and economic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 15 years after the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The agreement offi cially fi nished the war in this country. The goal of this article is to describe the complexity of the internal situation and the problems of the construction of a stable and independent state. The article discusses an extremely complicated political system, that was imposed in the peace agreement, which alongside with different political businesses of three constitutional nations is leading to the decision-making paralysis and makes stable ruling is making impossible. The role of the High Representative UN/EU was also described. The role is to coordinate the activity of international community and is indeed exercising the sovereign power in the state contributing to therecognition that Bosnia, although is an independent and sovereign state, actually became an international protectorate. Various opinions about the effectiveness of the High Representative and the legitimacy of taken actions were presented. The fact that (between 1992–2004) NATO forces (executing military missions) and (from 2004) European forces (executing civil-military missions) stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not without meaning. The author is also paying attention to the fact that a complicated and strained ethnic situation is a source of stagnation in BiH and individual constitutional nations have completely different expectations and political businesses which is making impossible to form a civil nation (national) and is still jeopardizing the state's territorial integrity.
The author proposes a technique of calculating the postulated minimum upper limit of the productive age, which uses potential demography methods. The technique is based on the postulate that the total number of years to live after the productive age for the whole population should not be higher than the total years to live in the productive age. This method accounts for both the length of the life expectancy and the population age structure. The minimum upper limit of the productive age is the highest for the population with a long life expectancy and high age dependency ratio. The results obtained using this technique for calculations in all European Union member states were compared and related to the statutory pension ages. ; The author proposes a technique of calculating the postulated minimum upper limit of the productive age, which uses potential demography methods. The technique is based on the postulate that the total number of years to live after the productive age for the whole population should not be higher than the total years to live in the productive age. This method accounts for both the length of the life expectancy and the population age structure. The minimum upper limit of the productive age is the highest for the population with a long life expectancy and high age dependency ratio. The results obtained using this technique for calculations in all European Union member states were compared and related to the statutory pension ages.
