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This contribution to the discussion about Dag Strpic's book Karl Marx and the Political Economy of Modernity focuses on the author's assessment that the weakening of US economic hegemony is questionable, especially with regard to the future prospects of capitalism (and its development), and prefers to speak of a "redesign" thereof. Accordingly, this article analyses in detail three aspects of capitalism redesign: the causal, the contingent and the functional aspects. Regarding causality, the partial redistribution of leading roles in world economy is caused by the introduction of new methods, from industrial and media technology to financial speculations and new wars -- which make profit-making possible. Regarding contingency, the shift in the centre provides opportunity for a small number of countries, such as China, India and Brazil, which are endowed with capitalist "talent" (in the sense of combining the policy of resource mobilization with elements of positive evaluation of labour in the local culture), to climb the ladder of successful development. The functional aspects indicate the favourable effects of the shift in the centre not only for newcomers to the club of the most developed, but also to the USA. The financialization of (primarily American) economy, along with giving over leadership to other industrial powers in many branches of industrial production, and in the rate of economic growth -- i.e. with a "new division of labour" in the centre -- gives to the US some sort of "aristocratic" status in the world of capitalism. Such a status is not incompatible with the cyclic process of capitalism development. Instead of a dialectical leap toward socialism, it rather aspires to a partial restoration of feudalism, as a global order of strong states in the centre and weak or apparent states on the margins. This, however, is not the worst possible ending of modern history. If a much more pronounced decline of US economic power in favour of the newcomers were to occur, this would probably strengthen the brutality of capitalism rather than weaken it. Provided that, in the EU, the trend of further decomposition of the welfare state is stopped, and the indispensable balance between the requirements of economic growth and of social solidarity and general well-being is restored, only a genuine and comprehensive "Europeanization" of the capitalist system could make possible the emergence of a global capitalism with a human face, and probably also of a world state which would provide for a balanced development of all parts of the world. Adapted from the source document.

Slovenian state assembly can be categorized as one of those new parliaments in Central & Eastern Europe that were not only beneficiaries of democratization but also major actors in the transition from the former socialist into a democratic system. It was in the forefront of the modernization of the entire legislature in the second stage of Europeization & played a major role in the process of EU accession. The state assembly as a new parliament has undoubtedly reached a satisfactory level of institutional & organizational competence. The problem is, however, its genuine subjective or "cultural capacity." The lack of such capacities among the delegates in the process of EU accession was occasionally manifested in a huge disparity between the lip service to the EU membership & its values & the real understanding of the functioning of its institutions & goals. On numerous occasions there was a marked contrast between the idealized perceptions about how after the EU accession everything was going to be simpler & the pessimistic predictions about "drowning" in the EU. The Slovenian parliamentary elite has not yet fully grasped the reality that the so called "internal" issues have largely become the European issues or that the European issues have already become "national" issues. On the other hand, too little attention is paid to the question of how demanding the participation of the Slovenian parliament in the circumstances of the full membership really is. The representatives will be exposed to a much more intensive flow of information from the EU institutions & the reaction time will get shorter. This will mean that the delegates will increasingly respond "reactively" instead of "actively." The conclusion is that the state assembly at the commencement of its fourth mandate & following Slovenia's EU accession is not yet fully qualified to participate via the government in the process of EU decision-making from the perspective of a swift grasp of vital information & taking stands; neither is it in the position to properly monitor the government. Also, the state assembly is not conversant enough in translating the European politics into the Slovenian setting since it lacks the necessary experience, knowledge & routine in operating in the new circumstances of multilevel decision-making. Due to this lack of precedents, the real hard work is only beginning. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

The texts focuses on constitutionalisation of democracy in the European Union and the phenomenon of democratic deficit through the failed Constitution for Europe and, thereafter, the Lisbon Treaty, which takes over the definition of democracy as the foundation of the European Union. In this context, the author also looks into the contribution of political scientist Zvonko Posavec, who was one of the first in Croatia to advocate the need for constitutionalisation of the European Union as a project of finalising the process of European integration. While writing about the need for constitutional foundation of the European Union, Posavec simultaneously reflects on representative democracy as the form of democracy on which the European Union is predominantly founded. Beside a valorisation of Posavec's works on democracy in the European Union, this paper deals with the problem of the democratic deficit in the European Union which is manifest in the lack of democratic legitimacy of EU institutions, with the sole exception of the European Parliament. The author finds, however, that the main deficit of the European Union is not the democratic process, but political alienation. He perceives the latter as alienation of citizens from the EU as a derivative community, non-transparent and distanced from the basic interests of the citizens and the media interest in politics. Although the European Union declaratively relies on basic democratic values, in practice democracy is experienced primarily through a democratic deficit contrasted by a more obvious bureaucratic surfeit of the European political construction. The author asserts that the Lisbon Treaty was a step towards founding the EU on democratic principles inasmuch as it introduced elements of participative democracy, although it did not accept proposals for introduction of direct democracy in the EU. Finally, the author puts forward some ideas which might reduce the degree of political alienation of citizens in relation to the European Union; this requires giving greater authority to the European Parliament, abolishing the monopoly of the legislative initiative of the European Commission, incorporating the Council of the European Union into the European Parliament as the second House, i.e. the European Senate, and consequently implementing the mechanism of consulting the citizens regarding the legislative initiatives of the EU. The author concludes that the democratic deficit and political alienation cannot be overcome in the European Union without overcoming the democratic deficits and concrete forms of political alienation in the member states which the European Union consists. Adapted from the source document.

If it is true that a systematic understanding of modern society cannot be constituted without relying on the major works of the political thinking of modernity, the opposite is also true, ie., that none of those works cannot be properly understood unless from the viewpoint of a developed theory of modernity. In his General Theory of Modernity, Jacques Bidet points out that his metastructural theory of the modern epoch finally makes it possible to critically reexamine & reconstruct the entire "political metaphysics" of modernity. His intention is sufficiently (at the very least) outlined in his interpretations of Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, Kant & Hegel. The author singles out Bidet's pregnant interpretation of Hobbes, & faces the question: what is to be done with the Leviathan? The first part of the article gives a detailed account of Bidet's basic hypotheses & insights into Hobbes' crucial role in finding an adequate conceptual definition of the logical starting point of exposition of the theory of modernity as a purely discursive relation in the formula of the social agreement. The second part puts forward a critical appraisal of Bidet's key reconstructional thesis that Hobbes' theory of authorization is perceived as the actual logical starting point of exposition of metastructural theory categories. In part three it is shown that Hobbes' theory of political representation & authorization could indeed be the starting point to a political theory of modernity (because it establishes man as the "author" of politics, & his representative or the sovereign as his "actor" or representative). In the author's judgment, Bidet's reconstructional thesis, which denies the epistemological status of the "natural state" as the first & most general concept in the sequence of exposition, is not valid. In the natural state, man's nature is not ahistorically postulated as that of a wolf; it is essentially dual. At issue here is primarily the modern man (and not merely man in general) in the epochal constellation wherein he, simultaneously & contradictorily, exists as a particular individual (bourgeois), which pursues his natural right, & as a moral subject (a Christian believer), which, as a being of conscience, fathoms & follows the imperatives of the natural or moral or divine laws. Precisely this duality, his inner cleavage of modern man, is also the starting supposition of Hobbes' theory of modernity encompassed in the key concept of the "natural state." In view of Bidet's argumentation, & relying above all on Zarka's fundamental interpretation of Hobbes' political philosophy as semiology of power, we are constantly faced with the Leviathan as an incomparable challenge to our cognitive faculty. Adapted from the source document.

The first part of the article gives a summary account of the basic concepts of general or meta/structural theory of modern society: metastructure, structure, system. In a critical confrontation with Marx & Habermas, the author starts by explaining his main theoretical innovation -- the concept of metastructure, as the most general supposition & a trait of the modern epoch in which the official watchword of liberty-equality-rationality vaguely & gradually comes to the fore: it is the watchword of public sociability which is, in the final instance, determined by the norms of the common word, in which all participate as equals. This discursive immediacy necessarily becomes manifest through a double mediation: of economic understanding (market/organization) & of legal-political reason (interindividual & central contractuality). In that sense, metastructure is the set supposition for the modern class structure; it is not its basis, but its referential fiction. However, it inevitably turns into its opposite -- into exploitation, domination, alienation -- in the society which calls itself 'capitalist.' The structure of such a society reveals a double bipolarity, a division into a ruling class & a ruled class, but also a division within the ruling class itself into the market pole as the first class factor (proprietors) & the pole of organization as the second class factor (managers & ones who are competent). The subordinated class is no mere multitude of passive "ruled ones." It is the "fundamental class" as a positive political actor. As opposed to class structure, which necessarily exists in a state-nation, it is characteristic of the world-system that it constantly impairs the metastructural supposition, distorting the modernness of the state-nation: the barbarism of centers in relation to peripheries is imminent to the centers themselves. The inevitable result of this historical tendency is the world-state. It abolishes neither the state-nations nor the world-system, & it is already appearing on the horizon as the final geopolitical realization of this social logic of modernity. In the second part of the article, the author briefly shows how the metastructural hypothesis is developed in his more recent & concrete research into the areas of history (the emergence of the modern form of society starting from the 13th-century Cities-states in Italy), sociology & politics (relation between social classes & political parties), & culture (general theory of ideologies). These analyses show that structure is key to the world-system, & not vice versa, in the sense where the whole would explain the part: the system (state-nation) can be adequately understood only from the starting point of (class) structure. Since the capitalist totality cannot be metastructurally organized in one go, it could not emerge as a space which is brought together, like an empire, by one institutionally unified will, but only as a plural whole, a systemic plurality of state-nations. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy in the context of the present-day debates on the theory of morals & politics. The starting point of Habermas' theory is his idea of discourse ethics. This is cognitivist ethics in the tradition of Kant, Rawis, Tugendhat & Apel that is built around the concept of normative correctness analogous to the descriptive notion of truth. This idea is best expressed by Kant's categorical imperative, according to which the validity of norms depends on their generalizability. Habermas, in line with Kant, is aware of the impossibility to rationally found universalist ethics. Instead of the final (deductive) foundations he offers the reflexion about the assumptions of a meaningful discourse i.e. the argumentation rules that must be respected if language communication is to be meaningful. Habermas' outline of the theory of law in his book Between Facts and Norms (Faktizirat und Geltung) builds on this moral-theoretical position. In modern society the function of law is to facilitate social communication: law is the legitimate framework of social communication on which the actors can rely. Habermas considers the specific link between human rights & popular sovereignty as the source of legitimacy. Human rights & popular sovereignty mutually condition each other & at the same time there is tension between them. The absolutization of individual rights makes democracy impossible since decision-making is obstructed; absolutization of popular sovereignty leads to the tyranny of the majority & the loss of rights. Habermas thinks that law can be legitimized by communicational mediation between the individual rights & popular sovereignty, in line with the principle that the claim to validity can only be laid by those norms that are approved of by all potentially affected individuals as rational discourse participants. Popular sovereignty is consistently procedurally interpreted. On the one hand, it is practised by means of public discourses & on the other through decision-making processes within democratically structured political institutions. The two dimensions of legitimizing law are different yet complementary: public discourses take place in civil society, political decisions are made in democratic institutions of the state. This is also an outline of the specific position of Habermas' political theory of deliberative democracy. It is equally distant from the model of liberal democracy which emphasizes possessive individualism & the protection of citizens' private interests, & from the republican democratic model that emphasizes political participation of active citizens. The theory of deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of civil society: It is a sort of a practical verification of discourse ethics. Civil society is a sphere of autonomous public communication that is complementary to state administration but cannot substitute it. Communication power is exercised in the "siege mode" i.e. multiple discourses of civil society should contribute to the rationality & legitimacy of the decisions made by the political system, but do not have to replace them nor expose them to populist pressures. 2 Figures, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy in the context of the present-day debates on the theory of morals & politics. The starting point of Habermas' theory is his idea of discourse ethics. This is cognitivist ethics in the tradition of Kant, Rawis, Tugendhat & Apel that is built around the concept of normative correctness analogous to the descriptive notion of truth. This idea is best expressed by Kant's categorical imperative, according to which the validity of norms depends on their generalizability. Habermas, in line with Kant, is aware of the impossibility to rationally found universalist ethics. Instead of the final (deductive) foundations he offers the reflexion about the assumptions of a meaningful discourse i.e. the argumentation rules that must be respected if language communication is to be meaningful. Habermas' outline of the theory of law in his book Between Facts and Norms (Faktizirat und Geltung) builds on this moral-theoretical position. In modern society the function of law is to facilitate social communication: law is the legitimate framework of social communication on which the actors can rely. Habermas considers the specific link between human rights & popular sovereignty as the source of legitimacy. Human rights & popular sovereignty mutually condition each other & at the same time there is tension between them. The absolutization of individual rights makes democracy impossible since decision-making is obstructed; absolutization of popular sovereignty leads to the tyranny of the majority & the loss of rights. Habermas thinks that law can be legitimized by communicational mediation between the individual rights & popular sovereignty, in line with the principle that the claim to validity can only be laid by those norms that are approved of by all potentially affected individuals as rational discourse participants. Popular sovereignty is consistently procedurally interpreted. On the one hand, it is practised by means of public discourses & on the other through decision-making processes within democratically structured political institutions. The two dimensions of legitimizing law are different yet complementary: public discourses take place in civil society, political decisions are made in democratic institutions of the state. This is also an outline of the specific position of Habermas' political theory of deliberative democracy. It is equally distant from the model of liberal democracy which emphasizes possessive individualism & the protection of citizens' private interests, & from the republican democratic model that emphasizes political participation of active citizens. The theory of deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of civil society: It is a sort of a practical verification of discourse ethics. Civil society is a sphere of autonomous public communication that is complementary to state administration but cannot substitute it. Communication power is exercised in the "siege mode" i.e. multiple discourses of civil society should contribute to the rationality & legitimacy of the decisions made by the political system, but do not have to replace them nor expose them to populist pressures. 2 Figures, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.