The standard concept of law, consisting of legislation and case law, provides authority and legitimacy to law, as well as a methodology. Transnationalisation of law has necessitated the recognition of non-state influences. Although this should lead to an updated concept of law, authority and legitimacy are not actually problematic as these are in practice derived from the authority and legitimacy of national courts which decide most cases, albeit using new sources of law. The main problem of global law is methodology.
International law principles enable a rationalisation of the values to which the Union order aspires as a collective political and legal commitment amongst the Member States. The doctrine of Union law supremacy, which parallels that of international law supremacy, emphasises the overriding character of Union legal demands as a set of values and objectives over those of purely domestic origin. A common view that the Union legal order is sui generis or municipal in character fails to explain the directing character of the values underlying the Union project including its legal order. In this article I therefore explore and defend the view that the Union legal order is essentially one of international law. A central contention in this regard is that the supremacy of Union law obligations within the Member States is based on the principle of the supremacy of international law obligations over those originating in the domestic arena. The intensive rationalisation of this principle by the Court of Justice within its case law manages the intrusive domestic legal effects of the values and ideals found in the Union Treaties and illustrates the evolutionary character of the Union project.
The characteristic features of modern banking law and its place in the national law. The structure of the legal system. Clarified the issue of banking relationship with the legal rights of the units : the rule of law, the institution of law, sub-sector and the field of law. Methods are defined with respect to the legal regulation of banking, such as a method of government regulations, administrative and regulate the power relations between the NBU and commercial banks, and the method of autonomy, that is, legal equality of the parties where applicable civil legal method of regulating social relations. defined legal acts regulating banking activity. Determined that the banking law is a complex interdisciplinary institute that combines norms of administrative, financial, civil and commercial law governing the relationship between the banks and corporations and individuals, as well as coordinate the relationship between the commercial banks and establish a procedure for submission of commercial banks to the National Bank of Ukraine
The common theme of the articles assembled for this issue is a focus on Asian societies and their struggle with the conceptualization of "non-law" and its relation to law. This brief Comment reflects on the construction of the "non-law" as analytical categories in the four contributions. It suggests that the struggle with "non-law" reflects a deeper confusion about the role of law in ordering social relations broadly defined.' Focusing on the "non-law" assumes implicitly that "law" is a useful and well-delineated category for analyzing governance structures within and across states and thus can serve as a benchmark for analyzing "non-law." Closer inspection, however, reveals this assumption is flawed. Governance takes many forms in any society, and law or legislation is only one of them. Moreover, the function and form of formal law has changed in many settings from one of direct social ordering by way of prohibitions, punishments, and the like to one of creating space for cooperation among multiple actors and adaptations in governance structures over time. Further, the level of formal versus informal law in a society and in the governance of certain aspects of social life is fairly irrelevant absent a debate over the substantive goals that governance shall achieve. Put differently, the focus on law versus non-law evades the more challenging task of considering the normative agenda underlying choices among different governance mechanisms and their use in practice.
Taking a cue from Professor Laurence Tribe's decision to abandon the third edition of his constitutional law treatise, the organizers of this symposium have asked us to address whether constitutional law is in crisis. I am agnostic on that question, although I think that there has been a turn in the wrong direction. But if there is a crisis, I know who to blame. If constitutional law is in crisis, it is our fault. The legal academy has erased the distinction between law and politics, used its expertise for political advantage rather than for elucidation, and mis-educated a generation of lawyers. We thus should not be surprised if judges have, as Professor Ristroph suggests, lost their faith in the Constitution. We have led them into the wilderness.
The presentation explores whether housing law and anti-discrimination law can be reflected upon jointly in order to address socioeconomic inequalities, understood as major constraints to the access to adequate housing. The first section analyses the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of socioeconomic status as contained in selected international human rights instruments and in European Union law, in light of the guidance of the bodies tasked with their interpretation and application. The second section focuses specifically on housing, examining how the aforementioned prohibition applies in this field and which specific mechanisms ought to be put in place to effectively secure the right to housing of low-income groups.
The article examines the issues of Internet legal relations and conflicts of jurisdiction between the states when resolving disputes. The interrelation of Internet legislation and private international law is investigated. The application of Russian legislation in Russian Federation in the regulation of human rights activities is analyzed. Judicial practice of the countries of the Anglo-Saxon legal system is considered.
ÖZET'Havayolu ile Taşıyanın Uluslarası Hukukta, Avrupa Hukukunda, ve Türk Hukukunda Sorumluluğu' başlığı altındaki bu tezi yazmaktaki amacım hava taşıyanın sorumluluğunu Uluslarası hukuk, Türk hukuku ve Avrupa Birliği hukuku açısından karşılaştırmalı olarak incelemektir. Yedi bölümde ele alınan bu tez, hava taşımacılığı geniş bir çalışma alanını kapsadığından, esas olarak hava yük taşıyanının sorumluluğunu incelemektedir. Bu nedenle çalışmanın amacı öncelikle 1929 Varşova Konvansiyonu ile düzenlenen uluslararası havayolu ile yük taşımacılığıdır. Çalışmanın birinci bölümünde uluslararası sivil havacılıkta havayolu ile taşıyanın sorumluluğunun gelişimini, La Haye 1955 Protokolünden başlayarak 1999 Montreal Konvansiyonuna kadar olan Varşova Konvansiyonun tarihi gelişimini temel kaynaklarını, yapılan değişikleri incelenmektedir. Ayrıca bu bölümde Intercarrier Agreements (Taşıyanlar arası anlaşmalar) ve Avrupa Birliği tüzükleri incelenmektedir. İkinci bölümde Türk Sivil Havacılık Kanunu ele alınmaktadır. Üçüncü bölümde, havayolu ile yük taşıma sözleşmesi ve hava yük senedi incelenmaktedir. Dördüncü bölümde, taşıyanın borçları ve hakları ele alınmaktadır. Beşinci bölümde, taşıtanın hak ve borçları ele alınmaktadır. Altıncı bölümde, gönderilenin hak ve borçları ele alınmaktadır. Yedinci ve son bölümde, taşıyanın sorumluluğu, sorumluluk halleri ve şartları, sorumluluğun sınırlandırılması, sınırsız sorumluluk ve sorumluluk davası incelenmektedir. ABSTRACTWith this research under the title "Air Carrier Liability in International Law, European Law and in Turkish Law' my purpose is to analyze liability of the carrier by air by comparing and contrasting the International and Turkish law and the European Union Legislation.The thesis, which is organized in seven parts, examines mainly the liability of the air cargo carrier, since the air transport covers a large concept of study. Therefore, the object of this study is the uniform law governing international carriage by air during international transportation of cargo which is primarily regulated by the Warsaw Convention, 1929. The first part of the thesis looks the evolution of the concept of air carrier liability in international law of civil aviation, the history of the Warsaw Convention including basic sources and subsequent amendments to the Warsaw Convention beginning from the Hague Protocol 1955 to the Montreal Convention 1999. It is also dealing with the Intercarrier Agreements and European Regulations. The second part deals with Turkish Civil Aviation Act. The third part deals with the contract for the carriage of cargo by air, and the air waybill. The fourth part deals with the rights and obligations of the carrier. The fifth part deals with rights and obligations of the consignor. The sixth part deals with the rights and obligations of the consignee. The seventh and last part deals with the liability of the carrier, liability grounds and conditions, principles of limitation of liability, unlimited liability and liability suit.
Henry Monaghan famously argued that much of constitutional interpretation takes the form of what he termed constitutional common law, a body of doctrines and rules that are constitutionally inspired but not constitutionally required and that can be altered or reversed by Congress. This Essay argues that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law: Constitutional concerns permeate core administrative law doctrines and requirements, yet Congress enjoys broad power to alter ordinary administrative law notwithstanding its constitutional aspect. Unfortunately, the constitutional common law character of much of ordinary administrative law is rarely acknowledged by courts. A striking example of this lack of acknowledgment is the 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., in which the Supreme Court insisted that whether an agency action is "arbitrary and capricious" and whether it is unconstitutional are separate questions. Recognizing the interrelationship between constitutional law and ordinary administrative law is important both for the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of constitutional common law and for proper appreciation of the role administrative agencies can play in our constitutional order. Underlying many attacks on constitutional common law is a view of constitutional law as having a narrow and determinate scope. Yet the interwoven relationship between ordinary law and constitutional law in the administrative law context suggests this view of constitutional law is false. In addition, seeking to enforce constitutional norms through ordinary administrative law better accords with constitutional principles than efforts to segregate out the two and is likely to prove less intrusive to the policymaking prerogatives of the political branches. The better critique is not the extent to which constitutional common law surfaces in administrative contexts, but rather the lack of transparency that accompanies it.
When elections bring about changes in the political party of the president, the shifts frequently involve a change in the philosophies that inform the approach to governing. In teaching constitutional law, administrative law, and health law, this author cautions students to consider the political content of agency actions underlying the judicial opinions studied. Examining the political and discretionary judgment government officials exercise may provide an explanation for the results or an analysis when the law does not seem to account for the agency action or court decision. This Article examines the opportunities available to an incoming administration to undo the work of its predecessor and the constraints the law imposes on the exercise of discretion. After surveying the increasing use of the Congressional Review Act to reverse the regulatory actions of a predecessor administration, Part I of the Article explores other administrative law tools available to halt or redirect regulatory actions with which an incoming administration disagrees. Part II examines some of the signature cases involving judicial review of agency action to illustrate the constraints courts may impose on changes in administrative policy. Parts III, IV, and V examine how courts have dealt with policy changes in federal health care programs and the potential impact of changes in the presidential approach to the appointment of administrative adjudicators. The Article closes with some reflections on how this author's experiences working in state and federal government have informed her view of government decision-making.
This law declares an energy crisis in the country due to high oil prices. It adopts measures in the hydrocarbon, electricity and transportation sectors in order to alleviate this crisis and to ensure the power supply to the general public. It declares a priority that the government seek international funding to invest in developing power generation projects using renewable energy. Lastly, it creates the Investment Fund for Energy Development and the Energy Crisis Fund.
Last term, in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Fox Television Stations, the Supreme Court expressly refused to link ordinary administrative law to constitutional concerns, insisting that whether an agency action is "arbitrary and capricious" and whether it is unconstitutional are separate questions. In this article, I argue that Fox is wrong. The Court's protestations aside, constitutional law and ordinary administrative law are inextricably linked, with the result that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as what Henry Monaghan famously termed constitutional common law. Its doctrines and requirements are constitutionally informed but rarely constitutionally mandated, with Congress and agencies enjoying broad power to alter specific administrative mechanisms notwithstanding their constitutional aspect. Recognizing the interrelationship between constitutional law and ordinary administrative law is important both for the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of constitutional common law and for proper appreciation of the role administrative agencies can play in our constitutional order. Underlying many attacks on constitutional common law is a view of constitutional law as having a narrow and determinate scope, but the interwoven relationship between ordinary law and constitutional law in the administrative law context suggests this view of constitutional law is a false one. In addition, seeking to enforce constitutional norms through ordinary administrative law better accords with constitutional principles than efforts to segregate out the two and is likely to prove less intrusive to the policymaking prerogatives of the political branches. As a result, the better critique is not the extent to which constitutional common law surfaces in administrative contexts, but rather the lack of transparency that accompanies it.
I have taught Health Law for almost three decades. In the early years, the course was primarily about private law, the application of contract and tort principles in the context of health insurance coverage and medical care. Federal law of Medicare, Medicaid, EMTALA, and federal civil rights laws always made an appearance. Other federal statutes were added as they came along: HIPAA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and GINA. Over the years, the course focused more and more on federal statutes until the passage of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") in 2010 completed the transition Health law is now a public law course.1 It focuses on federal statutes, and students need to understand the role of Congress, federal agencies, the states, and federal courts. The course explores myriad forms of federalism including Medicaid's cooperative federalism, the ACA's "fall back" federalism where the federal government steps in only if the states opt out, and old-fashioned federal law preemption of state law. Health law is now statutory interpretation and administrative law principles in the context of health insurance coverage and health care. Health law continues to be applied law: public law that affects health, health insurance, health care, and public health. About a third to a half of my health law course is devoted to providing students with a better understanding of medical decision making, the organization of health care delivery system, insurance theory, health disparities, and the social determinants of health— how where we live, work, play, and pray impact health Most importantly, Health Law remains a powerful lens through which to explore issues of social justice, social welfare, and law. We all get sick and need medical care. Many of my students and their families have had serious health problems and struggled to access medical care. Some have been bankrupted financially because of the costs of medical care. They know something about health and health care. This course is an opportunity to explore what equity, fairness, and justice mean when we talk about health and healthcare.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (&ldquo ; Refugee Convention&rdquo ; ) defines &lsquo ; persecution&rsquo ; based on five enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, and political opinion. This list of protected groups has not changed in the nearly 70 years since its inception, although the political and social context that gave rise to the Refugee Convention has changed. This article examines how &lsquo ; membership in a particular social group&rsquo ; (&ldquo ; MPSG&rdquo ; ) has been interpreted, then surveys international human rights law, transnational criminal law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law instruments to determine whether MPSG can encompass the broader protections afforded under other international law regimes. It concludes that the enumerated grounds are largely consistent with other instruments and protects, or at least has the potential to protect, many of the other categories through MPSG. However, as this ground is subject to domestic judicial interpretation and various analytical approaches taken in different countries, protection could be enhanced by amending the Refugee Convention to explicitly include additional protected groups from these other areas of international law, specifically international human rights law and international criminal law.
