Since it is imposed to thinking, deconstruction can be seen as a law, the Law itself. Deconstruction of law is to put it in the context of writing, to notice its submission to the différance, to the play in the language. The law of deconstruction acts in the deconstruction of law, revealing paradoxes and fragilities of juridical order, as well as concepts of natural law and human rights. Finally, deconstruction of law brings with it justice as undecidability, such as the obligation to make fair decisions, even when it is not possible to state the presence of justice. Law, writing and deconstruction converge then to justice, understood as the hospitality.
After the Lisbon Summit of 2009, the whole matter of fundamental rights in the European Union has taken a new connotation. Local economic interests and social protests – in opposition to the "neoliberal agenda" of EU institutions – have played an important role in stopping the enforcement of the "Constitutional Treaty" and boosted an anti-Euro mobilization. In the meanwhile, the European bodies and transnational corporations have continued to settle a new and alternative basis for the integration. A radical shift can be observed, from the research of synthetic set of principles – as those established on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – to a deeply technical and detailed normative production. The regulation on safety and healthy workplaces is one of the best point of view to study this change. Far from calling into question the unbalanced positions between the parties in contemporary labour relationships, the European strategy for workers' protection move through procedural issues and voluntary obedience to the soft law instruments. In the past, the legal doctrine described the creation of a multilevel architecture of institutions, sometimes implemented in a top-down approach. Along with this, recently, it was implemented the establishment of common organizational standards associated to a specific system of corporate governance to pursue a better integration between business and fundamental rights. ; Após o Summit de Lisboa de 2009, toda a questão dos direitos fundamentais na União Europeia tomou uma nova conotação. Os interesses econômicos locais e os protestos sociais – em oposição a "agenda neoliberal" promovida pelas instituições europeias – têm desempenhado um papel importante em parar a execução do "Tratado Constitucional" e impulsionaram uma mobilização anti-Euro. No enquanto isso, os organismos europeus e as empresas transnacionais instalaram uma base nova e alternativa para a integração. Uma mudança radical pode ser observada, a partir da pesquisa de um conjunto (ainda) sintético de princípios – como os estabelecidos na Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia – para uma produção normativa profundamente técnica e detalhada. A regulação da segurança no lugar de trabalho é um dos melhores pontos de observação para estudar a transformação mencionada. Longe de pôr em causa as posições desequilibradas entre as partes nas relações de trabalho contemporâneas, a estratégia europeia para a proteção da saúde dos trabalhadores prefere as questões procedimentais e a adesão voluntária aos instrumentos de soft law. No passado, a doutrina jurídica descrevia a criação de uma arquitetura multi-nível de instituições, as vezes implementada por meio de uma abordagem de cima para baixo (top-down approach). Junto com isso, recentemente, teve a implementação de padrões organizacionais comuns para a criação de um sistema específico de governança corporativa, finalizado a buscar uma melhor integração entre os negócios e os direitos fundamentais.
The paper aims to clarify the sense of contemporary fascism, particularly from the example of the Brazilian Bonsolarism, defining it as an anti-systemic, anti-institucional, anti-juridical and infralegal perspective with a personalist, devoted, voluntarist, spontaneous and militant character which starts from inside judiciary and in terms of subversion of the relation among law, politics and moral, and that, by means of politicization and partisanship of law, branches to the political system, serving as instrument to the fratricide political war among parties, from there linking to civil society in the form of constitution of a digital-social mass-militia of acclamation oriented to an anti-systemic posture. In this dynamic, the fascism has two constitutive and streamlining cores: on one side, it subverts the correlation of human rights and law, delegitimizing and truly destroying the ontogenetic primacy, the separation, the differentiation, the self-referentiality and the overposition of law in relation to politics and moral, as the subsidiarity of them regarding law; on other, it leads to the deconstruction from inside to judiciary and political system of the highly institutionalist, legalist, technical, formal and depersonalized perspective which is proper to them, eliminating the centrality of the judiciary and, them, delegitimizing its regulator role regarding to political system and to the social dialectics, normalizing the totalizing regression caused by political-moral colonization of the democratic law. By reconstructing the pluralist and universalist democracy's meta-normative and generative basis as a public system of law, that is, the co-originality of universality of human rights, pluralism and law, the condition of ontogenetic primacy, independence, self-subsistence and overposition of law in relation to politics and moral, as the subsidiarity of these regarding to law, we will point to the renewal of this systemic, systematic, procedural, mediated, instancial, progressive and publicized perspective of the public system of law, in the interrelation, separation and overposition of judiciary and political system, demarcated by a strong ideal of methodological-procedural-axiological institutionality, legality, technicality, formality and depersonalization, which eradicates the politicization and partisanship of law and, by devolving the complete integrality to law-judiciary, confines the democracy's political system and civil society to their true limits which are its structural basis: the human rights, the legal process and the public system of law, with the necessity of full translation of politics and moral to law, delimitating the pluralist and universalist democracy as a public system of law oriented to the production of universality in/as/by legality.
The problem to be addressed in this article is related to the precautionary principle and its incorporation into the Brazilian law. As it is beknown, this principle has been widely cited by Brazilian case law and it is an important part of the legal and environmental scholarly production. However, it follows that its application has been made fairly randomly, and even so there is no clear and operational definition of its content. The hypothesis being examined is that since the Rio Declaration's - in its translation into Portuguese - environmental legislation has termed as legal principle, which internationally is an approach, a precautionary measure, as can be seen in both the texts in English and French of the Rio Declaration and other relevant legal instruments. The methodology to be used is the research of the case law and relevant legal rules, as well as the examination of the scholarly production on the subject. As a result, the conclusion is that there is an overuse of the precautionary principle by the Brazilian courts, especially by the Superior Court of Justice and that, in this case, the Federal Supreme Court has played a moderating role in relation to the application of the precautionary principle.
The present investigation strives to show Nietzsche's considerations about natural law. Since the German philosopher bases his thinking on an organicist conception, in principle one is led to think of a welcome and even a positive emphasis on natural law. However, in several passages of his writings Nietzsche is hostile towards natural law, mainly because it acts as a framework, measurement and calculation of the movement of nature. Natural law, for this reason, consists in falsifying nature. For, the legal mechanisms are imposed on the free action of nature, depriving it of its organic singularity to fit it in an artificial rationality. The free action of nature cannot be captured by rational framing mechanisms dictated by natural law. However, Nietzsche recognizes in the will to power a kind of natural law that acts on natural phenomena without constraining them, but leads them to the highest peaks of force.
