Editorial. ; Trabajo Especial ; El nombre Humania del Sur. Recorrido por la memoria y sus arcanos. ; The name South Humania. A tour through memory and its secrets. ; Nweihed, Kaldone G. ; Debate ; El club nuclear del siglo XXI, rumbo al día después. ; The nuclear club in the XXI century: On the way to the day after. ; Lee, Franz J.T. ; El tratado de no proliferación nuclear. ; ¿Es posible el desarme? ; The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: is disarmament possible? ; Fernández Colón, Gustavo ; India, potencia nuclear: algo más que un elemento para el balance de poder. ; Nuclear India: more than an element for the balance of power. ; Mata, María Gabriela ; El problema nuclear en Corea del Norte. ; The nuclear predicament in North Corea. ; Cejas Armas, Ismael ; La Unión Europea ante la crisis nuclear iraní. ; The European Union and the iranian nuclear crisis. ; Schmidt, Axel ; El proyecto nuclear de Venezuela, el "derecho" de Irán a la energía nuclear y la contraposición de dos tipos de religiosidad. ; Venezuela's nuclear project, Iran's "right" to nuclear energy, and the contrast between two kinds of religiosity. ; Capriles Arias, Elías Manuel ; Caleidoscopio ; La agresión israelí al Líbano del año 2006. ; The israeli aggression against Lebanon of 2006. ; Yunis, Fadi Kallab ; Diálogos ; Sin miedo. ¿hacia la paz? ; Diálogo con Ahmad Sobhami, ex embajador de la República Islámica de Irán en Venezuela. ; Dialogue with Admad Sobhani, ex-ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran ; in Venezuela. ; Mata, María Gabriela ; Reseñas ; González, Silvia Lidia: Hiroshima, la noticia que nunca fue. ¿Cómo se censura la información en tiempos de conflicto? ; Reseñado por: Ferrer, Argelia ; Jatami, Muhamad: El diálogo entre civilizaciones. ; Reseñado por: Mata, María Gabriela ; Documentos ; Manifiesto ecosocialista. Por un socialismo del siglo XXI libre de los riesgos de la energía ; nuclear. ; Tratado sobre la no proliferación de las armas nucleáres (TNP) ; 127-138 ; semestral ; Nivel analítico
Traditionally, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have been more devoted to the control of Lebanese population than to national defence. At the same time, the control of both the LAF and the many other existing security agencies have been divided among the different political parties according to quotas of confessional affiliation, applying the traditional consotiational Lebanese model. Moreover, there are other non-state actors keeping important weaponry, although some of them (as in the case of Hezbollah) cooperate with the LAF in a very peculiar model of governance. Since the withdrawal of the Syrian troops in 2005, the country is split concerning how to tackle a security sector reform. While some actors only wanted to preserve the status quo (with Syrian and Iranian support), other only want to disarm Hezbollah (backed by the US and Saudi Arabia). The objective of this paper consists of assessing the degree to which the past reforms have contributed to the creation of a security sector adapted to the requirements of a democratic system and able to guarantee domestic peace, political neutrality and national defence. ; Tradicionalmente, las Fuerzas Armadas Libanesas (FAL) han servido más para el control de la población que para la defensa del país. Por su parte, tanto las FAL como las numerosas agencias de seguridad existentes han sido distribuidas entre los distintos partidos de acuerdo con cuotas de afiliación confesional, aplicando el modelo consociacional característico del Líbano. Además, existen distintos actores no estatales dotados de un importante armamento, si bien algunos de ellos (como es el caso de Hezbollah) colaboran con las FAL componiendo un modelo de gobernanza bastante peculiar. Desde la salida de las tropas sirias en 2005, el país se ha visto dividido en lo relativo a cómo afrontar una reforma del sector de la seguridad. Mientras algunos actores han querido mantener el statu quo (con el apoyo sirio o iraní), otros deseaban únicamente el desarme de Hezbollah (respaldados por Estados Unidos y Arabia Saudí). El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en evaluar hasta qué punto las reformas efectuadas han contribuido a la creación de un sector de la seguridad ajustado a las exigencias de un régimen democrático, capaz de garantizar la paz interior, la neutralidad política y la defensa del país.
Traditionally, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have been more devoted to the control of Lebanese population than to national defence. At the same time, the control of both the LAF and the many other existing security agencies have been divided among the different political parties according to quotas of confessional affiliation, applying the traditional consotiational Lebanese model. Moreover, there are other non-state actors keeping important weaponry, although some of them (as in the case of Hezbollah) cooperate with the LAF in a very peculiar model of governance. Since the withdrawal of the Syrian troops in 2005, the country is split concerning how to tackle a security sector reform. While some actors only wanted to preserve the status quo (with Syrian and Iranian support), other only want to disarm Hezbollah (backed by the US and Saudi Arabia). The objective of this paper consists of assessing the degree to which the past reforms have contributed to the creation of a security sector adapted to the requirements of a democratic system and able to guarantee domestic peace, political neutrality and national defence. ; Tradicionalmente, las Fuerzas Armadas Libanesas (FAL) han servido más para el control de la población que para la defensa del país. Por su parte, tanto las FAL como las numerosas agencias de seguridad existentes han sido distribuidas entre los distintos partidos de acuerdo con cuotas de afiliación confesional, aplicando el modelo consociacional característico del Líbano. Además, existen distintos actores no estatales dotados de un importante armamento, si bien algunos de ellos (como es el caso de Hezbollah) colaboran con las FAL componiendo un modelo de gobernanza bastante peculiar. Desde la salida de las tropas sirias en 2005, el país se ha visto dividido en lo relativo a cómo afrontar una reforma del sector de la seguridad. Mientras algunos actores han querido mantener el statu quo (con el apoyo sirio o iraní), otros deseaban únicamente el desarme de Hezbollah (respaldados por Estados Unidos y Arabia Saudí). El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en evaluar hasta qué punto las reformas efectuadas han contribuido a la creación de un sector de la seguridad ajustado a las exigencias de un régimen democrático, capaz de garantizar la paz interior, la neutralidad política y la defensa del país.
The aim of the paper is to analyze the shared basins between Lebanon and riparians, considering cooperation and conflict, geopolitical aspects in the Arab region, as well as governance. This is complemented with the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) approach. Traditionally, the issue of shared water resources in the Arab region has been highly politicized as well as a critical feature of high-level negotiations between governments. At the same time, it causes concerns about justice and security among the general public around the world in relation to the human right to water. Attention has largely been focused on long-standing disputes arising from Arab dependence on surface water resources originating from (or controlled by) non-Arab countries. Water is one of the most precious resources in Lebanon and all around the world, especially considering current and future climate change scenarios. The effects of the humanitarian crisis with 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, putting pressure on water services and resources cannot be diminished either. However, the water crisis affecting Lebanon predates the arrival of the Syrian refugees and it's signed by its geopolitical situation. Available water includes rivers and springs, storage dams and groundwater. Lebanon's water resources are under stress due to several factors: unsustainable water management practices, increasing water demand from all sectors, water pollution, and ineffective water governance. Lebanon shares the following basins with riparian countries: the Jordan River, the Orontes River basin, also known as the Al Asi River and the Nahr Al Kabir basin. Concerning to groundwater, the Anti-Lebanon Mountain range is located at the Lebanese-Syrian border. Originating from the Anti-Lebanon and Mount Hermon mountain ranges, the Jordan River covers a distance of 223 km from north to south and discharges into the Dead Sea. The river has five riparians: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria.The Jordan River headwaters (Hasbani, Banias and Dan) are fed by groundwater and seasonal surface runoff. Water use in the Jordan River basin is unevenly developed. Palestine and Syria have no access to the Jordan River; hence their use of water resources from the river itself is nil. However, Syria has built several dams in the Yarmouk River sub-basin. Overall, the Jordan River basin has an estimated total irrigated area of 100,000- 150,000 ha of which around 30% is located in Israel, Jordan and Syria, 5% in Palestine and 2% in Lebanon. Regarding to the main agreements, on 1953 and 1987 Jordan and Syria agreed on the use of the Yarmouk River, including the construction of the Wahdah Dam and 25 dams in Syria. The agreement also establishes a joint commission for the implementation of the provisions on the Wahdah Dam. On 1994, Israel and Jordan agreed on Annex II of the Treaty of Peace concerns water allocation and storage of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, and calls for efforts to prevent water pollution as well as the establishment of a Joint Water Committee. Israel and Palestine (PLO) accepted on 1995 the Article 40 of the Oslo II political agreement states that Israel recognizes Palestinian water rights in the West Bank only and establishes the Joint Water Committee to manage West Bank waters and develop new supplies. Palestinians are denied access to the Jordan River under this agreement. Geopolitically, the question of water sharing in the Jordan River basin is inextricably linked to the ongoing conflicts between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Palestine, and while a wide range of issues are at stake, control over water in the basin has added to existing regional tensions. The Orontes River basin, also known as the Al Asi River, is the only perennial river in Western Asia that flows north from Lebanon to Syria and Turkey, and drains west into the Mediterranean Sea. The river is mainly used for irrigation purposes with several agricultural projects planned in the three riparian countries. There is no basin-wide agreement between the three riparians, but there are several bilateral agreements in place on issues such as water allocation (Agreement between Lebanon and Syria on the distribution of water of Al Asi River, 1994) and the joint construction of infrastructure (Syria and Turkey). Orontes basin politics are heavily influenced by the status of Turkish-Syrian relations in general, and discussions over the sharing of the Euphrates River in particular. Syria and Turkey have not resolved the question of the disputed coastal province of Hatay (Iskenderun) through which the Orontes exits to the Mediterranean Sea. On 1994, Lebanon and Syria reached an agreement on the distribution of Orontes River Water originating in Lebanese territory, which specifies water allocation between the two countries. On 2009, Syria and Turkey agreed on the Memorandum of Understanding concerning the construction of the joint Orontes River Friendship Dam. The NahrAl Kabir basin rises from numerous springs in Syria and in the Lebanon Mountain range. It runs a westerly course forming a natural border between northern Lebanon and Syria. The river is severely polluted by widespread discharge of untreated sewage and uncontrolled solid waste disposal. The two countries cooperate on the basis of a 2002 water-sharing agreement, with several joint technical sub-committees tackling various issues related to the watershed. On 2002, Lebanon and Syria reached the Agreement to share the water of the NahrAl Kabir and build a joint dam on the main stem. Concerning to groundwater, the Anti-Lebanon Mountain range is located at the Lebanese-Syrian border between the Bekaa Plain in the west and the Damascus Plain in the east. The Anti-Lebanon is an important source of water, both locally and in the wider regional context, as it forms the source of a number of rivers in the Mashrek. Several large springs emanate from these aquifers and contribute to the Awaj, Barada, Litani, Orontes and (Upper) Jordan Rivers. There are no water agreements in place for any part of the Anti-Lebanon Mountain range, nor for the three shared spring catchments. The two riparians coordinate shared water resources management issues through the Syrian-Lebanese Joint Committee for Shared Water, which also implements the agreements in place over the Nahr Al Kabir and the Orontes River. In this regard, enhancing cooperation between Lebanon and riparians countries is crucial to manage shared water resources in this water-scarce region. More cooperative action and constructive dialogue is needed to sustain these shared resources, considering water governance, hydrodiplomacy principles and the IWRM approach. The questions that guide this study are to know which watersheds Lebanon shares with its neighboring countries, what their characteristics are, and if there are international agreements that regulate their use and joint development. In reference to the techniques of data collection, the research process will collect information from primary and secondary sources (academic research, specialized press, statistical series and international surveys, among others). As regards the techniques of data analysis, the research will use the documentary analysis, qualitative data analysis. This article is presented with an introduction to water management in Arab countries. Next, theoretical bases for the study of transboundary basins are proposed. As a contribution to the theoretical framework, the principles on shared watercourses in International Law are developed. Then, the transboundary basins of the country of Phoenician origin, Lebanon, are presented. Finally, the conclusions of the study are given. ; El objetivo del presente artículo es analizar las cuencas transfronterizas entre la República del Líbano y los países ribereños, considerando aspectos de cooperación y conflicto, geopolíticos de la región árabe, así como gobernanza. Esto se complementa con la propuesta del paradigma de la Gestión Integrada de Recursos Hídricos (GIRH). Tradicionalmente, la cuestión de recursos hídricos compartidos en la región árabe ha estado altamente politizada, así como las negociaciones de alto nivel entre gobiernos han sido críticas. Al mismo tiempo, esto genera preocupación sobre la justicia y la seguridad hídrica. La atención ha estado centrada en disputas de largo recorrido surgidas de la dependencia árabe en recursos hídricos superficiales originados (o controlados por) países no árabes. El agua es uno de los recursos más preciados en Líbano, como en todo el mundo, en especial si se consideran los actuales y futuros escenarios de cambio climático. La crisis humanitaria de 1,5 millones de refugiados sirios en territorio libanés presiona en mayor medidasobre los servicios de agua y sobre los recursos; si bien dicha crisis hídrica antecede a la llegada de dichos refugiados y está marcada por la propia situación geopolítica. El agua disponible discurre por ríos, lagos, embalses y aguas subterráneas. Los recursos hídricos de este país se encuentran bajo estrés debido a distintos factores: prácticas de manejo no sostenibles, aumento de la demanda desde todos los sectores, contaminación y gobernanza inefectiva (casi ausente) del agua. El Líbano comparte las siguientes cuencas con países ribereños: el río Jordán, el río Orontes y el río Nahr Al Kabir. En lo que respecta a agua subterránea, la cadena montañosa de Anti-Líbano está ubicada en la frontera con Siria. La promoción de la cooperación es crucial para el manejo de los recursos hídricos compartidos en esta región. En este sentido, una acción más cooperativa y un diálogo constructivo son necesarios para gestionar estos recursos compartidos, considerando la gobernanza del agua, los principios de la hidrodiplomacia y la GIRH. Las preguntas que guían este estudio son conocer qué cuencas hídricas comparte el Líbano, cuáles son las características de las mismas, y si existen acuerdos internacionales que regulen su uso y aprovechamiento conjunto. En cuanto a la metodología utilizada, la siguiente investigación se basa en información de fuentes primarias y secundarias (investigaciones académicas, prensa especializada, estadísticas, entre otras). El análisis de datos es cualitativo y documental. Este artículo comienza con una introducción a la administración del agua en los países árabes. A continuación, se proponen bases teóricas para el estudio de cuencas transfronterizas. Como aporte al marco teórico, se desarrollan los principios sobre cursos de agua compartidos en el Derecho Internacional. A continuación, se presentan las cuencas transfronterizas del país de origen fenicio. Finalmente, se proponen las conclusiones del estudio.
¿Cómo llegaron los shíitas a ocupar el lugar que actualmente tienen dentro del mundo islámico? El Profesor Der Ghougassian repasa la evolución de la doctrina shiíta, la obra de sus principales referentes ideológicos y la posterior aparición del Hezbolá como fuerza de lucha armada en "la marcha hacia la liberación de Palestina", hasta su integración en la vida política libanesa en 1989. Interesante aproximación a un tema poco abordado y sumamente trascendente de la actualidad internacional. ; How did the Shiites come to play the part they do play at present in the Islamic world? Professor Der Ghougassian reviews the evolution of Shiite doctrine, the work by their main ideological exponents and the eventual appearance of Hezbollah as a military force in the "march towards Palestine liberation", until its integration to Lebanese politics in 1989. This paper constitutes an interesting approach to a topic which has not been dealt with frequently and which is yet of great significance for international current reality. ; Sección Estudios. ; Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales (IRI)
El fermento político de la década de los años 30 en Líbano representa un importante momento histórico de consolidación nacional que llevará a la formal independencia del país con el Pacto Nacional de 1943. En esta fase, con el país bajo el Mandato francés, se distingue la presencia de una burguesía nacional que empieza a mirar con recelo las prerrogativas de las empresas francesas. La prensa francófona libanesa, directamente relacionada con la oligarquía cristiana, se vuelve en esta coyuntura una herramienta en sus manos para criticar el Mandato y atacar el adversario político en la lucha para el poder con mira al futuro Líbano independiente. El artículo destaca la estricta relación entre la agenda política y económica de una parte de las elites cristianas con las movilizaciones populares y el uso de los medios de comunicación por parte de estas oligarquías. ; The political upheaval in the decade of the 30s in Lebanon represents an important historical moment of national consolidation, which final outcome will be the formal independence with the National Pact of 1943. In these years, with the country under the authority of the French Mandate, it is possible to recognise the consolidation of a demanding national bourgeoisie with a growing unconformity due to the prerogatives of French companies. The Lebanese Francophone press, directly related to the two main blocks of the Christian oligarchy, became a tool in their hands in order to move their criticism towards the Mandate and against each other. The article highlights the strict relation between a part of the Christian elites agenda with these years' demonstrations, and it wants to shed light on the use of the media by these oligarchies.
El Líbano es un "Estado Penetrado", cuya soberanía se ve asolada por la influencia que los sucesos regionales y globales causan en el interior de las comunidades subnacionales que lo habitan. Al mismo tiempo, los vínculos tribales, fuertemente marcados en su población, sirven de anclaje a terceros Estados que se disputan espacios de poder en este estratégico rincón del Mundo Árabe. El fenómeno no es nuevo. Surgido en 1861, el confesionalismo político promovido por las potencias extranjeras moldeó su sistema de gobierno, primero de la mano del Imperio Otomano y luego de Francia. Este sistema, al día de hoy, presenta importantes continuidades. ; Lebanon is a "Penetrated State", whose sovereignty is under siege by the influence that regional and global events create within the subnational communities that live in it. At the same time, tribal ties, strongly marked in their population, serve as anchor to third States that dispute power spaces in this strategic corner of the Arab World. This phenomenon is not new. Having emerged in 1861, political confessionalism, as promoted by foreign powers, shaped its system of government, first by the Ottoman Empire and then by France. This system, today, has shown important continuities. ; Fil: Universidad Nacional de Rosario
One of the lesser-known consequences of the invasion of Iraq and the postwar period has been the mass exodus of Iraqis to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. To the personal and humanitarian drama that this wave of refugees represents we should add the enormous economic and political difficulties faced by the receiving countries to maintain them. Although security has improved, Ira\q does not yet offer guarantees of stability for an early return. Furthermore, the legal situation of the refugees in the receiving countries is in an administrative limbo that threatens to "Palestinize" their condition unless the international community adopts timely measures to avoid this and to guarantee the refugees' definitive return in safe conditions. Adapted from the source document.
[spa] Este texto analiza la política exterior española hacia Líbano a partir de los datos que aporta la "Base de Datos sobre Política Exterior" (BDPEX), un nuevo instrumento que arroja nueva luz sobre el estudio de las relaciones exteriores españolas. De los datos se desprende que Líbano es un país secundario para los intereses españoles, y que su importancia, en los últimos años, deriva del interés español en el proceso de paz de Oriente Medio y de la participación española, a partir de 2006, en la Fuerza Provisional de las Naciones Unidas en Líbano (FPNUL). Así lo demuestra el análisis de los datos sobre intercambio de visitas de alto nivel, debate parlamentario, aportación española a la cooperación en Líbano e intercambios económicos. [eng] This paper analyzes the Spanish foreign policy towards Lebanon from the data provided by the 'Database on Foreign Policy' (BDPEX), a new instrument which shed new light on the study of Spanish foreign relations. The data show that Lebanon is a secondary country for Spanish interests, and that its importance in recent years derives from the Spanish interest in the Middle East Peace Process and Spanish participation, from 2006 on, in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This is demonstrated by the analysis of data on exchange of high level visits, parliamentary debates, Spanish contribution to cooperation in Lebanon and economic exchanges.
