Suchergebnisse

AbstractDoes radical right political violence favour or hinder public support for right‐wing stances? Numerous existing studies have demonstrated that Islamic terrorism provokes a conservative shift, increases nationalism and induces negative sentiments towards immigration. However, little is known about the consequences of far‐right terrorism, despite its incidence in Western societies. We leverage four waves of the British Election Study (BES) and use a quasi‐experimental design to analyse individual political orientations shortly before and after terrorist attacks. We find that respondents distance themselves from the ideology associated with the perpetrator and shift away from ideological positions at the right end of the political spectrum. Furthermore, respondents are less likely to report nationalistic attitudes and immigration skepticism, core tenets of extremist right‐wing political ideologies. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of the perpetrators and their driving goals are crucial factors shaping the impact of terrorism on public sentiments.

Does radical right political violence favour or hinder public support for right-wing stances? Numerous existing studies have demonstrated that Islamic terrorism provokes a conservative shift, increases nationalism and induces negative sentiments towards immigration. However, little is known about the consequences of far-right terrorism, despite its incidence in Western societies. We leverage four waves of the British Election Study (BES) and use a quasi-experimental design to analyse individual political orientations shortly before and after terrorist attacks. We find that respondents distance themselves from the ideology associated with the perpetrator and shift away from ideological positions at the right end of the political spectrum. Furthermore, respondents are less likely to report nationalistic attitudes and immigration skepticism, core tenets of extremist right-wing political ideologies. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of the perpetrators and their driving goals are crucial factors shaping the impact of terrorism on public sentiments.

Abstract: The rise and development of Left-wing literature in Brazil is closely connected to the obstacles and dilemmas encountered during the evolution of its nation, and it is also inseparable from international political movements and intellectual trends. From the abolishment of slavery and collapse of empire in the nineteenth century, to the establishment and return of dictatorship in the 30s and 60s of the twentieth century, at every moment of crisis, Brazilian left-wing literature always played a seminal role. While criticizing social injustices, it also invigorates the development of modern Brazilian literature by incorporating different forms of language, thoughts and art. It is safe to say that left-wing literature forms a kind of literary tradition in Brazil, as it not only represents a moral and ethical stand, but also innovates the form and aesthetics.

Given rising populist nationalism and multiplying meanings of "right" and "left," this paper assesses whether Europeans who identify as extremely left-wing on the political spectrum hold anti-immigrant attitudes. In contrast to right-wing xenophobes, we further examine whether the political left, who conventionally emphasize class conflict, oppose immigrants less for cultural reasons and more for materialist reasons. We also consider whether socioeconomic status and values traditionally associated with the political left—favoring redistributive policies, egalitarianism, or social rights to benefits and services for immigrants—temper left- more than right-wing xenophobia. We find that a surprisingly large share of those who identify as far left do express extremely xenophobic attitudes, and we profile them in contrast to far right xenophobes. With logistic regression analysis of nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2018), we find that, all things equal, socioeconomic status influences far left xenophobia more than far right xenophobia, but inegalitarian values, less support for redistributive policies, and welfare chauvinism can only partially account for far left xenophobia and unexpectedly do not distinguish it from far right xenophobia. This implies that far left parties might adopt anti-immigrant policies to try to retain their loyal voters, even though such policies do not comport with broader left-wing values and may increase racial and ethnic inequality. Controlling for demographic and attitudinal differences reduces the probability of xenophobia among the far left by about sixty percent, but there remains some residual anti-immigrant attitudes among this group still to be explained.

Given rising populist nationalism and multiplying meanings of "right" and "left," this paper assesses whether Europeans who identify as extremely left-wing on the political spectrum hold anti-immigrant attitudes. In contrast to right-wing xenophobes, we further examine whether the political left, who conventionally emphasize class conflict, oppose immigrants less for cultural reasons and more for materialist reasons. We also consider whether socioeconomic status and values traditionally associated with the political left—favoring redistributive policies, egalitarianism, or social rights to benefits and services for immigrants—temper left- more than right-wing xenophobia. We find that a surprisingly large share of those who identify as far left do express extremely xenophobic attitudes, and we profile them in contrast to far right xenophobes. With logistic regression analysis of nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2018), we find that, all things equal, socioeconomic status influences far left xenophobia more than far right xenophobia, but inegalitarian values, less support for redistributive policies, and welfare chauvinism can only partially account for far left xenophobia and unexpectedly do not distinguish it from far right xenophobia. This implies that far left parties might adopt anti-immigrant policies to try to retain their loyal voters, even though such policies do not comport with broader left-wing values and may increase racial and ethnic inequality. Controlling for demographic and attitudinal differences reduces the probability of xenophobia among the far left by about sixty percent, but there remains some residual anti-immigrant attitudes among this group still to be explained.

The paper examines formation, evolution and political perspectives of the Spanish radical left-wing populist party 'We Can!' (Podemos) in the face of growing support for populism in the the Southern European countries as well as in the European Union in general. The author identifies the origins and country-specific characteristics of the left-wing populism in Spain and provides the general overview of trends in the country's party system since the middle of the 2000s, including the growing axiological, generational, political and ideological cleavages in the Spanish divided society. Special attention is paid to the political portrait of the Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias and the prospects for development of political situation in the country after his resignation and subsequent electoral defeat in the Autonomous Community of Madrid in May 2021. As such, this case study can provide some useful insights on the nature of populism in the EU member-states in general. In particular, the paper shows that the fragmentation of traditional political systems and the impacts of the sovereign debt crisis per se do not provide a sufficient explanation for the growing demand for populist rhetoric and charismatic leaders, but rather they have exposed certain structural economic and social imbalances. It is exactly these imbalances which traditional political parties are unable to address that create a breeding ground for various left- and right-wing parties and movements. As a result, the author concludes that populism will remain an essential element of political landscape in Spain despite all scandals that accompany populist politicians as the case of Pablo Iglesias has clearly demonstrated. At the same time the author emphasizes that it is this clear and imminent threat posed by the populist movements that may eventually serve as an impetus for a renewal of traditional parties and of the country's political system in general.

Examines the current attack on "left-wing" media content. Discussion opens with a look at the role of early-20th-century professional journalism, listing nine ideal principles that govern journalism & that find a narrow field of application that has since been transformed given the political & commercial requirements of media owners. Three biases have been adopted by professional journalism -- eg, government officials & powerful individuals are seen as the primary legitimate news source -- resulting in the institution of an establishment bias. The conservative media critique centers on four propositions: (1) Decisive power over the news lies with the journalists; owners & advertisers are irrelevant or relatively powerless. (2) Journalists are political liberals. (3) Journalists abuse their power to advance liberal politics. (4) Objective journalism would reflect the conservative worldview. These propositions are subjected to their own critique before addressing how the conservative critique of the liberal news media has assumed such strength in US political & media culture, citing hardcore financially powerful political organizing & the constant repetition of the phenomenon of a liberal news bias with no countervailing response as core reasons. Factors driving journalism's right-wing shift include the Republican Party's right wing, the diminished autonomy of journalists, & conservatism's comfort within corporate media. It is concluded that the key transformation in the news media has been the loss of space for critical journalistic work & an accompanying shift in favorable coverage to the conservative wing of elite opinion as evident in the news coverage of controversial & scandalous events connected to Bill Clinton as compared to George Bush. J. Zendejas

Universities are accused of being left‐wing bastions, unwelcoming to conservative and right‐wing professors. However, we know little about the political orientation of professors in comparison to other professionals, which would be the right comparison group if we want to know whether universities are potentially hostile environments to conservatives. Examining culturally and economically oriented political orientations in Europe, it is demonstrated that professors are more liberal and left‐leaning than other professionals. However, there is no greater homogeneity of political orientations among the professoriate relative to other specific professions, suggesting that there is a diversity of opinions which is similar to what professionals would find in other occupations. One exception concerns attitudes towards immigration, on which professors have more liberal orientations and comparatively low residual variance around that more liberal mean. Importantly, the difference between professors and other professionals is not so clear within graduates from the social sciences, but emerges more clearly among graduates with a medical, STEM, economics or law degree. An important political cleavage exists between professionals and managers, a group of similar social standing.

In this article, we argue that despite there being little evidence of an ideological convergence between Marxism and anarchism, such a convergence is not only sorely needed, but also eminently possible. We propose an open discussion on the appropriate terms of such a convergence, the context in which it should take place, and the reasons why it should. We close by showing how our contributors to this special issue open this debate for us in promising ways.