Suchergebnisse

The purpose of the study is to explain the evolution of regulations that resulted in minority rights for Romanians living in Transylvania in the pre-1918 period. The study analyses in detail the advancement of the idea of " nationalities" (in the meaning of national minorities) in the legislation from the last decade of the 18th century and presents the legal claims of the Transylvanian Romanians against the Habsburg Empire and the Hungarian Parliament. The authors present the Nationalities Act adopted in the 1848 revolution, but left without consequences, and examine the development of laws on minority rights during the legislative period following the Austrian-Hungarian settlement. The article discusses the grand debate on the act on nationalities, which took place in the Hungarian Parliament in 1868, and describes the later assimilation efforts by the majority lawmakers. The authors draw attention to the fact that non-Hungarian nationalities acquired a minority status only after the adoption of the Nationalities Act by the Hungarian state, which became a so-called majority state.

Fiume (current official name: Rijeka) became part of Hungary in 1779 as a "corpus separatum". At the time of the so-called provision, after 1870, the legal system of the port city developed in a special way. Although the Hungarian government took over the administration of the city again, this did not mean the automatic reception and application of the entire Hungarian legal system. Some Hungarian laws were not later enacted in Fiume. The article prepared on the basis of the conference lecture in Cluj-Napoca (Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania) intends to review the issues of legal interpretation of the applicability of Act XLIV of 1868 on National Equality by using descriptive method, taking into account legal history and legal theory aspects.

Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council in matters of succession is based on the principles of uniformity and predictability. The succession procedure should be governed by a single statutory provision in each Member State, uniformly with regard to all types of property, in terms of quality of succession, provisions on the opening and place of the succession, ineligibility for inheritance, survivor's rights. The harmonization that has begun runs counter to the different national laws and regulations of the Member States, which will only be possible to approximate over time, but uniform rules would significantly facilitate and resolve the legal problems that arise in succession proceedings.

In my study, I explore the logical self-contradictions stemming from the legal category of the national minority and argue that the minority rights that create this category are unsuitable for resolving the fundamental existential paradox of minority status. Similarly to Sándor Makkai, I see the minority paradox in the lack of homeliness of the physical home. In my view, homeliness as a measure of social defaultness is a function of the consensus prevailing in society and thus is related to the legal order of the state hosting the minority. To resolve this existential paradox of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, I find it necessary to recognize the right to homeliness, which entails stepping out from the paradigm of minority rights.

The Act XXX of 1868 regulated the public law situation of Croats and Hungarians in a uniquely subdualist way within the Monarchy, and the status quo provided an appropriate basis and guarantees for further development. Another significant step in the settlement of ethnic relations within the Monarchy was Act XLIV of 1868, a law that had an organic relationship with the Compromise Act. Both the Compromise Act and the Nationality Act were defined by the public law conception represented by Ferenc Deák, the essence of which is to focus on the terminology of the unified "political nation" for the Hungarian side, and the position and rights of other national minorities were regulated in relation to it. In Deák's understanding, the concept of the political nation was linked to the idea of the nation-state, which, as a result of domestic political changes after 1875, became increasingly nationalist and upset relations with individual nationalities, including Croats. In the long run, this process led to mutual misunderstandings between the peoples within the Habsburg Monarchy and to an explosion of ethnic and political relations as a result of several unfortunate political factors.

In our study, we attempt to provide a broad picture about the views of those authors who assessed the nationality concept of Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös, and through this analysis we would clarify how diverse approaches of the same issue might exist within the academic literature. We rely on the main relevant sources drafted under different political regimes: from the dualist period, Béla Grünwald, Lajos Mocsáry, and Oszkár Jászi are highlighted; from the era between the two world wars, Gyula Szekfű, Imre Mikó, and Kálmán Molnár will be cited; while the communist approach would be represented by Erzsébet Fazekas and Gábor Kemény G. Apart from the most influential Hungarian scholars, some authors from the neighbouring countries and the mainstream contemporary international literature on the status of national minorities will be also referred to. The core of our research is not the evaluation of the 1868 Act on nationalities or its application itself but the ex-post assessment of the political nation concept provided by Deák and Eötvös, which was a point of reference for the whole contemporary Hungarian political community and which also determined the logic of the 1868 Act on nationalities.

"There has been a lot of controversy among the Hungarian jurisprudence regarding the creation of the new Hungarian Criminal Procedure Act. It was also raised whether there was a need for a new code of procedure at all, whether it was not enough to adapt the existing regulations of the old Criminal Procedure Act to the new Criminal Code.
The Criminal Procedure Act, which has been in force since July 1 2018, may seem a distant start compared to Ferenc Finkey's work, but we will see that knowledge of the legal history and the processes involved are essential to understanding the changes in the present.
This is specially true for changes that affect the principles on which criminal proceedings are based. One of the biggest changes in the new Criminal Procedure Code – at the level of the priciples – is undoubtedly the relegation of the principle of official proceedings to the background, as it often turns to opportunism rather than officiality in order to increase simplification and efficiency.
In fact, in his work, Finkey has already perfectly described the mechanisms that we can discover in today's changes. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that his work may have provided a basis for fundamental changes in the new Criminal Procedure Code. His theories presented in this study shed excellent light on the dynamics that have permeated all areas of legal history in law and on the processes that, if we recognize them help us understand why it is necessary for our laws to be recreated sometimes.
All in all, we can see that the principles are never of absolute value, but their meaning is constantly changing, as the legislatorial ways breath in the spirit of the current age. When these principles are no longer able to keep up with change, they must be re-formed. And if we are to form such an important principle, we need to enforce a new vision throughout criminal proceedings that makes it necessary not only to make amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure but also to create a whole new law.
In order to see the real effects of the present innovations and the actual processes it has initiated in our criminal procedural law, a comprehensive analysis of the practice will be needed. We need to examine how quickly law enforcement can respond to the loss of space in centuries-old traditions. It may also be a question of whether we can talk about a real loss of space at all, as it is also conceivable that the principle of officiality has narrowed at the level of the normative text, but the old routine, attitude, and instincts live on in the application of law. The outcome of this examination may also raise important questions, including legal certainty. It is essential that once our procedural law has reached the point where it had to be born again, the application of the law be reborn with it."

The status of children, and their role have both undergone significant changesall over the world in the past half century. The rights and vulnerabilities of the child are now the subject of increased attention in all fields, including in the framework of the judicial process. Today, the notion of child-friendly justice is not unknown in Hungary although it is yet to be decided if the proper term is child-friendly or child-centred. The means of ensuring that the rights of the child are respected are common to all procedures; however, the traumas and adverse experiences they may have found themselves subjected to are widely diverse in civil cases (usually the establishment of parental supervision), criminal cases (usually crimes where the victim is a child), and in procedures specific to the tutelage authority; so, the question deserves examination in view of such specificities. The adoption of the New York Convention was a significant milestone in the domain of the rights of the child; however, laying down the theoretical foundations was only relatively slowly followed by a dynamic of development in practice, and that took place with a wide degree of variability in different fields. In Europe — as in Hungary —, the participation of the child during the procedure meant the same as a hearing when the child is addressed questions. Today we know that Laura Lundy was right when in several of her studies she drew attention to the fact that true participation is more than simply asking the child questions. In my research, I set myself the task to create a type of catalogue for the procedural rights of the child and to answer the question: what more can we do that has not yet been done in order to avoid transforming participation in a procedure into a burden, or even worse, a trauma for the child, but instead making it the reflection of a plenitude of rights, a defining but not uncomfortable experience?

Different shortcomings have been attributed to both legislators (the people & the parliament) in all countries & at all times. The key shortcoming of the people as a legislator is its unability to duly solve state-level issues: the totality of citizens can easily be misled, they lack knowledge or competence on specific issues, their decisions are based on stereotypes etc. Another limitation of people is related to the possibility that anonymity of its decisions can provoke cruelty & intolerance. Despite logical validity of the above-mentioned shortcomings their practical correctness is not proven. Falseness is also not proven as the only existing example of a frequent people's participation in legislation (Switzerland) among other things proving the falseness of the above-mentioned reproaches could hardly serve as a basis for generalization. To the disadvantage of people as a legislator, a procedural argument is presented: during a referendum it is not possible to adopt a maximum best & balanced law as in every case there is a choice "either... or." There is a vote en bloc & no editorial (even most rational) amendments are possible. Besides, the legislation that involves a referendum is related to huge costs. The people's participation in legislation is beneficial because it ensures a higher legitimacy of the decisions & brings people closer to the ruling elite (thus the gap between what citizens expect from the administration & what they receive from the administration is minimized), moreover, this guarantees every citizen's right to participate in tackling his/her affairs. There is one case where the laws adopted by the people have all the strengths of the laws adopted by the parliament & the people, & avoid almost all the failings. These are ratification referenda where the parliament-approved draft laws are adopted (or rejected). The people are only a nominal legislator in Lithuania. The recent practice proves that currently the requirements for holding a referendum make it impossible to pass laws in referenda. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the requirements for initiating a referendum are practically impossible to meet: so far nobody has managed to collect 300.000 signatures required to initiate a referendum, ie., 12 percent of the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania who have the right to vote. Consequently, the Seimas is de facto the only legislator in Lithuania. The Parliament as a lawmaker also has some weaknesses. First parliament members, unlike the people, are more prone to bribing or may be subject to some other personal impact. On the other hand, in contemporary electoral system, the parliamentarians who seek to stay in office pander both certain social or territorial groups of the electorate by adopting laws beneficial to them. The people as the whole is not the only popular actor in the legislative process. Individual citizens & their groups have certain powers as well. Yet they are not legislators as such, but rather merely participants of the legislative process. As compared to foreign practice, in Lithuania the conditions & procedure exercising citizens' legislative initiative (50.000 signatures required) are subject to relatively liberal regulation. Unlike in many countries of Europe, there are no direct restrictions on exercising this initiative. There are two indirect restrictions: 1) a draft law on the state budget of the Republic of Lithuania can only be prepared & submitted to the Seimas by the Government, 2) draft laws on ratification & denouncing international treaties are submitted by the President. In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often is used not to promote the idea of lawmaking but to use citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition & communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions. Adapted from the source document.

Siame straipsnyje analizuojama Lietuvos valstybes valdomu imoniu vadovu kaita ir politizacija 1990-2012 m. Ziniasklaidoje daznai aptariami konkreciu imoniu vadovu politizacijos atvejai, taciau sistemines analizes sioje srityje stoka neleidzia daryti pagristu apibendrinimu. Del to pagrindinis straipsnio tikslas - remiantis statistine mineto laikotarpio duomenu analize ne tik identifikuoti politizacijos masta bei pasikeitimus VVI vadovu postuose, bet ir nustatyti, kaip juos veikia siu imoniu teisinis statusas, valdymo sritis, vyriausybiu tipai, partiju isitvirtinimas valdzioje ir ju nariu skaicius. Tyrimo rezultatai atskleide, kad vadovu kaita suprasti padeda valdanciosios daugumos pasikeitimai ir vyriausybiu tipai, taciau sie veiksniai savaime nepaaiskina politizacijos. Norint suprasti ta reiskini, yra butina analizuoti valdymo sriti. Analize parode, kad labiausiai politizuoti sektoriai yra miskininkyste ir energetika This article analyses the turnover and politicisation of CEO positions in the Lithuanian state-owned enterprises between 1990 and 2012. Although some individual cases of politicisation of CEO positions get detailed media coverage, there is an obvious lack of systematic large-N analysis in this field. Therefore, the main aim of the article is to identify the scope of politicisation and changes in CEO positions, as well as to account for variation in the extent of politicisation in terms of different legal statuses of these enterprises, policy fields, types of government, party entrenchment and membership. The results of this article revealed that CEO turnover is best explained by the factors of changing ruling majorities and governments. However, neither of these two factors explains CEO positions' politicisation. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is essential to distinguish among policy fields, which showed that forestry and energy are the most politicised sectors. This conclusion points to different patterns of politicisation in different sectors of the economy. Adapted from the source document.

Although the correlation of welfare & democracy is not direct, it is possible to sustain that the problems related with democracy satisfaction could be solved by public policy measures. Lithuanian's who reflect themselves as the losers of the transition reforms are unsatisfied with their socio-economic status & their anticipation of the prompt life improvement is rather high. If such tendencies start to dominate in the society of Lithuania, the question of political stability arises. Therefore social security, welfare network & infrastructure development as well as the increase of the redistribution amounts look like inevitable reforms in nowadays Lithuania. All appropriate compensatory measures could be related to the development of the welfare state in Lithuania. The liberal model of the welfare state should be the most suitable option for Lithuania at first sight. The Lisbon Strategy is implicitly based on this kind of welfare state model. Lithuania was trying to apply active labor market policy nevertheless the efforts were restrained by the small resources. The structural policy of the EU, mainly the measures financed by the European Social Fund, should increase the amount of funds allocated to the active labor market policy. Considering public policy in Lithuania an exclusive attention should be paid to the reduction of regional inequalities, establishment of the workplaces & social security infrastructure. Due to the Lithuanian budget restrictions it's necessary to develop a tax base & to improve tax administration. The second important component is partial decentralization of programming & implementation of the EU funds by means of the EU Cohesion policy reform. The third component is the implementation of horizontal regional policy in Lithuania. Legal & organizational premises for the aforementioned steps are already established. Adapted from the source document.

2003 EU accession referenda results in the 8 East Central European countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, & Latvia) have been analyzed examining regional dimension of their results. Two criteria, active euro-optimism (percentage of YES voters out of all the electorate in particular region), & active euro-skepticism (percentage of NO voters out of all the electorate in the region), have been used. Comparison with two other variables, economic (GDP per capita in the region) & ethnic (percentage of ethnic group other than title one, if remarkable) has been made; Pearson correlations have been calculated. Though there is common agreement on suppositional influence of regional factors (possibly, North-South, East-West, urban-rural, richer-poorer regional cleavages, exceptional case of the capital city, influence of densely inhabited ethnic groups etc.) in previous euro-integration referenda, there were no consistent analyses on it. Examining of 8 East Central European countries has showed both varieties from country to country as well as a number of general trends. In Slovenia, region of its capital city, Ljubljana, is more euro-optimistic compared with eastern Pomurska region (Maribor & Ptuj). Though regional economic irregularities not enough significant, as well as the number of examples too small for generalization, one can suppose West-East cleavage connected with the economic factor here. In Hungary, though voters' turnout was exceptionally low, both factor of higher euro-optimism in the capital city, Budapest, was evident, as well as strong relation between economic factor & voting behavior. However, Hungary has its own specifics: higher economic development of the region increases both active euro-optimism & active euro-skepticism, too. This, in turn, cannot exclude that factor of "passive euro-skepticism" is important here. In Lithuania, strong relations between size of ethnic minorities in the region & both active euro-optimism (negative) & active euro-skepticism (positive) were evident. More complications were, to evaluate influence of the economic factor: present statistics of GDP per capita in apskritys are far not enough to support supposition that voting results in particular Lithuania's territories are related with their economic development, too. In Slovakia, quite strong influence can be found of the size of Hungarian ethnic minority, but the opposite compared to Lithuania: increasing number of ethnic Hungarians do increase active euro-optimism & decrease active euro-skepticism. This is in good accordance with widely known believe of Hungarian ethnic group that EU membership will improve their status. Surprisingly, in Slovakia it was impossibly to evaluate the influence of another ethnic factor: though this country is widely known by the problems connected with Roma ethnic group, official statistics does not even show remarkable percentage of Roma in any region at all. Influence of economic factor, though number of examples is very small, is also present in Slovakia: the higher is GDP per capita, the higher is active euro-optimism, & at the same time the lower active euro-skepticism. In Poland, clear pattern of lower active euro-optimism was shown for its eastern regions, Podlaskie, Lubelskie, & Podkarpackie; they are economically poorest, at the same time, & characterized by specific political culture (bigger number of orthodox, smaller agricultural incomes, dependence on small trans-border trade, etc.). In the Czech Republic, regional economic pattern is also present: increase in regional GDP per capita also increases the active euro-optimism. Capital city, Prague, has exceptional position: it is most economically developed, & most euro-optimistic, too. For Estonia, complicated picture of inter-related influence of both ethnic & economic factors is typical. On one hand, there are no clear correlations between economic & voting variables. On the other, eastern Ida-Virumaa region, densely populated by ethnic Russians & the least economically developed, is described at the same time as mostly active euro-optimistic, & less euro-skeptical. The most reliable explanation would be, economic underdevelopment & ethnicity, complicated by stronger trans-border relations of individuals living near Russian border, may reinforce uncertainty in euro-integration perspective. For Latvia, the ethnic factor is very much evident: Pearson correlation between regional percentage of Russian population & active euro-skepticism is 0.906; reversely, it is connected with active euro-optimism. Eastern regions of Daugavpils & Rezekne affected also by economic underdevelopment were the most euro-skeptical among all 8 East European countries & became only regions where bigger part of inhabitants were actively opposed EU integration than supported. Thus, a number of cleavages can be generalized for majority of the acceding countries examined. "Center-periphery" cleavage is more or less evident for all countries except of Lithuania & Latvia: better socio-economic development seems to be overcomplicated by ethnic factors in two the latter. In Slovenia, Poland, and, especially, the Baltic States, the East-West cleavage is important. This can be explained by specifics of eastern regions: economic underdevelopment, personal & business ties beyond border, especially among Russian ethnic group in the East of the Baltic States, can lead to rational individual arguments against integration into European Union. With reversed relation, ethnic factor is typical for Hungarian ethnic group in Slovakia: support for euro-integration is predominant within it. The universal factor influencing electoral behavior in referenda is economic one, especially remarkable for Visegrad countries & Slovenia. Adapted from the source document.

The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone's actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive & credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfill when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defense. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defense actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state's defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, & the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information & advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political & military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one. When employed by alliances, such as NATO, conventional deterrence also must face a number of additional problems. It requires a large & credible power projection capability because of the simple facts of geography. To operate large expeditionary forces requires an overseas base network & a forcible entry capability. Effective defense demands a large standing force structure, & technological superiority, to assure the success of conventional campaigns. Such complex, capable, & large forces prove to be very costly. Small non-nuclear powers may enhance deterrence using different strategies. Most importantly by making it plain through prior security agreements that aggressors will be severely for punished by the international community, whether or not their invasions are successful. The punishments could be military (including counter-value attacks or asymmetrical threats), political (pariah-state status), & economic (isolation), but they should be certain & tough, even if not perfectly enforced. For example, the European Union may seriously punish aggression from the East using economical measures such as sanctions, boycotts, exclusion from "clubs," etc. Conventional capabilities of small non-nuclear powers is also benefiting from significant improvements in the technology of conventional weapons, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, & information support. Nor does the current theory of conventional deterrence require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. Growing military strength & asymmetrical capabilities significantly contributes to the psychological credibility of deterrence. Adapted from the source document.

Lithuania's referendum on the accession into the European Union was part of the so-called "domino strategy" of the fourth wave of EU enlargement, which aimed to influence the mindset of the inhabitants of the less euro-enthusiastic member states by placing the pressure of the anticipated high positive result from the more enthusiastic member states (Lithuania among them) on them. Typical trend of elites' manipulations can be observed in Lithuania, i.e. changing of the legal basis on the referendum prior to the EU accession referendum in order to facilitate positive outcome. These facilitating rules had been introduced step by step, bringing any discussions on these matters in a parliament during election campaigns of 2000 & 2002 to an end in order to escape escalation of the pro versus the anti-European cleavages within political system. Thus, a double hurdle (both turn-out & voting YES of 50 per cent of all eligible voters) existing since 1989 in referendum legislation was lowered introducing triple hurdle (turnout of 50 per cent & voting YES one third of all eligible voters but more than 50 per cent of participants) in 2002. Then, in 2003 it was facilitated once again introducing new double hurdle (turn-out 50 per cent of all eligible voters & voting YES by 50 per cent of participants). Further attempts to facilitate positive result were limited by two factors: first, a specific factor, an almost parallel initiative of referendum on the constitutional amendments (so-called "Uspaskikh referendum"), is to be taken into consideration. In addition, a general requirement that the citizens themselves decide on the issue of Lithuania's EU integration in a decisive & binding manner, i.e. a referendum, typical for other CEE countries as well as, was also important here. Finally, other settings laying ground for a positive result, though facilitated twice, were further reinforced by a two-day voting procedure. Together with an unexpected apathy of Hungarian voters in their referendum, these risky rules became a reason for dramatization & anxiety expecting proclaiming referendum as invalid due to insufficient voter turnout. An official information campaign of the Government on the EU accession started in 2000. Gradually it turned into a one-sided agitation campaign, let alone before the referendum date. Positive involvement of the institutions possessing high public confidence such as te mass media & Catholic Church, a well-established consensus of the major political parties on the EU accession, weak organization of the euro-skeptical movement all led to an absence of any substantial political competition. Finally, the advertising as such started dominating the campaign. Features of propaganda, sometimes coming very close to a violation of laws banning advertising during the voting days, could be observed here too. Different points of view should be endorsed in order to interpret the high positive result of the referendum in a sufficient manner. As regards the history of Lithuania's political system, it was the fourth successful referendum since the 90s. What was typical for all of them was that the citizens & the elites held a common position on the issue. Seen within the context of the latest internal political developments in Lithuania, it could be nevertheless equated to an exception first of all in view of electorate's positive motivation, less apathy & the lack of tangible protest features. Referendum proceeding & its results -- maximal active support for the YES statement among all countries of fourth wave of EU enlargement -- give a fresh & useful data for testing "elite-centric," "rational choice," "ideological-cultural" theories of euro-integration. 6 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.