Suchergebnisse

The purpose of this project is to provide a fresh and in-depth analysis of legal jurisprudence through the use of two of the most important legal theorists of our time, H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. This project focuses on how Dworkin's position in his famous paper "Hard Cases", helps us understand an important Supreme Court case, Cohen v. California. Cohen will be the main focus of my project. The project will discuss the case and the possible ways of deciding the case. Then the project explains both Dworkin's and Hart's positions. Finally, the project will analyze how Dworkin's position, helps solve the case and problem of legal jurisprudence exemplified by Cohen. This project is one that I have spent both Fall 2019 and Spring 2020 researching and analyzing. I have always had a curiosity to understand what law is. In the Fall of 2019 I completed an independent study that allowed me to spend time reading Dworkin and working through the different ways to interpret legal statutes. The impact that Dworkin made on me was that there seems to be principles that help guide how judges interpret the law, but these principles are very rarely ever written down. This pushed me to go further and to research the history of why philosophers started to discuss legal interpretivist. The significance of this topic is that it is specific to my area of study. I am a philosophy major who intends to go to law school. In order to successful undertake such a task, I need to understand the reasons that guide judicial decision makers in interpreting laws in particular ways. I believe the position Dworkin espouses allows legal scholars to go deeper to understand what exactly goes into a judicial decision. By revealing how underlying normative principles of our legal system guide legal decisions.

Intro -- Contents -- 1 Introduction: Dimensions of Inquiry -- PART I: PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES -- 2 Speaker Intent and Convention -- Linguistic Meaning and Pragmatics -- Vagueness and Indeterminacy: Three Topics in the Philosophy of Language -- 3 Literary Interpretation, Performance Art, and Related Subjects -- 4 Religious Interpretation -- 5 General Theories of Interpretation -- 6 Starting from the Bottom: Informal Instructions -- PART II: INTERPRETING LEGALLY AUTHORITATIVE TEXTS OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS -- 7 The Law of Agency -- 8 Wills -- 9 Contracts -- 10 Judicial Alterations of Textual Provisions: Cy Pres and Relatives -- 11 Conclusion and a Comparison -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

Legal interpretation is discovering the solution to the given cases in accordance interpretation with the law now in force. Interpretation is always necessary since there are no clear cases and those who have the task of deciding the interpretation of the law are the judges and civil servants who have to resolve the cases presented to them for their consideration. This characteristic underlines that legal interpretation is the search for a solution based on equity. Another of the tasks of interpretation is the solution of conflicts and, in this sense, the appeal to principles and the logic of reason provides the acceptable solution. This dialectic among the legislature, the judges, the doctrine and public opinion make up the life of the law, in this way reconciling stability and change. ; La interpretación jurídica consiste en descubrir la solución en los supuestos dados con arreglo al derecho vigente. La interpretación es siempre necesaria porque no existen casos claros y a quien incumbe la tarea de decidir la interpretación del derecho es a los jueces y funcionarios, al resolver los casos que se presentan a su consideración. Una característica destacable de la interpretación judicial es la búsqueda de una solución basada en la equidad. Otra de las tareas de la interpretación es la solución de conflictos y, en este sentido, el recurso a los principios y a la lógica de lo razonable suministra la solución aceptable. Esta dialéctica entre el legislativo, los jueces, la doctrina y la opinión pública constituyen la vida del derecho, conciliando de este modo la estabilidad y el cambio.

This book discusses the question of whether legal interpretation is a scientific activity. The law's dependency on language, at least for the usual communication purposes, not only makes legal interpretation the main task performed by those whose work involves the law, but also an unavoidable step in the process of resolving a legal case. This task of decoding the words and sentences used by normative authorities while enacting norms, carried out in compliance with the principles and rules of the natural language adopted, is prone to all of the difficulties stemming from the uncertainty intrinsic to all linguistic conventions. In this context, seeking to determine whether legal interpretation can be scientific or, in other words, can comply with the requirements for scientific knowledge, becomes a central question. In fact, the coherent application of the law depends on a knowledge regarding the meaning of normative sentences that can be classified (at least) as being structured, systematically organized and tendentially objective. Accordingly, this book focuses on analyzing precisely these problems; its respective contributions offer a range of revealing perspectives on both the problems and their ramifications