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The common law, which is made by courts, consists of rules that govern relations between individuals, such as torts (the law of private wrongs) and contracts. Legal Reasoning explains and analyzes the modes of reasoning utilized by the courts in making and applying common law rules. These modes include reasoning from binding precedents (prior cases that are binding on the deciding court); reasoning from authoritative although not binding sources, such as leading treatises; reasoning from analogy; reasoning from propositions of morality, policy, and experience; making exceptions; drawing distinctions; and overruling. The book further examines and explains the roles of logic, deduction, and good judgment in legal reasoning. With accessible prose and full descriptions of illustrative cases, this book is a valuable resource for anyone who wishes to get a hands-on grasp of legal reasoning.

Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practise special forms of reasoning is false

"Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common-law reasoning, when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practice special forms of reasoning is false."--BOOK JACKET

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Part 1. Foundations -- Chapter 2. What is legal reasoning about: a jurisprudential account -- Chapter 3. Economic approaches to legal reasoning: an overview -- Part 2. Economics and Legal Interpretations -- Chapter 4. Economics in judicial decision-making: four types of situations where judges may apply economics -- Chapter 5. Characterizing economic and legal approaches to the regulation of market interactions -- Part 3. Economics and Fact-finding -- Chapter 6. What is Forensic Economics? -- Chapter 7. Why do US judges reject antitrust experts? -- Part 4. New Perspectives -- Chapter 8. Fostering the autonomy of legal reasoning through Legal Realism -- Chapter 9. Reverse engineering legal reasoning.

AbstractThis paper defends the distinction between law and equity with regard to legal reasoning. It argues that equity not only can provide – as the late Bernard Rudden said – an alibi but equally can add an extra dimension to the reasoning process. It helps the legal reasoner to escape from a two-dimensional "flat" world into one that functions in three-dimensions in which the complexities of social reality can be given more adequate expression.

According to Legrand, harmonization of European private law by means of a European Civil Code would not work, because of the different legal cultures (mentalités) within which such a code would have to operate. In the civil law tradition, legal reasoning on the basis of such a code would be deductive in the sense of the application of rules that are posited prior to the cases to which they should be applied. In the common law tradition, the starting point of legal reasoning is in the cases themselves. As a consequence, common law reasoning would abstract less from the peculiarities of individual cases. The main point of this paper is that Legrand's picture of civil law reasoning is based on the subsumption model of rule application, which does not allow adaptation of the law to the needs of concrete cases other than through the limited possibilities of interpretation. It is argued that this picture is wrong. As an alternative, the reason-based model of rule application is proposed, which allows legal decision makers much more leeway to tailor the law to the needs of concrete cases. In a comparison with case-based reasoning it is argued that rule-based reasoning, according to the reason-based model, gives the decision maker the same leeway. The final conclusion is that possible differences in legal culture between the civil law and the common law tradition are not rooted in the distinction between rule-based reasoning and case-based reasoning, and are therefore merely contingent. There is no reason why the introduction of a European Civil Code could not overcome the differences between the two traditions. Whether this would be desirable is a different question.

Methods of Legal Reasoning describes and criticizes four methods used in legal practice, legal dogmatics and legal theory: logic, analysis, argumentation and hermeneutics. The book takes the unusual approach of discussing in a single study four different, sometimes competing concepts of legal method. Sketched this way, the panorama allows the reader to reflect deeply on questions concerning the methodological conditioning of legal science and the existence of a unique, specific legal method.

Abstract
This paper investigates the basis arguments of so-called legal logic and their relation to logic in its standard meaning. There is no doubt that legal arguments belong to logic in the wide sense (sensu largo), but their reduction to schemes of formal logic (logica sensu stricto) is a controversial issue. It can be demonstrated that only some legal arguments fall under explicit rules of formal logic, that is, having a deductive character. Most such reasoning is fallible, and its correctness depends on appealing to extra-logical principles taken from legal norms. For instance, if we say, "If it is permitted more, then it is permitted less" (argumentum a maiori ad minus), we assume that the concepts expressed by the words "more" and "less" are already defined.