Suchergebnisse

AbstractPresidential vote shares in legislative districts are widely available for congressional districts and are often used by scholars in their research. Here, I describe the general methodology to construct statewide vote shares within districts and apply these methods to a new database of presidential vote shares within 36 states' legislative districts.

THE AUTHOR STRESSES THE THEMES OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS IN DISTRICTS AND REAPPORTIONMENT DECISIONS ARE INHERENTLY POLITICAL DECISION. ANY FIXED STANDARD OF POPULATION EQUALITY COMPATIBLE WITH THE ACCURACY OF CENSUS DATA WILL PERMIT A MYRIAD OF ALTERNATIVE DISTRICTING SCHEMES SATISFYING THAT STANDARD. THE AUTHOR ARGUES IN FAVOR OF A BIPARTISAN DISTRICTING COMMISSION.

Electing members of legislatures through multimember districts (MMDs) reduces racial & ethnic minorities' descriptive representation in those bodies, but is their substantive representation also hurt? Do legislative MMDs lead to worse policy outcomes for minorities independent of their effect on legislative demographics? To address these questions, I examine welfare policy in the states from 1997 to 2000. I find evidence that suggests that states whose upper legislative chamber is comprised of MMDs have significantly less generous welfare policy. I conclude that MMDs do indeed damage the substantive representation of racial & ethnic minorities in legislatures, independent of their effect on descriptive representation. 4 Tables, 1 Appendix, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.

This new policy brief from the UCLA Center for Health Policy Research presents diabetes prevalence rates among adults by California Assembly and Senate districts. These data are relevant to policymakers and advocates concerned with the impact of chronic conditions on the health of Californians. Estimating the prevalence of diabetes at the local level is increasingly important as rates continue to climb and the state's population continues to age and become more ethnically diverse. Diabetes prevalence rates were estimated using a small-area methodology with data from the 2001 California Health Interview Survey (CHIS 2001), 2000-2002 Current Population Surveys (CPS) and 2000 Census.

AbstractElecting members of legislatures through multimember districts (MMDs) reduces racial and ethnic minorities' descriptive representation in those bodies, but is their substantive representation also hurt? Do legislative MMDs lead to worse policy outcomes for minorities independent of their effect on legislative demographics? To address these questions, I examine welfare policy in the states from 1997 to 2000. I find evidence that suggests that states whose upper legislative chamber is comprised of MMDs have significantly less generous welfare policy. I conclude that MMDs do indeed damage the substantive representation of racial and ethnic minorities in legislatures, independent of their effect on descriptive representation.