Suchergebnisse

This research attempts to shed light on the role of the international Court of Justice (ICJ) and the significance of its adjudicatory and advisory functions. The theme of this research will initially project a brief introduction of the topic in question, keeping in view the historical and contemporary perspectives of the ICJ. This research also focuses on the organizational structure of the United Nations, keeping in view the position and role of the ICJ within the organization. With practical examples of case laws, the ambit of judicial review in the context of judicial and advisory function of ICJ will also be taken into account. It will also present brief analysis on the intra-organizational relationship between the ICJ and other organs of the UN. ; This research attempts to shed light on the role of the international Court of Justice (ICJ) and the significance of its adjudicatory and advisory functions. The theme of this paper will initially project a brief introduction of the topic in question, keeping in view the historical and contemporary perspectives of the ICJ . This research also focuses on the organizational structure of the United Nations, keeping in view the position and role of the ICJ within the organization. With practical examples of case laws, the ambit of judicial review in the context of judicial and advisory function of ICJ will also be taken into account. It will also present brief analysis on the intra-organizational relationship between the ICJ and other organs of the UN.

We have analyzed the political legitimacy of democracy in Latin America with Latinobarometro's data, which is a survey about attitudes and values that has been applied annually since 1996 in 18 countries of the region, in two axes: one methodological and the other theoretical. On the one hand, we contribute to the empirical validation of the concept and its differents operationalizations, while aligning our results to the wider debate. And, in the theoretical field, our results allow us to broaden the debate on the relationship between legitimacy and democratic stability.

Resumo: O controle das políticas públicas, por parte dos tribunais de contas, sempre ensejou muitos debates jurídicos acerca de seus pressupostos e limites, principalmente, em razão de albergar um campo maior para o exercício da discricionariedade administrativa na definição de metas, diretrizes, prioridades e planos de governo para a consecução do interesse público. O exercício dessa importante atividade de controle não é o cerne do problema, considerando que no atual modelo de Estado de Direito não existem mais campos imunes à incidência do direito, o que inclui a própria política, em especial quando se estiver tratando de políticas públicas deficitárias, também chamadas de falhas estruturantes, decorrente do próprio estado de coisas. O mérito das discussões está na efetivação dessas intervenções e ativismos estruturais quando realizados de forma unilateral e antidialógica, sem a realização de um amplo debate democrático, com a utilização de instrumentos de controle consensuais, sob o viés da consequencialidade, oportunizando o alcance de bons resultados práticos e privilegiando o equilíbrio institucional próprio de um governo democrático e com poderes constitucionalmente separados. ; Abstract: The control of public policies by the courts of audit has always given way to countless legal debates regarding their assumptions and limits, mainly in order to encompass a larger field for the exercise of administrative discretion in the definition of goals, guidelines, priorities and government plans to attain the public interest. The exercise of this important control activity is not at the heart of the problem, considering that in the current rule of law model there are no more fields immune to the reach of the law, which includes politics itself, especially when dealing with deficit public policies, resulting from structural failures of the Public Power to protect and promote fundamental rights. The merit of the discussions is in the analysis of the state of things, by the external control bodies, and in the search ...

The aim of this study is trying to interpret the crisis of legitimacy which faced the political system in Libya after the events of 2011, including the multiple legislative and executive bodies, based on specified theoretical perception is Crisis Theory for Jürgen Habermas, which he is trying to linking between the political system has legitimacy and its ability to overcome the different crises and challenges that faced, is a reliable perception in the case of Libya, in particular, every political party in the Libyan scene is consider himself the legal and legitimate representatives of the Libyan community, in light of political division and multiple parliamentary bodies and executive Governments in the country,the researcher adopted in this trying to analytical reading emphasize on specific points in many official and non-official studies and reports on the Libyan situation, study found that all successive political parties that topped the Libyan political scene form 2011, had failed to counter the various challenges whether security or constitutional, and were unable to manage the different crisis suffered by the Libyan citizen, specially economic, living and service, this place it in a real crisis of legitimacy at the level of society as a whole, in light of decrease what they have done in the past and what they can do in the future under the current situation, which contributed in create a case of distrust among the citizens in their programs and plans and lost motivation to participate in the various activities that they supervise on the one hand, and in increasing cases of disrespect for laws and decisions that represent their authority on the other hand,this leads us to say that the political system in Libya after the events of 2011, is faces a national crisis of legitimacy, accompanied by crises in motivation and non-normality, according to Habermas societal crisis theory, this is reflected in our reading of studies and reports that have been exposed to the Libyan crisis.

1. O orçamento é o ato jurídico em que se faz a previsão da receita, autorizando a sua arrecadação, e a fixação da despesa, autorizando, outrossim, a sua execução, relativas a determinado exercício financeiro. Embora o conteúdo do orçamento diga respeito à matéria de Direito Financeiro, pertinente à disciplina da receita e da despesa, a natureza jurídica da fiscalização da execução do orçamento se mantém no campo do Direito Administrativo, não obstante se utilize das normas de contabilidade pública e de técnica econômico-financeira para levá-la a cabo. Destarte, permanece no Direito Administrativo o estudo dos órgãos de controle do Estado quanto a atividade dos ordenadores da despesa e pagadores de contas, e os atos jurídicos de efetivação desse controle.Esse controle da execução do orçamento se faz através do Poder Executivo, por órgão do Ministério da Fazenda ou das Finanças, que acompanham a gestão financeira dos diferentes órgãos do Estado, e se denomina fiscalização interna; e, através do Poder Legislativo, valendo-se de pareceres de suas Comissões de Finanças ou Tomadas de Contas, e, especialmente, de órgão administrativo, autônomo, de cúpula colegiada ou individual, seu delegado, e auxiliar, ou melhor, colaborador, na verificação das contas dos órgãos do Estado, independente do Poder Executivo, e esse controle se denomina fiscalização externa.Ao Legislativo compete não só a aprovação do orçamento como a fiscalização última da sua fiel execução. Objetiva garantir o efetivo cumprimento do orçamento, quanto a receita e despesa. Sem a devida tomada de contas, os orçamentos se constituiriam em formalidades inúteis e seria impossível a apuração de responsabilidade dos agentes ordenadores e pagadores da despesa. 2. Como órgão auxiliar do Legislativo nessa tarefa de controle de contas do Executivo se cogitou, nos países latinos da Europa, do Tribunal de Contas, também denominado Conselho de Contas ou Corte de Contas, cujos membros, chamados Ministros ou Conselheiros, gozam de imunidades que asseguram a sua ...

Executive Council Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session 7 – 8 February 2019 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ; The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Court) was established in terms of Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Protocol"), adopted on 9 June 1998, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, by the then Organization of African Unity (OAU). The Protocol entered into force on 25 January 2004. The Court became operational in 2006 and is composed of eleven (11) Judges elected by the Executive Council and appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union. The Seat of the Court is in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania. Article 31 of the Protocol mandates the Court to "…submit to each regular session of the Assembly, a report on its work. The report shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a State has not complied with the Court's judgment.