Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Photini Danou, The words of the voiceless Did ordinary men and women in pre-modern England have an opinion about politics? What was "politics" for the common people at a time when they had not any say in choosing who would rule them? Was popular engagement in state politics only to secure subsistence? Were "knife and fork" politics of the masses so separate from issues of "high politics" of the State? Was pre-modern commoners' mentality, "pre-political" as well? This paper discusses early modern popular political awareness. I argue that commoners in Tudor England pursued their own political agenda, by exploiting the sovereign's self-image as the "protector of the poor". However, as I set out to show, in pursuing their political agenda commoners also raised issues on the content of Englishness, common good, patriotism, legitimate governance and the right of resistance. The political identity of the lower strata was not an entity fixed in its essence. On the contrary, plebeian political identity was rather shifting, changeable, and always constituting its content in particular historical contexts. The commoners' commitment to the ideal of the"nation", their loyalty to the government, their allegiance to their Queen, their obedience to her laws, or their active participation in the enforcement of state policies were not unconditional. The ways they practiced their political identity was interrelated to their superiors' behavior and draw its legitimacy from the public transcript of the English Common wealth. Common prosperity, reciprocity, solidarity and, in general, protection of the poorer and weaker members of English society were ideals that constituted the meaning of "common wealth" in the plebeian mind. Those ideals were prerequisites for their giving of devotion and loyalty to the state. Thus, the commoners' political mentality and behavior ranged from national loyalty to indifference or even animosity to state officials; from cooperation and acquiescence to covered or overt forms of opposition and active resistance.
Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; The declaration of the establishment of the «Kingdom of Serbs, Groats and Slovenes» on the 1st of December, 1918 —which in 1929 was renamed to Yugoslavia— fulfilled the long standing desire for the political unification of all South-Slavs. However, the new State which apart from the three old kingdoms of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia included the entities of the former Hungarian Vojvodina, the former Austrian Slovenia and Dalmatia and the Serbian Macedonia had to tackle certain problems. Its subjects were divided into several ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes —who constituted three quarters of its entire population— and Germans, Hungarians and Albanians as well as other ethnic minorities. The population of the new state was also divided into three religious categories: 47% were Orthodox Christians, 39% Catholics, and 11% Muslims. This paper attempts to analyze five constructive crises which came about in interwar Yugoslavia, and are characteristic of any modern state: 1) The crisis of identity of the state itself and of the various ethnic groups. The ideology of Yugoslavian unification failed to bridge the differences between the ethnic and religious groups; 2) The crisis of legitimacy. This is related with the nature of the regime. From 1918 until the dictatorship of 1929 twenty three governmental crises occured; 3) The crisis of integration, as reflected in the policies and the electoral results of the various political parties which had clear ethnic and geographical limits. During the interwar period none of the existing political parties attained to play this integrating role by securing mass support throughout the country; 4) The crisis of participation of individuals and social groups in controlling the public affairs and manning the state apparatus; 5) The crisis of distribution of goods and services. The ethnic and political contradictions between the Slovenes and Croats in the North and Serbs in the South resulted in the uneven development between these two geographical districts of the state.
Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.
