Suchergebnisse

This paper compares three lending mechanisms used by microfinance organizations, namely individual lending, simultaneous group lending and sequential group lend cotract enforcement is weak, sequential group lending unambiguously achieves the highest repayment rate. Hence sequential group lending can operate in settings in which simultaneous group lending and individual lending are not feasible due to weak contract enforcement. Simultaneous lending in contrast achieves the highest repayment rate if the level of official contract enforcement is high and if the likelihood of default is relatively low.

This book deals with the concept of Decentralized Lending on the Blockchain. In order to familiarize with the topic, the basic principles of the underlying technology, such as blockchain, smart contracts or the general architecture of Decentralized Finance, are highlighted. More specific points of Decentralized Lending, such as the principle of supplying and borrowing, lending pools and the underlying logic of overcollateralization will be presented in more detail subsequently. Furthermore, the principle of liquidation is explained, with a focus on the underlying reasons for this. The aim is to provide an overview of how Decentralized Loans work and how the interest rates for them are composed. In addition, the empirical part addresses the question of the extent to which price fluctuations of the deposited collateral have an influence on its liquidation. About the author Matthias Schaible completed an apprenticeship as a banker and studied Real Estate Management at Nürtingen-Geislingen University. He then completed his Master's degree in International Finance at the HWR Berlin and is now working as an investment analyst.

Abstract
This paper provides a moral hazard characterization of the effects of lending relationship on cost of funds. I develop a model that studies the problem of financial contracting between a bank and an entrepreneur and isolates the effect of the lending relationship on the interest rates. The main result is that a bank-entrepreneur relationship has a positive effect on the interest rates, the optimal contract specifying a decreasing sequence of interest rates. The possibility of the entrepreneur to use partially his retained earnings improves the terms of the contract between entrepreneur and lender by reducing the difference between the two interest rates.

The article shows the specific features of agricultural lending. An assessment given to the modern existing mechanisms for lending to agricultural producers. Moreover, the improvement of the mechanism of financial lending to agricultural enterprises is proposed.