Suchergebnisse

Abstract: Positive obligations of States to protect and implement human rights are considered a part of various effects of human rights in legislations. In this article, it is argued that a crucial problem arises from the inconsistent practice of addressing violations of human rights committed by juristic persons together with a lack of underlying general theory of liability for human rights violations committed by private entities. Without a major change in the legal doctrine and case-law, we will need to remain focused on the role of the State as a guarantor of human rights, rather than on the imposition of human rights obligations on private-law entities. In this article, it is argued that the nature of the relationship between a juristic person and the State is not the only relevant aspect, as we should also examine the activity of the juristic person in question.Keywords: Positive obligations of States. Juristic persons. State-juristic person nexus. Fundamental rights. Horizontal effect.Resumo: Obrigações estatais positivas de proteger e de implementar direitos humanos são parte dos vários efeitos dos direitos humanos nas legislações nacionais. Neste artigo, argumenta-se que um problema crucial decorre da prática de abordar violações de direitos humanos cometidas por pessoas jurídicas sem uma teoria geral da responsabilidade por violações de direitos humanos cometidas por entidades privadas. Sem uma mudança importante na doutrina e na jurisprudência será preciso permanecer olhando apenas para o papel do Estado como garantidor de direitos humanos. Neste artigo argumenta-se que a natureza da relação entre uma pessoa jurídica e o Estado não é o único aspecto relevante. É preciso examinar também a atividade da pessoa jurídica em questão.Palavras-chave: Obrigações positivas dos Estados. Pessoas jurídicas.

Lately there have been works that show that Kant bases human rights on innate freedom as the only innate right that man has by virtue of his humanity. However, innate freedom cannot justify a theory of human rights because it is only an innate right over my inner self that allows for empirical possession, and although a human right is inalienable, it must be renounced in order to enter the world; Moreover, the four analytical derivations of innate freedom generate consequences that are incompatible with a human rights doctrine, for as human rights refer to all, innate equality and innate independence apply to a limited number of people; Finally, there is a differentiation in the interpretation of humanity's formula in law and ethics, because, subjectively, treating humanity as an end requires the agent to consider that the end of humanity is the motive of his action in ethics, but in law it is only required that its external behavior be in accordance with the end of humanity, and objectively, in law, treating humanity as an end produces criminal law contrary to human rights and the law of humanity requires that innate integrity be suspended during the period of condemnation, furthermore, this differentiation in the idea of ​​humanity becomes explicit in innate imprehensibility, for in ethics lie is the greatest violation of the duty of humanity in his person, but in law only violates the right of humanity if it causes harm to others.

In this article we try to show the troublesome relation between biopolitcs, biopower and human rights in Michel Foucault. The notion of right is a classical notion, insofar as it pertains to the juridical conception of politics and to the techniques of sovereign power. On the other side, the idea of the human animal as human being appears only in Modernity, within the different dispositives that constitute what Foucault called the modern biopower. Therefore, talking of human rights one puts together the idea of right and the idea of human being, i.e. two notions belonging to two historically distinct techniques of power. In the awareness of this distinction, one has to question why Foucault, in face of what was going on in his days, did nevertheless appeal – against governments – to the rights of those who are governed. Classical right may have nothing to do with biopolitics; however with regard to the so-called human rights we cannot claim the same.

La tesi analizza il tema della natura della responsabilità endofamiliare, che rappresenta una tra le maggiori novità che, negli ultimi anni, ha interessato l'evoluzione del diritto di famiglia. Se per lungo tempo la famiglia è stata considerata immune alle regole di responsabilità, oggi, il panorama scientifico italiano è pressoché concorde nell'ammettere l'applicazione delle regole di responsabilità civile nelle ipotesi di violazione dei doveri coniugali e genitoriali. Tale acquisizione si pone quale corollario non solo al superamento dell'idea di specialità dei rapporti familiari, ma anche alla progressiva affermazione dei diritti della persona all'interno delle formazioni sociali in cui si esplica la personalità dell'individuo. Gli interventi della giurisprudenza di merito e di legittimità hanno oltrepassato i tradizionali confini del diritto di famiglia, aprendo tale settore alle regole aquiliane, facendo leva, per questa via, non soltanto sull'insufficienza dei rimedi giusfamiliari, ma soprattutto sulla necessità di assicurare all'individuo adeguata tutela, anche risarcitoria, e ciò indipendentemente dal fatto che l'individuo appartenga ad una comunità familiare. Nonostante la giurisprudenza ormai maggioritaria sia orientata nel senso di veicolare la responsabilità derivante dalla violazione del dovere familiare secondo le regole aquiliane, non mancano, tuttavia, voci contrarie che mettono in discussione la natura stessa di tale responsabilità. Si valuta, dunque, la possibilità di interpretare i doveri matrimoniali quali obblighi di protezione, ponendo attenzione alla natura del rapporto e agli obblighi che ne discendono, con l'obiettivo di valutare se sia possibile offrire una lettura alternativa alle ipotesi risarcitorie riguardanti la violazione dei doveri coniugali. In questo senso non si potrà certamente trascurare la presenza di obblighi giuridici specificamente individuati dal legislatore e la dimensione di relazionalità in cui vengono a trovarsi i familiari conviventi, che non possono essere considerati alla stregua di un «chiunque» generico, in quanto legati da un rapporto preesistente che nasce e si instaura quale rapporto particolarmente qualificato. L'indagine in esame si estende anche a valutazioni che riguardano l'opportunità e la convenienza a ravvisare in taluni istituti finalità punitive. Lo spunto è offerto dall'art. 709 ter cod. proc. civ., in tema di soluzione delle controversie nelle ipotesi di gravi inadempienze e violazioni nell'affidamento dei figli. L'espressa previsione di una formula risarcitoria, che attribuisce al giudice il potere di disporre il risarcimento del danno a carico di uno dei genitori, nei confronti del figlio, o anche dell'altro genitore, ha fatto emergere orientamenti contrastanti in ordine alla possibilità di configurare, attraverso tale disposizione, un'ipotesi di danno punitivo. ; This dissertation analyzes the theme of liability remedies between spouses, which represents one of the most important acquisitions, in recent years, that has interested the evolution of Family Law. If in the past the family was considered immune to the compensatory remedies, nowadays, the panorama of Italian legal science is almost unanimous to admit the application of civil liability rules in cases related to the violation of conjugal and parental duties. This opening to general remedies not only involves the overcoming of the specialty of Family Law, but also progressively affirms the expected growth of personal rights within all social formations, in which the personality of the individual is expressed. The interventions of the case law of merit and legitimacy have transcended the traditional boundaries of Family Law, opening the sector to non-contractual rules, levering, in this way, not only the inadequacy of the existing remedies, but above all the necessity to ensure adequate protection to the individual, also for damages, regardless of whether he belongs to a family community or not. While the majority of jurisprudence is oriented to acknowledge that the violation of duty of a spouse should be regulated by non-contractual liability, as if it were a tort, there are doctrines that contest the nature of that type of responsibility and prefer to define it as contractual liability. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the possibility to interpret marital obligations as «obligations of protection», by considering the nature of the relationship and the obligations that descend, with the purpose to evaluate if it is possible to offer an alternative interpretation of the hypothesis of compensation regarding the violation of conjugal duties. In this sense, the presence of legal obligations identified by the legislator and the relatedness of family members, who can not be considered as a generic person, because they are in a particularly qualified relationship, certainly can not be overlooked. This research extends across evaluations that regard the opportunity and convenience to recognize punitive damages, in certain institutes. A starting point is offered by analyzing art. 709 ter cod. proc. civ., in theme with solutions of the controversies in settling disputes in the hypothesis of serious defaults and violations involving child custody. The expressed prevision of a formula for compensation, that confers a judge the authority to order that compensation for damages against one of the parents, in favor of a child or even for the other parent, has caused conflicting orientations to emerge in the order of the possibility to configure a hypothesis of punitive damages. ; Dottorato di ricerca in Persona, impresa e lavoro: dal diritto interno a quello internazionale (XXVII ciclo)

This 45th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR or the Commission), which was presented to the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) in accordance with Article 54 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter or the Charter), covers the period from 10 May to 13 November 2018. It highlights, among others: the statutory and other institutional meetings of the Commission; the status of State reporting; Resolutions adopted by the Commission; the human rights complaints before the Commission; the various interventions of the Commission on human rights issues including Urgent Appeal Letters, Press Releases and Letters of Appreciation; the human rights situation on the continent; financial, staffing and operational matters of the Commission; implementation of the Recommendations of the Executive Council and Recommendations to the different stakeholders.

In the current debate on human rights, the political conception is attractive in its ability to try to find solutions to the central questions and problems, which the orthodox conception has difficulties in solving, because of its own nature (the political formulation of human rights) it does not need a moral foundation that is independent of the recognition established by international law and practice. On the one hand, it is necessary to recognize that the current practice and the international doctrine consider human rights as tools addressed, mainly, to establish the limits of the legitimate sovereignty of the state, thus, recognizing the plausibility of the political conception. On the other hand, the article intends to show that this specific function, while important, should not exhaust all that human rights perform. Therefore, the political conception runs the serious risk of weakening the normative force of human rights and conflating two different agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice. To go through this argument, first of all, the article presents the contemporary genesis of the political conception of human rights based on the work of John Rawls. Secondly, it focuses on the reformulation given by Raz and Beitz's approaches. Finally, in the third section, I criticize three main assumptions which ground the current paradigm of political conception of human rights.

Cover -- Quartino -- Dedication -- Table of contents -- List of abbreviations -- Introduction -- Part I - Defining state secrecy -- Chapter 1 - State secrecy in domestic legal systems -- Chapter 2 - State secrecy in the international legal system -- Part II - State secrecy and the international protection of human rights -- Chapter 3 - State secrecy and treaty monitoring bodies'practice -- Chapter 4 - State secrecy beyond treaties: towards a customary norm prohibiting recourse to state secrecy to conceal gross human rights violations? -- Part III - Theoretical and practical issues arising from the horizoantal and vertical interaction among norms and legal orders -- Chapter 5 - From state to international organisation secrecy -- Chapter VI - To disclose or not to disclose state secrets? The dilemmas of interstate cooperation in the field of intelligence, diplomacy, and mutual legal assistence -- General conclusions -- Bibliography -- Printed by.