Suchergebnisse

Straipsnyje nagrinejama, koki gyvenimo prasmes supratima isskleidzia moderni politikos samprata. Klasikineje graiku ir krikscioniu filosofijoje politine tvarka atspindejo zmoniu gyvenimo tikslus. Ikimoderni Vakaru civilizacija remesi finalistiniu kosmoso modeliu, nurodziusiu kiekvieno daikto bei zmogaus vieta ir paskirti. Todel politiniai sprendimai bent konceptualiai atspindejo zmogisku protu suvokiamus metafizikos ar dieviskojo istatymo postulatus. Nuo Renesanso ir Naujuju amziu finalistine mokslo samprata keicia kauzalistine, o gyvenimo prasmes problema dingsta is politines teorijos nagrinejamu klausimu saraso. Darbe teigiama, kad, nepaisant isorines modernybes sekuliarizacijos, kiekvienos politines teorijos branduoli sudaro teologiniu problemu sprendimas, todel gyvenimo prasmes klausimas niekada negali buti eliminuojamas is politines minties darbotvarkes. Modernybeje ivykusi slinktis nuo finalistinio prie kauzalistinio pasaulio supratimo zmonijai suteike iki tol neturetu priemoniu perdirbti bet kuria gamtine ir socialine tvarka. O Dievo mirtis prasmingo gyvenimo zenklu verte ieskoti siapus. Siu dvieju modernios minties elementu sujungimas igalino gyvenimo prasmes deficita pasalinti igyvendinant eschatono imanentizacija, t. y. perkeliant galutinius zmonijos tikslus i si pasauli. Straipsnyje konstatuojama, kad tokiu tikslu realizacija yra neatsiejama nuo politinio totalitarizmo. Del atviros modernybes laiko sampratos neimanoma nustatyti, kada galutiniu zmonijos tikslu realizavimas bus pasiektas. Sio sprendimo prerogatyva atiteko suverenui The study examines the place of meaning of life in the modern concept of politics. This can be done only by proving that political thought reflects the purpose of human life which actually is meaning of life. If a political body or political philosophy cannot prove this, it will always be possible to reject their arguments by stating that they are meaningless to humans. This created conditions for the idea that society should be permanently improved and the ultimate goal of such improvement is the salvation of every individual in this world. Although supporters of liberalism and socialism have a different understanding of this final stage of human development, both of them aim not at preparing individual for the salvation in another reality but they think that ideas of the heaven should be established in this world. Adapted from the source document.

Different shortcomings have been attributed to both legislators (the people & the parliament) in all countries & at all times. The key shortcoming of the people as a legislator is its unability to duly solve state-level issues: the totality of citizens can easily be misled, they lack knowledge or competence on specific issues, their decisions are based on stereotypes etc. Another limitation of people is related to the possibility that anonymity of its decisions can provoke cruelty & intolerance. Despite logical validity of the above-mentioned shortcomings their practical correctness is not proven. Falseness is also not proven as the only existing example of a frequent people's participation in legislation (Switzerland) among other things proving the falseness of the above-mentioned reproaches could hardly serve as a basis for generalization. To the disadvantage of people as a legislator, a procedural argument is presented: during a referendum it is not possible to adopt a maximum best & balanced law as in every case there is a choice "either... or." There is a vote en bloc & no editorial (even most rational) amendments are possible. Besides, the legislation that involves a referendum is related to huge costs. The people's participation in legislation is beneficial because it ensures a higher legitimacy of the decisions & brings people closer to the ruling elite (thus the gap between what citizens expect from the administration & what they receive from the administration is minimized), moreover, this guarantees every citizen's right to participate in tackling his/her affairs. There is one case where the laws adopted by the people have all the strengths of the laws adopted by the parliament & the people, & avoid almost all the failings. These are ratification referenda where the parliament-approved draft laws are adopted (or rejected). The people are only a nominal legislator in Lithuania. The recent practice proves that currently the requirements for holding a referendum make it impossible to pass laws in referenda. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the requirements for initiating a referendum are practically impossible to meet: so far nobody has managed to collect 300.000 signatures required to initiate a referendum, ie., 12 percent of the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania who have the right to vote. Consequently, the Seimas is de facto the only legislator in Lithuania. The Parliament as a lawmaker also has some weaknesses. First parliament members, unlike the people, are more prone to bribing or may be subject to some other personal impact. On the other hand, in contemporary electoral system, the parliamentarians who seek to stay in office pander both certain social or territorial groups of the electorate by adopting laws beneficial to them. The people as the whole is not the only popular actor in the legislative process. Individual citizens & their groups have certain powers as well. Yet they are not legislators as such, but rather merely participants of the legislative process. As compared to foreign practice, in Lithuania the conditions & procedure exercising citizens' legislative initiative (50.000 signatures required) are subject to relatively liberal regulation. Unlike in many countries of Europe, there are no direct restrictions on exercising this initiative. There are two indirect restrictions: 1) a draft law on the state budget of the Republic of Lithuania can only be prepared & submitted to the Seimas by the Government, 2) draft laws on ratification & denouncing international treaties are submitted by the President. In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often is used not to promote the idea of lawmaking but to use citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition & communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions. Adapted from the source document.

The article presents the survey, comparison & evaluation of the concepts of individual & social well-being used in the contemporary social science, with the main attention paid to their value assumptions & problems of measurement. In the neoclassical economics, presently predominant in the economic science, individual well-being is identified with welfare & is defined as satisfaction of informed preferences of an actor. This "welfarist" idea of well-being, accepted also by liberal social philosophy, is consequently subjectivist & formalist. According to the critics of welfarism, this idea is erroneous because it neglects the influence exercised by the production & advertising upon the consumer's desires, & because of its minimalist idea of social welfare, reduced to the concept of Pareto optimum. According to anti-welfarists, the evaluation of well-being should take as its point of departure not individual's wants, but objective human needs, providing the foundation for the substantive (content-rich) concept of well-being as individual's or society's high quality life. However, according to welfarists, the enriching of the idea of "good life" with substance goes hand in hand with the increasing danger of its instrumentalization to legitimate the paternalist suppression of the experiments with the alternative projects of the good life. On the article author's opinion, the reformed welfarist concept of well-being is most acceptable. In this concept, well-being is defined as the satisfaction of agent's informed preferences, which are compatible with her metapreferences. In this definition, values are conceived as wants of wants or metapreferences. Normally, human beings prefer do not have many of those wants, which they have as a matter of fact; they prefer to have some other wants instead of them. Advertising & pop culture do harm for individual well-being inasmuch as they "pollute" agent's wants, "seducing" them to satisfy the wants which they (meta)want do not have. The article closes by advancing a hypothesis, how non-linear character of the relation between the objective & subjective aspects of well-being which was discovered by Ronald F. Inglehart in his research on the value change in the developed countries, could be explained, This hypothesis ex-plains "Inglehart's effect" by the differences in the temporal dynamics & risk of failure characteristic for the consumption & self-realization activities. Adapted from the source document.

Political corruption in Japan is a very important issue. According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2009 survey Japanese perceived political parties, public officials and civil servants to be the institutions which are the most affected by corruption. In addition, governmental measures against corruption are regarded to be ineffective and inadequate to the real situation. Japanese have keen concern toward Japanese political parties, intransparent activity of politicians and preventive measures taken by government. The purpose of this research is to examine political corruption phenomena in contemporary Japanese politics. Research questions are what are the structure, scale, and causes of political corruption in Japan during 2001-2009. For answering to these research questions first of all it is discussed the concept and definition of political corruption itself. Article overviews previous political corruption studies in Japan from the time of Second World War to the recent times, including the report of the Transparency International National Integrity System. In third chapter of article the scale, the varieties and the main practitioners of political corruption in Japan are to be analyzed. It reveals the biggest political corruption scandals in Japanese politics in given time-period. Last chapter focuses on the explanation of political corruption mechanism in Japan and in particular relationship with clientelism practises. Combination of primary and secondary sources led me to make the following conclusions on the main political corruption tendencies in Japan during 2001-2009. First, the Asahi Shimbun front page content analysis indicates that 2002 and 2007 are special years in the context of corruption studies because in those years published the largest number of political corruption articles and the biggest number of the new themes on the political corruption issue revealed. Second, the common point of the three most significant political corruption scandals during 2001-2009 is that all of them have the relationship with political finance issue and in particular a suspicion on the violation of the PFRL. This finding reaffirms the NIS statement that political finance is one of the top priority issues in Japanese corruption scheme. Third, illegal political donation and influence peddling are the most frequent types of corruption in Japan during the period of 2001-2009. Fourth, main practitioners of political corruption in Japan were the LDP members from the House of Representatives. In addition, in as many as nine cases the Diet member secretaries were involved in political corruption scandals. The Diet member secretaries play an important role in political corruption scheme because they are often responsible for the political fund management. Fifth, the most vulnerable institution to political corruption seems to be Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and Ministry of Construction. Finally, article concludes that political corruption in Japan, to some extent, could be explained through the analysis of political clientelism. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines the provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the USSR Occupation (hereinafter -- the Law), which was adopted on 13 June 2000, in the light of customary rules of international law on state responsibility, as codified in the 2001 the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter -- the ILC Draft Articles). The main aim of the article is to deal with the international legal grounds of the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the Soviet occupation of the Republic of Lithuania and, against this background, to identify the role of the Law. The ground of Russia's responsibility is an internationally wrongful act committed as the aggression against the Republic of Lithuania, which was started by the 15 June 1940 incursion by the Soviet armed forces & subsequently continued in the form of the illegal occupation of Lithuania until the restoration of Lithuania's independence on 11 March 1990, however, the illegal presence of the foreign forces on Lithuania's soil ended only in 1993. The fact of the 1940 Soviet aggression & illegal occupation of the Baltic States has been widely recognized by the international community, it was even acknowledged by the USSR & Russia in 1989-1991. Therefore there is no doubt that under international law from 1940-1990 the Republic of Lithuania had been an occupied State. That is why the illegal occupation with its consequences, as the breach of an international obligation not to resort to aggression having a continuing character, constitutes an objective element of an internationally wrongful act being the ground for Russia's responsibility. That also explains why the title of the Law refers to the occupation. Meanwhile the specific feature of subjective element is addressed in the preamble of the Law. That is the continuity of the Russian State & the corresponding identity of its international legal personality with the Soviet Union, which was claimed by Russia & generally recognized by the international community. Therefore under international law the Russian Federation is the State continuing the rights & obligations of the former USSR (ie., it is the same international legal person). Consequently, internationally wrongful acts of the latter, including the Soviet occupation of Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, should be attributable to the Russian Federation. Apart from the ground for Russia's responsibility, the issue of reparation is addressed in the article. In accordance with international law (the ILC Draft Article), the principle of full reparation should be applied to realize responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The full reparation for the injury can be provided in the form of restitution, compensation & satisfaction, while any financially assessable damage should be covered by compensation when restitution is not practically possible. Responsibility for the Soviet occupation is the latter case. Therefore in this sense the Law concretizes the claim of Lithuania as it lays down the obligations of the Government of Lithuania to calculate the damage & seek its compensation from Russia. In conformity with the principle of full reparation, the provisions of the Law require to calculate the damage for all period of the Soviet occupation as well as to cover all types of financially assessable damage. The third main issue addressed in this article is admissibility of a claim for reparation, ie., the procedural requirements to be observed by the injured State invoking an international responsibility of other State. The main requirement, as follows from Art. 43 of the ILC Draft Articles, is that the injured State should give a timely & proper notice of its claim to the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act; the claim is admissible when it is waived by the injured State or it can be inadmissible when it is not maintained. However, a mere lapse of time without a claim is being resolved, including delay in its prosecution due to refusal of the respondent State, cannot result in loss of the right of the injured State to invoke responsibility. In this regard the Law is a unilateral act of the State of Lithuania which formulates & concretizes the claim for Russia's responsibility. The form of this act was determined by Lithuanian national rather than international law as the former requires that any compulsory rules or instructions for the Government can be laid down by the Seimas (the Parliament) only in the form of (statutory) law. As it is clear from the preamble of the Law, in continuing & consolidating the previous Lithuanian acts invoking Russia's responsibility the Law demonstrates that the claim for responsibility has been raised without any unreasonable delay a long time ago (the first time Lithuania declared about its claim for reparation in 1991) & Russia is aware of that claim from the very beginning. In such a manner the Law also proves a consistent & unchanging position of Lithuania with regard to Russia's responsibility. Therefore, the Law evidences that the claim of Lithuania remains admissible although still being unresolved & notwithstanding that Russia is rejecting it. Under international law the injured State has the right to waive its claim for responsibility of another State. National law may, however, restrict that right in setting up appropriate duties for the authorities of the injured State. In this regard it follows from the preamble of the Law that under Lithuanian constitutional law no State organ or official can declare a waiver of the claim for Russia's responsibility because the Law is based on & aims at implementation of the corresponding decision by the 14 June 1992 national referendum that demanded to seek reparation for the Soviet occupation. Therefore, the waiver can be declared only by other referendum as well as without a referendum the Seimas cannot abolish the provisions of the Law requiring to seek a compensation (such kind of action could amount to the waiver in the sense of Art. 45(a) of the ILC Draft Articles). To keep the claim for responsibility of another State admissible & valid, when it is being unresolved a long time, the injured State should do everything it can reasonably do to maintain the claim. Otherwise it can be questioned, whether the right to invoke responsibility is lost due to conduct of the injured State in the sense of Art. 45(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. Therefore, to avoid similar doubts the Law obliged the Government to seek constantly the compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation. Since Russia used to reject Lithuania's initiatives to conduct negotiations on the matter & any other way of settlement is not available without Russia's consent, it can be stated that as yet, in particular due to the Law, the conduct of Lithuania has not raised any serious doubts with regard to validity of its claim for compensation. Obviously such doubts would be serious if any kind of moratorium on the claim had been announced. To sum it up, it can be concluded that the Law is based on & is consistent with the rules of international law. It also implements the international legal requirements for the proper declaration & maintenance of the claim for reparation. Therefore both under international law & under Lithuanian constitutional law the Law has been necessary to consolidate & consistently maintain the claim to Russia for the compensation of the damages caused by the Soviet occupation. Lastly, it should be noted that a proper settlement of the problem of Russia's responsibility for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is not a question of self-interest for Lithuania & it should pursue the claim for compensation not only due to the decision by the 14 June 1992 referendum. Not accidentally Art. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles refers that "every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State." It is also not accidentally that the preamble of the 1991 Treaty between Lithuania & Russia states that mutual confidence between the people of both Parties is hard to achieve without elimination of the consequences of the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. Like for national law, rule of law & justice cannot be established without realization & inevitability of responsibility for grave breaches of international law. Therefore the realization of responsibility for the 1940 aggression against the Baltic States & its consequences would undoubtedly contribute to general prevention of such grave breaches as well as would assure that similar tragic events never happen again in the history of Lithuania. Such kind of prevention should be at the focus of attention of the whole international community rather than only Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, since a prohibition of aggression is a long-standing rule of jus cogens character & obligation erga omnes towards international community. Adapted from the source document.

Lithuania's referendum on the accession into the European Union was part of the so-called "domino strategy" of the fourth wave of EU enlargement, which aimed to influence the mindset of the inhabitants of the less euro-enthusiastic member states by placing the pressure of the anticipated high positive result from the more enthusiastic member states (Lithuania among them) on them. Typical trend of elites' manipulations can be observed in Lithuania, i.e. changing of the legal basis on the referendum prior to the EU accession referendum in order to facilitate positive outcome. These facilitating rules had been introduced step by step, bringing any discussions on these matters in a parliament during election campaigns of 2000 & 2002 to an end in order to escape escalation of the pro versus the anti-European cleavages within political system. Thus, a double hurdle (both turn-out & voting YES of 50 per cent of all eligible voters) existing since 1989 in referendum legislation was lowered introducing triple hurdle (turnout of 50 per cent & voting YES one third of all eligible voters but more than 50 per cent of participants) in 2002. Then, in 2003 it was facilitated once again introducing new double hurdle (turn-out 50 per cent of all eligible voters & voting YES by 50 per cent of participants). Further attempts to facilitate positive result were limited by two factors: first, a specific factor, an almost parallel initiative of referendum on the constitutional amendments (so-called "Uspaskikh referendum"), is to be taken into consideration. In addition, a general requirement that the citizens themselves decide on the issue of Lithuania's EU integration in a decisive & binding manner, i.e. a referendum, typical for other CEE countries as well as, was also important here. Finally, other settings laying ground for a positive result, though facilitated twice, were further reinforced by a two-day voting procedure. Together with an unexpected apathy of Hungarian voters in their referendum, these risky rules became a reason for dramatization & anxiety expecting proclaiming referendum as invalid due to insufficient voter turnout. An official information campaign of the Government on the EU accession started in 2000. Gradually it turned into a one-sided agitation campaign, let alone before the referendum date. Positive involvement of the institutions possessing high public confidence such as te mass media & Catholic Church, a well-established consensus of the major political parties on the EU accession, weak organization of the euro-skeptical movement all led to an absence of any substantial political competition. Finally, the advertising as such started dominating the campaign. Features of propaganda, sometimes coming very close to a violation of laws banning advertising during the voting days, could be observed here too. Different points of view should be endorsed in order to interpret the high positive result of the referendum in a sufficient manner. As regards the history of Lithuania's political system, it was the fourth successful referendum since the 90s. What was typical for all of them was that the citizens & the elites held a common position on the issue. Seen within the context of the latest internal political developments in Lithuania, it could be nevertheless equated to an exception first of all in view of electorate's positive motivation, less apathy & the lack of tangible protest features. Referendum proceeding & its results -- maximal active support for the YES statement among all countries of fourth wave of EU enlargement -- give a fresh & useful data for testing "elite-centric," "rational choice," "ideological-cultural" theories of euro-integration. 6 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.

The goal of paper is to put into focus and explain essential features of the political development in Lithuania during second post-communist decade by means of its comparison with the analogous processes in other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and in those Central European countries with political systems which resemble most closely Lithuanian case (Poland and Hungary). In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for the understanding of Rolandas Paksas' impeachment in Lithuania in 2003-2004. His Order and Justice party has to be classified together with the brothers Kaczynski's Law and Justice party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orban's Fidesz and Gabor Vona's Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part's Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repse's New Era in Latvia. While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in the former bureaucratic authoritarian countries Estonia and Latvia, in Hungary and Poland the outcome was the breakup of the implicit ex-communist and anti-communist elite pact which was the foundation of the political stability in these former countries of national communism. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti- communist elite pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated due to the collaboration of all, by this time, "established" and Left-of-centre populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. Adapted from the source document.

The contemporary information & communication technologies (ICT) will not, by themselves, resolve the issues, faced by Lithuanian public administration in designing & implementing its policies. This is the major argument of the article, supported by the available empirical information & various secondary sources. Why the bureaucracy, which is often considered as being slow, inflexible & inertic should suddenly change due to the mere fact of ICT being purchased & installed? The answer is often based on some intuitive logic, which is called in this article the "ideal model of e-government." The first of the assumptions in this model claim that the public sector has the right skills to select the relevant technology. The next assumption is that once the technology is installed, it will be used competently & open-mindedly -- with the right capacities, motivations & leaders available to do that. In turn, if the technology is used competently, one can indeed expect improvements in public policy making & implementation: organizational change, better inter-institutional co-operation, development of e-services, etc. Notably, many ICT projects in the public sector fail & Lithuania is no exception in this respect. The investment does not necessarily lead to a meaningful organizational change, it does not enhance co-operation between institutions & does not improve communication & trust between the citizens & the state. Surely, the e-government is a rather new development, so one should hardly expect that all the visions will be successful outright. However, while at least some of the major problems may be anticipated in advance, the solutions are not always clear-cut. In order to take a full advantage of the ICT potential in the public sector, a clear choice of an actual model of public administration is necessary. Here a number of classic dilemmas may be identified -- regarding the relations between the public & the private sectors, internal control within the organization, sharing of responsibilities between organizations, etc. It is argued in the article that the answers to these questions in Lithuania are clear only in the official strategies & statements. Meanwhile the practice shows, that the relations between the public & the private sector are unbalanced, organizations lack the culture of critically assessing their achievements, institutions are carefully avoiding "interference" from outside into their internal matters & government is far from being conceived as a "service" to the citizens. It is also noted, that the differences between the official rhetoric & the practice may well be explained by the experience of both the soviet period as well as the accession to the EU: the institutions developed the skill of flexible adjustment to the dominant discourse without finding it necessary to change the essence of policy process. All in all, while the ICT do provide opportunities for improvement of public management, in order to take a full advantage of these opportunities it is necessary to resolve some of the classical dilemmas of public administration. In order to do that, some deeper changes of attitudes, values, & culture are necessary both in the public sector as well as in the society at large. Therefore, notwithstanding the expectation of the big change towards modernization of public sector the old saying of "plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose" is applicable for estimating the potential of the ICT to change the public sector. Adapted from the source document.

In the sphere of construing regional identity, political science can accomplish less than philosophy. Common regional identity can never be derived from scientific cultural studies conducted in certain countries. A new cultural & philosophical meaning can never be devised on the basis of political science. It can only be the end result of philosophical imagination. Scientists can present facts which bear proof of merely cultural & political affinity. However, so far they have failed to propose any more significant concepts or images for the future of Central Europe. Mere knowledge of empirical facts cannot be treated as a philosophical discovery. Both politicians & scientists can be aware of & handle an abundance of facts, & yet a philosophical idea is needed to bind all these facts into one coherent whole. In construing the identity of Central Europe, there is no need whatever to get involved in discussions about certain given objective facts, similar to objects studied by natural sciences. There are no natural characteristics, which could predetermine the perception of regional identity, irrespective of a moral awareness of its citizens. Morality is an independent motive of human conduct, which can exert influence on the perception of regional identity. Nevertheless, today it is one of the most unpopular subjects of geopolitical discussions. Geopoliticians claim that cultural & political identity of a region must be objectively predetermined, be it by geography, economy or military power. Political philosophers seem to be the only ones who can take a stand against such a naturalist perception of regional identity. Adapted from the source document.

It is widely assumed that effective functioning of democratic institutions depends on the political support & civic engagement of the public. Public support for authorities is especially important during the reform period in new democracies. Evidence from different Central & Eastern European countries including Lithuania demonstrates critically low level of political support, e.g. satisfaction with regime performance & trust in political institutions as well as comparatively low level of political engagement. However, systematic & comprehensive account of these trends & their implications for political stability & democratic performance in new democracies is lacking. Here, the results of qualitative research of political attitudes & political behavior in the Lithuanian countryside are presented, drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in Alarita & Naujasodis (district of Moletai) in July 2003. The aim of the research is to explore the dominating patterns of political support & political engagement of Lithuanian citizens. The political support was analyzed by using the theoretical framework of David Easton & Pippa Norris. Easton in his classic model distinguished among different objects of support, including support for the community, the regime & the authorities. Moreover, he made a distinction between the specific support, a quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands, & diffuse support, unconditional attachment to political objects & a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will. This conceptual framework was recently revisited by Norris, who expanded the classification into a five-fold framework distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, & political actors. Political engagement is defined here to include psychological as well as actual political involvement. In more concrete terms, it comprises the following dimensions: 1) interest in politics; 2) voting & propensity to vote in elections or referenda; 3) engagement in community politics; 4) partisanship, including both the party membership & party identification; 5) participation or propensity to engage in unconventional political activity. The analysis resulted in classification of ten types of political outlook: 'prosoviet radical', 'soviet system builder', 'moderate critic', 'rural wisdom optimist', 'apathetic youth', 'rational youth', 'disappointed activist', 'civic optimist', 'right1st democrat' & 'rightist radical'. These types can be expected to represent the dominant patterns of political attitudes & political behavior in rural Lithuania. The investigation reveals that political support for democracy is highly dependent on the attitudes towards the soviet past. Moreover, it is indirectly linked with the age & former social status of the respondent. The data shows that supporters of democratic regime are usually right-oriented or young persons. Surprisingly, the satisfaction with current regime performance is not linked with the support for current authorities. Finally, the results suggest that most disappointed persons are more skeptical toward conventional forms of political engagement & are likely to support unconventional political activities. The actual political behavior, however, is not dependent on the level of political support. 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

The article discusses factors, determining loyalty of the European Parliament members, which is marginalized in most of researches on the European Parliament. The initial assumption holds that as given the rates of loyalty to the national states are high it is groundless to assess it as a neutral variable. Loyalty of the European Parliament members to national states can significantly contribute to the studies of European Parliament's internal relations and power contribution. The first section of this article presents and analyses main insights of the influence of national parties and political groups on the voting behavior of the European Parliament members, justifying objective reasons which caused marginalization of importance of the European Parliament members' loyalty to national states. It should be noted that the European Parliament members, like most of other politicians, have fixed set of objectives forming their choices. Goals of re-election, positions and policy (leading to power gains/losses) are leading. In the hands of national parties and political groups these goals become instruments of pressure and enforcement, determining behavior of the European Parliament members. National parties controlling the access of candidates to the electoral lists and defining their position on those lists gain extreme importance in the competition for loyalty. Since political groups of the European Parliament have dominant political force for the second objective of the parliament members each of them have an interest in maintaining balance between loyalty to the national party and particular political group. Loyalty to national states loses its importance as it has minimal influence on the success of achieving objectives of the parliament members. The second section is devoted to the research of links between voting of European Parliament members and their national states, more specifically -- to the analysis of European Parliament members' loyalty to their national states. Lithuania is chosen as a case study. The fact that loyalty to the national states during 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 terms of the European Parliament is over 85 % indicates that this variable should not be seen as accidental or insignificant. It is argued that loyalty to the national state mainly reflects voting unity of national delegation. The rest of this section analyzes factors which can explain why, despite the fact that national delegation is very diverse in the context of left-right ideological divide, rates of loyalty to the national states, demonstrated by the national delegations, remain very high. The article concludes stating that loyalty of European Parliament members to their national states is a valuable source of data for the analysis of the party behavior in the European Parliament as well as outside it and should not be overlooked. Adapted from the source document.

Lietuvos viesojoje erdveje gajus isitikinimas, kad Lietuvos rinkejo santykis su politiniais atstovais yra suasmenintas, neretai besiremiantis subjektyviomis ir iracionaliomis simpatijomis ar antipatijomis konkretiems politiniams lyderiams. Kiek pagristas toks pesimizmas? Straipsnio tikslas - issiaiskinti, kokio rysio esama tarp politiniu lyderiu asmenybes portretu suvokimo salies visuomeneje ir rinkeju vertybiniu orientaciju, kurios traktuojamos kaip vienas personalizacijos sklaida Lietuvos politikoje ribojanciu veiksniu. Pasitelkus 2012 m. rudens Lietuvos gyventoju viesosios nuomones apklausu duomenis, nagrinejama, kaip politiniu lyderiu paveikslai varijuoja priklausomai nuo rinkejo ideologinio identifikavimosi, (anti)sovietiskumo, tautinio konservatizmo ir postmaterializmo nuostatu. Nors daugelis asmenybes bruozu yra objektyvus ir ilgalaikiai asmens psichologines sandaros elementai, Lietuvos visuomeneje rimtai nesutariama, koks 'is tiesu' yra gerai zinomas salies politikas, ir nuomoniu issiskyrimui reiksminga itaka daro politiniu paziuru bei vertybiniu nuostatu skirtumai. Rinkejo identifikavimasis kaires-desines skaleje ir (anti)sovietiskumo nuostatos svarbios vertinant tris is penkiu tirtu Lietuvos politiniu lyderiu asmenybes dimensiju - sutaikomuma, samoninguma ir atviruma patirciai. Tautinio konservatizmo nuostatos padeda paaiskinti pirmu dvieju dimensiju suvokima visuomeneje. Gauti rezultatai taip pat skatina tolesniuose tyrimuose aiskintis rinkejo vertybiniu nuostatu poveikio politiniu lyderiu 'moraliniu bruozu' ir temperamento suvokimui skirtumus Lithuanian public debates share a strong conviction that the relationship between a Lithuanian voter and his/her political representatives rests on personalisation, often nurtured by voter's subjective and irrational feelings of love or hate in regard to particular political leaders. Is such kind of pessimism well-grounded? The article aims to explore the relationship between perceptions of well-known political leaders' personality portraits among Lithuanian population and voter's normative orientations on the individual level, holding voter's normative orientations an important factor, limiting the proliferation of personalisation of politics. Based on the empirical data of public surveys, conducted in autumn 2012, the study explores how perceptions of political leaders' personalities vary according to voter's ideological self-identification, the level of adherence to soviet values, national conservatism and post-materialism. Even though personality traits are objective and stable elements of individual's psychological constitution, a serious disagreement regarding the personality portraits of analysed political leaders is revealed in the Lithuanian society, and the perceptions diverge according to individual's political views and normative attitudes. Voter's left-right self-identification and (anti)soviet attitudes predict the perception of three personality dimensions of Big Five - Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Openness to experience - for analysed leaders, and national conservatism - perceptions of the abovementioned first two dimensions. The results of the study ask for further analysis of a different level of impact that voter's normative attitudes may bear on popular perception of political leaders' 'moral traits' and temperamental features. Adapted from the source document.

Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible -- that "to every one who has will more be given" -- this article starts with observation that weaker parties can & do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old & answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power -- one of the most complex & difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualize it. Detaching the notion of power from resources, in this article power is associated to the structure of negotiation, comprising of number of parties, interests, resisting points & possible zone of agreements, thus leaving the concept of power open to much more detail & accurate analysis. Having said that the structural analysis does not renounce the importance of resources all in all since every negotiation begins with a certain distribution of actor characteristics that are given. However, important are only the issue related characteristics. Moreover, as the structural model of analysis demonstrates, power is not a constant. The structural characteristics can be "photographed" at the beginning but may change during the process. In addition, the structure may be manipulated that in turn indicates that power is also a matter of perception. Perception mediates objective negotiating structure, although reality imposes certain limits on the implication of perceptions. The structural model of analysis permits to make the following propositions about power. The lower value that a party to a negotiation assigns to its resistance point, the less power it will have, because: The more it will perceive a negotiated agreement primary in terms of the gains it offers over the non-agreement alternative as well as other factors that shape the resistance point; The more risk averse it will be to achieve those gains; The more willing it will be to make concessions. Conversely, the higher value that a party to a negotiation assigns to its resistance point, the more power it will have, because: The more it will perceive a negotiated agreement primary in terms of the loss it entails as compared to the non-agreement alternative and other factors that shape the resistance point; The more risk seeking it will be to avoid those losses; The more it will be to withhold concessions. Adapted from the source document.

Anti-globalist riots in Seattle in 1999 & the global anti-war demonstrations in 2003 not only made their way to the news headlines, but also received renewed academic attention. This article seeks to outline the differences between the traditional social movements & the new social movements. The first part of the article addresses the definition & classification issues of social movements. It also presents a comparison of three theoretical approaches (rational choice, Marxism & social constructivism) towards the phenomenon of social movement. The author concludes, that advocates of all three approaches present certain valuable insights on the causes & effects of this phenomenon. The second chapter of the article outlines presents trends & problems in the research of the social movements. It is argued that researchers of this subject face basically the same problems as all social scientists, first of the problems of comparability & the limits of qualitative methods. On the other it is assessed that new tools of quantitative analysis, information technologies significantly enhance the possibilities of research. By combining different theoretical approaches the author then seeks to outline the criteria of what could be the constitutive elements of the new social movements as opposed to the traditional ones. It is concluded that the new social movements can only exist in the postmodern or post-materialist societies where the questions of physical survival or national liberation are replaced by the questions of quality of life & self-expression. The new movements are also transnational in nature & their goals are usually universal (ecology, peace, rights of animals) rather than national (independence) or individual (employment, salary etc.). The new movements mobilize around collective identity & common values while the traditional movements mobilize around common goals of social or economic changes. The organization mode of the new movements is usually horizontal & the role of the leaders is rather limited while in the case of traditional movements the organization structure is strictly hierarchical & the role of the leader is essential. Finally the new movements are less prone to violence & rely more on the new technologies of communication & information. Building on the criteria outlined in the second part of the article, the final chapter discusses the case of Lithuania. It is concluded that the number & activities of the new social movements in Lithuania are very scarce. The most significant among such movements is the feminist movement, which is indeed rather active, & even have established ties with international feminist network. Traditional movements (in particular farmers, nationalists & neo-nazists, are still abundant in Lithuania. The authors argues that such imbalance between traditional & new movements could be a cause for concern as the number & activity of the new social movements is a good indicator of the maturity of the civil society in a country. The conclusion of the article reiterates the importance to continue the research of the phenomenon of the social movements. The warning of Ortega Y Gaset voiced in 1932 about the danger of the masses that have the supreme power in their hands is still relevant. Adapted from the source document.