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The purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between the notions of ethnocentrism and liberalism from the perspective of the neopragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty. In this sense, we show that this tenuous political philosophy, centered on these notions, emphasizes the connectivity between conversational practices and the moral, political and social issues shared by different cultures. In Rorty's philosophy, his thin notion of ethnocentrism acts as an articulating element between his anti-representationalist perspective of knowledge and his version of political liberalism. From the naturalist criticism that makes transcendental explanations of reality unfeasible Rorty draws the historicist consequences necessary for his proposition that there are no limits, except those of conversational character, for the apprehension and description of knowledge. In this ethnocentric proposal in which there is nothing transcendent in relation to cultural, contingent and historical practices, everything is considered to be dependent on the provisional intersubjective consensus, in terms of the vocabulary and politics of a given community and time.

The mainstream view of the twentieth century suggests that the Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith made a tout court defense of individualism and the pure rational calculation of economics. However, we consider this to be a biased interpretation that ignores an integrated reading of his books, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and Wealth of Nations (1776), which hinder a global view of his thinking. In opposition to this dominant view, we propose, as the central objective of this article, the conciliation between Smith's classical liberalism and his sentimental ethics, based on the notion of human dignity, present in the recognition of the other as an equal. If this hypothesis is confirmed, we will defend the thesis of sympathetic liberalism in Adam Smith's philosophical system. For this, we will analyze the feeling of Smithian sympathy and its interference in interpersonal relationships, then, the device of moral justification of impartiality as a promoter of fairness behavior. Finally, we will argue that the intertwining of these two elements of Smithian sentimental ethics in public space engenders a notion of human dignity compatible with his liberalism, insofar as it respects individual freedoms while fostering the progress of commercial societies. For such, we will make use of the work Theory of Moral Sentimentalism by Adam Smith and the article Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith by Stephen Darwall.

The purpose of this article is to reinforce the alert that the German philosopher Hans Jonas makes in his work Principle responsibility for the imminent possibility of a tragic end of history for humanity if the unpredictable effects arising from the form of action of the liberal political-economic system and the inconsequential advance of the technology that follows are considered. In this intention, we chose as a strategy, to weaken and oppose the Hegelian idea, opposed to Jonah's view, that there would be no cause for alarm because history, in its development, is guided by an immanent and well-intentioned reason that inevitably leads humanity towards the realm of freedom and the absolute spirit. More recently, the American philosopher, economist and political scientist Francis Fukuyama, seeking support in Hegelian thought decreed that history had come to an end with the culmination of the sociocultural evolution of humanity. In this context, we initially seek to present an interpretative analysis of the ideas of Hegel and Fukuyama, and then to make a critique of this way of thinking, in the light of Hans Jonas' arguments. Finally, it is concluded, through the Jonasian lens, that the story, in addition to not having reached its end, as Fukuyama stated, may also have a quite different ending from that imagined by Hegel. Therefore, one should not disregard the occurrence of the hypothesis of an essential death followed by a physical death of the human race, well before the Hegelian project of freedom has a chance to take place. In doubt, it is better for man to be wary of the existence and(or) of the intention and(or) of the capacity of an imminent reason and to retake in time the reins of his own destiny, through the adoption of a new ethical principle: that of responsibility.

Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar alguns dos paradoxos relacionados ao liberalismo econômico e os discursos de segurança a ele subjacentes que, embora neguem os princípios basilares das democracias modernas, passam a fazer parte delas. Neste exame o principal eixo teórico será o pensamento de Foucault. Primeiramente será apontado que o liberalismo econômico, na análise foucaultiana, tem como premissa uma essência antropológica de ser humano, pois assume como ponto de partida que a liberdade só floresce na ausência de constrangimentos. Na medida em que esta premissa metafísica se impõe às instituições das democracias modernas, alguns desdobramentos se colocam. Surge a noção de que o papel das instituições democráticas é o de proporcionar liberdade. Entretanto, só pode haver liberdade se houver segurança. Assim, impõe-se um paradoxo: as democracias têm como telos a liberdade, mas a liberdade pressupõe medidas de segurança (na guerra ao terror, por exemplo) que negam tanto os preceitos democráticos quanto a própria liberdade. ; This article aims to analyze some of the paradoxes related to economic liberalism and the underlying security discourses that, although denying the basic principles of modern democracies, become part of them. In this exam the main theoretical axis will be Foucault's thought. First, it will be pointed out that economic liberalism, in Foucaultian analysis, has as its premise an anthropological essence of being human, since it assumes as its starting point that freedom only flourishes in the absence of constraints. As this metaphysical premise imposes itself on the institutions of modern democracies, some developments are posed. Arises the notion that the role of democratic institutions is to provide freedom. However, there can be freedom only if there is security. Therefore, a paradox is imposed: democracies have freedom as their telos, but freedom presupposes security measures (in the war on terror, for example) that deny both democratic precepts and freedom itself.

The "place" of liberalism in Brazil of the 19th century had been the subject of major debates in the Social Sciences. Thus, we aim to map this debate and provide a summary of these positions. To do this, we will first make a return to the context of the emergence of liberalism in England, then we will advance to its philosophical principles in John Locke. Then, we will demonstrate how these philosophical principles were interpreted in Brazil in three positions: First as an "idea out of place" (SCHWARZ, 2000; NOGUEIRA, 1976), second as "an idea tends to find its place" (COUTINHO, 2000) and third as an "idea that is in its right place" (FRANCO, 1976; BOSI, 2010). ; El "lugar" del liberalismo en el Brasil del siglo XIX es objeto de grandes debates en filosofía política (RICUPERO, 2007). Por lo tanto, nuestro objetivo es trazar un mapa de este debate y ofrecer una síntesis de estas posiciones. Para ello, primero haremos un retorno al contexto de la irrupción del liberalismo en Inglaterra y, posteriormente, avanzaremos a sus principios filosóficos en John Locke. Luego, demostraremos cómo estos principios filosóficos fueron interpretados en Brasil en tres posiciones: primero como "idea fuera de lugar" (SCHWARZ, 2000; NOGUEIRA, 1976), segundo como "una idea tiende a encontrar su lugar" (COUTINHO, 2000) y tercero como una "idea que está en su debido lugar" (FRANCO, 1976; BOSI, 2010). ; O "lugar" do liberalismo no Brasil do século XIX é alvo de grandes debates na filosofia política (RICUPERO, 2007). Assim, temos como objetivo mapear esse debate e fornecer uma síntese dessas posições. Para isso, faremos, primeiro, um retorno ao contexto de surgimento do liberalismo na Inglaterra e, posteriormente, avançaremos para seus princípios filosóficos em John Locke. Em seguida, demonstraremos como esses princípios filosóficos foram interpretados no Brasil em três posições: primeiro como "ideia fora do lugar" (SCHWARZ, 2000; NOGUEIRA, 1976), segundo como "uma ideia tende a encontrar seu lugar" (COUTINHO, 2000) e terceiro como uma ...

The late John Kenneth Galbraith was one of the most influential personalities of economic thought on the second half of the 20th century. In many aspects, he was among the intellectuals who better voiced the spirit of American liberalism (that is, liberalism in its U.S. meaning of moderate left). J. K. Galbraith left us a set of insights & clues to understanding contemporary capitalist societies that is indeed, impressive. Therefore in this article we take up only some of the concepts that he brought to us, underlining their usefulness & pointedness to the analysis of today's economics. References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper seeks to contribute to a reflection on the current European crisis through a critical theorization of liberalism, here characterized as a philosophical, political and ontological assumption of a liberal peace that rests increasingly on the geopolitical scenario of germanisation of Europe. Therefore, two main essays are revisited in the paper, one by Carl Schmitt and the other by Emanuel Levinas, their criticisms to the model of liberal peace describes many of the limitations of the industrial and technocratic model that underpins it, but above all the way in which this model paves the way for its own collapse. Adapted from the source document.