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For both John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum, the concept of love plays a significant role in moral psychology. Rawls views the sense of justice as grounded in parental love, and continuous with love of mankind. Nussbaum's recent defence of patriotism revives the emotion of love as essential for political contexts. I argue that love ought to play a substantial part in the shaping of global politics, and that a moral psychology of love based merely on a combination of Rawls's and Nussbaum's accounts fails to produce an adequate ground for conceptualizing moral motivation with respect to addressing transnational concerns of justice. I contend that by critically synthesizing Rawls's and Nussbaum's conceptions of love and moral psychology with resources from Kant's ethics, it is possible to develop a more attractive, and potentially politically effective, conception of love of human beings in the framework of political liberalism.

For both John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum, the concept of love plays a significant role in moral psychology. Rawls views the sense of justice as grounded in parental love, and continuous with love of mankind. Nussbaum's recent defence of patriotism revives the emotion of love as essential for political contexts. I argue that love ought to play a substantial part in the shaping of global politics, and that a moral psychology of love based merely on a combination of Rawls's and Nussbaum's accounts fails to produce an adequate ground for conceptualizing moral motivation with respect to addressing transnational concerns of justice. I contend that by critically synthesizing Rawls's and Nussbaum's conceptions of love and moral psychology with resources from Kant's ethics, it is possible to develop a more attractive, and potentially politically effective, conception of love of human beings in the framework of political liberalism.

El artículo busca hacer una presentación de dos momentos del desarrollo del pensamiento de Habermas. En la primera parte se realiza una exposición crítica de la concepción habermasiana de la sociedad para señalar las limitaciones y contradicciones de su diagnóstico de la modernidad. En la segunda, se reconstruye la propuesta deliberativa del derecho y la democracia, hecha por Habermas en Faktizitat und Geltung, con el fin de mostrar su relevancia frente a los problemas de la crisis de legitimidad del liberalismo. ; It is made here a two-moments presentation of the thought of Jürgen Habermas. First, Habermas concept of society is critically examined to bring out the limits and contradictions it has when diagnosing modemity. Second, the proposal he made in Faktizitiit and Geltung about deliberative law and democracy is reconstructed to expose its importance concerning the crisis of liberalism legitimacy.

This article is devoted to the problem of the historical heritage of the confessional division of the German lands as a result of the completion of the Reformation in Germany, as well as the specifics of the formation of the national German political elite. The confrontation between the Lutherans and the Calvinists during the years of the Reformation created a solid foundation for the formation of the future strong neo-confessional political parties in Germany, a striking example of which is the party of the Centre. The analysis of the characteristic features of the party system of the Empire of the Hohenzollerns, the features of the models of German conservatism and German liberalism of the 19th century allows us to conclude about the impact of the bi-confessional factor on the process of formation of both the German totalitarianism and the effective democracy of Germany.

Virtue is given instrumental value by many liberal political philosophers, as a means to secure some desired pattern of behaviour from citizens where institutions alone would not suffice. Such liberals are thus assuming that cultivating virtue is an effective means by which to make citizens behave. Indeed, what debate there has been regarding incorporating virtue into liberalism focuses on theoretical challenges, especially regarding whether cultivating virtues is illiberal. However, this article attacks the view widely held among liberals that cultivating virtue is the best way to make citizens behave, on the grounds that it is an ineffective method by which to secure desired patterns of behaviour from citizens. Further, this article demonstrates that the question of whether a method of making citizens behave is effective should be considered prior to addressing details of its normative costs for liberals. Adapted from the source document.

It is commonly accepted that social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) are potent unique predictors of a variety of prejudice and prejudice-related constructs. However, contrary to some predictions, there has been little evidence that these constructs interact to produce this outcome-they appear to be additive but not interactive in their prediction of prejudice. We extend the interaction hypothesis to consideration of another broadly relevant construct-political ideology. Drawing from 14 independent New Zealand-based samples, we show, through meta-analysis and multilevel random coefficient modelling, that SDO and RWA additively and interactively predict levels of political conservatism operationalised in a variety of ways. Specifically, both constructs are associated with increasing political conservatism, and the lowest levels of conservatism (or highest levels of political liberalism) are found in those lowest in both SDO and RWA. Adapted from the source document.

The paper analyzes the contribution of Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice for development studies. The influence of Sen's book for thinking about development is likely to parallel that of John Rawls's Theory of Justice in political theory. This paper argues that The Idea of Justice has a limited reach in relation to addressing concrete cases of injustice because it is built only on the dual foundations of freedom and reasoning. On the basis of real world examples of unjust situations derived from Sen's body of writings itself, the paper discusses the limits of The Idea of Justice. It contends that remedying injustice requires an understanding of how justice is structural and which recognizes that discussion of justice is inseparable from reasoning about the nature of the good society. The paper concludes by pointing out The Idea of Justice's ambiguous relationship with liberalism.

The concept of governance belongs to a period when attempts were being made to describe a new approach to the complex reality of the contemporary world. It first made its appearance twenty years ago in the euphoria of a world freed from post-war tensions and driven by the technological revolution and the primacy of liberalism. Governance was intended to benefit from these apparent improvements and so to enhance classical democracy with a new dimension designed to defuse long-standing conflicts and ensure a better world. Indeed, good governance can be seen as a mutation of power (Moreau Defarges, 2001) at a wide range of levels -- private and public, national and international -- and in all areas of political activity ranging from straightforward behavioural guidelines at the most basic level up to a global vision of society as a whole. Adapted from the source document.

This article offers a contribution to the question of the distinction liberal political language and republican political languages. Setting aside the debates on the membership of republicanism in the communitarian movement and the potentially comprehensive character of that theory, the article attempts to demonstrate that, at the end of the 18th century, republican language was confronted with the challenge to engender stable political systems to replace the monarchies of the ancient regime. In addition, it adapted itself by abandoning its archaic components that were incompatible with the modern world. At the same time, republicanism does not transform into the variant of liberalism many would like to see, because it conserves one idea: that equality is the condition of liberty, and this implies that in a society of individual liberty, property law can be neither absolute nor unconditional. Adapted from the source document.