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This article deals with two neglected fields of democratic peace research: How do liberal democracies, that are considered to be peaceful towards one another, justify their wars against non-democracies? How can we explain the varying (non-)participation of democracies in wars? Based on assumptions of social-constructivist foreign policy analysis, the article presents results of a comparative content analysis of parliamentary debates in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom and the U.S. in the run-up to three wars (Gulf war 1991, Kosovo war 1999, Iraq war 2003). While macro results for all seven countries are presented, a more detailed investigation highlights results for four countries. Of particular importance are differences in argumentative patterns between the countries but also justifications that are specifically attached to democracies or to liberalism. The article discusses to what extent the three wars can be regarded as "democratic wars" and what the implications are for democratic peace theories. Adapted from the source document.

On 13 May 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, with Afghanistan'spPresident Hamid Karzai at her side, made clear that while American officialspsupported Karzai's plan to 'open the door' to Taliban militants, there werep'certain conditions that [had] to be met'. Along with renouncing violencepand abiding by the Afghan constitution, the Taliban, Clinton explained,p'must respect women's rights'.1pIt is unclear what 'respect' means or what it would entail, as Clinton didpnot differentiate between the Taliban's system of gender-based oppressionpand indigenous cultural prohibitions that discriminate against women. Thatpdistinction, however, is significant.pMany policymakers and political activists believe the United States, withpits commitment to individual liberty, political and religious freedom, andpthe rule of law, has a unique role to play in the advancement of Afghanpwomen's rights.2 Though well-meaning, this belief and the prescriptionspthat follow from it fail to draw a meaningful causal link between desires andpoutcomes. In fact, the perceived universality of Western values tells us littlepabout the most effective means for advancing them.3 Current foreign-ledpefforts to motivate Afghans to adopt new habits also raise a host of practicalpand ethical considerations, given the unforeseen consequences that arise inpthe course of military occupation, as well as the situational constraints ofpoperating in the context of a foreign culture. (Survival / SWP)

In relational fathering, where relationship is central to parenting practice, fathers of sons grow and develop. The father–son connection provides a liberatory context for relational development in the fathers. By co-identifying with their sons, fathers begin to re-envision their sense of self, redefining a new way of being where masculinity is conceived of as caring and manhood as relational. The co-identification process, or the Myson/Myself dynamic, stirs the cauldron of transformation, fueled by the son's unconditional love and acceptance. Using Relational-Cultural Theory as a theoretical model for interpretation, this article outlines a father's growth and process of development in a growth-fostering relationship with his son.