This paper reviews the governance framework of the Lisbon Strategy and discusses the specific option of increasing the role of benchmarking as a means of improving the implementation record of structural reforms in the European Union. Against this background, the paper puts forward a possible avenue for developing a strong form of quantitative benchmarking, namely ranking. The ranking methodology relies on the construction of a synthetic indicator using the "benefit of the doubt" approach, which acknowledges differences in emphasis among Member States with regard to structural reform priorities. The methodology is applied by using the structural indicators that have been commonly agreed by the governments of the Member States, but could also be used for ranking exercises on the basis of other indicators.
The European Union is changing significantly. It has recently been enlarged by 10 new Member States, decision-making about the European Constitution is going on, and it has set itself the target of becoming the most competitive economy in the world (Lisbon Strategy). The scenarios explore in an integrated way the territorial impacts of future changes in the economy, transport, rural development, environment, and other policy fields. They do not only concentrate on the territorial impacts of the trends and driving forces but also of the relevant EU Policies. The scenarios throw a light on the effectiveness of EU Policies and the synergies as well as conflicts they generate. By doing this they provide important insights in the conditions under which these trends, driving forces and policies will favour a balanced and polycentric territory and territorial cohesion within the enlarging European Union. These insights are relevant for recommendations on possible adjustments and/or changes of EU Policies.
In this paper, we develop an analysis of the reasons for the apparent failure of the "Lisbon strategy" (2000) so far. After having made the general case for a comprehensive "institutionalist perspective" on the European economy, we first try to formalise the objectives of "Lisbon" in order to present a mid-term review of the results attained. Since we find, like many others, that too little has been achieved, we then offer some possible explanations. Apart from an inconsistency problem between the different objectives set, we argue that the major reason for this failure appears to lie in the contradiction between the EU macroeconomic policy framework, based on the logic of delegation of power and control to independent authorities with conservative objectives, and the proactive policies required by the "Lisbon strategy", which objectives the EU member states eventually find themselves accountable for (not) achieving individually.
In this paper, we develop an analysis of the reasons for the apparent failure of the "Lisbon strategy" (2000) so far. After having made the general case for a comprehensive "institutionalist perspective" on the European economy, we first try to formalise the objectives of "Lisbon" in order to present a mid-term review of the results attained. Since we find, like many others, that too little has been achieved, we then offer some possible explanations. Apart from an inconsistency problem between the different objectives set, we argue that the major reason for this failure appears to lie in the contradiction between the EU macroeconomic policy framework, based on the logic of delegation of power and control to independent authorities with conservative objectives, and the proactive policies required by the "Lisbon strategy", which objectives the EU member states eventually find themselves accountable for (not) achieving individually.
This article considers the relationship between financial and technological integration in Europe. It finds that market-based financial systems support output growth, investment and total factor productivity (TFP) more than bank-based ones. It identifies three groups of countries and estimates the probability of transition between the groups. It finds that financial integration might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for moving towards the 'Lisbon benchmark'.
This article considers the relationship between financial and technological integration in Europe. It finds that market-based financial systems support output growth, investment and total factor productivity (TFP) more than bank-based ones. It identifies three groups of countries and estimates the probability of transition between the groups. It finds that financial integration might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for moving towards the 'Lisbon benchmark'.
The aim of this article is to identify diversity between the EU-15 and the New Members in their implementation of the Lisbon Strategy in the period 2000-2010. By analyzing a set of structural indicators, we aim to fill a gap in the literature: a lack of publications providing complex evaluation of the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy using measurable indicators. The results of our analyses confirm the hypothesis of a large gap between the EU-15 countries and the 12 New Members in key areas of the Lisbon Strategy. According to rankings given by our taxonomic analyses, a high level of the indicators selected is confirmed only for the EU-15 countries and only three New Members belong to a group presenting the average level of these indicators. This study demonstrates a need for a significant intensification of the EU cohesion policy, which is one of the main tools for achieving the Lisbon Strategy goals.
To be published at Krings, Bettina-J. ed. (2011), Brain Drain or Brain Gain? Changes of Work in Knowledge-based Societies, Berlin, Ed. Sigma. The author wants to thanks the comments and suggestions from Bettina Krings and Sylke Wintzer. They are not, however, responsible for the final result. ; The majority of papers published in the last decades on European Union policy strongly stress the importance of the so-called Lisbon Strategy approved in the year 2000. The same applies to studies and reports on the shift of the European countries towards modernisation and restructuring policy in recent years. This EU development strategy defines a new direction for the coordination of national policies. But why has it become so important? One of the reasons is the fact that many of the papers are based on the concept of "knowledge society" as the key driver for an increased competitiveness of all political and economic regions of Europe. In this context, the term "knowledge" means the inter-linkage of education (including training, qualification, skills) and innovation (including research, information and communication). The use of the concept represents an important shift in the European strategy: further development would not only be based on investment in material infrastructures, but also more on the immaterial ground. However, this Lisbon Strategy was criticised by many politicians and opinion-makers in the first years of this century because the European structures were not prepared for such a quick change. At the same time, the focus for investment moved away from the traditional support of industrial sectors (manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries, construction) towards the "new economy" sectors. The vision of a knowledge society remained appealing also in a changing international context: the Middle East wars (Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel-Palestine) and the fast growth of the Chinese economy. However, the shadows of new recessions have strongly questioned the options made by the European Council. New challenges have emerged with the need to redefine collective strategies in terms of European development as set by the Lisbon strategy. "Europe 2020" is one more attempt to define a new strategy. But at present no clear path has been identified. Whether the programme will bring about progress for the European economies, or is again an illusion, is not yet clear. This shows, however, that new paths and common strategies are still needed in Europe.
Presentation given at the 12th Zermat Symposium "Lissabon" - Der europaische Glaube an die Planbarkeit des Wachstums, August 21st to 24th 2005. Abstract en español e inglés. ; Las esperanzas puestas en la Cumbre de Lisboa el año 2000 no se han cumplido, ya que el proceso no se ha realizado. Se ha vuelto a replantear si aquel giro drástico de la orientacion europea se ha considerado una Utopia o sencillamente era errónea o si bien no ha habido fuerza política y economica para este cambio. La nueva orientacion a las personas en busqueda del conocimiento como respuesta a la competitividad europea se vuelve a plantear dado que es la nueva orientación que está realizando el mundo empresarial. Los sistemas de dirección y de organización de las empresas han asumido esta "visión" y la están realizando más allá de la propia realidad del marco politico.
ÖZETBu tezin temel amacı, Avrupa'daki sosyal ve ekonomik gerilimlere dayanan yabancı karşıtlığını göz önünde tutarak, ne ölçüde bir göçün Avrupa Birliği ekonomisine fayda getireceğini saptamaktır. Birleşik Devletler deneyiminden hareketle, göçmenlerin Amerikan ekonomisine büyük katkı sağladıkları ve bugün Birleşik Devletler'in dünya'nın önde gelen ekonomisi olmasında önemli rol oynadıkları söylenebilir. Bu tez, bu bakış çerçevesinde, devletlerce uygulanmakta olan göç politikaları ile ulusların rekabet güçlerini ilişkilendirmekte ve Avrupa Birliği'nin Lizbon hedeflerine iktisadi göçmenler yoluyla ulaşıp ulaşamayacağı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır.Bu çalışma, Birlik düzeyinde ortak göç politikasının yerleştirilmesi yönünde Avrupa'da güçlü ekonomik gerekçelerin bulunduğunu göstermekte ve ayrıca iktisadi esaslara dayanan bir göç politikasının nitelikli beyinleri Avrupa Birliği'ne çekme konusunda becerisini arttıracağını ortaya koymaktadır. Böyle bir politika sadece nitelikli göçmen işçileri gelmeleri konusunda teşvik etmekle kalmayıp aynı zamanda, Avrupa emek piyasalarındaki vasıfsız yabancıların da piyasada yer alma isteklerini olumsuz yönde etkileyecektir. Daha da önemlisi, bu tezde Avrupa Birliği'nin Lizbon Stratejisi'nin gerçekleştirilmesinin Avrupa'da bilgiye dayalı ekonomilerin oluşumu ile yakından bağlı olduğu gösterilmektedir. Bu argümana dayalı olarak, Avrupa Birliği'nin iktisadi rekabet edebilirliğinin güçlendirilmesinde ve bilgi birikimi transferinde "iktisadi göçün" kilit araç olarak kullanılabileceği kuvvetle vurgulanmaktadır. ABSTRACTBy taking the social and economic tensions of European people towards foreigners into account, the main objective of this thesis is to determine what extent "immigration" brings benefits to the European Union economy. As in the United States experience, it can be said that immigrants have been making great contributions to the US economy and today, the US has a leading economy in the world by immigrants' significant role. From the point of this view, this thesis relates the immigration policies to competitiveness of nations and intends to answer the following question: Whether the European Union can achieve the Lisbon goals by stimulating economic migrants into the Union? This study shows that there are strong economic reasons in Europe to introduce a common immigration policy at the European Union level. This study also tries to explain that an economically motivated immigration policy would increase the Union's ability to attract well qualified brains into Europe. This means that this policy not only encourages the skilled immigrant workers but also discourages unskilled foreigners in European labour markets. More importantly, this thesis argues that the accomplishment of the Lisbon Strategy of the Union is closely linked to creation of knowledge based economies in the EU and as a consequence of this evidence, it is strongly emphasized that "economic migration" can be used as a key instrument to transfer the knowledge (brain gain) and strengthen the economic competitiveness of the EU.
In March 2010, the European Commission (2010, preface) introduced Europe 2020 as marking "a new beginning" and having "new tools and […] new ambition". The research questions guiding my paper are the following: Does Europe 2020 constitute a new beginning? Does Europe 2020 address the shortcomings of the Lisbon Strategy? Is Europe 2020 likely to succeed? The recent crisis illustrates that the EU needs to decide on how to address multiple and pressing challenges. As the member states are faced by similar challenges, adopting a common economic strategy appears to be sensible. However, in 2000 the Lisbon Strategy was also launched as an ambitious common strategy. Despite the substantial effort and resources which were invested, the Lisbon Strategy was a failure. The success of Europe 2020 will in large part depend on whether the lessons have been learned. I conducted a comparative analysis of two strategies. The analysis of key-documents and publications showed that policy content and implementation mechanism of Europe 2020 closely resemble those of the Lisbon Strategy. Further, I identified the main shortcomings of the Lisbon Strategy and analyzed whether Europe 2020 constitutes an adequate remedy. Here, I particularly focused on the open method of coordination (OMC) and found that many shortcomings of the Lisbon Strategy are likely to persist. Based on my findings, I argue that Europe 2020 is unlikely to succeed, unless significant amendments are made. The paper is of relevance for everyone who is interested in engaging in a critical and informed dialogue regarding European economic strategy.
Under the Lisbon strategy, education and training form an essential element of the social pillar which aims to modernise the European social model through investment in human resources and combating social exclusion. Up to 2004, elearning was promoted as a key element in achieving the strategy especially through the Elearning Action Plan (2004-2006). This paper will analyse the process through which elearning emerged as a policy measure in implementing the Lisbon strategy. Using Kingdon's policy streams metaphor (Kingdon, 1995), this paper will outline the policy and problem streams which coalesced in the late 1980s, opening a 'policy window', and which pushed distance learning onto the EU political agenda in the early 1990s. These included the accretion of 'soft law' around the area of vocational education and training since the Treaty of Rome in 1957; the challenges offered by the emerging new information technologies, declining industries and changing demands for skills; the adoption of distance learning systems at national level to redress disadvantage, and to provide flexible, high-quality and cost-effective access to higher education to adults who were unable to attend on-campus; and the role of the Commission, policy entrepreneurs and networks in promoting distance education as a solution to the major social and economic problems facing Europe. The Treaty of Maastricht committed the EU to supporting education and training in the community, and in particular, to 'encouraging the development of distance education' (Art 126 changed to Art 149 in Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties). A series of implementation programmes in the 1990s, including Socrates, Tempus and Phare, funded distance learning initiatives in the EU and accession countries. With the development of the Internet and web technologies, elearning came to replace distance education in the EU discourse. The paper will conclude with some observations on the current role of elearning policy within the Lisbon strategy.
This report provides an analysis of the Nordic innovation policies of relevance for regional innovation systems. The central question addressed is how national policy makers can best apply the broad Lisbon strategy goals to the specific creation of regional innovation policies adapted to the Nordic context. Meeting the ideals and goals of the Lisbon Agenda may imply significant changes in the Nordic countries. Specifically, if innovation is to be stimulated in the public sector this demands an increased role for the market in the production of goods and services produced by the public sector. The data available tends to highlight the fact that the metropolitan areas dominate in terms of innovation performance and potential across the Nordic countries. Regional differences must thus be considered in the context of the development of innovation policy instruments, while more sophisticated enabling instruments will undoubtedly also be needed. In the EU context the regions are viewed as being the actors best able to appreciate local and regional needs and thus best placed to develop innovation policies. Historically, the state has controlled innovation policy in the Nordic countries. The regional level may therefore need to be granted formal competence for the development of regional innovation policies. The EU commission has asked for the application of a broad view of innovation. Innovation policy in the Nordic countries has traditionally however been concerned, predominantly, with research and development policies, though all of the Nordic countries are currently in the course of adopting a broader approach to innovation. By its very nature this broader approach ensures that a wider and ever expanding range of policy fields address the notion of innovation. Better coordination between the various policy fields addressing innovation may thus be needed in order to avoid competing or overlapping measures at the national and regional levels.
The article tries to reveal some of the reasons why the national strategy of research and development and first Version of Lisbon Strategy for the period 2005-2007 in Estonia has been quite efficient. Since 2000, the European Commission has been measuring the innovation performance of countries with the help of the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) which is the instrument developed by the European Commission, under the Lisbon Strategy, to provide a comparative assessment of the innovation performance of EU Member States annually. The research problem being solved in this article is: how to implement Lisbon agenda in Estonia (in 2008-2015). The aim of the article was to highlight the theoretical constitution of knowledge triangle based on Lisbon agenda and to analyse conception problems of knowledge triangle (academic research, infrastructure of higher educational institutions, innovative enterprise) concerning Estonian situation. In order to evaluate Estonia's perspectives in Lisbon strategy in 2008-2015 there was made analysis on ground of European Innovation Scoreboard. There are two main tendencies of the development of Knowledge Triangle: first, innovative rearrangements done in social sphere, in economy and in higher educational sphere to fulfil tasks from Lisbon strategy and, second, increase Estonian competitiveness. Another side of the knowledge triangle concerns creating new economic mechanisms (concrete business solutions) and creating new structure of institutions (rearrangement) to carry out new comprehensive and dynamic innovation model.According to European Innovation Scoreboard 2008 Estonia's place among 27 EU states is 12th. This is clearly evident that Estonia is reaching the EU mean level for summary innovation index and has a relatively high growth rate for its level.
In 2000, the European Union set itself a target in the Lisbon Strategy to become the most dynamic, competitive and knowledge-based economy in the world in ten years, whereas during the mid-term review, which was held five years later, it redefined its two main objectives: creation of new and better jobs and achievement of stronger, lasting economic growth. This paper aims to study the current situation in the European Union and Slovenia regarding the implementation of the targets of the renewed Lisbon Strategy. The analysis focuses on establishing at what stage the EU is in the attainment of its goals and how successfully it has implemented the strategy at the regional level of the EU Member States. The basic tools in the analysis included the time-distance monitoring method and a presentation of the time lead or lag in the implementation of the selected Lisbon Strategy targets at the NUTS 2 regional level of the enlarged EU and Slovenia.
