Suchergebnisse

This paper reviews the governance framework of the Lisbon Strategy and discusses the specific option of increasing the role of benchmarking as a means of improving the implementation record of structural reforms in the European Union. Against this background, the paper puts forward a possible avenue for developing a strong form of quantitative benchmarking, namely ranking. The ranking methodology relies on the construction of a synthetic indicator using the "benefit of the doubt" approach, which acknowledges differences in emphasis among Member States with regard to structural reform priorities. The methodology is applied by using the structural indicators that have been commonly agreed by the governments of the Member States, but could also be used for ranking exercises on the basis of other indicators.

The European Union is changing significantly. It has recently been enlarged by 10 new Member States, decision-making about the European Constitution is going on, and it has set itself the target of becoming the most competitive economy in the world (Lisbon Strategy). The scenarios explore in an integrated way the territorial impacts of future changes in the economy, transport, rural development, environment, and other policy fields. They do not only concentrate on the territorial impacts of the trends and driving forces but also of the relevant EU Policies. The scenarios throw a light on the effectiveness of EU Policies and the synergies as well as conflicts they generate. By doing this they provide important insights in the conditions under which these trends, driving forces and policies will favour a balanced and polycentric territory and territorial cohesion within the enlarging European Union. These insights are relevant for recommendations on possible adjustments and/or changes of EU Policies.

The Lisbon strategy, launched in 2000 to promote growth and employment by developing a highly competitive European economy, is an incoherent mixture of economic liberalism, social democratic aspirations and neo-Schumpeterian technological determinism. This article presents the macroeconomic environment of the Lisbon strategy and calls into question the generally accepted notion that Europe lags behind the USA in terms of productivity and innovation. It discusses the implications of the most important integrated guidelines that member countries should follow to implement the Lisbon agenda and argues that they represent more a neoliberal programme than a renewal of the European social model. This article also presents the results of empirical work that tested the effectiveness of the various market liberalisation measures promoted by the Lisbon agenda. These results show that one should not expect significant results in two key areas: innovation and employment.

"Die Lissabon-Strategie, die im Jahr 2000 ins Leben gerufen wurde mit dem Ziel, eine höchst wettbewerbsfähige europäische Wirtschaft zu schaffen, ist eine inkohärente Mixtur aus Wirtschaftsliberalismus, sozialdemokratischen Zielen und neo-schumpeterianischem technologischen Determinismus. Dieser Beitrag beschreibt das makroökonomische Umfeld der Lissabon-Strategie und stellt die allgemein akzeptierte Auffassung in Frage, dass Europa in Sachen Produktivität und Innovation hinter den USA zurückbleibt. Die Autoren erörtern die Folgen der wichtigsten integrierten Leitlinien, die von den Mitgliedstaaten befolgt werden müssen, um die Lissabon Agenda umzusetzen, und argumentieren, dass diese eher einem neoliberalen Programm als einer Erneuerung des europäischen Sozialmodells entsprechen. In dem Beitrag werden ferner die Ergebnisse empirischer Arbeiten vorgestellt, bei denen die Wirksamkeit der verschiedenen von der Lissabon-Strategie geförderten Marktliberalisierungsmaßnahmen untersucht wurde. Aus diesen geht hervor, dass in zwei Schlüsselbereichen, nämlich Innovation und Beschäftigung, keine nennenswerten Ergebnisse erwartet werden sollten." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

In this paper, we develop an analysis of the reasons for the apparent failure of the "Lisbon strategy" (2000) so far. After having made the general case for a comprehensive "institutionalist perspective" on the European economy, we first try to formalise the objectives of "Lisbon" in order to present a mid-term review of the results attained. Since we find, like many others, that too little has been achieved, we then offer some possible explanations. Apart from an inconsistency problem between the different objectives set, we argue that the major reason for this failure appears to lie in the contradiction between the EU macroeconomic policy framework, based on the logic of delegation of power and control to independent authorities with conservative objectives, and the proactive policies required by the "Lisbon strategy", which objectives the EU member states eventually find themselves accountable for (not) achieving individually.

In this paper, we develop an analysis of the reasons for the apparent failure of the "Lisbon strategy" (2000) so far. After having made the general case for a comprehensive "institutionalist perspective" on the European economy, we first try to formalise the objectives of "Lisbon" in order to present a mid-term review of the results attained. Since we find, like many others, that too little has been achieved, we then offer some possible explanations. Apart from an inconsistency problem between the different objectives set, we argue that the major reason for this failure appears to lie in the contradiction between the EU macroeconomic policy framework, based on the logic of delegation of power and control to independent authorities with conservative objectives, and the proactive policies required by the "Lisbon strategy", which objectives the EU member states eventually find themselves accountable for (not) achieving individually.