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There are two dominant views of the American Constitution. The first holds that it is a remarkably stable foundation of our deepest values, protected from the shifting tides of public opinion. The second holds that our interpretation of it needs to change with the times given that the founders had no idea how our society would evolve. Holders of the former view--best known as "originalists"--contend that if we don't treat the Constitution's meaning as fixed, judges can say that the Constitution means whatever they want it to mean. In The Living Constitution (part of the Inalienable Rights book series) acclaimed constitutional scholar David Strauss argues that these two approaches are reconcilable. Strauss begins by contending that a rigid originalist approach, which is now more powerful than ever given the Court's conservative bent, is intellectually indefensible. While many might therefore conclude that the circle cannot be squared, Strauss shows that the common law tradition--which accounts for constant incremental social change yet which respects the constraints of tradition--drives a great deal of constitutional reasoning. The common law tradition respects the power of original understandings yet also can adust to social changes, and The Living Constitution is an eloquent defense of its role in Constitutional law.

In the doctrine of the "Living Constitution" ("Constitucion viviente"), originating in the United States and linked to "non-interpretivism", it is understood that the Constitutions is something ultimately emancipated from the written text. From this perspective, the Constitution is what both the people and the government recognize and respect as such. In this regard, when judges construe the Constitution, instead of looking for already made solutions to dissipate constitutional doubts they should consult the aspirations, beliefs and values of the present community, and only then proceed to prepare beneficial constitutional answers according to these elements.For the legitimization of this stance, the «"generations" argument» is used. (Le., the generation having passed the Constitution has no rigl1t to impose on the next, the present one, its ways of understanding and enforcing the supreme law), as well as the «"present constituents" argument» (where the important thing is not being faithful to the historical constituent but to the people of our present days, who are those that ultimately possess the real constituent power).Of course, the "Living Constitution" vision is criticized for the insecurity dose implied in any Constitution being able to say different things in different times. Moreover, it is not always easy to detect social consensus about what judgments and beliefs are now prevailing within the community today. In parallel, perhaps there is no real consensus but debatable positions, or a "bad consensus" (for instance, if the majority puts forward discriminatory or axiomatically negative solutions).It would be worth as well asking whether judges, in interpreting and giving shape to the "Living Constitution", should merely act like a microphone conveying common social opinion or beliefs, if there is any consensus. Or if, in a more active role, they would have to retouch and polish up any such beliefs according to the constitutional values (like justice, equality, and so forth), and even reject any "bad consensus".Any way, and despite the above-mentioned criticism, several courts, without telling anyone, apply many guidelines of the "Living Constitution" doctrine under the label of evolutionary and dynamic interpretations of the Chart and constitutional mutation, related to decidedly activist positions adopted by the constitutional magistracy. Ultimately, a detailed and critical analysis of this thesis is imperative: on the one hand is useful too as to make a constitution be come operative (particularly if it is old), give it a modern social legitimacy and, on the other hand, establish both its limits and tops in terms of axiomatic and juridical legitimatization. ; La doctrina de la "Constitución viviente" (Living Constitution), de fuente, estadounidense y vinculada al "no interpretativismo", entiende que la Constitución es algo en última instancia emancipado del texto escrito. La Constitución, desde esa perspectiva, es lo que el pueblo y el gobierno reconocen respetan como tal. Al respecto, cuando los jueces interpretan la Constitución, en vez de buscar soluciones ya hechas para disipar las dudas constitucionales, deberían consultar las aspiraciones, creencias y valores de la comunidad presente, y elaborar respuestas constitucionales provechosas en función de tales elementos.La legitimación de tal postura utiliza principalmente el "argumento de la generaciones" (la generación que sancionó a la Constitución no tiene derecho de imponerle a la actual su modo de entender y hacer efectiva la le suprema), y el "argumento del constituyente actual" (lo importante no es se fiel al constituyente histórico, sino al pueblo de nuestros días, que es quien posee en definitiva el poder constituyente realDesde luego, la visión de la "Constitución viviente" es criticada por la dosis de inseguridad que significa que la misma Constitución pueda decir cos distintas en tiempos diferentes, Por lo demás, no siempre es fácil detectarlos consensos sociales acerca de cuáles son las valoraciones y las creencia imperantes hoy en la comunidad. Paralelamente, puede que no haya real mente consenso, sino posiciones controvertidas, o que haya un "consenso malo" (p. ej., si la mayoría postula soluciones discriminatorias o axiológica mente negativas). También cabe preguntarse si el juez, al interpretar y d forma a la "Constitución viviente", debe ser un mero micrófono de lo que piense el consenso social, cuando éste exista, o si, en un papel más activo tendría que retocar esas creencias, pulirlas en función de los valores constitucionales (como justicia, igualdad, etc.), y aun desechar los "consensos malos".De todos modos, y pese a las críticas referidas, muchos tribunales aplican sin decirlo varias de las directrices de la doctrina de la "Constitución viviente", bajo el rótulo de interpretaciones evolutivas y dinámicas de la Constitución y de la mutación constitucional, emparentadas con posiciones decididamente activistas por parte de la magistratura constitucional. En definitiva, se impone un análisis detallado y crítico de la tesis, útil, por un lado, para tomar operativa una constitución (sobre todo, si ella es antigua) y darle legitimación social contemporánea y, por otro lado, fijarle límites y topes en términos de legitimación axiológica y jurídica.

The development of the constitution must be based on the rule of law. Direct democratic rights allow citizens to participate in the amendment process. The direct democratic process of institutional change is theoretically and empirically analyzed. A number of counter arguments and issues for a gradual introduction are discussed.

A crucial aspect of constitutional design is the provision of rules on how a constitution is to be amended. If procedures for constitutional amendment are very restrictive, changes will take place outside the constitution. These changes are likely to be against the citizens' interests and their ability to influence the political process. We argue that the development of the constitution must be based on the rule of law. We propose direct democratic rights that allow citizens to participate in the amendment process. The direct democratic process of institutional change is theoretically and empirically analyzed. A number of counter arguments and issues for a gradual introduction are discussed.