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An idiosyncratic array of international rules allows "consultants" to gain special access to international officials and lawmakers. Historically, many of these consultants were public-interest associations like Amnesty International. For this reason, the access rules have been celebrated as a way to democratize international organizations, enhancing their legitimacy and that of the rules they produce. But a focus on the classic public-law virtues of democracy and legitimacy produces a theory at odds with the facts: Many of these international consultants are now industry and trade associations like the World Coal Association, whose principal purpose is to lobby for their corporate clients. The presence of these corporate lobbyists challenges the conventional view, which I call strong legitimacy optimism, by focusing a set of longstanding critiques: Consultant associations are not always representatives of the "global public" and consultation is not robust participation in governance. Moreover, the access rules both overregulate and underregulate access to lawmakers. This critique is particularly salient in the context of business lobbying, where the access rules do not balance the costs and benefits of business access to international lawmaking and governance. This Article introduces a theory of international lobbying law. Reframing the international access rules as a body of lobbying regulations delivers explanatory and normative payoffs by identifying (1) the full array of actors who obtain access (public interest and private sector alike); (2) the quantum of access that the current system delivers (informal lobbying, not participation in governance); and (3) new regulatory strategies. Specifically, two regulatory models emerge. One draws on the flawed but best-available registration and disclosure norms of domestic lobbying regulation. The other is a multistakeholder model pioneered by twenty-first-century public-private partnership organizations. The Article develops an original typology to organize and ...

Lobbying public decision-makers is an increasingly widespread managerial practice, but has so far attracted little research attention in Europe. This article studies how it is put into practice as a strategy by French and UK firms. An empirical study examines 679 lobbying campaigns (also known as "political action"), that are grouped into categories and described using statistical data analysis techniques. The results highlight a pattern in the corporate lobbying phenomenon: five types of lobbying strategy (that can be described and illustrated) exist for French firms, and four for UK firms. The central theme of discussion is to what extent firms'political strategies are universal or country specific. Tentative explanations can be put forward: implementation of lobbying strategies appears to depend on the type of issues addressed (which could be universal), but also on the country's political environment (which could be country specific). The study shows the interdependent influence of human resources, economic structures and the political environment (laws and the role of the state) on firms' lobbying strategies.

Lobbying public decision-makers is an increasingly widespread managerial practice, but has so far attracted little research attention in Europe. This article studies how it is put into practice as a strategy by French and UK firms. An empirical study examines 679 lobbying campaigns (also known as "political action"), that are grouped into categories and described using statistical data analysis techniques. The results highlight a pattern in the corporate lobbying phenomenon: five types of lobbying strategy (that can be described and illustrated) exist for French firms, and four for UK firms. The central theme of discussion is to what extent firms'political strategies are universal or country specific. Tentative explanations can be put forward: implementation of lobbying strategies appears to depend on the type of issues addressed (which could be universal), but also on the country's political environment (which could be country specific). The study shows the interdependent influence of human resources, economic structures and the political environment (laws and the role of the state) on firms' lobbying strategies.

Les résultats de l'enquête présentée ici proviennent des recherches coordonnées dans le séminaire de sociologie du lobbying du DESS de Droit de la vie politique de l'université Paris X Nanterre durant l'année 2003-2004.

Les résultats de l'enquête présentée ici proviennent des recherches coordonnées dans le séminaire de sociologie du lobbying du DESS de Droit de la vie politique de l'université Paris X Nanterre durant l'année 2003-2004.

Astroturf lobbying refers to the simulation of grassroots support for or against a public policy. The objective of this tactic is for private interests to pretend they have public support for their cause. However, omitting to disclose the real sponsor of a message renders the communication unauthentic and undermines democratic and pluralist values. This article seeks to develop a method to detect astroturf movements based on emphasis framing analysis. The hypothesis is that astroturf groups employ different frames than genuine grassroots movements to comply with the private interests they truly represent. The results of the case study on the shale gas exploration debate in the United States show that astroturf groups used frames that differed significantly from authentic non-governmental organizations, which allowed their detection. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can promise largerpolitical contributions than the entrants due to the higher rents earned withless competition. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribu-tion becomes less unequal, and the political system becomes more accountable.Consistent with these predictions, in a cross-section of 38 countries we find that greater accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more dependent on external capital and have greater growth opportunities. Also,higher accountability and lower income inequality are associated with more ef-fective legal enforcement, even after controlling for legal origin and per-capita income.

Nach intensiven Debatten über die Mängel der gegenwärtigen Fusionskontrolle hat die Europäische Kommission den Entwurf einer Reform vorgelegt. Darin wird insbesondere auch über die Einführung einer so genannten Effizienzverteidigung nachgedacht. Die Autoren analysieren, wann eine Effizienzverteidigung wünschenswert ist.

The paper deals with the issue of lobbying, defined as a democratic means of promoting interests. The text tries to find answers to the problems in the current economic theory. The basic links are defined by using a simple graphic model, which are further examined by the SWOT analysis. The result is the knowledge that the basic coordination mechanism is the market - the information market. The role of government lies above all in creating a favourable institutional environment that does not interfere with spontaneous market relations. However, there are certain situations that the government could or should regulate. These situations are described by three hypothetical scenarios - a society without lobbying, a society where lobbing exists, but it is not transparent, and a society where lobbing is transparent, leading to a final discussion of possible directions and ways of its regulation.

Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.

The lobbying of government ministers by medical professionals is a live issue. Health professionals around the world have been active in the pursuit of legislative change. In the UK, the AllTrials campaign continues to exert pressure on parliamentarians to force greater transparency in the publication of clinical trial results. This year doctors in Australia refused to discharge child refugees from hospital into detention centres deemed harmful to their health. The lobbying of medical humanitarians such as Médecins sans Frontières in France effected a change in the law there, in 1998, that allowed undocumented immigrants with life-threatening conditions to remain in the country for medical treatment.

First paragraph: In the last 30 years, in the light of a series of new European Union treaties, thousands of lobbyists have flocked to Brussels, drawn by the increasing importance of EU-level decision making. Today on average 30-40 per cent of all national laws and regulations in the 27 EU Member States derive from EU rules and legislation; for environmental issues, it is more than 60 per cent.

This article argues for a more thorough analysis of the dynamics of corporate lobbying within the European Union (EU). Although there is broad consensus among scholars on the emergence of a new type of European lobbying, studies have not sufficiently addressed the underlying economic rationale. Indeed, many authors emphasise the shift towards a system based on direct lobbying; however, these concentre only on systemic and non-economic causes. Direct lobbying dynamics are perceived mainly in two ways: either as a consequence of a conscious political strategy of the European institutions in response to the ?interest overload? of the mid-1990s or as a normal phase of the development of interest group populations. Advocating an economics-based analytical approach to European corporate lobbying, this contribution to the debate provides one of the very first attempts to uncover the influence of economic factors on direct corporate lobbying by building on the seminal work proposed by Bernhagen and Mitchell. These authors, very familiar with the American tradition of corporate lobbying studies, were the first to apply a ?standard model of corporate political behaviour? to the European context by examining the various determinants of direct lobbying. This article goes further: it analyses the empirical database constructed by Bernhagen and Mitchell, with a multi-dimensional proxy of corporate lobbying. Indeed, the main contribution of this study is in its analysis, namely, the operationalisation of the dependent variable ?direct lobbying?. It proposes a multi-strategy/multi-venue operationalisation of the dependent variable aiming to overcome the pitfalls that characterise dichotomous and uni-dimensional operational definitions, in order to answer the research question: ?What are the economic determinants of direct corporate lobbying in the EU?? Such a multi-dimensional operationalisation of the dependent variable has required the unpacking of some of the elements taken for granted in the discussion on corporate lobbying. This article argues that the researcher needs to take into consideration the various direct lobbying strategies and their relative weights (that is, the multi-strategy operationalisation). For example, accreditation to the EP is not equal to the establishment of a company representation office in Brussels. Furthermore, another possible level of action of a firm's strategy, namely, the industry one, should also be considered (that is, the multi-venue operationalisation): direct lobbying should be analysed as a preference over other lobbying approaches rather than in absolute terms. The findings show how such an expanded operationalisation casts light on the economic determinants of European corporate lobbying. First of all, the Olsonian argument finds empirical support: industry concentration determines lobbying strategies. Second, asset mobility/specificity influences a firm's preference to lobby directly vis-à-vis other venues.

International audience ; How does the associative system contribute to shaping public representations and policies regarding autism? This question refers to the more general role of social movements. In the field of health, these movements are increasingly involved in public action and are gaining influence. Associations of parents of children with autism have contributed to public awareness and have played an increasing role in changing public representations and policies on autism, but a gap has widened between the positions adopted by "association experts" who influence the political decisions and situations that many parents face on a daily basis. This article on the role of associations of parents of autistic children in the United States and France aims to analyse the rise of community lobbying that influences political authorities in order to set new standards in the field of autism. ; Comment le système associatif contribue-t-il à façonner les représentations et les politiques publiques en matière d'autisme ? Cette question renvoie au rôle plus général des mouvements sociaux. Dans le domaine de la santé, ces mouvements participent de plus en plus à l'action publique et acquièrent une influence grandissante. Les associations de parents d'enfants autistes ont contribué à la prise de conscience du public et ont joué un rôle croissant dans les changements des représentations et des politiques publiques en matière d'autisme mais un fossé s'est creusé entre les positions adoptées par des « experts associatifs » qui pèsent sur les décisions politiques et les situations que vivent au quotidien de nombreux parents. Cet article sur le rôle des associations de parents d'enfants autistes aux États-Unis et en France vise à analyser la montée en puissance d'un lobbying associatif qui influence les autorités politiques afin d'établir de nouvelles normes en matière d'autisme.

International audience ; How does the associative system contribute to shaping public representations and policies regarding autism? This question refers to the more general role of social movements. In the field of health, these movements are increasingly involved in public action and are gaining influence. Associations of parents of children with autism have contributed to public awareness and have played an increasing role in changing public representations and policies on autism, but a gap has widened between the positions adopted by "association experts" who influence the political decisions and situations that many parents face on a daily basis. This article on the role of associations of parents of autistic children in the United States and France aims to analyse the rise of community lobbying that influences political authorities in order to set new standards in the field of autism. ; Comment le système associatif contribue-t-il à façonner les représentations et les politiques publiques en matière d'autisme ? Cette question renvoie au rôle plus général des mouvements sociaux. Dans le domaine de la santé, ces mouvements participent de plus en plus à l'action publique et acquièrent une influence grandissante. Les associations de parents d'enfants autistes ont contribué à la prise de conscience du public et ont joué un rôle croissant dans les changements des représentations et des politiques publiques en matière d'autisme mais un fossé s'est creusé entre les positions adoptées par des « experts associatifs » qui pèsent sur les décisions politiques et les situations que vivent au quotidien de nombreux parents. Cet article sur le rôle des associations de parents d'enfants autistes aux États-Unis et en France vise à analyser la montée en puissance d'un lobbying associatif qui influence les autorités politiques afin d'établir de nouvelles normes en matière d'autisme.