Suchergebnisse

One of the fundamental features of liberal democratic systems is the existence of diverse interests that seek to influence government decisions. It is therefore no surprise that the activities of organized interests present a natural and legitimate part of the democratic process. Nevertheless, we regard lobbyists with considerable skepticism, and the concept of lobbying often has negative connotations. This situation is mainly the result of a growth in the diversification and number of organized interests that often act in informal or unfair ways. Trying to distinguish lobbying from corruption or other illegal ways of influencing people in public office has led many countries to make efforts to level the playing field and the processes that take place in it. The result of these efforts is the introduction of the regulation of lobbying, which may be achieved by means of various tools. The aim of this paper is to briefly map the attempts by the Slovak government to establish rules governing the behavior of organized interests in the Slovak Republic and to identify the preferences of the particular actors in the Slovak political system with respect to the issue of regulating lobbying in Slovakia.

The aim of this article is to underline a more broad and complex approach towards the regulation of lobbying. Our objective here is to provide a systematic enumeration of possible regulatory alternatives. This research involves the examination of the most notable and significant cases of lobbying regulation in the western world and is based largely on the textual analysis of relevant regulatory documents. We do not, however, intend to present the detailed mapping of lobbying regulation in all possible arenas, or evaluate these means, or even recommend particular regulatory options or instruments. We therefore suggest an analytical framework highlighting three important points that should be clarified in each regulatory system: 1) the actors involved in lobbying, 2) the form of regulation, and 3) the regulatory means and instruments. The proposed topography of lobbying regulation can serve as a general basis for the further analysis of regulatory schemes and their comparison, but also as a guide for those considering regulatory options. Adapted from the source document.

The paper deals with lobbying in the EU & CR. The starting point is the selected definitions of lobbying & lobbying efforts to integrate into the broader context of promoting economic interests in society. The text therefore considers the criteria for defining lobbying, the defining of the environment for lobbying & the role of interest groups & tries to map the relevant literature on the topic. When you define the issues of lobbying in the EU, the emphasis is on structural differences between the EU in terms of influence & being influenced & the bureaucratic apparatus throughout the countries. For various interest groups operating in the European political market is important to know the position of the EU institutions to lobbying & their willingness to create binding standards of behavior & conduct (codes), as well as the need to define the line between lobbying & corruption. The text also deals with the assessment & measurement capabilities of different forms & methods of lobbing; it compares the direct & indirect data of the EU-15, the CR & the new EU Member States which regulate lobbying (unlike the CR). Adapted from the source document.

It is obvious that lobbying in European institutions is an inseparable part of the EU legislative process. The growth of lobbying & the greater sensitivity of European institutions to their public image have resulted in lobbying being more closely regulated now. The basic purpose of all regulation & codes is to bring lobbying into the open. The regulation of lobbying in Brussels seems essential so as to introduce greater transparency in EU law making. The aim of this paper is to outline the particularities of lobbying regulation in the European Commission & the European Parliament, ie., the two most lobbied EU institutions. The European Commission, with its monopoly of legislative initiative, offers a unique possibility to influence the process of legislation formation from the very beginning. The EP has been able to amend legislation since the enactment of the Single European Act in July 1987, thereby incorporating certain interests & policy aims in the decision making process. The paper aims to tackle the following questions: What is the development of European institutions' attitudes towards interest group actions? Are there any explicit regulation criteria for the assertion of interests? In this respect, does the EU act homogenously or not? And in the case that it does not, is there any substantiation for different approaches? Adapted from the source document.

This study is an attempt to outline some initial insights into the practice of PA professionals in the Czech Republic. The main goal of our research study was to describe and analyze the state of the field of public affairs (PA). Our main research focus thus was to describe the current situation and build a solid background of the profession and emerging field for further research: first, we characterize professionals working in the field (their professional background, education, income and goals). Next, we attempt to define the main issues they deal with professionally (such as politics, lobbying, the energy sector, etc.). This is followed by a description of the market itself and the level to which it is institutionalized. Finally, we attempt to analyze how PA as a field is understood and perceived by domestic and foreign professionals working in the Czech Republic. In our conclusion, we also state openly a few challenges we encountered during our research and set goals for future research. Adapted from the source document.

A common initiative of the European Parliament and the European Commission resulted in the unification of the rules governing lobbyists at EU level in June 2011. The aim of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature as regards evaluation of the new system of the EU Transparency Register using the CPI methodology and to generate a numerical value for the scheme for further comparative purposes. Detailed analysis of relevant documents indicates that the current EU scheme's index is 26, which mirrors its supposed low level of stringency. Thorough comparison with past regulatory schemes of the Parliament and Commission reveals that, surprisingly, it is the European Parliament which has made greater steps in lobby regulation, especially towards enhancing transparency in lobbying. Although the new scheme represents a compromise between both institutional approaches, regarding its individual elements, there is a clear dominance of the Commission's approach, which can be regarded as the true leader of reform. ; A common initiative of the European Parliament and the European Commission resulted in the unification of the rules governing lobbyists at EU level in June 2011. The aim of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature as regards evaluation of the new system of the EU Transparency Register using the CPI methodology and to generate a numerical value for the scheme for further comparative purposes. Detailed analysis of relevant documents indicates that the current EU scheme's index is 26, which mirrors its supposed low level of stringency. Thorough comparison with past regulatory schemes of the Parliament and Commission reveals that, surprisingly, it is the European Parliament which has made greater steps in lobby regulation, especially towards enhancing transparency in lobbying. Although the new scheme represents a compromise between both institutional approaches, regarding its individual elements, there is a clear dominance of the Commission's approach, which can be regarded as the true leader of reform.

This article seeks to identity functional and systemic shortcomings of the Register of Interest Representatives (the Register) and contrasts them with the Commission's own evaluation of the Register's functioning. Special attention is accorded to the analysis of financial data published by interest groups in the Register. The article builds on original empirical research in which quantifiable data from 1063 registered interest groups were evaluated. The analysis of the financial data is complemented by the results of a questionnaire given to the registered interest groups. The questionnaire was addressed to almost one third (324) of interests registered at the end of February 2009; the return rate achieved 22.84%. The research suggests that the methods for calculating financial amounts are inadequate. This situation is exacerbated by a passive control system of truthfulness and completeness of registered data, as well as by a weak voluntarily motivation to register and by the lack of a sanctions policy. These factors diminish the credibility of the data in the Register. Consequently, the level of transparency with regard to the financial aspects of lobbying is, to a great extent, limited. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of this case study is to explore the application of the code of conduct for lobbyists as one possible modern instrument of lobbying regulation. The reason why the code of conduct was selected out of the other regulatory means is the fact that codes represent the essential principle of lobby regulation in the European Parliament & the European Commission. Therefore the primary objective of this work is to evaluate the attitude of the EU member states towards this particular regulatory instrument. However, the research illustrates that the application of the code has not been extended in the member countries yet. The authorities decided to apply the code only in Lithuania & France. In addition to this, the possibility of introducing the code has been discussed in Ireland. Adapted from the source document.