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AbstractThis paper suggests that the nature of activism is changing to take account of the shifts in political and economic conditions. It further goes on to consider that as a result of these emerging trends we have witnessed a generational shift in how governments, businesses, interest groups and citizens will interact. It is possible to place the issues and questions that this new environment raises under a number of broad headings—Democracy and Dissent, Government and Parliament, Media, and Lobbying –each of which the paper deals with in turn. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications.

Do interest groups strategically select lobbying tactics in response to the legislative context of policies they wish to influence? As rational actors, interest groups should be keen to spend their resources wisely by responding strategically to legislative contexts. This research suggests a theoretical and empirical framework and attempts to explain variations in interest group behavior at the policy level. The empirical design associates direct and indirect interest group lobbying activities with specific policies and tests the hypothesis that interest groups use legislative context as a part of their decision calculus when considering how to lobby Congress. I find that measures of legislative context are important components of models of direct and indirect lobbying. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2007.]

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries & loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries & beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying. Figures, References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]

"We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truthtelling." (author's abstract)

Based on research conducted by the Study of Parliament Group.

Many if not most government policies, regulations, and laws continue in effect unless changed by the legislature, providing a natural dynamic to the political process. Lobbying is a ubiquitous component of that process and can affect both proposal making and voting. This paper characterizes Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic legislative bargaining model with stable policies and durable coalitions despite lobbying. Interest groups aligned with challenges to the incumbent coalition have a greater willingness to pay than have the defending interest groups, but the defenders have a legislative incumbency advantage in needing to counter-lobby fewer legislators than the challengers lobby. If legislators are sufficiently patient, equilibria exist such that the defenders of the incumbent coalition are successful. More than a minimal majority may be lobbied by the challengers, and coalitions can be surplus. Lobbying can increase proposal power, resulting in a more unequal distribution within a coalition.