Suchergebnisse

This paper examines features common to both policy analyses and community-power studies, focusing on the conceptualization of power, the boundary specification of the system, the content of relationships and the effects of institutional frameworks. Two community studies, `Altneustadt' and `Towertown', provide the empirical basis. The effects of the institutional frameworks on policy-domain networks and the relation between policy-domain networks and policy networks are analyzed empirically, with information relationships as the most important content of the networks. With regard to boundary specification, actors in issue-specific networks differ from the discussion partners of actors within the social system, depending on the phase in the political process. Both pluralistic approaches and structural aspects of the policy domains are analyzed. In theory, the different institutional conditions in the German and American communities lead one to expect differences that can, in fact, be demonstrated empirically.

Studied are the factors that determine local policy outputs in Israel's centrist system. The variables used in comparing the effects on local expenditure policy are: political & SE variables & the role of tax revenue & central (government) aid. The political variable, party competition, was found to have little effect on local service expenditures. SE variables, eg, industrialization, urbanization, number of welfare recipients, & residents' average wealth, age, & educational level, were found to be related more to local service expenditures than to local/state services. However, these variables did have a strong influence on local service policy through tax revenue, which was found to be an intervening variable rather than a policy output. Government aid was paramount in determining the local policy in two ways: by increasing local capacity & by influencing the methods & options of distribution. The data, which were analyzed in a two-step model using causal ordering through path analysis, suggest that individuals can operate as important brokers for communities that want to obtain government aid. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Diagram. T. Keister.

Introduction: Course Syllabus -- Globalization and Global Policies -- Concepts and Principles of Conflict -- Concepts and Principles of Negotiation -- Domestic Interests and International Negotiations -- Concepts and Principles of Cooperation -- Climate Change Policy -- The CDM: A Cooperation Mechanism? -- Shaping Global Policies by International Organizations and NGOs.

This paper estimates the impact of central grants on local spending decisions in England in the 19%. The analysis is based on a more explicit conceptual framework and a more appropriate methodology than conventionally used to measure grant effects in 'output' studies' of local policy variation. A set of six hypotheses is derived from political and economic theories of grant impact. The relationship between grants and expenditure change is estimated through a TSLS (Two Stage Least Squares) regression model. The main empirical results are that grants are an important constraint on spending decisions and that different types of grants have different effects: lump sum grants are substitutive and matching grants are stimulative. The evidence also indicates that spending is influenced by party politics, service needs and the local tax base.

Analyses political and economic theories of the role of grants, and assesses the quality of the existing evidence on the relationship between central grants and local policies in the UK. Specifies a statistical model of the impact of grants on local expenditure and presents evidence on the validity of the model in the context of English local authorities. (SJK)

This paper critically surveys the growing literature on the policy choices of local governments. First, we identify various reasons for local government policy interactions, including fiscal competition, bidding for firms, yardstick competition, expenditure spillovers, and Tiebout sorting. We discuss theoretically what parameters should be estimated to determine the reason for competition among local governments. We emphasize how the policy outcomes emerging from this competition are affected by the presence of constraints imposed by higher-level governments. Second, we integrate theoretical and empirical analyses on the effects of fiscal decentralization on mobility, spillovers, fiscal externalities, economic outcomes, and distributional issues. Third, we identify key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of strategic interactions among local governments and highlight recent quasi-experimental evidence that has attempted to identify the mechanism at work. Finally, a synthesis model, containing multiple mechanisms and fiscal instruments, resolves some puzzles and provides guidance for future research.