Suchergebnisse

Examines fundraising activities of the two main loyalist paramilitary groups, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Pt. 1, In defense of the realm: financing loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland; pt. 2, Drink, drugs, and rock 'n' roll: financing loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland. Role of extortion and blackmail of small and large businesses and on building sites, risk of corruption among senior ranking loyalists, drinking clubs, robberies, drug trafficking, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) "rat pack", counterfeiting, fuel rackets, and other frauds.

This paper analyses the use of violence by Loyalist paramilitaries over the course of the peace process and after the Belfast Agreement. The focus is on a largely understudied area in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. It is argued that Loyalist paramilitaries have continually used violence to serve several objectives. These objectives of violence have shifted in dominance as the peace process unfolded. A typology of the objectives of Loyalist violence is presented which identifies violence as either between or within groups and in search of political, sectarian, economic, social and territorial aims. In conclusion, the article considers some implications of continuing Loyalist paramilitary violence for state and society. (Ethnopolitics)

Staying put -- The Loyalist prison experience -- Class matters -- Fighting with history instead of guns -- Loyalism and the voluntary sector -- Loyalist feuds -- Immigrants, paramilitaries, and turf -- What to do with the paramilitaries?

LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES HAVE BEEN CARRYING OUT VIGILANTE ATTACKS SINCE THE EARLIEST YEARS OF THE TROUBLES. IN FOUR OF THE PAST SIX YEARS, THEY HAVE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT MORE VIGILANTE ATTACKS THAN REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARIES. YET DESPITE THIS HISTORY, VIRTUALLY NOTHING HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT THIS ASPECT OF PARAMILITARISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF LOYALIST VIGILANTISM. THE IMPACT OF PIVOTAL EVENTS SUCH AS THE 1985 ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT AND THE 1994 CEASE-FIRES ARE DISCUSSED. THE VIGILANTISM CLEARLY FULFILS A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS FOR THE LOYALISTS BUT IT ALSO CARRIES HEAVY COSTS. THE ARTICLE EXAMINES HOW THE POLITICAL PARTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PARAMILITARIES HAVE STRUGGLED TO ACCOMMODATE THE VIGILANTE CAMPAIGNS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO BUILD WIDER POLITICAL APPEAL. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES THAT DESPITE THE POLITICAL COSTS, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND APPEAR TO FAVOR AN INTENSIFICATION RATHER THAN A DIMINUTION OF LOYALIST VIGILANTISM.

Following the 1998 Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland, levels of paramilitary violence have declined substantially. Among loyalists, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and associated Red Hand Commando (RHC) have formally renounced violence, and dissolved their 'military structures', and perhaps the most reticent of all of the major paramilitary groupings, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), has taken on board the central tenets of conflict transformation, and 'stood down' all of its 'active service units' in the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Thus, paramilitary violence now is mainly confined to the activities of 'dissident' republican groups, notably the Real and Continuity IRAs, although low-level sectarian violence remains a problem. Such dramatic societal and political change has resulted in a focus on the roles of formal party political leadership as agents of social change. This gaze, however, tends to obscure other important events such as the efforts, structures and approaches taken at the grassroots level to uphold and sustain conflict transformation and to maintain a reduction in violence. This article provides analysis of the role played by former loyalist paramilitary combatants in conflict transformation, and draws on material obtained through significant access to those former paramilitaries engaged in processes of societal shifts. In both personal and structural terms there is evidence of former combatants working to diminish the political tensions that remain as a result of the long-term inter-communal hostility developed across decades of violence and conflict. Adapted from the source document.

Information available regarding the use of the 'military instrument' by loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland tends to be addressed journalistically. This article states that there is a need for a reinterpretation of loyalist activity employing a synthetic method. It is hoped that the utilisation of the 'strategic approach' will provide this new, academic understanding of loyalist terrorist organisations. Essentially, the strategic approach is concerned with tracing the line of thinking of political actors to comprehend how they propose to achieve their objectives. Emerging as an offshoot from public choice economics, it shares assumptions found in game, drama and rational choice theory. Due to the early hypothesis stage of this research this article will not present findings as such, but will offer an alternative approach and invite comments.