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Digital ‘liquid’ consumption is delimited from solid physical possession by ephemerality, dematerialisation, and accessibility. Web3 applications (including non-fungible tokens, the metaverse and decentralised platforms) have the potential to de-liquify consumption and re-attribute the notions of ownership, longevity, and materiality to digital goods. Daniel Albrecht Nuedling writes that Web3 technologies reshape the notion of digital ownership and offer … Continued

A year and a half ago I published an Op-Ed article and
Blog post on the great popular revolt in Cuba motivated by economic hardship
and the lack of future prospects, aggravated by the pandemic. I speculated that
since the Army was the country's most powerful and best-organized institution, some generals might try to maintain their advantageous economic
positions by avoiding participating in the repression and seeking a reformist
accommodation. This was not the case. The week after the revolt, five high-ranking
generals died without the causes being clarified and a few months later General
Luis-Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja, head of the business and financial
conglomerate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces that controls the main landmarks
of the Cuban economy, including the tourism sector, and one of the most
important men in the command structure in Cuba, also died suddenly.

Cuba had experienced in July 2021 the largest
anti-government protests since the Revolution. The previous crisis, the
Maleconazo of 1994 (the subject of the documentary Balseros, co-produced
by TV de Catalunya and nominated for an Oscar) ended with 300 people arrested.
The 2021 revolt generated 1,400 detainees, 790 prosecuted and 128 sentenced to
prison terms of up to thirty years.

Between the two crises, the Cuban opposition lost its
historic leaders. Oswaldo Payá was the victim of a probable assassination
attempt; Gustavo Arcos, whom I visited in Havana, died; Elizardo Sánchez, whom
I also met, was held captive by spies and infiltrators. Cardinal Jaime Ortega
must be in Heaven.

In parallel, the exile voice in Miami has almost been extinguished
after the death of its veteran leaders and the adaptation of the next
generation born in the United States. Neither the conservative Mas Canosa nor
the social democrat Jesús Díaz, in whose magazine I collaborated, are among us
anymore, while my friend the liberal Carlos Alberto Montaner has already
written his memoirs. The last time I went to the Café Versailles on 8th Street,
it looked like an abandoned place.

According to economist Albert Hirschman, there are three
alternatives to a political regime: voice, loyalty, and exit. As I have
described, voice has been harshly repressed in Cuba for the last year and a half. But at the same time, the economic situation has worsened, and loyalty to
the regime has diminished.

Last September there was a referendum on gay marriage and
other family issues, which could have been viewed positively given the
Revolution's homophobic record. But it turned into a plebiscite on the regime
and more than half of the census did not vote or voted against, null or blank.
In November there were municipal elections in which 40% of the census did not
participate or rejected the candidates selected by the single party. This
disaffection is unprecedented in Cuba, where in Fidel Castro's time 95% voted.
In the regime's typical response mobilization, they had to get Raul Castro out
of bed, at 91 years of age and without any official position, to see if this
would revive the revolutionary spirit. 

Hirschman explains that when the voice is eliminated and
loyalty is lowered, the only alternative is the exit, i.e., emigration. Thus,
since the July 2021 revolt, some 250,000 Cubans have left the island, a figure
far higher than the sum of all previous emigration crises.

Leaving Cuba by sea is illegal without a visa. Donald
Trump dismantled the U.S. consulate in Havana and suspended the issuance of
visas. But according to the Cuban Adjustment Act, anyone who sets foot on land,
even without a visa, is considered a refugee. Faced with the massive flight, the
U.S. Coast Guard has captured at sea and returned to the island more than two
thousand Cubans trying to reach Florida this past year. At least 100 died in
the crossing.

The other way out requires traveling by plane to the
Bahamas, Panama, Nicaragua, or Mexico and attempting to cross the Mexican
border with the United States on foot. For a Cuban with an average salary
equivalent to thirty-three dollars a month, this type of journey involves a cost
of eight to ten thousand dollars, including ransoms to coyotes and polleros
and bribes to corrupt officials. Despite all this, the number of Cubans who
manage to cross the southern border of the United States has steadily increased
to 35,000 in a month.

During the year 2022, with the presidency of Joe Biden,
the US issued some 20,000 immigrant visas. A few days ago, on January 4, the
Consulate in Havana resumed its services. Long lines and hundreds of thousands
of petitions to leave the island legally are expected, the vast majority of
young people without vital expectations.

Fidel Castro repeated several times his curse that
"first the island will sink into the sea before abandoning
communism". Posthumously, he may end up succeeding.In Catalan and Spanish in daily ARA:https://www.arabalears.cat/opinio/cuba-enfonsa-mar-josep-colomer_129_4596330.htmlCOMMENTSResumen certero, conciso y por desgracia triste, de la actualidad de Cuba. Lo he circulado en mi chat hispano-latinoamericano (aún hay irredentos que creen en la revolución cubana).Saludos cordiales.RamónRamón Puig de la Bellacasa AlberolaEmbajador…Impresiona lo que cuentas sobre Cuba, en lo que te veo te has involucrado a fondo. Yo recuerdo mis amigos nicaragüenses, y ahora veo con lo que tienen que vivir, si es que no han salido del país…Víctor Pérez DiazSociólogoMuchísimas gracias por el último articulo que me has enviado sobre cuba.Un fuerte abrazoJose Manuel BandrésTribunal SupremoTerrific article. Gracias.Alfred CuzanWest Florida UniversityTriste realidad!Pedro FreyreAkerman's International PracticeMuy difícil el panorama cubano; no hay mejor metáfora que la referida maldición de Castro que citas. Acabo de regresar una semana, entre la inflación y la depauperación generalizada…Carlos-Manuel Rodríguez-ArechavaletaUniversidad Iberoamericana, MéxicoBellísima y elocuentes palabras. Gracias por abordar este tema. No había pensado lo del vacío de liderazgo miamense que mencionas.Javier CorralesAmherst College, MassachusettsGracias, Josep, por un elocuente y triste artículo.Leandro Prados de la EscosuraUniversidad Carlos IIIAgraït . Desconeixia les actuals tensions a Cuba.Josep M.BricallBarcelonaArtículo muy interesante, como todos los tuyos, que leo con devoción. Merece amplia difusión. En los tiempos que corren, visto lo que sucede en Brasil, USA y Europa, provoca gran curiosidad lo que pueda suceder en Cuba en relación con la democracia.Oscar Rodriguez BuznegoUniversidad de OviedoEnhorabuena por lo atinado de tu texto, aunque sea un escenario lamentableManuel AlcantaraUniversidad de SalamancaMolt bé Josep! El curs passat vaig ser uns mesos a RDom i ho vaig veure d'aprop. El 10 de Febrer me'n hi torno.Joan Maria ThomàsUniversitat Rovira i VirgiliMolt bon article. Important trencar el silenci.Andreu Claret SerraEl PeriodicoMuchas gracias! Un recordatorio necesarioManuel Villoria MendietaUniversidad Rey Juan CarlosExcel·lent. Com sempre.Carlos Castro SanzLa Vanguardia

Historically, Black voters in the US have supported the Democratic Party. But after successive Democratic victories at the national and state level, and seemingly few tangible benefits for the Black community, this support is beginning to waver, writes Donovan A. Watts. In new research which analyses the party identification of Black Americans, he finds that … Continued

Justice O'Connor is rightly admired for her inspiring life story and unswerving loyalty to the highest civic principles as well as the ideals of the judiciary.

The Russian political system needs elections. Especially at the regional level, they serve to cultivate loyalty and as an initiation ritual for governors, their aides, and local power brokers.

Neben Payback gibt es viele weitere Anbieter, die mithilfe des sogenannten Loyalty Marketing versuchen, u.a. durch Rabattaktionen eine langfristige Kundenzufriedenheit und -bindung zu erreichen. Auf den ersten Blick scheint dies eine Win-Win-Situation für Anbieter und KartenbesitzerInnen zu sein: Treue gegen Rabatte. Dahinter steckt jedoch ein weitaus kritischer zu betrachtendes Tauschgeschäft: Daten gegen Rabatte. Ich spare […]

Republican political strategist Sarah Longwell and ABC News Political Director Rick Klein said ahead of 2024, the economy is top of mind for voters, enthusiasm for President Joe Biden is low and loyalty to former President Donald Trump remains strong.

In pro-democracy uprisings around the globe—from the Philippines' People Power Revolution to the collapse of Indonesia's New Order to the fall of the Pinochet regime in Chile—defection of military and security forces to the side of the people has proven pivotal in weakening authoritarian regimes. These shifts in loyalty signaled to the public that cracks […]
The post Dismantling the Junta from Within appeared first on International Republican Institute.

 There's been a lot of talk recently about Blacks and Latinos shifting to the Republican party (an example).   Most of the accounts I've seen say that it results from a weakening of party loyalty, so that Black and Latino conservatives start moving to their "natural" home.  However, you would expect that to be a gradual process, much of it the result of generational replacement--why would it be happening now more than it was 10, 20, or 30 years ago?  I looked at the Echelon Insights surveys, which ask people about their views of Joe Biden and Donald Trump, comparing the latest one available (Feb 2024) to October 2021, which I chose as the baseline so that we would be past Biden's "honeymoon" and the reaction to January 6 would have had time to fade.  The figure shows change in mean favorability (4=very favorable, 3=somewhat favorable, 2=somewhat unfavorable, 1=very unfavorable), for groups that were included in  reports (party, race/ethnicity, sex, income, education).Biden's ratings have declined among most groups, and Trumps have risen, but three stand out:  blacks, Hispanics, and people without a college degree.  These groups have had the largest anti-Biden and pro-Trump shifts.  People without a college degree are different from Blacks and Hispanics because they already gave strong support to Trump--that is, the decline of party loyalty explanation can't account for their change.  Is there any common factor that might explain the recent shift of these three groups?  I think that it might be the increase in foreign conflicts and illegal immigration.  As I've mentioned before, many people think that other countries take advantage of the United States--they we try to be fair but they don't.  The political importance of this feeling is likely to increase when times are tough--people will think that under the circumstances we can't afford to worry about other countries and their problems and need to focus on our own national interests.  This point is relevant to the group shifts because blacks, Hispanics, and less educated people tend to be more suspicious of others--less likely to think that other people can be trusted or will generally treat you fairly--and the differences are big by the standard of individual-level survey data.  That suggests that they will respond more strongly to the kind of appeals that Trump makes.  But it also suggests that they may shift strongly in the other direction if Biden seems to be getting things under control.  

Qualifying
for this fall's Louisiana governor's race went off as expected – predictably
since to make a serious effort once must start campaigning months in advance of
the due date. So, where do things stand?

Among the 16 candidates were a retread here and
there among the several significant ones, the latter being Republicans state
Sen. Sharon Hewitt, Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry, state Rep. Richard Nelson, Treasurer John Schroder, and past top gubernatorial
appointee Stephen Waguespack; Democrat and
recent cabinet member Shawn Wilson,
and independent lawyer Hunter Lundy.
They gained this distinction by having large enough campaign war chests – in
Lundy's case, mostly self-financed – with at least occasional media references
to their candidacies.

Although clearly Landry by this metric is in a
class of his own. Having spent millions already and with over $9 million available,
that banked figure means Hewitt has in her account 3.8 percent of that
total, Nelson has 3
percent, Schroder has 24 percent,
Waguespack has 24.2
percent, Wilson has 6.5
percent, and Lundy has 23 percent.
That is, all together the significant candidates have 84.5 percent of Landry's
total.

This means, as long as it isn't frivolous and stupid,
that the Landry campaign holds all the cards to make an inevitable general
election runoff, along with Wilson for whose campaign money doesn't matter as
much because of the pathological loyalty many black voters have for, especially
a black, Democrats. To be sure, Wilson
is a weak candidate, but he won't draw less than a quarter of the vote and perhaps
could go as high as a third.

That creates a problem for all other candidates
not named Landry. Currently, according
to every recent poll unconnected to a campaign or interest group and just of
all of these but one backing Waguespack, no other candidate but Landry and
Wilson draw even higher single digits. And given that Landry polls in the same quarter
to third range as Wilson, anyone other that them must either hack votes from
Landry or cannibalize practically all support from others save Wilson in order
to ace out Landry from the inevitable runoff.

To do that, they will have to spend some resources
boosting themselves, but most of it attacking Landry and each other. Their problem
is Landry has the resources to fend off attacks against him and to go negative on
them, if not drown them out completely. It's almost an impossible task.

Perhaps the Republicans other than Landry –
discounting the novelty candidacy of Lundy who seems to be attracting
old-school white Democrats, but really applicable to the two much more monied
candidacies of Schroder and Waguespack while the resource-poor Hewitt and
Nelson candidacies have become the longest of shots – can hold out hope that
something like 2015 can occur where frontrunner Republican former Sen. David
Vitter had a money and polling advantage but went down to current Democrat Gov.
John Bel Edwards.

Back
then, as with Landry and Wilson now, Edwards and Vitter basically ran even
in polls. But those numbers and finance figures were very different than today.
Vitter at that point eight years ago had about $5 million banked,
but his two major Republican opponents former Lt. Gov. Scott Angelle and then
Lt. Gov. Jay Dardenne,
had, respectively, just over a
million and just
under $2 million, so they were in a somewhat-better position to try to
overtake Vitter. More importantly, they didn't have nearly as much ground to
make up; both were polling into double digits, with Angelle close to Vitter in
a race to the runoff where eventually he would lose to him by just four points.

In short, Landry is in a better position than
Vitter was in 2015, and has the money and a slew of endorsements and backers
that would make going negative on him much less effective than when Angelle and
Dardenne teamed up on Vitter as a response to try to make the runoff against
Edwards. Even the entry of retread black Democrat Omar Dantzler, who in his many campaigns
has
run to the far left and will take a small chunk out of Wilson's vote, won't
be enough to push Wilson down enough to allow Schroder or Waguespack to leap
over him.

Unlike the frontrunner in 2015, Landry has created
enough separation from his main rivals and has enough resources to fend them
off while negating the negative campaigning that will come to try to close the
gap that will fail to injure his chances against Democrat Wilson in a runoff. That
pairing remains overwhelmingly likely, and an eventual Landry triumph that
probable as well.

On February 15, the U.S. government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Somalia to construct up to five military bases for the Somali National Army in the name of bolstering the army's capabilities in the ongoing fight against the militant group al-Shabaab. This is a troubling development that not only risks further militarizing Somalia and perpetuating endless war, but comes with the potential of exacerbating geopolitical rivalries at the expense of the needs and interests of ordinary Somalis. According to statements by U.S. officials, the bases are intended for the Danab ("Lightning") Brigade, a U.S.-sponsored Special Ops Force that was established in 2014. Funding for Danab initially came from the U.S. State Department, which contracted the private security firm Bancroft Global to train and advise the unit. More recently, Danab has received funding, equipment, and training from the Department of Defense. U.S. support is made possible by the 127e program, a U.S. budgetary authority that allows the Pentagon to bypass congressional oversight by allowing U.S. special operations forces to use foreign military units as surrogates in counterterrorism missions. The Intercept has documented similar 127e operations in multiple African countries, primarily in locations that the U.S. government does not recognize as combat zones, but in which AFRICOM troops are present on the ground.But this MoU is about much more than the U.S. government's proclaimed commitment to help Somalia defeat al-Shabaab. It is a clear indication of the growing geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa, and comes at a time of mounting concerns (mostly attempts by Yemen's Houthis to disrupt global shipping in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza) about securing the flow of international commerce via the Red Sea. It also coincides with a growing awareness that rising tensions in the Middle East could force the U.S. out of Iraq.The U.S. government's plan to train Somali security forces at newly-established military bases in five different parts of the country (Baidoa, Dhusamareb, Jowhar, Kismayo, and Mogadishu) is a back-door strategy not only to expand the U.S. military's presence in Somalia, but to position itself more assertively vis-à-vis other powers in the region. Indeed, the 127e program is not the only policy that allows for the training and equipping of foreign forces as proxies: section 1202 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act further expands the ability of the U.S. to wage war via surrogate forces in places where it has not formally declared war, with the broader objective of countering the influence of adversaries like China and Russia. While much ink has been spilled attempting to analyze great power competition on the continent, we have yet to adequately scrutinize the growing influence of middle powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar who are each attempting to negotiate their own sphere of influence, and whose involvement in the Horn points to uncertain, if not waning, U.S. power. Turkey maintains its largest foreign military presence in Mogadishu, has trained Somali security forces, and more recently has worked closely with the Somali government in conducting drone strikes against Al-Shabaab. Further underlining deepening Turkish engagement in the country, Somalia and Turkey signed defense and economic agreements earlier this month. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have trained, and continue to train, local security forces as part of a broader strategy to secure access to regional markets and to assert their control over vital shipping lanes in the Red Sea.With the drawdown of the African Union sponsored "peacekeeping" mission — previously known as AMISOM but renamed ATMIS in 2022 — analysts have expressed apprehension about the expansive nature of foreign actor involvement in Somalia and the risk of Cold War-style competition fueling instability. Indeed, the foreign-sponsored training of multiple "elite" contingents of the Somali National Army (Danab, Waran, Gashaan) has prompted internal divisions within the security establishment in Somalia as it raises chain of command issues and questions about the loyalty of these units. As Colin D. Robinson and Jahara Matisek, both regional and military experts, have said, "The only thing worse is that various Somali units become more loyal and dependent on their foreign patron, short-circuiting the political logic of having security forces that look more like hired proxies than locally organized for self-defense. This may contribute to the growing perception of Somalia becoming a hyper-competitive arena; a republic of militias if you will."Equally significant is the recently announced Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a separatist region in northwestern Somalia. According to the terms of this yet-to-be signed agreement, in exchange for Somaliland granting 20km of much coveted sea access for the Ethiopian Navy for a period of 50 years, Ethiopia would formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent nation. The MoU has elicited a wave of anger among Somalis who view Ethiopia as meddling in their internal affairs — and it is precisely this history of meddling that has in the past contributed to al-Shabaab's support base as it positions itself as the defender of Somali nationalism and autonomy. While the U.S. State Department called for respect for Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and urged dialogue in response to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU in the name of de-escalating tensions in the region, the February 15 announcement that the U.S. intends to ramp up its involvement in Somalia is hardly an indication of a neutral stance. Rather, it is an indication of U.S. positioning in an increasingly militarized jockeying by foreign powers in this strategic but troubled country and region. In Mogadishu, many Somalis are welcoming the U.S. announcement, perhaps in some cases hoping for job opportunities, and in others viewing the U.S. military support and presence as a potential buffer against Ethiopia. But if the past several decades of U.S. mis-adventures in Somalia are any indication, expanding U.S. involvement risks perpetuating rather than minimizing further conflict.

The so-called GOP "civil war" over the role the United States should play in the world made headlines earlier this week when the Senate finally passed a national security supplemental that provides $60 billion in aid for Ukraine and $14 billion for Israel. The legislation, which was supported by President Joe Biden and the overwhelming majority of the Senate's Democratic caucus, proved more controversial among Republicans. Twenty-two GOP Senators voted in favor of the legislation, while 27 opposed it.An analysis of the votes shows an interesting generational divide within the Republican caucus.Each of the five oldest Republicans in the Senate — and nine of the ten oldest — voted in favor of the supplemental spending package. Conversely, the six youngest senators, and 12 of the 14 youngest, opposed it. Equally striking was the breakdown of votes among Republicans based on when they assumed their current office. Of the 49 sitting GOP Senators, 30 were elected before Donald Trump first became the party's presidential candidate in 2016. Eighteen of those 30 supported the aid legislation. Of the members who came to office in 2017 or later, only four voted to advance the bill, while 15 voted against. The difference in votes among those elected since 2016 is likely partly attributable to Trump's unconventional approach to foreign policy. The Republican party establishment during the Cold War and Global War on Terror is often associated with hawkishness, including towards Russia. While the party has always carried some skepticism toward foreign aid, some of the most significant spending increases have taken place during the presidencies of Republicans Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. Trump, however, won in 2016 in part for his open disdain for mission creep after the GWOT, what he called the failed war in Iraq, and foreign aid he believed made countries dependents rather than reciprocal partners and allies."[Trump] certainly created the cognitive space," Brandan Buck, a U.S. Army veteran and historian of GOP foreign policy, tells RS. "He's more of an intuitive thinker than a person of principle, but I think him being on the scene, prying open the Overton window has allowed for a greater array of dissenting voices." Others have argued that the trends are perhaps also indicative of the loyalty that Republicans who assumed their offices during the Trump presidency feel toward him. Trump spoke out forcefully against the legislation in advance of the vote. "WE SHOULD NEVER GIVE MONEY ANYMORE WITHOUT THE HOPE OF A PAYBACK, OR WITHOUT "STRINGS" ATTACHED. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SHOULD BE "STUPID" NO LONGER!," the former president wrote on the social media platform Truth Social the weekend before the vote. The vote cannot only be explained by ideology, as some typically hawkish allies of Trump, like Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) ultimately voted against the package. Graham is a staunch supporter of Israel, has voted for previous Ukraine aid packages, and in the past called aid for Ukraine "a good investment" and "the best money we've ever spent." By the time the vote on the most recent spending package came around, Graham was lamenting the lack of border security provisions and echoing Trump's argument that aid to Ukraine should be a "loan."Meanwhile, Senators took note of the generational gap, and the debate spilled over into the public."Nearly every Republican Senator under the age of 55 voted NO on this America Last bill," wrote Sen. Eric Schmitt (R-Mo.), 48, on the social media platform X. "Things are changing just not fast enough." Schmitt was elected in 2022."Youthful naivety is bliss, the wisdom of age may save the west," retorted Sen. Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.) "Reagan may be dead, but his doctrine saved the world during less dangerous times than these. If the modern Marx (Putin for the youngsters) restores the USSR while we pretend it's not our problem, God help us." Cramer, 63, was sworn in in 2019, making him one of the handful of recently elected senators to support the aid legislation. "I like Kevin, but come on, man, have some self-awareness," Sen. J.D. Vance fired back. "This moment calls out for many things, but boomer neoconservatism is not among them."Vance, who at 39 is the youngest Republican member of the Senate, noted in his post that "the fruits of this generation in American leadership is: quagmire in Afghanistan, war in Iraq under false pretenses." He said younger Americans were disillusioned with that track record. Buck, who served several tours in the Afghanistan war, and whose research includes generational trends in U.S. foreign policy thinking, pointed out that there is strong historical precedent for believing that age and generation affect how members of Congress view America's role in the world. "It's certainly not unusual for there to be generational trends in foreign policy thinking, especially within the Republican Party," Buck told RS. Following the end of World War II, he said, it took "a full churning" of the conservative movement to replace old-school non-interventionist Republicans and to get the party in line with the Cold War consensus. "I think what we're seeing now is something similar but in reverse with a generation of conservatives."He added that the failures of the War on Terror resulted in a deep skepticism of the national security state and the Republican party establishment. Opinion polling and trends show that the American public that grew up either during or in the shadow of the disastrous military campaigns in the Greater Middle East is generally opposed to military intervention and more questioning of American institutions."All the energy on FP [foreign policy] in the GOP right now is with the younger generation that wants fundamental transformation of USFP [U.S. foreign policy]," noted Justin Logan, director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, on X. "The self-satisfied, insular neocons who loathe their voters' FP views are a dying breed."

Foreign policy mandarins have spent years fighting over what to make of former President Donald Trump. At heart, is he a hawk or a dove? Does he hope to be a new Nixon, capable of seeking detente with enemies despite (or even because of) his mean streak? Or perhaps a new Reagan, focused on achieving "peace through strength"?I might ask it a different way: Who cares? New political science research suggests that Trump's personal views are not the most important part of the puzzle. In short, it's the advisers, stupid. This may sound like received wisdom, but its implications are profound. Researchers created an unprecedented dataset of minutes from presidential meetings related to foreign policy during the Cold War. Using complex statistical methods, they found that the relative hawkishness of a president's advisers is a remarkably good predictor of whether a leader will make "conflictual decisions" regarding an adversary.The differences can be stark. If you assemble the most hawkish group of presidential advisers from the Cold War, the model predicts they would make six times as many aggressive choices as the least hawkish group. Over the course of a presidency, that could mean hundreds of extra moves liable to spark new conflicts or escalate simmering disputes."Who dominates the room [...] does seem to have a systematic effect" on whether presidents choose hawkish or dovish paths, said Tyler Jost, a professor at Brown University who co-led the project.Now, Trump has a unique opportunity. The new research finds that hawkishness is surprisingly consistent from administration to administration; in fact, it varies more within administrations than between them — a statistical testament to the power of the so-called foreign policy "blob." Perhaps more than any president in recent memory, Trump has the chance to ditch advocates of global primacy and hire proponents of a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.Indeed, the former president is spoiled for choice. Most candidates for posts in a new Trump administration now agree that Washington should shift its focus to Asia by pursuing real retrenchment in Europe and the Middle East. Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio) — a close Trump ally and top vice presidential candidate — has slammed U.S. military adventurism, called for a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, and even voted in favor of removing U.S. troops from Syria in December.New think tanks have popped up to support this viewpoint, and some old conservative stalwarts have refashioned themselves as America Firsters who want to help shape a different, more populist vision of U.S. foreign policy. These groups are creating staffing pipelines for a new brand of conservative foreign policy, and the consequences of their investment could go far beyond 2024.The transition battleThe Heritage Foundation wants you to know that it's changed. Once a premier home for neocons and uber hawks, the eminence grise of conservative politics now loudly calls for the U.S. to pull back from the Middle East and Europe, all while railing against inefficient military spending.Heritage's shift reflects broader changes in the conservative movement dating back to Trump's first election in 2016. "The real America First foreign policy position recognizes that the last few decades were characterized by a series of blunders," argued Micah Meadowcroft, the research director at the conservative Center for Renewing America (CRA) and a former staffer in the Trump White House. "Our leadership class messed up badly" during the so-called unipolar moment by launching a global crusade against terrorism and ignoring China's rise, Meadowcroft told RS.Conservative realists hope that recognizing this shift will allow the U.S. to focus all of its attention on preparing for — and hopefully deterring — a war with China over Taiwan. "China remains the single greatest threat to American interests in the world today, and we just haven't been acting like it," said Alex Velez-Green, a former adviser to Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) now based at Heritage. "My view is that a new administration will really need to prioritize it."The key question is how to strike a balance between deterrence and provocation. Velez-Green draws on a "peace through strength" tradition exemplified by Elbridge Colby, a prominent China hawk who appears poised to get a major role in a new Trump administration. While all hope to avoid war, other realists have argued for a more conservative approach to Beijing's rise.Regardless of the reasons behind this broader shift, conservatives have made big investments in order to shape its path. The most influential effort is Heritage's Project 2025, an initiative that has raised millions of dollars to identify potential staffers for a second Trump administration and plan policies to help vault it back into the White House.For supporters of a more restrained foreign policy, Project 2025 has a lot to offer. While any Heritage program is bound to make up a big tent of conservative views, "the leadership of Project 2025 is a lot more aligned to a more Trumpian strain of America First, which is a more narrow, national-interest oriented idea," said Sumantra Maitra of the CRA, who has advised on the effort. Will Ruger, who Trump nominated as his ambassador to Afghanistan, welcomed Heritage's shift toward a "much more prudential approach to American foreign policy."But there are still some reasons to doubt Heritage's restraint bona fides. Project 2025's transition manifesto makes clear that the conservative tone setter is not quite ready to drop its commitment to fighting global terrorism and keeping down America's parochial enemies, however weak they may now be.Of course, Heritage is far from the only game in town. Its foreign policy team has often found common cause with the CRA, a right-wing think tank with restraint-oriented views on international affairs that Maitra said will be a "key player" in the planning for a second Trump term. Trump himself reportedly read and at least partially endorsed Maitra's CRA paper calling for a major down-sizing of the U.S. role in NATO.On the other side, traditional hawks at organizations like the American Enterprise Institute and the Hoover Institute continue to hold sway in both mainstream and conservative media, as Meadowcroft pointed out. But many prominent hard-line hawks — like one-time Trump adviser John Bolton — have had a sufficiently large break with the MAGA movement to make them persona non grata in any future Trump White House.The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) appears determined to split the difference. Like Heritage, AFPI has questioned the wisdom of continued U.S. aid to Ukraine and pushed hard for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of its own defense. But the startup policy outfit — created as something of a White House in waiting — has a bit of a neocon streak when it comes to the Middle East, with a particular focus on countering Iranian influence and supporting Israel.There is no love lost between Heritage and AFPI, as journalist Sam Adler-Bell recently noted in the New York Times. "A.F.P.I. partisans see Heritage as a latecomer to the Trump train, establishment wolves in 'America First' clothing," Adler-Bell wrote. "Some at Heritage see A.F.P.I. as a redoubt of precisely those unreliable Trump appointees — grifters and RINOs — who trade on their relationships with the president to ensure they can continue to run the show." This antipathy helps to explain why AFPI has a separate Trump staffing effort, known as the America First Transition Project.One should note, however, that the two don't always disagree. They share some staff and have both kept strong ties to more traditional foreign policy shops. Part of this stems from the fact that even the more dovish members of the GOP national security world are more hawkish on, say, the Middle East and Venezuela than hard-line realists. But, on balance, restrainers are more skeptical of AFPI than their old foes at Heritage.It remains unclear which side has Trump's ear. AFPI associates — including Fred Fleitz, Keith Kellogg, and John Ratcliffe — often show up on lists of current and potential future Trump advisers. He also reportedly consults with former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), who rank among the most hawkish figures in American politics. (Pompeo's habit of calling himself a "realist" is a particular point of frustration for many America Firsters.)But, as efforts like Project 2025 demonstrate, Trump will no longer be stuck with old-school options on every front. There are no hardcore restrainers known to be in the running for major roles, but the former president is reportedly considering Richard Grenell and Kash Patel — both of whom have a somewhat less interventionist streak — for top jobs in his administration. And, as just about everyone I spoke with noted, there's still plenty of time for other potential nominees to gain ground before the election."The bench is deeper, and therefore there are more folks to turn to if a president wants to go in a restraint direction," said Ruger.Trump 2.0Much of the planning for a second Trump administration revolves around staffing. This laser focus is a response to his first term, in which advisers and officials often took steps to block the implementation of the president's preferred policies.Take Syria. When Trump ordered that U.S. troops be withdrawn from the country in 2019, the move sparked an uproar among policy experts who argued that it would leave our Kurdish allies in the lurch. Jim Jeffrey — then the special envoy to Syria — persuaded Trump to leave a token force in the country but later revealed that "we were always playing shell games to not make clear to our leadership how many troops we had there."Trump world is looking to make sure that never happens again. Heritage wants a new administration to make sweeping personnel changes that would allow Trump to replace thousands of federal bureaucrats with more sympathetic cadres.This is both an opportunity and a challenge for restrainers. On the "challenge" side, Trump has increasingly signaled that he wants to use military force against Mexican cartels, a proposal that most realists reject as dangerous and counterproductive. And, as Jost of Brown University notes, presidents don't just select their advisers based on hawkishness. They have to make decisions about which advisers will appease which constituencies in their base, among other considerations. In Trump's case, loyalty to the president appears to be another key criterion.But loyalty to Trump doesn't get your nomination through Congress. For many top jobs, nominees will have to persuade the old-school hawks in the Senate that they won't change too much about the status quo. Restraint-oriented nominees will, however, get help from the growing group of young America Firsters on Capitol Hill, not to mention the changing of the guard symbolized by Sen. Mitch McConnell's (R-Ky.) decision to step down from leadership.It will be up to Trump to decide whether he picks less controversial candidates for these positions or simply relies on "acting" appointees, as he did at the end of his first term. The former president will have much more room to maneuver when it comes to the National Security Council, whose leaders don't require confirmation.These challenges aside, the decisions that Trump makes in a potential second term could have a massive, lasting impact on the direction of conservative foreign policy. To better understand how, a quick history lesson is in order.In 2007, Democratic foreign policy big wigs founded the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a hawkish center-left think tank first conceived as a government in waiting for Hillary Clinton. When Barack Obama beat Clinton in the primaries, he made the fateful decision to soften his stance on the Iraq War and staff up his team with CNAS acolytes.The CNAS crew — in addition to Clinton herself — earned powerful roles in Obama's administration that allowed them to steer the president away from his anti-war rhetoric on the campaign trail. The result was a vicious or virtuous cycle, depending on where you stand. The more hawkish CNAS staffers got coveted government experience (and connections) that put weight behind their arguments. Once they left government, they took their place as the sages of liberal foreign policy, with many returning in 2020 to staff the Biden administration.Obama's decision may have been practical. The progressive foreign policy landscape was, and in many ways still is, short on funding and candidates for high-level jobs. But Trump has the virtue of a genuine choice. The former president probably won't reject staffers based on their hawkishness — but perhaps he should. Research suggests it just might prevent the next war before it happens.

Not just on philosophical grounds, but more relevantly
on practical grounds Louisiana State University was correct in terminating a
graduate student's assistantship for levying
a direct threat of harm against a state lawmaker – and dramatically increasing
his employment chances down the road.

Last week, LSU sociology graduate student Marcus
Venable, who must have an excitable nature, lost it upon learning Republican
state Sen. "Big" Mike Fesi had voted to overturn Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards'
veto of HB 648,
which prohibits (from the start of next year) surgical or chemical sex
alterations of minors, legislation that correctly understands research shows a significant
proportion of children who do this express regrets and that a significant
proportion have underlying psychiatric issues that don't improve even after
these interventions or non-medical interventions. The outright ban equips
parents to safeguard their children better from attempts outside the family to play
to children's transitory thinking, which because their typically underdeveloped
emotional and intellectual capacity is suspect, if not goad them to embark upon
irreversible interventions.

The successful override so unhinged Venable that
he left, from his campus office phone, a profane message to Fesi full of emotion
and absent of any facts. While incredibly boorish, most of it, even a part
about celebrating Fesi's death, legally was harmless – until his last sentence,
where he declared the celebration would be resulting from "when we put you in
the ground."

For much of my life, I received threats of harm because
of what I wrote, beginning on my dorm room phone when I was 19. This led to a practice
of paying to keep my home phone numbers unlisted until now, although threats to
me to my office phones dropped off years ago I suspect because caller
identification became common and technology made any call traceable by law enforcement
(occasionally, I still get one by surface mail, predictably anonymously, to my
Louisiana State University Shreveport office, usually along the lines of, "we're
watching you," "we know where you work," etc.). Over 40 years ago, it was only
slightly unsettling, as I knew only cowards and bullies that would recoil and
hide at the first show of defiance issued such things.

That was then. Today, such messaging takes on much
more gravity, especially on the political left with its eliminationist
expression. It's not that the left since historically and ideologically has
shown over the year an increasing disregard for human life and suffering, as it
always has countenanced violations against individuals who it puts on an
enemies list in the name of its presumed greater cause. It's that with such rhetoric
happening despite the costs of detection going up as well as proliferating
instances of such threats being carried out and a general rise in sociopathic
violence in society, you simply can't be sure any more that these aren't empty.

None of this was in haste in Venable's case. He
took the time and effort to procure Fesi's number and then to make the call,
using university resources to do so. If LSU is anything like other universities
and like it was almost 40 years ago when I signed a system graduate assistant contract,
it contains language relating to a general morals clause that states if you act
criminally in a way that discredits the university, you can be fired (as well
as getting canned for not attesting to the loyalty oath). Additionally,
the system has policy
that considers his use of the phone as misuse of university property,
subjecting him to discipline.

Venable's booting amusingly has led to the usual campus
suspects who routinely
condemn speech, and non-threatening at that, which triggers them to defend
this example of genuine hate speech as not hateful enough to give him his walking papers. Mistakenly, so does the usually on-target Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression,
which has a long and illustrious history in defense of free speech (note: I have
worked with the group in the past). It
terms the message as hyperbole and therefore not unprotected speech, but
that is, as noted above, a serious misjudgment.

But don't mistake the valid grounds for termination
that LSU had as the reason for that occurring. In reality, no doubt Venable's
threat in the aggregate minds of campus decision-makers concerning his
employment was greeted as regrettable overenthusiasm and bad judgment in its
deployment, but basically sound in theory and motivation. It would not be surprising,
given how academia so often these days supplants wisdom with nuttiness, if a
few secretly wished they had done the same.

No, the reason why he was terminated was revelation
of his action made LSU look bad, with the school's allowing some kook with LSU imprimatur
to berate dangerously the majority of the state's population – and families who
send their progeny and donations to LSU – for their views they shared with Fesi
concerning the new law, as well as this carried the implication that the
typical instructor there was an entirely unhinged nutjob, which doesn't serve as
the best advertisement for enrollment. Venable may have engaged in unprotected
speech, but that would have been tolerated except for the ruin to LSU's
reputation he represented by his continued employment there.

Yet he may have the last laugh. Undoubtedly, this
incident has sent his stock through the ceiling in faculty lounges,
disconnected as they may be from the real world and reality, across the country
from admiration of his zeal. When he hits the market eventually, Internet
searches will turn up this and he'll zoom to the top of hiring lists, with the
caution during his interviews that he tone it down a bit when he can't be
guaranteed his communications would be confidential. They'll lionize him
between trying to punish
other instructors who for reasons of conscience use pronouns aligning with
students' actual sex (FIRE has successfully defended attacked faculty
members in such instances).

Authorities will decide whether to charge Venable
by the end of the week. Regardless, cheer for this assertion of equal
protection under the law (unlike, for example, in Washington, D.C. where the highest
official in the land rates preferential treatment for partisan and
ideological reasons) even as we must recognize the underlying incident reflects
a disease spreading in academia. 

Former President Donald Trump's foreign policy is as murky as ever.He gave a rare long-form interview to journalist Eric Cortellessa for TIME's stark May magazine cover, simply titled, "If He Wins." Alongside the profile, TIME also released the full transcripts of two interviews that Cortellessa had with the former president. Cortellessa grilled Trump on a number of foreign policy topics, including the ongoing wars in Gaza and Ukraine. As is often the case with Trump's views on international affairs, they raise more questions than answers, leaving uncertainty about what he would do if elected president in November.In general, Trump's foreign policy approach seems motivated by criticizing what he considers to be Joe Biden's failures while avoiding providing clear, discernible alternatives. On multiple occasions, Trump has claimed that neither Russia's invasion of Ukraine nor Hamas's incursion into Israel would have happened under his watch, claims he repeated during Tuesday's interview. Israel and the Middle East Trump's answers to what he would do about wars in the Middle East were largely noncommittal, with one notable exception. When asked in the first interview — which took place the day before Iran launched airstrikes at Israel — Trump said that he would "protect Israel" in the case of a war with Tehran. During a second conversation two weeks later, Trump seemed to endorse the idea that Iran's strikes on Israel in April were telegraphed with the intention of avoiding further escalation — and said that that was a "good thing" — but then affirmed his support for defending Israel. "So it would depend, obviously, but the answer is yes," Trump said. "If they attack Israel, yes, we would be there." Otherwise, Trump played up his loyalty to Israel during his presidential term, touting his withdrawal from the JCPOA, his moving of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and his recognition of the Golan Heights as part of Israel. But Trump also had harsh words for Benjamin Netanyahu. "I had a bad experience with Bibi. And it had to do with Soleimani, because as you probably know by now, he dropped out just before the attack," Trump said, referring to the January 2020 strike that killed Iranian military officer Qassem Soleimani, in which, Trump claims, the Israeli prime minister declined to participate at the last minute. "And I was not happy about that. That was something I never forgot. And it showed me something. I would say that what happened on—the October 7 should have never happened."He added that Netanyahu "rightfully has been criticized for what took place on October 7," without elaborating on exactly what he meant. Speaking about Israel's reaction to the Hamas attacks, Trump repeated an earlier criticism that Israel had mismanaged its PR approach to the war. "I don't think that the Israel Defense Fund or any other group should be sending out pictures every night of buildings falling down and being bombed with possibly people in those buildings every single night, which is what they do," Trump said, misnaming the Israel Defense Forces. While Trump has previously said that Israel should "get [the war] over with," he did not say what he would do to accomplish that goal. When pressed by Cortellesa over whether he would be willing to condition military aid to Israel to try to end the war, Trump deflected, instead listing the pro-Israeli policies implemented during his presidency. Trump also expressed skepticism over the possibility of a two-state solution, but did not suggest an alternative proposal. He did point to doubts from his former patron and late pro-Israel GOP mega-donor Sheldon Adelson as a reason for his pessimism."He loved Israel, and he wanted to protect Israel. And he felt that it was impossible to make a deal because of the level of hatred," Trump said. "I disagreed with it. But so far, he hasn't been wrong" The former president was similarly noncommittal about withdrawing troops from the region to focus on other theaters, only saying that the U.S. was "in a lot of places where we shouldn't be," and that "We have a lot of options" when it comes to military deployments. Ukraine, Russia, and NATO Trump has been painted by members of the media, his opponents, and even some supporters as a staunch opponent of aid to Ukraine. And while he earlier pledged to end the war in 24 hours, the former president has never articulated a clear strategy for doing so. He reportedly quietly blessed Speaker Mike Johnson's foreign aid package — which included roughly $60 billion in assistance for Kyiv — and since its passage has continued to praise the Speaker while generally staying quiet on the details of the legislation.In the TIME interview, Trump again provided very few details on his policy preferences. His primary gripe is that Europe has expected Washington to foot the bill while not providing sufficient aid itself."We're in for billions of dollars more than they're in in Ukraine. It shouldn't be that way. It should be the opposite way. Because they're much more greatly affected. We have an ocean in between us. They don't," he said.When pressed about whether he would support cutting off military aid for Kyiv, Trump said, "I wouldn't give unless Europe starts equalizing." He repeated similar talking points in response to a series of further questions trying to pin down his stance on Ukraine aid. Trump also said that he had not yet called for the release of detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich because he has "so many things I'm working on." He added that, if elected president, he would secure Gershkovich's release. "I get along very well with Putin, but the reporter should be released and he will be released," he said. "I don't know if he's going to be released under Biden." Other notable quotablesCortellessa also asked Trump about his stance on China/Taiwan, South Korea, and NATO. Asked whether the U.S. should defend Taiwan if China invades, Trump remained ambiguous. "I've been asked this question many times and I always refuse to answer it because I don't want to reveal my cards to a wonderful reporter like you," Trump said. "But no. China knows my answer very well. But they have to understand that things like that can't come easy. But I will say that I have never publicly stated although I want to, because I wouldn't want to give away any negotiating abilities by giving information like that to any reporter."On South Korea, Trump seemed to threaten a withdrawal of U.S. forces if Seoul did not "treat us properly.""They've become a very wealthy country. We've essentially paid for much of their military, free of charge. And they agreed to pay billions of dollars," he said. "And now probably now that I'm gone, they're paying very little. I don't know if you know that they renegotiated the deal I made. And they're paying very little."The 45th president made a similar case for the NATO alliance, which he said he was not interested in re-negotiating. "I don't need to renegotiate the terms of the treaty. All I need to do is have them pay their bills. They don't pay their bills," Trump said, seemingly referring to a certain percentage of GDP NATO countries pledge to spend on defense. There are no NATO "bills." He added that his primary problem with the alliance was that he doubted that NATO countries would come to America's defense if attacked despite the fact that many NATO countries fought alongside the United States in Afghanistan. Trump gave a meandering interview which covered a lot of ground but ultimately didn't reveal much about what another term would look like, instead sticking to his common talking points — perhaps deliberately offering little detail to keep his options open if he returns to the Oval Office next year.