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The article examines the main elements of the labor market infrastructure, directions of development, the classification of the activities of state and non-state structures to promote employment, as well as their relationship and interdependence.

The aim is to consider the development of different elements of European insurance market infrastructure. The next tasks of the study were done: to generalize main indicators of the development of European insurance market from 2012 to 2016; to characterize elements of European insurance market infrastructure and define their collaboration with elements of the world insurance market infrastructure. Methodology. Such methods were used to do an abovementioned tasks: information collection about elements of European insurance market infrastructure; analysis of tendencies of the main indicators of the development of European insurance market from 2012 to 2016; generalization to characterize the elements of European insurance market infrastructure, define their collaboration with the elements of the world insurance market infrastructure and make conclusions. Results. Main indicators of the de-velopment of European insurance market were increasing from 2012 to 2014 and decreasing from 2015 to 2016. Total premium volume as a share in GDP of Europe (insurance penetration) did not exceed 7% from 2012 to 2016 and as a share in the world GDP declined from 2.1% in 2014 to 1.95% in 2016. It was connected with results of the United Kingdom referendum on the European Union membership. The development of European insurance market is also under the influence of activity of elements of insurance market infrastructure such as Actuarial Association of Europe (AAE), Association of Mutual Insurers and Insurance Cooperatives in Europe (AMICE), European Financial Management Association (EFMA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), European Federation of Insurance Intermediaries (BIPAR), European insurance and reinsurance federation (Insurance Europe), Geneva Association, Insurance Institute of London (IIL). Value. This research indicates that the development of European insurance market infrastructure is caused by different factors: financial crises, legislation gap, improving the quality of information and others. Various of elements of European insurance market infrastructure were established to overcome such challenges and provide participants of insurance market with a necessary information, consultations, educational services and re-sults of research, also through collaboration with elements of the world insurance market infrastructure. Results of this investigation can become a ground for fur-ther research in the field of defining an impact of activity of infrastructure elements on the development of an insurance market.

"This book is a pivotal reference source for the latest scholarly research on the current developments in financial systems and how these processes are evolving due to new regulations and technical advances"--

In business literature, both academic and popular, a lot of attention is paid to the process of starting a company as well as to company management patterns. Similarly, numerous activities of the Polish government together with a number of European programmes focus on providing support for widely understood entrepreneurship. Commercial initiatives (regardless of the type of entity starting such activity) turn into a driving force of the economy, promoting innovations, employment and general prosperity.

Analytical framework in assessing systemic financial market infrastructure / by Nephil Matangi Maskay -- Analytical framework in assessing systemic financial market infrastructure of India / by Edwin Prabu A. -- Analytical framework in assessing systemic financial market infrastructures in Indonesia / by Irwanto -- Financial market infrastructure interdependencies in Korea / by Jongsang Lee and Seungjin Baek -- An analytical framework in assessing systemic financial market infrastructure, Nepal / by Hari Gopal Adhikari -- Analytical framework in assessing systemic financial market infrastructure of Papua New Guinea / by Wilson E. Jonathan -- The Philippine payment system / by Cristeta Bagsic

Bitcoin is the oldest and most widely established cryptocurrency network with the highest market capitalization among all cryptocurrencies. Although bitcoin (with lowercase b) is increasingly viewed as a digital asset belonging to a new asset class, the Bitcoin network (with uppercase B) is a decentralized financial market infrastructure (dFMI) that clears and settles transactions in its native asset without relying on the conventional financial market infrastructures (FMIs). To be a reliable asset class as well as a dFMI, however, Bitcoin needs to have robust governance arrangements; whether such arrangements are built into the protocol (i.e., on-chain governance mechanisms) or relegated to the participants in the Bitcoin network (i.e., off-chain governance mechanisms), or are composed of a combination of both mechanisms (i.e., a hybrid form of governance). This paper studies Bitcoin governance with a focus on its alleged shortcomings. In so doing, after defining Bitcoin governance and its objectives, the paper puts forward an idiosyncratic governance model whose main objective is to preserve and maximize the main value proposition of Bitcoin, i.e., its censorship-resistant property, which allows participants to transact in an environment with minimum social trust. Therefore, Bitcoin governance, including the processes through which Bitcoin governance crises have been resolved and the standards against which the Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) are examined, should be analyzed in light of the prevailing narrative of Bitcoin as a censorship-resistant store of value and payment infrastructure. Within such a special governance model, this paper seeks to identify the potential shortcomings in Bitcoin governance by reference to the major governance crises that posed serious threats to Bitcoin in the last decade. It concludes that the existing governance arrangements in the Bitcoin network have been largely successful in dealing with Bitcoin's major crises that would have otherwise become existential threats to the Bitcoin network.

Bitcoin is the oldest and most widely established cryptocurrency network with the highest market capitalization among all cryptocurrencies. Although bitcoin (with lowercase b) is increasingly viewed as a digital asset belonging to a new asset class, the Bitcoin network (with uppercase B) is a decentralized financial market infrastructure (dFMI) that clears and settles transactions in its native asset without relying on the conventional financial market infrastructures (FMIs). To be a reliable asset class as well as a dFMI, however, Bitcoin needs to have robust governance arrangements; whether such arrangements are built into the protocol (i.e., on-chain governance mechanisms) or relegated to the participants in the Bitcoin network (i.e., off-chain governance mechanisms), or are composed of a combination of both mechanisms (i.e., a hybrid form of governance). This paper studies Bitcoin governance with a focus on its alleged shortcomings. In so doing, after defining Bitcoin governance and its objectives, the paper puts forward an idiosyncratic governance model whose main objective is to preserve and maximize the main value proposition of Bitcoin, i.e., its censorship-resistant property, which allows participants to transact in an environment with minimum social trust. Therefore, Bitcoin governance, including the processes through which Bitcoin governance crises have been resolved and the standards against which the Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) are examined, should be analyzed in light of the prevailing narrative of Bitcoin as a censorship-resistant store of value and payment infrastructure. Within such a special governance model, this paper seeks to identify the potential shortcomings in Bitcoin governance by reference to the major governance crises that posed serious threats to Bitcoin in the last decade. It concludes that the existing governance arrangements in the Bitcoin network have been largely successful in dealing with Bitcoin's major crises that would have otherwise become existential threats to ...