Suchergebnisse

Dieses Lehrbuch gibt einen umfassenden Überblick über Methoden der deskriptiven Statistik, die durch einige Verfahren der explorativen Datenanalyse ergänzt wurden. Die zahlreichen statistischen Möglichkeiten zur Quantifizierung empirischer Phänomene werden problemorientiert dargestellt, wobei ihre Entwicklung schrittweise erfolgt, so daß Notwendigkeit und Nutzen der Vorgehensweise deutlich hervortreten. Dadurch soll ein fundiertes Verständnis für statistische Methoden geweckt werden. Dieses wird durch repräsentative Beispiele unterstützt. Übungsaufgaben mit Lösungen ergänzen den Text

The subject of this book is the incorporation and integration of mathematical and statistical techniques and information science topics into the field of classification, data analysis, and knowledge organization. Readers will find survey papers as well as research papers and reports on newest results. The papers are a combination of theoretical issues and applications in special fields: Spatial Data Analysis, Economics, Medicine, Biology, and Linguistics

Sequential Stochastic Optimization provides mathematicians and applied researchers with a well-developed framework in which stochastic optimization problems can be formulated and solved. Offering much material that is either new or has never before appeared in book form, it lucidly presents a unified theory of optimal stopping and optimal sequential control of stochastic processes. This book has been carefully organized so that little prior knowledge of the subject is assumed; its only prerequisites are a standard graduate course in probability theory and some familiarity with discrete-paramet.

The article sketches the evolution of mathematical social sciences in Great Britain, focussing on Political Economy and Social Statistics. The formal methods which were later to become of greatest importance in these sciences (differential calculus and probability theory) were mainly imported from continental mathematics at the beginning of the 19th century. The emergence of Political Economy and the transformation of classical Political Arithmetic into Statistics roughly coincided with this "catching-up" process. Moreover, the "Cambridge Network of Scientists" (Cannon), with its protagonists Whewell, Herschel, Babbage and Peacock, played a central role in the adoption of French mathematics as well as in the early attempts to place the social sciences on a methodologically sound basis. Not surprisingly, the Cambridge Scientists (gathered mainly in the Cambridge Philosophical Society and the Cambridge Astronomical Society) were among the first to use mathematical methods in dealing with "the complicated conduct of our social and moral relations" (Herschel). However, the mathematicization of the social sciences cannot be seen as a smooth, continuous process of successively applying formal techniques to social phenomena. The application of the general equilibrium framework of analytical mechanics to the study of man's desires and actions, and the use of probability theory in explaining (not just describing) the synthesis and development of social aggregates, required an essential precondition: a new kind of analysis of "man", such as had emerged in geology and physiology since the late 1830s. Using the principles of natural selection and reflex action, it became possible to view human societies simultaneously as random samples and systems of forces, to which mathematical techniques now became reasonably applicable. The rise of Economics and Eugenics (founded by Jevons and Galton, respectively) towards the end of the 19th century can thus be perceived as a late consequence of this "anthropological turn". Therefore, the evolution of mathematical social sciences is not a symptom of a "mechanistic" view of man (usually associated with Cartesian epistomology), but simply another result of the very dissolving of classical "mathesis" (Foucault), which entailed the appearance of "man" as a privileged object of knowledge. ; The article sketches the evolution of mathematical social sciences in Great Britain, focussing on Political Economy and Social Statistics. The formal methods which were later to become of greatest importance in these sciences (differential calculus and probability theory) were mainly imported from continental mathematics at the beginning of the 19th century. The emergence of Political Economy and the transformation of classical Political Arithmetic into Statistics roughly coincided with this "catching-up" process. Moreover, the "Cambridge Network of Scientists" (Cannon), with its protagonists Whewell, Herschel, Babbage and Peacock, played a central role in the adoption of French mathematics as well as in the early attempts to place the social sciences on a methodologically sound basis. Not surprisingly, the Cambridge Scientists (gathered mainly in the Cambridge Philosophical Society and the Cambridge Astronomical Society) were among the first to use mathematical methods in dealing with "the complicated conduct of our social and moral relations" (Herschel). However, the mathematicization of the social sciences cannot be seen as a smooth, continuous process of successively applying formal techniques to social phenomena. The application of the general equilibrium framework of analytical mechanics to the study of man's desires and actions, and the use of probability theory in explaining (not just describing) the synthesis and development of social aggregates, required an essential precondition: a new kind of analysis of "man", such as had emerged in geology and physiology since the late 1830s. Using the principles of natural selection and reflex action, it became possible to view human societies simultaneously as random samples and systems of forces, to which mathematical techniques now became reasonably applicable. The rise of Economics and Eugenics (founded by Jevons and Galton, respectively) towards the end of the 19th century can thus be perceived as a late consequence of this "anthropological turn". Therefore, the evolution of mathematical social sciences is not a symptom of a "mechanistic" view of man (usually associated with Cartesian epistomology), but simply another result of the very dissolving of classical "mathesis" (Foucault), which entailed the appearance of "man" as a privileged object of knowledge.

Explains that the focus of decision theory is on
the mathematical models. These may be probability based; loss functions or other forms of
statistical representations of judgements. Yet, much of decision theory does not lie entirely
within any one discipline: it draws on psychology, economics, mathematics, statistics, social
sciences and many other areas of study. Investigates investors' perceptions and attitudes
towards real estate. Highlights the important difference between theoretical exposure levels and
pragmatic business considerations. Suggests a prescriptive model to explore judgements, beliefs and
preferences of decision makers and to inform decision making. Examines the concept of risk and its
place in developing a prescriptive model. Maintains that a decision must be judged on factors other
than the risk of a single outcome.

Mendelssohn's Philosophical Writings, published in 1761, bring the metaphysical tradition to bear on the topic of 'sentiments' (defined as knowledge or awareness by way of the senses). Mendelssohn offers a nuanced defence of Leibniz's theodicy and conception of freedom, an examination of the ethics of suicide, an account of the 'mixed sentiments' so central to the tragic genre, a hypothesis about weakness of will, an elaboration of the main principles and types of art, a definition of sublimity and analysis of its basic forms, and, lastly, a brief tract on probability theory, aimed at rebutting Hume's scepticism. This volume also includes the essay 'On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences', selected in 1763 by the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences over all other submitted essays, including one by Kant, as the best answer to the question of whether metaphysical sciences are capable of the same sort and degree of evidence as mathematics

In the same way than Voltaire as far as justice and litterature are concerned, and than Turgot in matter of economics and politics, d'Alembert has been traditionally considered as the mentor of condorcet in sciences and mathematics. For all that, is the influence of the joint publisher of the encyclopedie upon Condorcet's ideas in economics to be judged as a marginal one ? Precisely not : departing from a mixed conception of mathematics which he shares with d'alembert, and from a questioning upon probabilistic doubts of the latter, Condorcet has been induced to develop a choice theory under uncertainty which overtakes the classical field of chance games or of insurances, to extend to the domain of economical enterprise as such, whatsoever consisting in culture, commerce or industry. In doing this, he submits the factor of risk to an unprecedented probabilistic formalisation as he envisages the profit collected by the undertaker. Moreover, the rehabilitation by condorcet of the praxeology's significance of probability theory, which had been ruined by d'alembert, enlightens the peculiarity of some of his reflections in matter of public education, those being closely linked to his thought in economics. According to condorcet, only the teaching of doctrine of chances can actually enable individuals to give a rational turn to their economic behaviour. ; Au même titre que Voltaire pour ce qui concerne la justice et les lettres et que Turgot en matière d'économie et de politique, D'Alembert est traditionnellement considéré comme le mentor de Condorcet dans les sciences et les mathématiques. Pour autant, l'influence du coéditeur de l'encyclopédie sur les idées économiques de Condorcet doit-elle être jugée marginale ? Justement pas : en partant d'une conception " mixte " des mathématiques qu'il partage avec D'Alembert et d'une interrogation sur les doutes probabilistes de ce dernier, Condorcet est amené à développer une théorie du choix en univers incertain qui dépasse le domaine classique des jeux de hasard ou des ...

In the same way than Voltaire as far as justice and litterature are concerned, and than Turgot in matter of economics and politics, d'Alembert has been traditionally considered as the mentor of condorcet in sciences and mathematics. For all that, is the influence of the joint publisher of the encyclopedie upon Condorcet's ideas in economics to be judged as a marginal one ? Precisely not : departing from a mixed conception of mathematics which he shares with d'alembert, and from a questioning upon probabilistic doubts of the latter, Condorcet has been induced to develop a choice theory under uncertainty which overtakes the classical field of chance games or of insurances, to extend to the domain of economical enterprise as such, whatsoever consisting in culture, commerce or industry. In doing this, he submits the factor of risk to an unprecedented probabilistic formalisation as he envisages the profit collected by the undertaker. Moreover, the rehabilitation by condorcet of the praxeology's significance of probability theory, which had been ruined by d'alembert, enlightens the peculiarity of some of his reflections in matter of public education, those being closely linked to his thought in economics. According to condorcet, only the teaching of doctrine of chances can actually enable individuals to give a rational turn to their economic behaviour. ; Au même titre que Voltaire pour ce qui concerne la justice et les lettres et que Turgot en matière d'économie et de politique, D'Alembert est traditionnellement considéré comme le mentor de Condorcet dans les sciences et les mathématiques. Pour autant, l'influence du coéditeur de l'encyclopédie sur les idées économiques de Condorcet doit-elle être jugée marginale ? Justement pas : en partant d'une conception " mixte " des mathématiques qu'il partage avec D'Alembert et d'une interrogation sur les doutes probabilistes de ce dernier, Condorcet est amené à développer une théorie du choix en univers incertain qui dépasse le domaine classique des jeux de hasard ou des ...

In the same way than Voltaire as far as justice and litterature are concerned, and than Turgot in matter of economics and politics, d'Alembert has been traditionally considered as the mentor of condorcet in sciences and mathematics. For all that, is the influence of the joint publisher of the encyclopedie upon Condorcet's ideas in economics to be judged as a marginal one ? Precisely not : departing from a mixed conception of mathematics which he shares with d'alembert, and from a questioning upon probabilistic doubts of the latter, Condorcet has been induced to develop a choice theory under uncertainty which overtakes the classical field of chance games or of insurances, to extend to the domain of economical enterprise as such, whatsoever consisting in culture, commerce or industry. In doing this, he submits the factor of risk to an unprecedented probabilistic formalisation as he envisages the profit collected by the undertaker. Moreover, the rehabilitation by condorcet of the praxeology's significance of probability theory, which had been ruined by d'alembert, enlightens the peculiarity of some of his reflections in matter of public education, those being closely linked to his thought in economics. According to condorcet, only the teaching of doctrine of chances can actually enable individuals to give a rational turn to their economic behaviour. ; Au même titre que Voltaire pour ce qui concerne la justice et les lettres et que Turgot en matière d'économie et de politique, D'Alembert est traditionnellement considéré comme le mentor de Condorcet dans les sciences et les mathématiques. Pour autant, l'influence du coéditeur de l'encyclopédie sur les idées économiques de Condorcet doit-elle être jugée marginale ? Justement pas : en partant d'une conception " mixte " des mathématiques qu'il partage avec D'Alembert et d'une interrogation sur les doutes probabilistes de ce dernier, Condorcet est amené à développer une théorie du choix en univers incertain qui dépasse le domaine classique des jeux de hasard ou des assurances pour s'étendre à celui de l'entreprise économique en tant que telle, qu'elle soit de culture, de commerce ou d'industrie. Ce faisant, il soumet le facteur risque à une formalisation probabiliste sans précèdent lorsqu'il envisage le profit perçu par l'entrepreneur. Par ailleurs, la réhabilitation par Condorcet de la portée praxéologique du calcul des probabilités, ruinée par d'Alembert, éclaire la singularité de certaines de ses réflexions en matière d'instruction publique, celles-ci étant étroitement liées à sa pensée économique. D'après Condorcet, seul l'enseignement de la doctrine des chances peut effectivement permettre à l'individu de donner à sa conduite économique une tournure rationnelle.

The paper is an inquiry into the definition of the early econometric program and the conditions for the introduction of the probability approach in economics, namely the discussions Frisch and Schumpeter held from the late twenties through the early thirties about the adequate model to represent innovations, change and equilibrium in economics. The argument and the framework are briefly presented in the first section. The 1931 intense correspondence on the matter is discussed in the second section. It provides a magnificent example of the importance of rhetorics in economics, of the role of constitutive metaphors in a research program and of the difficulties to define the adequate mathematical formalism to deal with cycles and structural change. The third section presents the conclusion of the story, the bifurcation between the resulting contributions by Frisch (1933) and by Schumpeter (1939, and the posthumous volume of 1954 ). The paper is based upon still unpublished papers that were found at Frisch's Collections (Oslo University Library and Frisch's Rommet at the Institute of Economics) and Schumpeter's Collection (Harvard University). Joseph Schumpeter' s main contribution to economics was a passionate defence of the historical approach to cycles and to the dynamics of capitalism. Although a stubborn supporter of the use of mathematics, a founder of the Econometric Society in 1930 and the writer of a crucial paper in the first issue of Econometrica presenting its antecedents and program, Schumpeter distinguished himself as an intensely dedicated researcher in the field of concrete historical processes. He became eventually the most quoted economist in the first decades of the century, until the glamorous triumph of Keynes' General Theory. Schumpeter's main publications are historical in the sense of applied historical and conceptual work (Business Cycles, 1939), of a polemic interpretation of the historical trends (Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942) and of a historical account of the science itself (History of Economic Analysis, posthumously published in 1954 ). His single most important contribution, and indeed the reason for contemporary attention in relation to his work and inspiration, was the analysis of innovation, of creative destruction and of disequilibrium processes in moderncapitalism. This paper presents an important and ignored discussion which contributed to the definition of Schumpeter' s concept of innovation, challenging his own definition from the view point of the requirements for an econometric approach to cycles and to economic structural change, as presented by his close friend Ragnar Frisch. It also highlights the crucial importance of metaphors - the rocking horse, the pendulum, the violin, and the Magallenic Oceans - both for persuasion and for concrete representation and abductive creation of new hypotheses in economics. . ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion