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ABSTRACTDuring the 1920s and 1930s many working-class families needed emergency credit. Their use of pawnbrokers is well documented but the presence of a network of moneylenders, most of whom were women operating from their own homes, is not. This article examines the background to and the impact of the Moneylenders Act (1927) which was designed to reduce the number of working-class lenders, widely perceived as disreputable, in order to protect vulnerable borrowers, most of whom were women. Using Liverpool as a case-study, I also examine the possible reasons for the dramatic decline in the number of licensed moneylenders and analyse the implications of this for the provision of working-class credit.

This book tells the story of Burma's financial system – of its banks, moneylenders and 'microfinanciers' – from colonial times to the present day. It argues that Burma's financial system matters, and that the careful study of this system can tell us something about Burma – not least about how the richest country in Southeast Asia at the dawn of the twentieth century, became the poorest at the dawn of the twenty-first. While financial systems and institutions matter in all countries, the book argues that they especially count in Burma. Events in the financial and monetary sphere have been unusually, spectacularly, prominent in Burma's turbulent modern history. From the Chettiars and the alienation of the land, to the backlash against the foreign moneylender. From the great state banks of the democracy years, to the Orwellian 'people's banks' of the Burma way to socialism. From Burma's bizarre demonetization experiences, to the rise and crash of the entrepreneurial bankers. And from the money launderers to the practitioners of microfinance. The story of Burma's financial system and its players is one that has shaped the country. It is a dramatic story, and it is an important story.

After revisiting Sind in 1876, Sir Richard Burton wrote, 'The Hindu's reed-pen is a rod of iron and abjectly the unhappy Sindi trembles before it.' By 'Hindu,' Burton meant the Hindu bania, the trader and moneylender, and by 'Sindi' he meant the Sindhi Muslim zamindar (landholder), the perennial debtor. The creditor tyrannized over the debtor, imposing ever harsher and more inequitable terms on him. What is interesting is that Burton scarcely appeared to recognize the Hindu banias as Sindhis at all; he wrote as if they were interlopers on the Sindhi scene. It was a colourful summary of the average British official's attitude towards debt. Twenty years later, Evan James, the Commissioner in Sind, quoted Burton's remark to lend support to his own argument that debt was an intolerable burden on Sindhi Muslims in general and the great zamindars in particular.

AbstractAccording to the British Government in Mandate Palestine, the tendency of the fallahin (Arab peasants) to "strategic default" and the monopolistic power of local moneylenders led to high interest lending in rural areas. The government sought to remedy this by assisting banks in collecting bad debts, by guaranteeing some bank loans and by imposing the maximum legal interest rate. However, the colonial perception was incorrect. Defaults were usually "involuntary" as a result of natural and occasionally man-made hazards (thus creating a high interest rate environment), and the moneylending market was "contestable." In such an environment, despite government assistance, moneylenders had a comparative advantage over banks. They were usually merchants who could easily utilise collateral on loans (crops and lands); they ignored the law of maximum interest rate and they had good information about borrowers. For these reasons moneylenders remained the main source of credit for the fallahin. D'après le gouvernment britannique dans la Palestine sous mandat, la propension des fallahin (les paysans arabes) à se trouver en « défaut de paiement stratégique » et le monopole des prêteurs locaux expliquent les prêts à intérêts élevés dans les régions rurales. Le gouvernent essaya de pallier cette situation en aidant les banques à reprendre les créances irrécouvrables, en garantissant quelques prêts bancaires et en imposant un taux d'intérêt maximum légal. Cette interprétation coloniale était cependant erronée. Les défauts de paiement étaient en général « involontaires » , le résultat d'aléas d'ordre naturel ou parfois humain (créant un taux d'intérêt élevé) et le marché du prêt était « contestable ». Dans ces circonstances, et malgré l'aide gouvernementale, les prêteurs avaient un avantage par rapport aux banques. Il s'agissait en général de marchands qui pouvaient facilement faire usage des nantissements garantissant les prêts (récoltes ou terrains); ils ne tenaient pas compte de la loi de taux d'intérêt maximum et ils étaient bien informés sur les emprunteurs. Tous ces faits expliquent pourquoi les prêteurs demeuraient, pour les fallahin, la principale source de crédit.