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International law in general — Sources — Customary international law — State practice — Conditions for creation of rule of customary international law.Treaties — Conclusion and operation of — Effect on third parties Interpretation of bilateral agreement — Treaties on similar subject between parties and third States — Whether evidence of intention of parties.Treaties — Interpretation of — Agencies of interpretation — Parties Subsequent practice — Probative value.Treaties — Interpretation of — Bilingual treaties (English-Italian) — Meaning of words in both languages — "And" and "or" — "E" and "o" — Whether cumulative or alternative sense.Treaties — Interpretation of — Consideration of preparatory work — Agreement modelled on earlier agreement between one of parties and third State — Whether earlier agreement constitutes preparatory work for later — Whether relevant to interpretation of intention of parties and objective of later agreement.Treaties — Special Kinds of — Air transport agreements — Agreement between Italy and United States, 1948 — Interpretation of — Whether all-cargo flights covered.Disputes — Arbitration — In general — The law applied by arbitral tribunals — Treaties — Principles and rules of interpretation.Treaties — Conclusion and operation of — Operation and enforcement of — Warsaw Convention, 1929 — Hague Protocol, 1955 — Article 11 of Protocol amending Article 22 of Warsaw Convention and raising limit of liability of air carriers — Whether applicable to accident in course of carriage between France and Senegal prior to entry into force — Whether Senegal party to Hague Protocol — Whether ratification by France prior to Independence of Senegal extended application to Senegal in absence of contrary declaration or denunciation — Article 25 — Whether Protocol applicable to all contracts in force at date of entry into force — The law of France.

Feminists are divided on whether consent should be employed in legal definitions of rape. Catharine MacKinnon has criticized the usefulness of consent in enabling legal systems to recognize and prosecute instances of rape (MacKinnon 1989, 2005, 2016). In a recent article in this journal, Lisa H. Schwartzman defends the use of affirmative consent in rape law against MacKinnon's critique (Schwartzman 2019). In contrast to MacKinnon, Schwartzman claims our understanding of rape must include both force and consent components. In this paper, I will argue in agreement with Schwartzman and against MacKinnon that the legal definition of rape should include an affirmative consent component. I will take Schwartzman's discussion as my point of departure and consider whether she has responded adequately to MacKinnon's criticisms of consent. I will argue that her responses are not fully adequate. In particular, she has not successfully rebutted the argument that an appeal to consent is unnecessary once we have accepted an expanded definition of coercion. I will then provide a more affirmative defense of affirmative consent in response to MacKinnon's most challenging criticism.

Jurisdiction — Over Nationals Abroad — Merchant Vessel in Foreign Territorial Waters — Whether Exterritorial — Acts Internal to Vessel — What is lex loci delicti — Relevance of Law of Port of Registry — Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.

This article responds to the recent special issue of Scottish Affairs on 'Gàidhealtachd Futures' and in particular the article by Iain MacKinnon proposing that ancestry, ethnicity and indigeneity should become the principal elements in contemporary Gaelic identity. The editors of the special issue do not give an analytically meaningful presentation of the term Gàidhealtachd and MacKinnon fails to give a complete or balanced account of previous research on the question of Gaelic identity. There is considerable uncertainty about how the term Gael is understood today; many Gaelic speakers are reluctant to accept this label for themselves. MacKinnon's arguments concerning the role of ancestry in defining Gaelic identity are highly problematic in both analytical and political terms. His proposals concerning ethnicity and indigeneity are unsustainable, particularly in light of relevant legal standards, and amount to a strategic, ethical and legal dead end for the Gaelic revitalisation movement.

Although others have focused on Catharine MacKinnon's claim that pornography subordinates and silences women, I here focus on her claim that pornography constructs women's nature and that this construction is, in some sense, false. Since it is unclear how pornography, as speech, can construct facts and how constructed facts can nevertheless be false, MacKinnon's claim requires elucidation. Appealing to speech act theory, I introduce an analysis of the erroneous verdictive and use it to make sense of MacKinnon's constructionist claims. I also show that the erroneous verdictive is of more general interest.